

---

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google<sup>TM</sup> books

<http://books.google.com>




3 3433 06820257 5










ZIE

Americ



2E

Americ








THE  
AMERICAN JOURNAL  
OF  
THEOLOGY

EDITED BY  
THE DIVINITY FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

VOLUME XIV  
1910

CHICAGO  
**The University of Chicago Press**  
1910





Published  
January, April, July, October, 1910

Composed and Printed By  
The University of Chicago Press  
Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## JANUARY

THE RELIGIOUS FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WORSHIP. William H. P. Faunce . . . . .	1-15
THE ULTIMATE TEST OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH; IS IT HISTORICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL? James Hayden Tufts, Eugene W. Lyman, and E. Hershey Sneath . . . . .	16-46
THE FIRST GREAT CHRISTIAN CREED. John Alfred Faulkner . . . . .	47-61
CHRISTOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES IN THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER. John Cowper Granbery . . . . .	62-81
SOME WHOLESOME HUMILIATIONS OF THE MODERN CHURCH. Charles H. Dickinson . . . . .	82-106
THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION: A PRACTICAL PROGRAMME. Gregory D. Walcott . . . . .	107-113
CRITICAL NOTE: <i>The Earliest Social Prophet</i> . James Henry Breasted . . . . .	114-116
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	117-153
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	154-165
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	166-168

## APRIL

THE STATUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN INDIA. Ernest D. Burton . . . . .	169-191
THE TASK AND METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Benjamin B. Warfield, William Adams Brown, and Gerald B. Smith . . . . .	192-233
THE RELIGION OF JESUS. Shirley J. Case . . . . .	234-252
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF GOD IN ITS RELATION TO FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY. A. Oosterheerdt . . . . .	253-265
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>The Significance of the Nicene Creed: A Reply to Professor Faulkner</i> . Professor Francis A. Christie . . . . .	266
<i>Religion and Miracle</i> . George Holley Gilbert . . . . .	271
<i>Notes on Luther's Letters</i> . Preserved Smith . . . . .	280
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	286-323
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	324-333
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	334-336

## JULY

THE ORIGIN OF THE MESSIANIC HOPE IN ISRAEL. Henry Preserved Smith	337-360
THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN THE TEACHING OF PAUL. Douglas C. McIntosh . . . . .	361-381
THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT. Rev. John J. Martin . . . . .	382-405
THE POSSIBLE IDEALISM OF A PLURALIST. Alfred H. Lloyd . . . . .	406-421
ESTIMATES AND COMMENTS . . . . .	422-440
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	441-490
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	491-501
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	502-504

## OCTOBER

THE PLAY IMPULSE AND ATTITUDE IN RELIGION. Carl E. Seashore . . . . .	505-520
THE GREEK ELEMENT IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. George Holley Gilbert . . . . .	521-532
THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PSYCHO-THERAPEUTIC MOVEMENT. Irving King . . . . .	533-551
WAS NEWMAN A MODERNIST? William Henry Allison . . . . .	552-571
A MISTAKE IN STRATEGY. James Bissett Pratt . . . . .	572-588
FOUR PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. Clyde Weber Votaw . . . . .	589-607
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>Manuscripts of the Vulgate in the British Museum.</i> G. Mallows Youngman . . . . .	608-626
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	627-661
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	662-664



---

The editors of the *American Journal of Theology* record with deep regret the death on January 2, 1910, of William Arnold Stevens, D.D., LL.D., Trevor professor of New Testament interpretation in the Rochester Theological Seminary, Rochester, N. Y. Professor Stevens was born in Granville, Ohio, February 5, 1839. He graduated from Denison University, at Granville, in 1862, and pursued further studies in Harvard University, the Newton Theological Institution, Rochester Theological Seminary, the University of Leipzig, and the University of Berlin. He was successively tutor and professor of the Greek language at Granville, whence he was called in 1877 to the professorship at Rochester which he occupied till his death. While professor of Greek at Granville he published an edition of the *Orations of Lysias* and, within the time of his Rochester professorship, a *Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians*, and, in association with a former pupil, *A Harmony of the Gospels for Historical Study*. In 1883 he spent some months in travel and study in Palestine. By his fairness of mind, his exact scholarship, his breadth of sympathy with all good things, his skill and patience as a teacher, and his eminent Christian character he endeared himself to the successive generations of his students, and to those who had the privilege of association with him as colleague and friend. Professor Stevens had been associated with this *Journal* as co-operating editor since 1908.

---

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XIV

JANUARY, 1910

Number 1

## THE RELIGIOUS FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

---

PRESIDENT WILLIAM H. P. FAUNCE, D.D. LL.D.  
Brown University, Providence, R. I.

---

A wave of social consciousness is now sweeping over our land, and at the same time there is obviously a wave of recession from public worship. The tide of corporate endeavor is at the full, but the tide of corporate devotion mysteriously ebbs. Just when men are getting together as never before in congresses, conventions, federations, to consider every phase of educational and altruistic endeavor, just when women are meeting constantly in clubs and associations for study, for philanthropy, for civic betterment, precisely this is the time when both men and women show an increasing disinclination to assemble for the purpose of public worship. This disinclination exists not alone among the irreligious or immoral, it exists most obviously among the devout and the thoughtful—it exists among the readers of this *Journal*. Whatever the causes of this paradoxical situation, it is obvious that our ordinary public worship fails to meet the vital needs of the people. While the function of worship in the Middle Ages filled the people with an ecstasy of adoration, worship frequently seems to the modern man either a superfluity—"the touching of one's cap to the commanding general before the soldier goes into battle"—or a positive hindrance, the substitution of empty surviving forms in place of noble ethical passion and effective humanitarian endeavor. "The feeling," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "with which some go away from an average place of worship is too often a feeling of irritation and regret for wasted time." There is clearly

need of study of the psychology of worship. What is the object of worship, and what is necessary in order to attain that object?

The word "worship"—if we may drop for a moment into the often deceptive region of etymology—has passed through various meanings. Primarily of course it signified a state of worth. Next it came to mean an appreciation of worth, a sense of value, the state of emotion arising in one who beholds a worthwhile person. Then it came to mean the outward expression of such appreciation in words of esteem or honor. Then the word came to be set apart for religious uses, and to signify our appreciation of the worth or worthiness of God, our emotional out-go toward him in praise and prayer. Finally, as the hardening and specializing process has continued, the word has grown into a more technical meaning. Today it is applied to certain public acts performed by a religious assembly in consecrated buildings, acts having the order and sequence and symbolism of ritual, and designed to express our collective appreciation of the worthfulness of God.

A single passage in the Authorized Version shows us the word "worship" in this process of transition. The guest invited to a feast has sat down in the lowest place. Soon he is bidden to take a higher place: "then shall thou have worship in the presence of them that sit at meat with thee" (Luke 14:10). Evidently this means that the guest should win appreciation and esteem, and also should receive the outer marks of such esteem (R. V.: "glory") in words of commendation or gestures of approval on the part of the assembled company. We, then, publicly worship God when we vividly feel his greatness and goodness, and join with others in some collective expression of his majesty and moral value. The paradoxical situation of the church today is that never before was there so deep a sense of moral values as now, never so great desire for collective action, and yet never before so little inclination to join in expressing collective values in the ordered acts of public worship.

The psychology of the crowd has been widely studied in recent years, and Le Bon's classical work has been the basis of much investigation. The general laws observed in the behavior of crowds are the same whether the object of the crowd is political or social or religious. The physical contiguity of men is merely the first step in

the formation of a "crowd" or a "congregation." We bring bodies together in a building only that we may then fuse minds and hearts in a spiritual unity. We ring bells or publish notices or take other means of calling an assembly, merely in order that after physical proximity is secured, we may more easily gather up the many desires in one collective aspiration, and weld the multitude of wills into a collective and dominating will. A true congregation is vastly more than an aggregation. The assembling of a multitude is useless if the individual units are to remain in isolated consciousness—like the clocks in a jewelers' window, each ticking busily and noisily regardless of the rest. A true assembly is rather like the electric clocks installed in a modern office building, each dial regulated constantly by the central clock on the first floor. The great question about any assembly is: Do these various intelligences unite in one great insight? Do these many wills fuse in yielding to any superior will? Do these human souls, full of various jangling desires and wandering impulses, melt into any one great desire, and throb with one great purpose? We know how the Crusades swept men as by a whirlwind into a wholly new realm of sacrifice, and the cry, "God wills it," burst from 10,000 throats at once. We know how the religious revival has fused multitudes into a unitary consciousness where individual pain and sorrow were quite forgotten. But the same phenomenon in lesser measure appears in every service of worship, unless the service is a failure—as it frequently is. Merely to get men inside a church is useless. To seat them "by hundreds and by fifties" means nothing in itself. The question is not how many are present, but how many are united and fused in a true "crowd," with that escape from individual limitations, that immense receptivity, and that enormous power which a crowd may always develop.

The characteristics of a crowd are: first, the partial submergence of the single consciousness in some greater consciousness; next, the obvious contagion of ideas and emotions; and last, the peculiar susceptibility of the assembly to suggestion from without. All these phenomena may well be studied in the narrative of Pentecost, in the life of Francis of Assisi, and in the lives of Whitefield and Wesley and Finney. Such phenomena may be found in the experience of Beecher facing the mob at Liverpool and triumphing over mob-suspicion



and lawlessness. Yet they are found not only in dramatic and unusual incidents, but in the ordinary service of every church. The great essentials to a religious service are the lessening—we may better say heightening—of the single consciousness into a great collective consciousness, the swift running of feeling from man to man, and the susceptibility of the entire assembly to conceptions and impulses from the leader. Where these things exist, a true congregation comes into being, whether it number twenty or twenty thousand. The individual personalities are filled, transcended, and overborne, as all the little salt pools on the beach are filled and united by the rising tide.

By this submergence of private desire and will in the general consciousness a man may rise or he may descend in character. "The crowd may be better or worse than the individual."<sup>1</sup> It is not true that the phenomena of great assemblies are merely pathological. It is mere intellectual snobbishness for the monk in his cell or the philosopher in his retreat to look down on great assemblies as mere flocks of heedless sheep. To speak of the "recognized lowering of critical ability, of the power of accurate observation, indeed of rationality, which merely being one of a crowd induces,"<sup>2</sup> is to exaggerate, and to ignore certain compensating facts. Of course the crowd is not the place for scientific experiment. One would hardly choose the center of Brooklyn bridge for an astronomical observatory. But on the other hand, one would not choose an observatory as the place to study human nature. If the crowd may descend under the spell of the demagogue, it may also soar to incredible heights of aspiration and devotion under the speech of the prophet. If the crowd cried "Crucify him," the crowd also cried a little later: "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" The man who imagines that it is the mark of superior intellect to build a cabin in the forest, as did Thoreau, and avoid all the massing of his fellows, is self-deceived and self-excluded from the most thrilling and energizing experiences of life. The man who has not quivered and glowed at the passing of the regiment, who has not shouted and sung with hundreds of others at some celebration by his school or college, who has not bowed with a great

<sup>1</sup> Le Bon, *The Psychology of the Crowd*, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Jastrow, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, p. 133.

multitude confessing its sin, is still a partial and isolated person, of limited and provincial experience. Shall he from his fastidious "palace of art" look down disdainfully on the robust and red-blooded men who sing and pray together on a Sunday? Rather let him look *up* to them, as to those who are entering into social and racial experiences to which he is a stranger.

Deep in human nature lies, therefore, the necessity for congregational worship. In spite of the printing of the books of which there is no end, in spite of the ubiquitous and monstrous Sunday newspaper, in spite of the tragic failure of many churches to feed the souls of men, it still remains true that apart from physical assembly some of the noblest religious experience of the race has been and always will be impossible. Whoever has heard Wendell Phillips in Tremont Temple pleading for justice, or Phillips Brooks in Trinity Church pouring out a soul that shrank from all private confession, has realized that the isolated man is a fragment and that only in union do we achieve highest vision and victory.

Yet these great possibilities are rarely realized, because of certain faults in the form of worship, which render it nugatory to some men and injurious to the finer feelings of others. Of these, two faults are the most common today—crudity and fragmentariness.

The crudity of many forms of worship renders them useless to persons of genuine sensibility. When the Scripture is read as if it were a railroad time-table, or on the other hand as if it were a text-book in elocution, the result is the reverse of devotional. When prayer ostensibly addressed to God takes the form of an harangue to the audience, the effect is the same as that produced by any other form of hypocrisy. In many churches the performance of the choir is admirable from an aesthetic standpoint, but quite irrelevant as an aid to worship. Indeed in most churches the task of the preacher is rendered vastly more difficult by the intrusion of incongruous or impertinent music. After the choir by elaborate performance has brought the congregation into the concert-mood, the preacher is expected to remove that mood and replace it by the temper of devotion. In some churches the ordinance of baptism is a mere survival of what was at the banks of the Jordan deeply and tenderly significant, but is now repeated amid such irreverence and vulgar curiosity as to make

it hardly more than a kind of amateur dramatics. The Lord's Supper is in some places so shabbily administered as to repel the worshipful mind, and a carelessness which we should not for a moment allow in our homes is not infrequently seen at the table of the Lord. The invention of individual cups—in which the fear of microbes has proved stronger than love of the brethren—has converted the sacred Supper from a symbol of a common life and an all-embracing love into the extreme expression of a timid individualism and an unmistakable *noli me tangere*. When the common cup, which symbolizes undying unity, is split into scores of glass thimbles symbolizing hygienic protection from the contaminating touch of other men, is not the resulting ceremony an inversion of the original *communion*? Of course the Christian consciousness may in time adjust itself to this inversion, as to many other radical changes of symbol. But at present the most striking expression of modern religious separatism is in many churches to be seen at the Lord's Supper. In all worship due care should be exercised lest our most sacred ritual either become slovenly in method, or drift far away from its "inward and spiritual grace."

But the chief defect in worship is that it frequently expresses a fragment of our human nature, when in its ideal form it should gather up and express the total personality of the worshipers. That which impresses us in the worship of the Middle Ages is that it spoke for the whole man and spoke to the whole man. In the vast rituals of pagan Greece and Rome, poor as was much of the teaching, the entire nature of the worshiper was in play. A public sacrifice before the sailing of the fleet, or at the return of the conquering general, appealed to the whole nation and to the whole experience of every citizen. It was a proclamation of doctrine, an expression of gratitude and joy, an aesthetic triumph, a union of music and sculpture and all the arts in the service of religion, a union of all public and private institutions in symbolic action, and it spoke to the nation and for the nation with a comprehensiveness which has now become difficult or impossible. Our modern worship shows plainly its submission to the great command: "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate." It has gained moral purity by isolating itself from large sections of experience. Our problem is to preserve that purity and yet enable

worship to express the entire nature of man and the experience of the community.

Christianity appeals to the intellect, the emotions, and the will. It is at the same time a system of truth, a storehouse of feeling, and an ideal of conduct. To man's intellect it offers truths long hidden from the wise and prudent. To the emotional life it offers objects of deep devotion and lasting allegiance. To conscience and will it offers an ethical ideal imperative and alluring. And all three aspects of human nature—the mental, the emotional, the volitional—must find adequate utterance in worship.

The Puritan made the intellectual element in worship supreme. With fierce zeal he broke the statues in the cathedrals, and built for himself a chapel where no image of man or tree or flower could distract, no stained glass could delight his vision, no swinging censer or tinkling bell could minister to the flesh, and no lust of the eye seduce his steadfast soul. He exalted the sermon at the expense of all other parts of the worship, because clear ideas of truth were essential to the moral life and instruction was the great task of religion. Knowledge of the true God was the chief essential, and to communicate such knowledge was the highest form of worship.

We who are the heirs of the Puritan tradition may well be thankful for this virile, if incomplete, conception of religious worship. At least it was not sensuous idolatry. It was free from sentimentalism and filled with robust and sturdy self-reliance. It would not be "carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease," but would patiently, logically, think its way to God, to righteousness and peace.

But the defect of Puritan worship was that it recognized only one way of approach to the city of Mansoul. Its exaltation of human reason as the central principle in man led to an exaltation of doctrine as of supreme value in worship. New England Christianity is bewildered today because New England is half filled by a foreign population born of the Latin races, to whom the service of the Puritan meeting-house is quite unintelligible. To our Italian and French and Portuguese populations the worship of the average Protestant church, with its cool and logical process, makes little appeal, while deep in their hearts is an inborn longing for fervor and color and symbol and pageant. One trembles to think what would happen to

this great foreign population if the Roman Catholic church were suddenly to withdraw its ministry before Protestantism is ready to discard its narrow appeal to the intellect alone, and is prepared to address all the legitimate hungers and aspirations of humanity.

It is a curious fact that the Puritans went to the Old Testament for the commonwealth, their ideals of law and government, but refused to take any hint from it as to the organization of worship. They exalted Moses at the court of Pharaoh, and Elijah defying Ahab, as models of popular resistance to tyranny. They sought to reconstruct the state as a true theocracy. How could they fail to see that the Old Testament worship was aglow with gorgeous colors, heavy with form and formula, rich in symbolism, and clearly pictorial in its proclamation of every truth? The modern critic may indeed shake off every Old Testament suggestion or regulation, as a species of materialism belonging to the early stages of religious development. But the upholder of the verbal inspiration and Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch cannot disdain in modern worship the use of such rich symbolism as he holds was divinely ordained for ancient Israel. We cannot affirm that Israel's use of sound and color and golden censer and embroidered curtain reveals the mind of God regarding human approach, and at the same time affirm that the Puritan abhorrence of all symbolism is likewise in accord with divine direction. The so-called change of dispensations cannot mean a change in human nature. Either the worship of Israel was puerile, petty, materialistic, and tended only to hide Jehovah from the worshiper, or there is inherent in human nature a demand for religious symbolism and a deep necessity for the concrete and visible expression of religious faith.

The position of the Puritan and the Quaker is a "reform against nature." In the justifiable revolt against ceremony that had become magic, and formula that had become incantation, they treated men as disembodied spirits, or rather as pure mental processes, as mere calculating machines. For children, and for men in the childish stage, logical demonstration of truth is both useless and repellent. It is "truth embodied in a tale," or in a simple ceremony, that "enters in at lowly doors."

In our own time the Chautauqua movement would have been

quite impossible apart from the badges and seals and enrolments and graduations which the fertile American mind invented in order to give physical recognition to intellectual work. The Salvation Army is the visible embodiment of a metaphor. It flees from surplice and crucifix, only to invent its own vestments and carry its own banners. Probably the modern army and navy would be impossible apart from the epaulets and gold braid at which civilians smile. Our colleges and universities are steadily reverting to the academic pageantry of the Middle Ages, finding in the gowns and hoods shelter from the crudeness and extemporaneousness and personal eccentricity which bring all true dignity into contempt.

Of course it will be pointed out that our university decorations are free from the fatal assumption of divine authority which so inheres in ecclesiastical robes and insignia. This is happily true. No man dreams that because a man wears a doctor's gown and a gold tassel he therefore may assume to control the thought or action of his fellow-men. These academic regalia symbolize not authority, but attainment, fellowship, and joy of possession. The moment they become the accouterments of tyranny, that moment we must discard them. But has not the time come in religion when such symbols may be helpers of our joy? If a stained-glass window will help us to conceive the past or the unseen, why not have it? If a processional at the opening of service is more seemly than a choir straggling into church in distractingly various costumes, who shall forbid? The amount of such ceremonial we can wisely use depends on the amount of clear thought and spiritual energy that the church possesses. Liturgy as substitute for thought, and symbol as consolation for departed spiritual life, we cannot admit or endure. First there must be an inside, then an outside. First, the deep realization of God's power and nearness, then for that realization the appropriate and tangible expression. First, the allegiance of the soul to the living Lord, and then the expression of that allegiance in all ritual that is fair and significant and impressive.

There are three essential qualities in all worship—sincerity, a close relation of the ritual to the life which is to follow, and a vivid sense of the presence of the infinite.

Without sincerity, in creed, in symbol, in hymns, in public address,

worship, of course, becomes hollow and positively repellant to truth-loving men. All ritual is the expression of previous life, as the sea shell is the deposit and envelope of some marine creature which once lived in it. But a museum of empty shells is not more useless than a collection of prayers and hymns and creedal statements which the Christian experience has outgrown. From generation to generation the best formulas of the church must be constantly revised or they will become falsehoods. The Presbyterian church was driven to propose a shorter and simpler creed than the Westminster Confession by the inner demand for an utterance of faith that should be true to present experience. The Church of England is now at work on a revision of that marriage service which has become shocking to modern ears. The imposition of certain liturgical forms upon a generation which has grown away from them is a cause of keenest distress among the clergymen of today. When the modern minister is compelled to say at baptism: "This child is now regenerate," must he not inwardly shrink from the original meaning of the phrase? When he quotes Isaac and Rebekah to the newly wedded pair, does he still regard those Old Testament characters as divinely chosen models? When the church officer standing at the head of the pew sings of himself as

A guilty, weak, and helpless worm,

or cries, in the words of another hymn,

At thy feet  
A guilty rebel lies,

is he true to himself and his own experience, or is he hiding behind another man's experience and masquerading in the place of prayer? The hymnology of the church sadly retards its advancing life, and men sing not so much what they feel as what they believe their fathers felt. The disciple of Darwin still labors on Sunday morning to take the world-view of Isaac Watts, and the college Senior after a course in modern ethics endeavors soberly to pronounce himself "vile" as "the dying thief."

These incongruities do not mean deliberate hypocrisy. They mean that the rapidly expanding experience of religion has found in many cases no genuine and worthy expression. It is a twentieth-

century spirit still compelled to wear an eighteenth- or sixteenth-century garb. The average hymnbook is at least fifty years behind the average church, and a hundred years behind the modern conscience. On a recent Sunday evening the writer labored for a half-hour to show the congregation that the old extreme idea of individual escape must now be supplemented by the idea of the salvation of society which Christ embodied in the "Kingdom of God." At the close of the sermon the choir rendered "Let some droppings fall on me"—entirely unconscious that they were melodiously opposing all the preacher had said. But our hymnbooks and choirs are still looking on the world through the eyes of St. Bernard and William Cowper.

Closely connected with sincerity is the maintenance of intimate relation between the worship of the church and the life of the world. Our generation is eager for results. It asks about church service, as about all else, *Cui bono?* Men of our time are not impatient of serious thought. They are not averse to brooding meditation. The inventor in our day ponders as long and patiently as did St. Francis or St. Dominic. The chemist retires from the world and enters into his closet as seriously as did any mediaeval anchorite. The astronomer understands the value of vigil and self-denial as truly as the monks of the Grande Chartreuse. But this modern withdrawal from the world, this concentration of the mind on fact or truth, is for some clearly defined objective end. The growing approximation of study and life is everywhere obvious. The vocational aim is transforming our universities and our high schools. An education that is a mere luxurious self-indulgence, the mere enjoyment of acquisition, with no thought of future service, is in our generation repudiated by every worthy school.

Then in the church the mere indulgence of emotion under the name of worship can no longer be justified. That emotion may be a delight in stained glass and gorgeous procession and perfumed air, or it may be the happiness of reconciliation with oneself and one's God. But if it does not lead outward into effective action for humanity, if it is not focused on the coming of the Kingdom, it is a spurious thing, a form of self-pity or self-laudation. True worship has in all ages been a preparation for action. So Moses prayed before he led the



host through the sea. So the Continental Congress prayed before it drew up the immortal Declaration. In that spirit was held the Haystack prayer-meeting at Williamstown. In that spirit the primitive church tarried in Jerusalem, preparing for the time when signs and wonders should be done in Corinth, Athens, and Rome.

The lamentable fact is that most of our church services lead nowhere. They conclude in themselves, like the eastern serpent biting its own tail. If the pews are well occupied, the collection large, the singing aesthetically pleasing, if the attention is held by the preacher, and if the congregation breaks up with a pleasurable glow of feeling, we seem to think that the goal of the service has already been reached. But this is to confuse putting on the uniform with fighting the battle. "Is the sermon done?" said a late-comer standing in the vestibule of the church. "No," was the reply, "it is ended, but it yet remains to be done."

The last time I saw Dwight L. Moody, he was full of concern over the aimlessness and ineffectiveness of Sunday-evening services in our great cities. "If I was a young man living in——," he said, "I would not go to church Sunday evenings. I have looked over the list of all the church announcements, and there is really nothing vital done on Sunday evening. The services are merely weak repetitions of the morning service, with no real object in view." If the men stay away from church today, their absence is not due to innate depravity or to hostility to the Christian faith. It is chiefly because church-going seems to the vast majority a pointless custom. Fifty years ago a man must attend church to learn the news of the day, to retain his place in society, to put himself in touch with social and political forces. These reasons are no longer valid, and the modern man asks himself, perhaps unconsciously: What is being actually done at the church? Are opinions being molded, principles and policies discussed, new enterprises started, new moral battles planned? Does the church sound a trumpet-summons, or does it merely administer, under the name of "Christian consolation," a moral anaesthetic? Robert Gould Shaw, bidding his bride farewell at the church door, while he mounted his horse and rode away to die at Fort Wagner, is inexhaustibly suggestive of the relation of church service to heroic endeavor.

And this in no way conflicts with the third characteristic of genuine worship—the sense of the Infinite as immediately present. Both the search for truth and allegiance to duty must be bathed and transfigured in a sense of the unexplored riches, the boundless strength, the overflowing peace, of a present God. There can be no possible substitute for genuine religion—the sense of direct access to the highest and holiest. Yet this is the rarest, as it is the most precious, of human attainments. No eloquence or knowledge in the preacher can make him a true prophet, unless he brings to his congregation this sense of being in the presence-chamber of God, and seeing every problem and task in its relation to the “pattern in the mount.”

Here is a constant defect in many ministers of really enlightened intelligence and liberal spirit. They seem to have no sense of wonder left. To their clear eyes the mystery and awe of human life have somehow evaporated, and what Phillips Brooks called “a tight little conception of God” has taken their place. To their rationalistic minds all mystery has been explored and charted; all the deeper enigmas of humanity are explained away. Christianity is reduced to its lowest terms, and all is as fatally clear as in Watts’ description of heaven:

No midnight shade, no clouded sun,  
But sacred high eternal noon.

Under the dominance of the rationalistic temper, the church becomes a lecture-room, the sermon an address on social or civic morality, and the service of worship a sort of educational convention. From such a service men depart intellectually improved, but with no imperative sense of the immanent God in their lives. In such a service men sit contiguous, but severely isolated, shunning all self-surrender, constantly on guard against the sudden or the mystical, and so avoiding the deeper experiences of the religious life.

On the other hand, churches that will not submit to this desiccation of faith may err by slipping into an attitude of familiarity, which also excludes genuine sense of God. In such churches the sanctuary is the auditorium, and the vestibule is the “lobby.” The people chat lightly before service and forget to pray after it. Such worship habitually ignores the tragedy and burden of the world, and seems to say: “Let not God speak with us, lest we die.”

But the true church must take the people seriously, steadily refuse mere entertainment, and lift the congregation into the full and radiant joy of the realization of God. The preacher who faces a congregation on Sunday morning must perceive his problem before he can solve it. On the one hand he has some rare advantages such as no other speaker can expect. He speaks on a day set apart for such speaking. The store and the mill and the office have been closed that the prophet may be heard. The congregation is never hostile, but is usually in sympathy with the preacher before the first word is spoken. The place is rich with associations, the time is one of expectation, the hush of the world's noises gives rare opportunity, while limitation of voluntary movement, due to stiff clothing and immovable pews, makes the assembly susceptible to any sort of suggestion. On the other hand the preacher is hindered by the monotony of ritual, by the deadening effect of long-continued worship in the same spot, and by the popular familiarity with his theme. He is hindered by the heterogeneousness of an assembly embracing the veteran and the stripling, the clerk and the millionaire, the college professor and the bricklayer. Can he speak so vitally and sincerely as to pierce through decorous apathy and touch the springs of life? Can he address the universal need in a universal language? Can he melt those various and opposing interests into one supreme concern, unite all those petty wills in one eternal will, and banish fear and care and pain in the sense of the immediate divine plenitude?

He certainly cannot do this by a fragmentary and provincial service—by mere formulation of ideas, or mere sensuous appeal, or mere ethical discussion. He has a right to summon to his service all that makes appeal to the entire nature of man. It is impossible that any one form of worship should be equally effective for all men. The varieties of denominational expression are due to temperamental differences rather than to victories in debate. But the time has now come when each church may learn from all others, and when we may see beneath the theological and liturgical variations the common psychological need. To one temperament prayer is most real when the worshiper is kneeling, gazing at a picture of Christ; to another when all symbols are banished and the heart cries out in need; to another *laborare est orare* and the “cup of cold water” is a communion

chalice. But the aim of all these modes of approach is to attain to the experience of a present God. The church should rejoice in the many gates through which men enter the celestial city. It should encourage architecture, painting, and sculpture as servants of the religious feeling. It should utilize universal literature, supplementing Thomas à Kempis and Baxter with Carlyle and Browning. It should welcome scientific research as simply the fulfilment of the demand of religion: "Handle me and see that it is I myself." It should avail itself of all significant symbols, as often succeeding where other language fails. The church that is to render service to all humanity must regard the realization and experience of an immanent God as its supreme gift, and steadily use all art, literature, science, and symbolism, to make that experience credible and alluring.

## THE ULTIMATE TEST OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH: IS IT HISTORICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL?<sup>1</sup>

---

JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; EUGENE W.  
LYMAN, D.D., BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY; AND PROFESSOR  
E. HERSHEY SNEATH, PH.D., YALE UNIVERSITY

---

Truth in any sphere implies two things: On the one hand we have some experience, some immediately sensed or felt reality, and on the other hand we bring some other experience to put with it, some meaning, some idea, some purpose or emotion. If we select for our meaning some other partial aspect of experience, then we have the various kinds of knowledge used in common life, or, if more highly defined, that of the sciences. If we try to look at our part in the light of the whole, we have philosophy.

It is by this process of enlarging our impulses that we rise from the life of an animal or infant, to the life of the man who looks before and after, to the life of the scientist who, by selecting the aspects of experience that he will consider, is able to describe and predict, to the enhanced thought values of beauty, and finally to the life of the moral person who shapes his conduct by the ideas and meanings he sets up.

No mental or moral life is possible except with both these factors—the immediate experience on the one hand, the meaning or purpose which interprets it for science or shapes it for conduct on the other.

It is evident that in the world of intelligence and morality it is impossible to divorce these two aspects of truth, but it is convenient to lay emphasis for special purposes on one or the other. If we leave out of account for the moment all conscious reference to meaning and interpretation, to purpose and self, we have an abstraction which we call facts. If we leave out all the immediate, the real, we have another abstraction which we call ideas. We then by another artificial separation which is useful for the division of labor say that we can study each of these abstractions by itself. We assume to

<sup>1</sup> A discussion at the Commencement of the Yale Divinity School, May 31, 1909.

study facts and call this history; we assume to study the meanings, the relations, the values of these facts, and call this study science or philosophy. Instead of appealing to one wise Daniel to supply both the dream and the interpretation, modern life finds it more expedient to divide these functions. Historical research or observation tells the dream; reflection or philosophy essays its interpretation. Evidently, however, what we usually call history is three-fourths philosophy. For it speaks of men's purposes and plans not merely as facts, but as though they effected something; it speaks of causes and results, and these are never, and can never be, observed; it approves or condemns; it constructs far more than it records.

Philosophy, it must be confessed, has been more successful in its abstractions. It has at one time seized upon the spatial aspect of things and, forgetting all else, built a world of materialism. Again, fascinated by the power of thought in ignoring the here and now, and framing laws of universal scope, it has built a world *sub specie aeternitatis*, of eternal ideas, of a timeless, changeless absolute, or of eternal and immutable morality.

Against this abstractness of a rationalistic philosophy there have, indeed, been protests. The empirical Locke and Hume, Mill and Adam Smith, have taken their stand upon what is present and immediate. But they for the most part have made the opposite abstraction. They have failed to read the part in the light of the whole, and so have served rather to brush aside the airy cobwebs spun by the metaphysicians than to build a house for the soul of man.

Religious truth starts with three or perhaps four aspects of immediate experience, perceptions, needs, impulses, emotions. It gives these an interpretation, just as do science and philosophy. In which aspect is that peculiar character which marks the truth off as religious? Is it in the immediate impulse, feeling, sensation, or act on the one hand, as was held by Schleiermacher, and by those who talk of a religious instinct, or is it in the interpretation, on the other, as Hegel thought? Does it belong to history, or to philosophy? Let us postpone this until we notice briefly what these experiences are and what is the interpretation. The facts are of three or four kinds. The interpretation, however it differs in detail, has one common character: it seeks to read the facts in social or personal terms.

1. Simplest and crudest of these experiences, no doubt, but nevertheless the most vital to primitive man, is the bodily life with its urgent needs pointing beyond with the organism. Food supply, involving in most cases attention to the animating and reproductive powers of nature, the avoidance of mysterious dangers, the cure of disease, plays a large rôle. Cults with ritual, prayer, taboos, and magic rites, embody interpretations of these needs. Plenty and famine, rain and harvest, sickness and cure, are explained by divine agency on the one hand, and over against it is conceived a human breath, "double," *anima*, or ghost, which is only a more tenuous and subtle body. Is our religious element here to be sought in fact, or in interpretation? The facts do indeed signify that man and nature, organism and environment, grow up together, and that it is abstract to consider man by himself. But later religion is apt to turn its back upon these simpler experiences, or assign them to science or to poetry, and to find a more congenial center in other phases of life.

2. The life in groups—clan, family, tribe—is both cause and effect of impulses and needs for companionship, sympathy, and protection. These are idealized in terms of Protector, Father, Redeemer, or Next-of-Kin, while the self becomes the group-member, continuing perhaps in the company of ancestral spirits. Here again there is an experience which points beyond itself, but it is only in the interpretation that it gets what can be properly called religious truth.

3. The perceptions of change and movement, of life, of order, and of might in the world awaken wonder and awe. Myths of the growth of creation gradually merge into the declaration that "The heavens declare the glory of God," on the one hand, or into the design arguments of philosophy, on the other, while the soul begins now to be conceived in terms of thought or reason. Decidedly, again, we have an unfolding of consciousness which suggests interpretation in terms of God and self, but the dream without the interpretation is not religion.

4. The moral experiences. These are of two sorts: those of inner life, of conscience and inner struggle, and those of outer act, of making the purpose effective. They are both an overcoming of the world—the world of evil within and without. These experiences are not so primary as the others. They arise as man begins

to choose and value, to read his acts as a member of a social order, of a clan or family, and of the mysterious whole of which he is a part. The twofold aspect of conscious experience which in the previously described cases man finds pointing beyond himself to a helper or companion or creator, now calls for a new interpretation: man feels that this choosing and approving, this law and ideal, are not merely a private and individual matter. He views himself as a member of a larger, and ideal order. As a member of such an order he is now a person, and the order is likewise personal. The larger life into which he is thus born is at once his accuser and his helper. Sin and redemption are the interpretations of this new life within; a kingdom of God is the response to the demand that moral salvation shall mean not merely inner feeling and purpose, but outer act and a world of other moral beings.

Every great religion illustrates these facts and interpretations with varying fulness. In the Hebrew and Christian religion we recognize the Protector and Provider in war and peace; the personal Companion and Fountain of life, the Father and Creator who has clothed the heavens with beauty, the divine Sovereign whose love assists, the Messiah who is to secure the triumph of right and justice. Conversely man knows himself first as a creature of bodily wants, then as capable of friendship, and intellectual vision; finally as a soul with capacity for both good and evil, for the prophet's ideal, and for the messianic hope. We often read the Scriptures as though we were reading facts. But a moment's reflection tells us that the whole life of prophet and priest and psalmist, of Jesus and Paul, was lived in and through, not the immediate facts but the ideals and visions, the faith and the hopes, of Israel's religion. And conversely, these ideals and hopes, these poignant judgments of sin and punishment, were not framed in the world of pure thought or of separate detached values. They were forced into consciousness and brought into the heart of a David or an Isaiah or a Jeremiah as he confronted plenty or famine or pestilence, victory or defeat, murder or adultery, injustice or persecution, and refused to go down in surrender to evil within or without.

Can the test of religious truth be historical? If we mean, Can it be found in facts divested of any interpretation? the answer is



plain: The bare facts of sensation, feeling, doing, or of outer succession of events, are not religious truth. Taken merely as facts they neither are, nor can they disclose, God or soul, sin or redemption, guilt or forgiveness, divine love or divine justice. None of these can ever be proved by any historical test. For these simply are not facts. These are in every case interpretations which go beyond any immediate experience. But, I suppose, those who would stand for the historical test would have in mind not the bare particular, immediate facts, but the doctrines proclaimed by Jesus and Paul and John and other founders of Christianity. Jesus and Paul, it may be thought, were witnesses, not philosophers. They testified to God's love and forgiveness. The death on the cross was an event which itself made things different ever since. Here was not a mere philosophy; here was a fact.

But I need not say that two difficulties at once confront us in adopting this standpoint advocated so impressively by some: (1) Shall we accept unquestioningly everything which we find ascribed to Jesus and uttered by Paul as being not only their belief but an objective fact? If so, what can we do with their views as to demonism and the Second Coming? If we hesitate on these matters we are employing some criterion other than that of bare authority. (2) And again, does anyone know exactly what Jesus and Paul meant? Whatever their experience, or their knowledge, they had to express it, if they expressed it at all, in language. And this language was the language of other men. Its symbols and conceptions are borrowed from the experiences and ideas which Jews and Greeks had had. Jesus and Paul had a new revelation it could be made known on so far as it could gradually induce new experiences in others and thus give a new meaning. The new bottles must be provided for the new wine, and the bottles could not be made at once. It seems impossible to sever what in the consciousness of Jesus and Paul was temporal and of their age and time, from what was for all time and for all men, unless we take some standpoint outside history by which to test what was the divine and what the human. The test of religious truth for any man who questions an infallible book, a wholly magic view of revelation, and an external authority, cannot be historical in the narrow sense.

Can the test of religious truth be philosophical? There are two conceptions of philosophy and philosophical truth: According to one of these conceptions philosophy is to start with certain definitions and conceptions, as does the mathematician. It is then to develop these and test any proposed idea or proposition by its conformity to these premises. Its logic is that of identity and contradiction. This method as we all know has been a favorite in theology. You start with God as Substance, or First Cause, or Perfect Being, or Infinite, or Absolute, and you deduce the consequences with logical consistency. This gives indeed a world of reason, but it evidently proves nothing as to the world in which we live. Consistency is a necessary element in a world of rational beings, but as the modern mathematicians show us we may have many a consistent world which is not real. The other conception of philosophy is that it is to view all its interpretations, its conceptions, as merely experimental, and partial, as ways of reading new meaning into the crude, bare facts of feeling and impulse, perception and emotion—as means of transforming the natural into the spiritual. On this basis the test of philosophy is not: Does my conclusion square with my definitions? but, Does my conclusion enable me to forecast nature, to guide my life into larger achievement, to disclose new values, and bring about a better world?

Can religious truth be tested by either philosophic method? Evidently not by the first. Religion must come to men with more than a consistent series of deductions from definitions. And if we turn to the second method, and ask, Has philosophy yet furnished an adequate interpretation of religious experience? I should answer unhesitatingly "No!" Various philosophies have helped man to understand more fully his life and his world, but only the complacent metaphysician of bygone days could suppose he had illumined more than a small circle in the unexplored and boundless ocean whose tides wash the shores on which we stand.

The Hebrew philosophy gave a profound meaning to one aspect of the moral life, but its philosophy of nature does not satisfy our present science, while its doctrine of the triumph of good through the sudden presence of God or his Messiah is not our working plan of life.

The Greek and the modern rationalist have had their philosophy.

Fixing on the timeless procedure of thought they have made the religious world a timeless, eternal realm of lifeless being. God has been essence and substance, being and cause, changeless, infinite, and absolute. Moral struggle and victory find no place in such a being. They, like all finiteness and imperfections, must belong to appearance, not to reality.

Now, however well this may express certain intellectual and mystic longings of the religious consciousness, I believe that it is utterly inadequate as an interpretation of the moral life. It does not offer the redemption, nor the companionship, nor the actual making of new moral reality which the religious experience of today demands. The God who works in us and in whom we trust must in some sense be with us in the fiery furnace; must know struggle and purpose as reality, unless we dismiss the whole moral side of life as a dream battle.

Philosophy indeed took one great step in advance a century ago when Kant attempted to shift the center of philosophy from intellect to will. But, in the first place, the will with Kant was still too much the reason under another form. It had no place for sympathy and love as motives. And in the next place it shared the defect of all philosophy, which has lasted even to this day; it was individualistic, not social. The philosophy which is to test religious truth must be social. If the very essence of religious truth is a social, a personal interpretation of the world and of the inner life, then only a philosophy which employs social categories can meet the religious demand half-way. This gap has long been recognized. It has frequently been assumed that the situation is met by saying that man creates his gods according to his needs or his desires. Or it is said that religion uses the language of imagination, philosophy that of thought. But to take one's stand on the private, subjective, individual half of this world of conscious experience; to assume that this is real, independent, self-sustaining, and that the Other, the Socius, the Over-Soul, the God, the Not-ourselves, is only a fancy, a fiction, a creation—this is sheer abstraction. In our social psychology we are learning that the individual comes to intellectual and moral birth only in a social world of fellow-men. Must not philosophy carry this insight as it essays to read the depths of human life, of con-

science, of beauty, and of science, of spiritual power and spiritual achievements.

It has been a true instinct therefore which has led religion to refuse to trust its truth to philosophy for decision. There are more things in heaven and earth than have been dreamed of in the philosophies of Judea or Greece, of Germany or England. Our systems are still "but broken lights."

The historical—the fact—means nothing except as it is viewed in the light of other experiences, of some larger whole, but in turn these larger wholes need to return again and again to earth to renew their strength. A great soul like that of Jesus—who shall sound its depths? Who shall say whence he drew inspiration, and in what strength he overcame the world? Certainly no doctrine of associational psychology, no doctrine of the soul as a simple substance. Who shall explain what difference his life and death did make in the actual universe?—certainly no doctrine of an eternal essence, or of a legal expiation. And what shall guarantee the triumph of good? What shall assure the soul, as baffled and perplexed by mystery and evil it cries in the *Te Deum* of the ages, "O Lord, in thee have I trusted, let me never be confounded!" Certainly no past can demonstrate *this* future. It is—and must be so long as moral life demands resolution—a supreme venture of faith. But if anything can give not only emotional cheer and contagious hope, but also the rational basis for this venture, it is the experience, the struggles, the serene calm, the confidence, the actual achievement of the world's great spirits. "Be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world" is the historic note which tells of reality—not only the reality of actual deeds, but as well the reality of a kinship of spirit that promises similar victory.

The vital religious truth underlying the views presented is this: Our theologies are none of them more than working hypotheses. They are all certainly inadequate. Nevertheless, just as in science every hypothesis helps us on, so without ideas and interpretations there is no growing life of the mind or of the spirit. We gain new glimpses into religious truth only as we bring to the great souls the new interpretations which their lives and teachings beget in us. In this sense the full interpretation of religious experience can come only when the

kingdom of God has itself become a reality. Just because the philosophies of the past are thus inadequate I conceive it our duty to rethink God and the religious life in new categories. Neither sovereignty nor fatherhood seems an adequate interpretation of the social conscience of today any more than the first chapter of Genesis is an adequate theory of evolution. Neither legal theories of atonement, nor timeless being, nor an absolute which knows no struggle, is adequate to our conviction of the reality of evil and the duty of overcoming it.

If we leave the shore and launch out upon the deep, what shall guarantee that here we shall find truth? We certainly cannot demonstrate the new by history or by philosophy. But religion is after all a venture of the soul, a venture of faith. If God and eternity were immediately present there were then, as Kant has taught us, no room for high resolve—no room to make the great decision to leave all and follow Him. But in spite of failures and shipwrecks, humanity has moved upward as it has made such ventures of faith. We cannot test *our* truth by the “experience” of the child or the savage. We have moved on, and found a new evidence in the larger life of the spirit. If the humanity of a later time is to have a larger vision, a larger and richer revelation, it must test this by its own higher life. It must find God and soul, redemption and the divine kingdom, in new ways. It must not fear to leave its outgrown shell: but it will never outgrow the need of studying those profound and priceless experiences and deeds through which the divine has been revealed.

JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

There are two ways in which the terms “historical” and “philosophical,” as employed in our subject, may be understood. They both may be thought of as referring to fixed bodies of facts or ideas, or they both may be regarded as describing methods of testing truth. We will consider the question from each of these points of view; and first let us regard the terms as denoting fixed bodies of facts or ideas.

## I

We begin then with the question: Is the final test of religious truth a fixed body of historical facts? There are probably many

causes that impel us to think of the standard of religious truth in this way, but prominent among them is the conservative instinct. We feel the need of guarding against subjectivism in religious thought. Natural science and historical criticism have swept over us with the swiftness of a barbarian invasion. They have made wide breaches in our theologies and dismantled our creeds. The result is that the way has been opened for much lawless thinking in the field of religion. The conservative instinct prompts us to quell this lawlessness, and in order that this may be done, it bids us fix upon some definite historical standard with which our religion must square.

This conception of the test of religious truth is able to put forward very strong claims. Christianity is a historical religion, and indeed it is so to a higher degree than any other faith. It is dependent upon the Scriptures for the nourishment of its life; it is inseparable from its founder, Jesus Christ; it has embodied its faith in great historic creeds and confessions; it is organized in a church, which is a far bigger thing than any individual's religious consciousness. Surely then the individual is under obligation to measure his own faith by these great historic realities. Nothing else will save our religion from degenerating into pettiness and subjectivism, and prevent us from placing halos of sanctity around the most tawdry vagaries and whims.

Stated in this general way, this position is not to be gainsaid. But when we seek out a certain portion of this historical material, and give to it final and absolute authority, then we defeat the very end we have in view. There is no surer way than this to enthrone subjectivism. All historic facts must be interpreted, and into the process of interpretation a subjective element necessarily enters. But it is of no avail to claim absolute authority for the facts, unless we also claim it for the interpretation of the facts. The authority must be transferred to the facts as interpreted, in order to be practically effective. Now such a transfer cannot be made without unwittingly ignoring the presence of the subjective element in the interpretation. But it is only when this subjective element is unacknowledged and unconscious that it becomes really dangerous. Therefore the attempt to give absolute authority to historical facts, instead of protecting us against subjectivism, fosters and legalizes it.

The traditional interpretations of the Bible furnish us abundant

proof that to give legislative authority to historic realities is to enthrone subjectivism. We need only to recall, for example, the types for what is narrated in the New Testament which have been found in the Old, the verbal fulfilments of the Old Testament which have been found in the New, the acceptance of the demonology of the Bible, the reading of apocalypses as authoritative descriptions of future events and of man's final destiny, the submerging of the ethical and spiritual meaning of atonement in legal ideas, or the proof of each separate variety of church government from the New Testament. These are but a few of the forms of subjectivism which have arisen out of the attempt to give legislative authority to a certain body of historical facts. On such a basis subjectivism is tenfold more dangerous than in its unconventional forms. It becomes consecrated; it gets backed up by a syndicate; religious faith has to surrender to it, or else go to the wall. If we must have subjectivism, then by all means let it be our own, for ecclesiastical subjectivism means the death of deaths for religion.

But, someone says, everything depends upon the kind of historical reality to which we assign legislative authority. If we look to Christ for such an authority, these disastrous results cannot follow. It is true that by such a transfer the danger of legalized subjectivism is diminished somewhat, but at the same time it will continue to exist in serious proportions, so long as our principle remains unchanged. The position we are discussing means practically that in Christ men may find a substitute for the infallible Bible in which they used to believe. The chief function of the infallibility of the Bible was that it guaranteed to men special information about the supernatural realm and definite rules as to what they should do. At present we are pointed to Christ as the performer of the same function. Through his incarnation a seal of authority is set upon a certain system of belief, and in his words we have prescribed for us what right conduct is. Now so far as this view is workable, it legalizes subjectivism just as truly as did the idea of the infallible Bible. Christ's words require interpretation no less than other portions of Scripture. So it comes about that it is to his words as interpreted that the legislative authority really is assigned, and thus the evil we are seeking to avoid is upon us once more.

But new difficulties arise as well. The attempt to find in Jesus' words an unconditional authority is not altogether workable. His teachings were in the form of parables and paradoxical sayings. Moreover he did not write them down for us, and we cannot be sure of their original form. Besides this we are beginning to see that he used the forms of thought current in his time, and that, to a considerable extent at least, he did his own thinking in those forms. So men find it difficult to determine just what system of beliefs Christ authorizes, and just what his prescriptions for conduct are, and they long to have the infallible Bible back again. What they fail to see is, that the very function assigned to the infallible Bible was wrong in itself, and not simply wrongly placed, and that this function is not made right by assigning it to Christ. Faith is thrown into confusion because a kind of authority is sought in Christ which the gospel tradition cannot supply and which he never intended to have.

In the second part of our discussion there will appear a fuller proof that the final test of truth in religion cannot be historical in the sense that a fixed body of historical facts has legislative authority for our experience. But enough has been said to show that such a test breaks down of itself; for it either enthrones subjectivism, as is the case when an unconditional appeal is made to the Bible or a church or a creed, or else, where subjectivism is mitigated, as is the case when such a test is sought in Christ, faith is left in confusion, because it expects a kind of authority that it cannot have.

Our next question must be: Is the final test of religious truth philosophical in the sense of a fixed body of philosophical ideas with which religion must square? This view has certain great merits as compared with the preceding. It throws off the trammels of tradition, and calls all the ideas of the past to account before the bar of reason. It is not dismayed at the ruined theologies of the past, for it holds that one should rest nowhere but in the ultimate truth. It does not regard with apprehension the great multitude of new truths that swarm about us from physical science, anthropology, archaeology, and history, as though our faith had suffered invasion, but it rather considers that religion has migrated with the onward march of civilization from the barren steppes of scholasticism to a far more luxuriant environment, and that it simply needs to find itself



again in its new relations. Its predominant impulse is constructive, and it bids us to begin by sinking our foundations deeper into eternal truth.

But when we make a fixed body of philosophical ideas the final test of religious truth, we again defeat our own end. For on what does the fixity of such a test depend? Of course it must depend on the logical process and on nothing else. For if this fixed test depended upon any branch of experience, further experience might change it, and then it would be fixed no longer. But if ideas deduced from the logical process alone are to be final in the religious realm, religion is excluded from a share in constituting the test by which it is to be measured. For it is impossible to derive religion from the mere process of logic. Accordingly, wherever such a purely logical test prevails, it tends to suppress religion. The religious experience has its seat primarily in man's practical nature. The practical nature, therefore, must have a voice in testing the truth that the religious experience yields. Religion indeed must be responsible to the court of reason, but the suffrages of religion must have something to do with constituting the court to which it is responsible. It is not by the merely theoretical reason that the cause of religion is to be judged, but rather by the practical reason—and the practical reason so understood that religion itself may be seen to have a share in shaping it. The attempt to protect the truth and exterminate the error in religion by means of intellectualistic philosophy is like healing by blood-letting—it saps the strength of that which it seeks to sustain.

Proof of the ineffectiveness of the philosophical test, when it is understood as a fixed system of ideas, is not wanting in history. Gnosticism, deism, and the Hegelian philosophy have all dealt with religion on such a basis, and historic Christianity has reacted powerfully from them all. Widely different as these points of view are in other respects, they are alike in this: that they reduce religious ideas to allegory. From their standpoints, religion becomes philosophy in story form. It is a way of teaching philosophy to average people. The sober truth is to be found in the philosophy. Religion tells this truth to the unphilosophical by means of pictures. Translate your religious idea into a philosophical concept, and then you will find what truth, if any, that idea contains.

Now such a procedure, instead of doing justice to the conviction of the religious man that his faith is a primary source of truth, does despite to that conviction. If what this meant were that the truths religion gains are partial or not free from alloy, the reverently and humbly religious would quickly assent. But what it really means is that religion is a very inadequate way of gaining and holding truth. The dialectician gains the truth more surely than the pure in heart. One need not ascend the heights by the devious and often painful pathway of religious experience. He may take the funicular railway provided by philosophy. But such an attitude is the result of failing to grasp the true place of religion in human experience. It makes religion a transitional stage in the development of human culture. Ultimately men must dispense with the allegories of religion, and even now our chief need it to get them translated into the naked truth of philosophy. This attitude cannot satisfy those who are convinced, by personal experience and by history, that religion has a permanent place in human life and holds that place for the reason that, without it, the door to the fullest knowledge of truth remains closed.

Let me add a further explanation before leaving this part of our discussion. In setting aside the unconditional appeal to philosophy because it reduces religious ideas to allegory, we must not ignore the fact that there is a symbolical element in religious ideas. The question how large that element is cannot be discussed here in detail. But the point is this: the fundamental religious ideas, whether symbolical or not, have their right because they present profounder truth than men otherwise can express. The Heavenly Father, the sonship of man, the eternal atonement, the Spirit that was in Christ becoming with us an indwelling source of freedom and power—all these ideas express truth deeper and more adequate than is contained in the concepts of the most absolute philosophy. They cannot be translated into philosophical notions completely and without loss. To make certain fixed philosophical concepts the final test of religious truth is like measuring liquids with porous vessels. The very truth we are trying to measure seeps away from us in our effort to preserve it.

## II

We now turn to consider the terms of our subject according to the other sense mentioned at the outset. The words "historical" and

"philosophical" may be used to denote methods by which religious truth should be tested, rather than fixed bodies of facts or ideas with which it must square.

And when we conceive the final test as a method, then we may say that such a test will have both a philosophical and a historical aspect.

To begin with the philosophical aspect: It is required for two reasons. First, religious truth must be correlated with other truth. All attempts to treat it in isolation will suffer shipwreck in the end. One of the foremost among the causes that make the theme of our present discussion an urgent one is the great mass of new truth from the realms of natural science and history that is felt to have a vitally bearing on religion. The infinite universe of stars, the tiny universe of the living cell, the upward struggle of animal life, the history of culture, the ethnic faiths, the science of mind, with its new laws and its baffling mysteries, the new developments of economics and society—all these spheres of new knowledge must be taken into account by religious thinkers. The task is enormous and requires the co-operation of many minds. But it cannot be evaded. One might as well suppose that the Anglo-Saxon stock could be dominant among the races of America and yet be isolated from them, as to suppose that religious truth can be truly influential and yet remain in isolation. As with races, so with ideas—their virility is their only hope of genuine and permanent influence.

The Ritschlian theology has sought to place an embargo on metaphysics, but in this respect its attitude has only transitory significance. It is valid as against that use of philosophy which has been criticized in the first part of this discussion. In contrast to the position which finds in a certain metaphysical scheme an absolute norm for religious truth, the Ritschlian school is wholly justified in emphasizing the independence of theology. But this independence after all is only relative. While theology may protest in the name of religious experience against an absolutist metaphysics, it has no ground for debarring an inductive metaphysics. On the contrary it requires such a metaphysics as a necessary means for bringing religious truth into organic relation to other truth.

The synthesis of the ideas based on religious experience with those

based on other branches of experience therefore must be a part of the test we are seeking. Only we need to remember that in this synthesis religious experience counts as the peer of the other branches. They test and interpret it, but it in turn tests and interprets them. The whole body of truth is organically interrelated, so that, in testing truth, the various departments of experience should be regarded as conditioning one another.

The second reason why the method of testing religious truth must be in part philosophical is that religion itself is constantly subject to growth. Above all others that religion which claims for itself finality must possess the capacity for limitless growth. Religious doctrines are not exempt from this law. The truths of the past can be conserved only as they are reconstructed. They cease to be truth unless they can be transformed. We cannot hoard religious truth, as we hoard gold and silver in treasury vaults, as a basis for credit. Rather, like wheat, the truths of the past must be sown again, or transformed into nourishment, if their value is to be preserved. There is nothing more tragic in religion than the attempt to hoard its truth. Whenever the attempt is made, thieves break through and steal. When men make the Bible nothing but a treasure-house of promises, all sorts of wildcat speculations in religion result. The sanctity of truth consists in its power for life. We do the greatest homage to the truths of our religion when we freely trust their power to preserve and increase their significance through the transmutation of their forms.

The history of our faith is the history of the expansion and enrichment of its content upon the very condition that its form has been subject to change. The religion of Moses underwent a change at the hand of the later prophets. In Job and the Psalms another stage was reached. With Jesus the old faith became a new religion. By Paul this new religion was disengaged from Judaism. As Christianity mastered Graeco-Roman culture, it became enormously altered. Modern culture is making necessary equally great transformations, and still others may be called for by the new industrial and social order and by contact with the awakened Orient.

It therefore is the duty of the thinker, in dealing with religious doctrines, to distinguish between their form and their essence. He

has to look beneath the external fashion of tradition to the underlying principles. He has to interpret doctrines by their meaning and value for life, and to search for the spirit that animates outward shape. Such a process, which is jointly one of criticism and of insight, may be justly termed philosophical. Let me illustrate this point from the field of politics. We cannot suppose that the institutions of our government mean precisely the same to us as they did to our forefathers, or that they ought to mean precisely the same. Democracy is something that requires constant reinterpretation; and it is to remain the adequate ideal of our political life. Equality of property, the contract relation, police power, and the like, cannot retain in our own day precisely the significance they had under the homespun conditions of our country's beginning. The spirit of democracy must be slowly but surely remolding its forms. It is in the realm of religion. No single formulated theory of the faith can claim the right to remain unmodified, except as it proves itself more adequate for present needs than any revision we can make. Christianity is something bigger than its creeds, and the most fundamental framework of its thought must be to some extent plastic to the needs of its expanding life. It is not decadence but abundant vigor in religion that calls for reconstruction in theology; and the capacity to undergo progressive reconstruction is one of the fundamental proofs of the truth of a religion.

The method, therefore, which is to constitute the final test of religious truth must be philosophical for the two reasons that religion itself calls for a synthesis between its own experience and other branches of experience, and that it also requires a continuous reconstruction of its intellectual forms.

But this method we have been describing has its reverse aspect which is no less important. It must be as much historical as philosophical. The first reason for requiring the method of testing truth to be historical arises out of the fact already emphasized, namely, that religion is always the product of a process of growth. Reconstructive thought is indeed needed, but its material must be furnished by history. A religion cannot be invented. Its ritual develops slowly through the accumulation of custom. Its ideas are largely a product of gradual accretion. Its sacred literature grows up spontaneously.

and uninfluenced by the thought of its becoming a canon. Its personalities are thoroughly conditioned by the times in which they live. A religion can really flourish only in a rich historic soil and in a normal psychological climate. No single intellect or combination of intellects could constitute a laboratory big enough for compounding the conditions needed to nourish the faith of men. It is in the laboratory of history that the great experiments are wrought out by which the real significance of a religion is revealed. So subtle and vast are the elements of soil and climate which make religion thrive that they can be comprehended only as we study them in the long epochs and great crises of religious evolution. Hence such study is an indispensable means of discovering the truth which a religion contains.

It is only when we get this point of view that we are in a position to appreciate at its full value the movement of historical criticism. Systematic theology, at all events, has for the most part fallen short at this point. It has been occupied largely with throwing up breastworks against criticism, in the frantic effort to protect certain citadels of the faith from critical investigation. Or else it has taken the attitude that criticism, while necessary, makes no real difference with faith—like those Germans in Napoleonic times who said, "Let the conqueror come! Germany is not a political entity at all, but a culture, an idea!" As to the breastworks, they already have proven futile against the sappers and miners of criticism. And as to the position that criticism makes no difference to faith, it involves an unsatisfactory dualism—as though we could be content to keep criticism in one compartment of the mind and faith in an entirely separate one. The favorite watchword of this position is that "the genesis of a thing does not affect its value." This is quite true, but it is not the whole truth. It should be supplemented by that other dictum, "The history of an idea is its criticism." It is true that the present value of an idea is not in the least diminished by discovering that it had humble and apparently trivial beginnings. But it is also true that the real value of an idea to us now cannot be measured solely by its present appeal to us. We need to study its workings in history, in order to know what its real value is. For example, the religious value of legalism and asceticism has been pretty

well worked out in history, and when these principles reappear in somewhat disguised form, and begin to win acceptance, the church ought to be able to detect their spuriousness. Again, certain theories of redemption and atonement have already been thoroughly tested in history, and every teacher of religion needs to have the memory of that testing constantly in mind. Just now there is pressing need of historical investigation to aid in determining whether God is thought of as Infinite Substance or as Spirit, and as to what personality means, if applied to him. So all the ideas of religion require historical testing. They are all the product of growth and can be understood only in the light of their growth.

But there is another reason why the historical test is indispensable. History shows that religions are inextricably bound up with prophetic personalities from whom they have sprung or who have given them their greatest forward impulses. You can cut off the top of a tree and have it grow again, but to cut off its roots is fatal. Now the roots of a religion, by which it draws sustenance from the soil of the past for the nourishing of each growing bud that it sends forth--these roots are its prophetic personalities. I know that the question whether permanent significance can be attributed to great religious personalities is warmly debated in these days. Liberal theologians are at present divided over the issue as to whether the central thing in Christianity is a personality or a principle. Jesus of history or the Christ of faith; the Person or the Idea; which the Person gave rise to; the unique, concrete personality, which came at one point in history, or the Logos, progressively manifesting itself throughout history--which is fundamental? Now the interest of this issue arises out of the supposition that in the one way or the other a fixed norm is to be secured. Either the person of Christ is to be withdrawn from historical study and given legislative authority in some respects, or some abstract principle, which we may deduce, is to be ultimate. But when we once have given up the idea that the problem of religious truth can be settled by an ultimatum, either from the realm of philosophy or of history, and perceive that our reliance must be upon a method, which has both its philosophical and historical aspects, then we can see that the dependence upon prophetic personalities and the search for principles supplement each other.

What is the nature of the prophet's claim to an abiding place in religion? Is it not based upon his originality and creativeness in the moral and spiritual realm? But if originality and creativeness in the realm of the spirit are the essential characteristics of the great religious personality, then such qualities belong to the essence of religion itself in its fully developed form. The religious ideal for every soul must be to bring it to the point where it will be able to send out its own ray of light, however tiny, to the lives of other men, and add its special increment of power, however slight, to the forwarding of the great common human ends. The very significance of the unique personalities, who become a permanent source of revelation for their fellows, is that they can engender in other men a real and direct life with God, and so enable them to meet their own problems with independent insight and energy. To become a disciple of Agassiz, as one can see from the delightful *Recollections* of Professor Shaler, was to become an original scientist. If one failed to acquire original power in his work he was no true disciple of the great Agassiz. What is true in such an instance is more profoundly true in the realm of religion. The prophet gives us a deeper insight into the principles which he has embodied, imparts to us his own mind and spirit, and so enables us to live, in some measure, the prophetic life.

But it is a lack of insight to suppose that, as we appropriate the principles of the prophet's life, his personality as a concrete whole becomes any less significant for us. No abstract principle can be an adequate substitute for the prophet himself. For truths embodied in life are always more luminous than truths in their abstract form. An ideal gains a new radiance when it shines through a personality. Books will never replace teachers. Magazine articles will never drive out orators. Printed homilies will never serve as a substitute for preachers. And this, not because of any ineradicable weakness in human nature, but because there is more truth in an ideal glowing with the passion of a human soul than in the most faultless of its intellectual definitions. If we would have something more than the skeleton of religious truth, if we would apprehend its flesh and blood and nerve, then we must learn directly from the personality of the prophet.

The necessity for this is imbedded most deeply in the very nature



of religion itself. Religion is concerned with man's relation to the Infinite. It is an experience in which the finite and the Infinite meet. But now the fullest expression of the Infinite is not in abstractions but in individualities. The more normally and completely an individual is developed, the more he embodies the Infinite. The genius of an artist is a very pervasive thing. It is not easily caught as you study his life. If you would really know it, go to his masterpiece, sit down before it, and let that individual expression of the artist's genius sink into your soul. The genius of the Infinite God is the most pervasive of all realities, but if we would appreciate it most vividly and poignantly, we must sit at the feet of Jesus Christ. In this abiding significance of Jesus Christ and of every prophet of God is to be found the supreme reason for the historical testing of our faith.

Our discussion has led us to the conclusion that the final test of religious truth must be a method rather than an absolute norm, and that this method must be both historical and philosophical in its character. On the one hand, we need to co-ordinate religious truth with other truth, and to reconstruct the doctrines of the past for the sake of enhancing their present value, while on the other hand we are bound also to study the way in which religious ideas and functions have worked in history, in order to determine what their real value is. And above all we need to have our own sense of religious values nourished, purified, and developed by spiritual association with the great prophets of faith.

EUGENE W. LYMAN

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
BANGOR, ME.

---

If we take the real meaning of the question under discussion to be: "Is history rather than philosophy the final court of appeal in the determination of religious truth?" then, since history represents external authority, and philosophy represents the free, rational spirit of man, the question really amounts to this: "Is the final test of religious truth some form of external authority, or human reason itself?"

Inasmuch as what may be said on this subject applies not only to one but to all religions, it might simplify matters, and prove of more immediate interest to all of us, were we to confine our discussion to

the question in its application to the Christian religion. This would prove the more fitting as, doubtless, in the entire history of religion, the relative claims of external authority and of human reason have been more frequently and more vitally discussed in connection with the religion of Christ than in the case of any other religion.

Usually the source of external authority in religion is to be found in a person or persons regarded as infallible; or in an organization, religious or ecclesiastical, or both; or in a book, or series of books, regarded as inspired, or partly inspired, and containing absolute truth. Wherever the source of external authority is placed it is regarded as supreme, to which all other authority, including that of human reason, is subordinate. Occasionally individuals will speak of several sources of authority, and regard them as co-ordinate, but, as a rule, one ultimate, supreme authority is recognized.

In the case of the Christian religion the great body of Christian believers is divided, broadly speaking, into two classes—one emphasizing the claims of external authority, the other emphasizing the right of private judgment. The question at issue is the question of the right to interpret the Holy Scriptures. Both parties agree in recognizing the Scriptures to be in some manner, and in some degree, a source of divine authority, but the question is, Who shall interpret their contents? Who shall authoritatively declare what they teach? One of the parties believes the church alone has authority to declare the real meaning of the Bible. The other party insists upon the right of the individual to make his own interpretation. Generally speaking, the first position is taken by the Roman Catholic, and the second by the Protestant.

The Catholic position is clearly defined in the fourth decree of the "Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent," where we find these words:

Furthermore, in order to restrain petulant spirits, it decrees, that no one, relying on his own skill, shall, in matters of faith and of morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, wresting the sacred Scripture to his own senses, presume to interpret the said sacred Scripture contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, whose it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the holy Scriptures, hath held and doth hold.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* (New York, 1877), II, 83.

The meaning of this is plain. The Roman Catholic acknowledges the Scriptures to be divine, and that the holy mother church stands between the individual and the Scriptures as the real interpreter of what the Scriptures teach, and any other interpretation on the part of the individual, contrary to that given by the church, must be rejected as false.

On the other hand, Luther, Calvin, and all of the early creators of Protestantism define the general position of Protestants who insist upon the right of private judgment. Calvin says:

But there has very generally prevailed a most pernicious error that the Scriptures have only so much weight as is conceded to them by the suffrages of the Church, as though the eternal and inviolable truth of God depended on the arbitrary will of man. . . . For as God alone is a sufficient witness of Himself, His own Word, so also the Word will never gain credit in the hearts of men unless it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit. It is necessary therefore that the same Spirit who spoke by the mouths of the prophets should penetrate into our hearts, to convince us that they faithfully delivered the oracles which were divinely intrusted to them.<sup>2</sup>

If anyone will examine the early creeds of Protestantism, he will find this position even more emphatically stated. It is declared in the Helvetic, Gallican, Scotch, and Westminster Confessions, and it is to be greatly regretted that later Protestantism in some quarters has receded from this broad position in favor of a more dogmatic interpretation of the Scriptures which it tries, on the basis of ecclesiastical authority, to force on the acceptance of others to the embarrassment of Christian scholarship, and to the real detriment of the Christian church.

Now, in regard to the positions of the Roman Catholic and Protestant just explained, it seems to me it must be patent to a non-partisan that the Protestant position is the more tenable, for the Protestant plants himself on the rights of human reason and human conscience, and the very claims of the Roman Catholic in regard to the divine authority of the holy mother church must ultimately be addressed to, and substantiated by, human reason and human conscience themselves. How else are these claims to be vindicated and established? Every argument he puts forth to establish the divine authority of

<sup>2</sup> *Institutes*, I, 7. Quoted from Briggs, *The Bible, the Church, and the Reformation* (New York, 1892), p. 2.

church is made at the bar of human reason, is framed by human reason, and is established, if established at all, by human reason. If he appeal to tradition, that tradition itself must be sifted by human reason. If he appeal to the Scriptures to support his claim, the legitimacy of his interpretation of the Scriptures as bearing on the divine authority of the mother church can only be confirmed by reason itself; and, in endeavoring to vindicate it, he makes use of reason, and addresses himself to reason. In other words, no matter on what grounds the Catholic rests his claims for the authority of the church, whether on the declaration of the Scriptures, or on tradition, or on both, these claims must be tested by criticism, and this criticism must make use of the rational processes of knowledge and belief. To claim to accept such authority on any other grounds is to proceed on the basis of a blind and ignorant faith, which is not only absurd, but seems inconsistent with our moral obligations to the truth.

But our Roman Catholic brother may urge, and urge with a great deal of plausibility and justification, that to insist upon the right of private judgment, as does the Protestant, is to land us in a complete individualism, and that means relativism; and relativism ultimately means skepticism. We may have as many different interpretations of the Scriptures as we have individuals, and this is as bad as the old Protagoreanism of Greek philosophy. Man (i. e., individual man) is the measure of all things—the measure of the true and the good. This simply means anarchy in knowledge and morals. It is essentially the same in regard to the Christian religion. There must be some universal norm in accordance with which the individual can test his interpretations of the Scriptures, otherwise we shall have anarchy. Every man will be a law unto himself in attempting to find out the real meaning of Holy Writ.

If the Protestant reply that the individual may be guided by the Holy Spirit in his interpretation of the Bible, this will hardly prove an adequate response. The Catholic will be ready with a rejoinder. He can ask, with a great deal of justice, Why is the individual more likely to be guided by the Holy Spirit than the holy mother church? And to the non-partisan, however firm a believer in the office of the Holy Spirit he may be, this doctrine of divine guidance of the individual in his interpretation of the Scriptures, is considerably weakened by his

consciousness of the numerous and often antithetical interpretation of the Bible by different individuals, and by different sects. So, the whole, the Protestant does not make a very strong defense against the Catholic's charge of individualism and relativism by taking refuge in the divine guidance of the Holy Spirit in his attempts to get at the real meaning of the Scriptures. If the Protestant is to maintain his position, he must meet the objection of individualism fairly, by insisting on the inherent rights of personality, the native freedom of human spirit to form its own judgment of the teachings of the Scriptures, and then defend his interpretation on the basis of soundest principles of rational interpretation or criticism. Such a position as this will, at least, meet with the approval of the non-partisan, and is free from dogmatism—that bane of all religious and theological controversy. This attitude will be in harmony with the true spirit of the Reformation, if not altogether in conformity to letter.

And now let us take another step forward. Thus far we have found that the Catholic and Protestant are in essential agreement in recognizing the Scriptures as an infallible authority in matters of faith and practice—differing mainly in regard to the question of their authoritative interpretation. And we are enjoined by both to accept the infallible authority of the Scriptures. By the Protestant directly, by the Catholic indirectly, through the infallible interpretation of the church. In other words, we are asked again to bow down to external authority. We are asked to yield belief and obedience to a certain body of religious truth on the authority of the Scriptures conceived of as the Word of God. Though this be not the position of all Protestantism, it is the attitude taken in many quarters of the Protestant church. But the non-partisan is not easily moved by appeals to authority—even the authority that is often vested by so many in the Scriptures. In the first place, he manifests a grave suspicion of it in regard to the credentials of the so-called Scriptures. He has been following the investigations of the historical critics, the textual critics, and also of the higher critics, and has been greatly impressed by the results. He notes that both external and internal criticism of the Scriptures has forced carefully informed and conscientious men to change their inherited conceptions of the Bible materially; and when he has

the light of critical investigations, separated the true from the false, the genuine from the spurious, the seeming from the real, if there be any credible documents left, containing consistent and valuable teaching, the non-partisan is willing to respectfully and reverentially consider them and their authority; and to determine if possible, whether this authority be superior to that of human reason.

Now it is useless to find fault with this respectful and reverential non-partisanship. Historical, textual, and higher criticism justify themselves. There is no valid reason why the Bible should be above reverential criticism. It is evident to any person who has carefully considered the matter that, in the first place, a large body of error has grown up about the Scriptures owing to the fallibility of human knowledge and belief. And, in the second place, that there is a mixture of error and truth in the Bible, and that, therefore, it is obligatory upon all of us to encourage a criticism that will separate the true from the false, the genuine from the spurious. Criticism is not the perverse thing so many misguided persons think it to be. It is performing a genuine service to the Christian world, and ought to be encouraged rather than condemned. It is simply a sane, rational means of attaining what is true. And the truth never hurts any man except him who violates it. Criticism is one of the functions of the rational spirit, and to this extent, at least, the Scriptures must submit to the authority of human reason.

Now suppose, through careful criticism, we are enabled to determine what the genuine Scriptural message is, then it is proper to ask: What evidence have we that it is divine, that those who declared it were invested with divine authority to speak to men? To such a question as this, many will doubtless give an answer which is an inheritance from the Reformation, viz., The Scriptures speak for themselves. They carry with them evidence of their own authority. Their very teachings carry with them infallible assurance of their own divineness. But it may be asked: To whom do they thus speak, and how or by what method do they assure? Do they not speak to human reason and conscience? Do they not present rational and moral evidence? In other words, do they not appeal to the rational, moral, and religious consciousness to convince us, and is it not on the authority of our own rational, moral, and religious consciousness that we

ultimately accept their teaching, rather than on the authority of the Scriptures themselves? Suppose their teachings contradicted human reason, or ran contrary to human conscience, would we feel obliged to accept them? Would we not rather feel under obligations to reject them? In other words, ultimately we accept them on the authority of the human spirit rather than on any external authority.

But it may be affirmed, as both Calvin and the "Westminster Confession" affirm, that we ultimately accept the Scriptures on the authority of the testimony of the Holy Spirit witnessing to our hearts as to their contents. But even here it is conceded that our hearts judge of that to which the Spirit witnesses. The very fact that the Spirit presents evidence to us involves a recognition of the human spirit as a judge and final arbiter. Were it conceivable that the Holy Spirit testified to contradictions we should feel under obligation to reject its testimony. That is, while apparently we do accept the essential contents of the real Scriptures on the authority of the Scriptures themselves, or on authority of the Scriptures testified to by the Holy Spirit, in the final analysis this is not the case; we accept them on the authority of the human spirit sitting in judgment on them and declaring them to be essential truth.

And now let us take a further step, and say that even were an angel from heaven, known really to be a messenger from the Deity to declare thus and so to be ultimate religious truth; or, to speak reverently, were the very God himself to declare thus and so to be absolute truth; even then we should not accept it as such on the basis of divine authority, or because it is a divine declaration; but *ultimately* because it evidences itself as absolute truth to the rational, moral, and religious consciousness of man. Truth is not, finally considered, to be accepted on the ground that it is divinely declared, but on the ground that the spirit of man itself gives evidence to itself that that which is thus divinely declared is true. No other position can be intelligently or conscientiously taken. This does not mean that the Scriptures do not contain infallible truth; nor that the Holy Spirit does not guide the devout man into the truth; nor that both do not speak with divine authority. It means simply this, that, ultimately considered, we do not accept the truth on the basis of external authority—that, finally, the ground on which man is bound to accept truth is, that it is declared

to be such by the human spirit. The church may speak to man; the Scriptures may speak to man; God himself may speak to man; and man may receive the message; but the ultimate ground on which he receives it is, that it evidences itself at the bar of his own soul as truth. He accepts it not on the authority of the church, nor of the Scriptures, nor of God, but on the authoritative declaration and command of his own free spirit. To receive it *ultimately* on any other ground is to demean his own personality; to prove a traitor to his own sovereignty; to strip himself of his own God-like prerogatives.

But, finally, it may be objected: Do you not overlook the fact that the large part of religious truth is not capable of proof—either by rational demonstration from so-called self-evident principles, or by logical inference from established fact? The great truths of religion lie beyond reason. They admit neither of proof nor of disproof. They are truths, therefore, of Faith, and is not Faith justified in resting upon some sort of external authority?

Now, undoubtedly, a part of this objection is well taken. The great, fundamental truths of religion do lie beyond the domain of reason. And yet this impotency of human reason does not constitute a legitimate ground for the rejection of such supposed truths, as long as they do not contradict reason. The two fundamental beliefs of the Christian religion are: belief in the existence of a personal God, and in the immortality of the soul. Neither of these beliefs can be converted into truths established by rational demonstration or by rational inference from acknowledged fact. All of the traditional arguments for the being of God—the ontological, cosmological, and teleological—fall short of proof thus understood. The same statement applies to all of the arguments for the soul's immortality. But this is no reason why man is not justified in believing that a personal God is, and that the soul endures forever. There is a sense in which not only external authority, but reason itself, is not the final court of authority with respect to religious truth. In a real and true sense there is a more ultimate court of appeal—a supreme court—and this supreme court is life. It is highly important for believers in the great fundamentals of religion to emphasize this fact. Religious truth has for its guarantee the warrant of the soul whose complex vital interests are much deeper, and far more comprehensive and



significant, than those of mere reason. Man is not merely demonstrating and logically inferring mind, but moral, aesthetic, and religious soul. These aspects of his being are really the most vital parts of his nature, and they have their own peculiar interests and peculiar truths. They have a right to their own body of ideas and postulates, so far as these ideas and postulates do not involve contradiction. To this extent they are subordinate to reason. We cannot believe in any idea, or make any postulate, that is rationally inconsistent, or involves contradiction. But beyond this we are justified in holding to those ideas and principles which are the very conditions of moral, aesthetic and religious development. Man is just as constitutionally moral, aesthetic, and religious as rational. Life in all its complexity must go on, and life, it must be remembered, comprehends more than the life of pure reason. Certain beliefs and postulates are absolutely necessary if life thus understood is to progress. In default of disproof these may be accepted—indeed, must be accepted. What more vital than our moral interests? Without them life could hardly preserve its unity. Yet our moral ideals and postulates defy logical demonstration or proof. Man is a religious being also. Religion is one of the oldest, as well as one of the most powerful, manifestations of the human spirit. It colors the whole life of the individual, and is reckoned one of the most vital forces in his attainment of moral good. But its ideals and beliefs also defy logical proof. Man is by nature aesthetic, and what a tremendous factor the Beautiful is in human life! But who will attempt to establish its ideals and ultimate truths by the formal processes of the rational intellect? We do not live by logical reason alone, nor can we live by it alone. We lay hold upon certain fundamentals necessary for living and progressing, and our warrant for so doing is this very necessity itself.

Now religion, morals, and aesthetics are not alone in this. Science does the same thing. Much of theoretical science has not the warrant of strict logic. It is adhered to indeed! in the face of much that makes against it. Often it has more of an aesthetic than a logical warrant. We cannot prove a world of universal law. We cannot logically establish a cosmos; yet the scientist will not throw these conceptions overboard. They are necessary for the very life of

science, and on this ground they are ultimately affirmed. Professor Bowne has cogently urged this position. He says:

The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies. These outline its development, and furnish the driving power. The implicit aim in mental development is to recognize these interests, and make room for them, so that each shall have its proper field and object. In this way a series of ideals arise in our mental life. As cognitive, we assume that the universe is rational. Many of its elements are opaque, and utterly unmanageable by us at present, but we assume spontaneously and unconsciously that at the center all is order, and that there all is crystalline and transparent to intelligence. . . .

But we are moral beings also, and our moral interests must be recognized. Hence arises a moral ideal, which we join to the cognitive. The universe must not only be rational, but righteous at root. Here too we set aside the facts which make against our faith as something not yet understood. . . .

Finally, we are religious, and our entire nature works together to construct the religious ideal. . . . Here, as in previous cases, we do not ignore the facts which make against the view, but we set them aside as things to be explained, but which must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith. All of these ideals are, primarily, alike subjective.<sup>3</sup>

These rational, moral, and religious ideals are not demonstrable, but, so far as they do not involve contradiction, they are affirmed on the ground of necessity. They are essential to the soul's progress.

So that, while faith concedes to reason the authority to judge of the rational consistency of such ideals, and all that they imply, and the right to reject them if they imply contradiction; in default of this, the warrant for their acceptance is the living soul itself—in all of its manifold and vital interests. The final court of appeal is life—the life of the human spirit.

In this sense, then, there is a realm of reality and truth that is above and beyond reason, and faith may move forward confidently and complacently. It has the warrant of the living soul for its truths. In this sense too, life is the final test of religious truth—the supreme court to which ultimate appeals must be made. But this is far from an appeal to external authority.

To sum up: In his controversy with the Catholic, let the Protestant insist upon the right of private judgment; because the Catholic can only vindicate the authority of the church by an appeal to the rational

<sup>3</sup> *Philosophy of Theism* (New York, 1887), pp. 19-21.

spirit, and by means of rational argument; because, also, of the inalienable right of the human spirit to seek truth for itself.

In the second place, let the spirit of man assert its own sovereignty in seeking truth even when called upon to accept certain things on the plea that they are the declarations of the Scriptures, or of the Scriptures as testified to by the Holy Spirit, or even that they are the declarations of the Deity himself. Ultimately considered man's duty is to accept religious truth on the authority of the declaration of his own spirit that it is truth.

In the third place, let us recognize the fact of the limitations of human reason, that there may be truths which do not admit either of proof or of disproof, but are not therefore to be rejected. They have the warrant or guaranty of the living soul. They are necessary for its highest progress, and in this necessity lies the ground of their acceptance. As Tennyson puts it in "The Ancient Sage":

Thou canst not prove the Nameless, O my son,  
Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in,  
Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone,  
Nor canst thou prove that thou art spirit alone,  
Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one.  
Thou canst not prove thou art immortal, no  
Nor yet that thou art mortal—nay, my son,  
Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,  
Am not thyself in converse with thyself,  
For nothing worthy proving can be proven,  
Nor yet disproven: wherefore thou be wise,  
Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt,  
And cling to Faith, beyond the Forms of Faith!

E. HERSHEY SNEATH

YALE UNIVERSITY  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

## THE FIRST GREAT CHRISTIAN CREED

---

PROFESSOR JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER, D. D.  
Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J.

---

The relation of Jesus Christ the Son to God the Father was a question not fully determined by any common action of the church until the Council of Nicaea, in 325. How to preserve the unity of God, how to be true to Christianity as a monotheistic religion, and yet be true to the universal conscience of the church that in Christ she had a divine Savior and Lord, that was the question. There were different answers to it in that ante-Nicene age. (It is not the intention to give here a history of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in that age, but simply to select a few outstanding men.) There was the answer, for instance, of the Monarchians, sometimes called Unitarians, of whom there were two schools, the Dynamistic and the Modalistic. The chief man of the first school was Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch after 260, an original and fruitful thinker, who might be called in a sense the father of Unitarianism. The Logos and Spirit were not subsistences in God, but simply powers in him, like the mind and reason of man. This reason existed in the man Jesus above all other creatures, and this man remained free from sin owing to the large measure of this indwelling divine reason, so that he conquered sin for the whole race, and became Savior and Lord. There resulted an ethical oneness with God. "In the oneness of the will, in the immutability of love man becomes indissolubly united with Deity, under the influence of the Logos progressively deified." According to Paul of Samosata, Christ was only a man as to his entire nature (though born miraculously), but he became divine through the indwelling divine reason and could be worshiped. Many so-called "liberals" today are the unconscious followers of Paul of Samosata.

The second, or Modalistic, school of Monarchians, sometimes called Patripassians, had as their chief representative Praxeas, who

came to Rome from Asia Minor about 170, and apparently won some of the Roman popes into sympathy with his views. According to the Patristic schools there is no God but God the Father. By self-humiliation he became man, so that the Son is the Father veiled in the flesh. There is no God but the one manifested in Christ, a view like that of the Swedenborgians. Here the divinity of Christ is completely preserved, but by the sacrifice of the personal, substantial pre-existence with God. It is interesting to note that both of these Monarchian schools tried to be true in some sense to a real divinity of Jesus. That he was a mere man in the recent Unitarian sense, or that he came into the world by ordinary means, they never thought.

Another answer to this question was that of the Sabellians, who also preserves the divinity of the Savior, though in a startling way. Sabellius was a daring thinker (flourished about 200), who started from the philosophical idea of the divine monad immanent in the world, expanding or contracting for its work in the universe. The monad unfolds or expands himself into a threefold, successive revelation: first as God the Father in the Old Testament, second as God the Son in the incarnation and redemption, and third as God the Spirit in quickening, enlightening, and saving. The monad becomes a triad, which finally returns into the monad state, when the work of salvation is complete. This view makes Christ divine, if one might so speak; that is, it denies a real incarnation.

At the Council of Nicaea there were two views in mortal conflict—the Athanasian and the Arian. The Athanasian held that in a mysterious sense Jesus Christ existed as Son or Logos eternally with the Father, and that he came forth for our salvation at the incarnation. This pre-existence was a substantial and, in a sense, a personal (but not in our modern sense of the word personal). Arius held that Christ had no eternal pre-existence with God, who alone is eternal, unchangeable. God is separated by an infinite chasm from man—a Gnostic and Hindu idea. God cannot create the world directly, but only through an agent, the Logos, who is himself created for the purpose of creating the world. But this creature is before time and before the world. The Logos is higher than all creatures; he is the middle being between God and the world, the image of the Father, his executor, and the creator of the world. He might

secondary sense be called "God," but he is a creature, made out of nothing by the will of the Father, and is changeable and imperfect.

Now this view of Arius did not spring out of the ground, and it did not drop ready-made from heaven. It had its antecedents in the church. What were they? Let us see where some of the views of the great church teachers, from Justin Martyr to Arius, anticipate Athanasius and Arius, and thus notice how both were in a line of development.

Justin Martyr (flourished 150) thought that the Logos came forth from God by generation without division or diminution of the divine substance, and thus he (the Logos or Christ) is the only and absolute Son of God, the only begotten. He is divine therefore in the full sense and may be worshiped. But this generation is not an eternal one immanent in the divine essence, but took place through the will of God before time. Christ is the incarnation of the reason of God, is the first-begotten of God, and thus may be worshiped with the Father, but yet is subordinate to the Father. Justin is not clearly Athanasian, much less Arian. He might be called an undeveloped Athanasian. Had he lived later he would, as Semisch has shown, have subscribed to the Nicene Creed.

Clement of Alexandria (died about 235) has both the formula and the conception of the Trinity. Christ is the Logos of God, active in the world from the beginning, the cause of our being and of our well-being, the only one both God and man, the cause of all things good in us. The Logos became man that we might be taught how we may become divine. Christ as God forgives sin. Here we have a doctrine of Christ's divinity in general harmony with the church view, but not fully defined.

Tertullian (flourished 200) taught that the Logos is a real subsistence, a being proceeding from God and begotten by him, but begotten not from eternity but at some distinct time. There was a time when the Son was not, but this does not make the Son a creature in the ordinary sense (his being is not by creation but by generation or procession—*prolatio*, "extension" [*A pol.* 21]), for as to his nature he is one with the Father. He is personally distinct from God, but substantially one with him. The Father is the whole substance, the Son a division or portion of the whole. Tertullian was Athanasian

then as to the substantial oneness of Christ with the Father, as to his absolute divinity in nature, but Arian as to Christ's origin. He might be called an Athanasian Subordinationist.

Origen (died 254) came still nearer to Athanasius in looking upon God as always Father, who always generates the Son (as the sun always generates light and heat) who is his image, his crown, his wisdom, his Logos. There is then a unity of substance with God, he is *ὁμοούσιος* ("of the same essence") with the Father. At the same time he has a separate hypostasis, which does not mean a separate existence in the human sense, for both God and the Logos have the same will, the same activity, the same thought. Here we have an entirely Athanasian Christ. But still Origen has another side to his Christology. Christ's being, though fully divine, is still derived from God the Father and rests on God the Father. He is the "second God," properly God, but as the image of the Father. He has the attributes of God, but as the emanation and image of the Father. One can pray to him, not as the absolute God, but as the executive of God; and yet it is better to pray to the Father. "Christ is God as is the Father, like him eternal; yet he is the 'second God,' and dependent on the Father."

It will be seen from this review that there was an Arian side—if we may so call it—to some of the great teachers in the second and third centuries; but that this side was a small one, their larger view being that of the actual divinity of Christ. Now suppose someone should take hold of that Arian side, develop it logically, carry it out into a consistent Christology—there you would have Arianism, there you would have a created Christ, with certain divine qualities. It is not meant by this that Arius really carried out in any fair way the subordinationism of Origen and other Fathers, as Neander (*Ch. Hist.*, II, 403, 404) seems to think, for I believe thoroughly with Thomasius (*DG.*, 2 Aufl., I, 214, 215) that he took that theory out of its connection and use, since with Origen and others it had a different significance, aimed at a different error, as it stood with them against a negation of the independent personality of Christ, against Monarchianism, whereas with Arius it was used against the deity of Christ. The non-Arian side of the Fathers was really their larger and deeper view, for Thomasius is right in saying that in so far as it denied

that deity, it "stood in opposition to the whole historical development hitherto, it was an attempt to lead it back to Ebionism—a fundamental (*grundstürzende*) heresy."

We have failed to mention one great teacher who is the link between Paul of Samosata and Arius, namely, Lucian of Antioch (flourished 275-303) who is said by some to have also sprung from Samosata, and who shared and taught at Antioch Paul of Samosata's views. Here he had as his pupils all those who afterward became known as Arians, namely, Arius himself, Eusebius bishop of Nicomedia, Maris bishop of Chalcedon, Theognis bishop of Nicaea, Leontius bishop of Antioch, etc. But in one point Lucian differed from Paul of Samosata, namely, in teaching the separate creation of the Logos before time began and his full personality in Jesus. But Lucian was the father of Arianism. It is significant that Paul was put down from his episcopate in Antioch about 268, and that Lucian himself was out of communion with the church there through three episcopates. But whether these disagreements with the Antioch church were solely due to doctrinal disputes, we cannot tell. Later Lucian stood high in the Greek church, and his followers seemed to feel that they were good Catholic Christians.

Arius, then, a presbyter in Alexandria, a pupil of Lucian, came out in the first quarter of the fourth century with a full-fledged Unitarianism, couched in terms made familiar by the discussions of the two preceding centuries. God only is without beginning; the Son had a beginning before all time; the Son is the Logos and wisdom of the Father, but not the Logos immanent in God, but a created being who received a share of the immanent Logos. This created Son created the world, and received so much of the divine favor that he receives the names God and Son of God, though he is unlike the substance or nature of the Father in all respects. Though mutable, God saw that the Son or Logos would remain good, so he bestowed upon him in advance the pay which his life merited. Arius differed from Paul of Samosata in teaching that Christ did not have a human soul. These views Arius set forth with great zeal and polemic vigor, preaching them everywhere, composing hymns, interesting all classes of people, winning followers wherever he could. Of course, his old fellow-students under Lucian took up his views.



Now it is instructive that no sooner did Arius come forth with his ideas than he evoked a bitter opposition. Alexander, his bishop, preached against him with great positiveness, teaching the Athanasian view, which shows that there was a great doctrinal tradition in the church which Arius' view outraged. So interested was Alexander in getting a consensus of opinion on Arius that he called two councils (320 or 321), in both of which the latter was condemned. Alexander then appealed to his friends in Asia Minor, those under the influence of Lucian and his circle, and a synod in Bithynia favored him. Civil strife spread, and Constantine, who had only recently become emperor, ruler of the Roman world, and who had the heathen idea of the necessity of religion being necessary to the oneness of the state, or in other words, were differences that they should be held peaceably and buried in outward uniformity, felt that measures must be taken to restore order to the church. For this purpose he called a council to meet at Nicaea in Bithynia, where he had a summer palace, twenty miles from the regular capital at Nicomedia. Nicaea was then an important city on the great highway of commerce, and easily accessible by land from all parts of the empire. This is the first ecumenical council (325), a turning-point in the history of the church, a date which is given with 1517 as the best known in church history. It was not an ecumenical or universal council, however, as the number of delegates there were at the most only about three hundred, when there were really about eighteen hundred bishops in the empire. Nor was it representative as to sections of the empire, as the whole western empire had only seven delegates.

Constantine cared for the council with princely generosity. He paid all the traveling expenses of the delegates and of their priests and servants and saw to their entertainment in Nicaea. This placed all the delegates under personal obligation to him, and helped to secure the adhesion of the council to the views indorsed by him.

What was the opinion of the majority of the council when they came together? Bernoulli says that the most of them had no definite views one way or the other. Some were ignorant, others had heard of the controversy, others looked upon Christ as Lord and Savior without having thought through the theological implications of that belief, others still were willing to vote according to the suggestions of their own conscience.

arguments, yet others according to the emperor's wish. Though not acting as president, the emperor was really moderator of the council, hearing one and then another, trying to calm the Hotspurs, producing reasons himself, and making every effort to get some united decision.

It is significant of the strength of the Athanasian view that Constantine, though originally surrounded by those entirely or partially in sympathy with Arius, changed his opinion. His bishop at Nicomedia (Eusebius) was an Arian; the bishop at Nicaea itself, Theognis, was an Arian; and the emperor's friend and later panegyrist, Eusebius bishop of Caesarea, the church historian, was at least not a strong Athanasian, but rather a follower of Origen. "He preferred," says Bernoulli "the modal theology of the Orient, poorly decked out with philosophical tinsel work; and he could not decide to believe in the unity of the nature of the Son with the Father" (*Das Konzil von Nicaea*, Freib. i. Br. and Lpz., 1896, 9). Naturally the half-heathen Constantine would be inclined to the doctrine of Lucian and Arius, which fitted in well with the Roman pantheon. Then he gave Arius, a presbyter condemned by the councils and bishop of his own province, a seat in the council, where he took part in the debates and explained and defended his views. Besides, as just said, the bishops of the east who were nearest to Constantine were Arians and semi-Arians. When we add to all this the fact that the Arians went to the council with unconcealed confidence that they would be victorious, we may be quite sure on whose side Constantine was at the beginning. The fact that in spite of this tremendous difficulty the Athanasians won both the council and the emperor speaks volumes.

Outside of the dummies and other neutrals, there were three parties at the beginning—the right, center, and left.<sup>1</sup> The right

<sup>1</sup> Seeck (*ZKG.*, XVII, 10 [1897]) says that there were only two parties, and this is true in the sense of the final and logical disposition of the members. But it is not true in the ordinary sense, as may be seen from Eusebius of Caesarea's letter (in *Socr.* I, 8 and appendix to Athanasius' *De Decr.*) compared with Theod. I, 6. First, the Arians presented their creed through Eusebius of Nicomedia, which was rejected, then the middle party presented the Caesarean creed, which was accepted with the additions insisted upon by the Athanasians. The actual numbering in the sources gives two parties (cf. *ἐχάρετον ταγμα* in Eus., *Vita Const.*, iii, 13, and Ath., *De Deor.*, ii, 3), while the historical facts in the sources imply three. So with the world outside. See also Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism* (London, 1882), 52, indorsed by Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, III, 137, note.

wing was the Athanasian, apparently not the largest, but the most deeply convinced, the most firmly entrenched in the Scriptures and in purely religious arguments, as well as in Christian experience. The members of this party counted, among others, bishops of most of the apostolic centers, as, e. g., Macarius of Jerusalem, Sylvester of Rome, Eustathius of Antioch, Alexander of Alexandria, as well as Hosius of Cordova, and Marcellus of Ancyra. The center was the mediatory party (headed by the historian, Eusebius of Caesarea), sometimes called the Origenist party. They were "neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring," but they leaned toward the Athanasian view, it would appear, as in the end they generally drifted toward that party. Some of them had no clear views in any direction, so they went in the end with the stronger party. Other than this large section of the council believed earnestly in the reality of Jesus, but cared nothing for scholastic or metaphysical or philosophical terminology. They knew in whom they believed, but they did not know why they believed it, nor what their belief implied. The left was the Arian party, numbering about 20 bishops, and therefore greatly in the minority. They numbered Arius himself, who fought for his views tooth and nail, his old schoolfellow, Eusebius of Nicomedia, later of Constantinople, and the bishops of the places where the first four ecumenical councils were held, Theognis of Nicaea, Maris of Chalcedon, and Monophantes of Ephesus.

At an early stage in the proceedings Eusebius of Nicomedia drew up an Arian creed which was read by his namesake of Caesarea, probably as president. Unfortunately we have no copy of this creed. But we know that it was instantly rejected; in fact, Eusebius was not allowed to read it through, but it was snatched out of his hand, and torn to pieces (Theod. i, 6). This seems to show that in 325 the church was in no mood to accept Arianism. In fact, the convinced Arians and convinced Athanasians were in a minority in the council, but the latter by sheer power of personality, of reasoning, of logic, and of Christian feeling won over the larger crowd, who were either Origenists or indifferent.

As the Arian creed was rejected Eusebius of Caesarea at length brought forward a creed which as neither distinctly Arian nor Athanasian he thought might be a basis for united action. He called

“our symbol”; and he says that he learned it from the Scriptures, that he received it from the bishops who preceded him, and that it was the basis of instruction in the church (Theod. i, 11).<sup>2</sup> It reads as follows:

We believe in the one God Almighty Father, the creator of all things visible and invisible, and in the one Lord Jesus Christ, the Logos of God, God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life, the only begotten Son, the firstborn of all creation, begotten from God the Father before all time. By him have all things become, who for our salvation became flesh, and lived among men; who suffered on the third day, rose from the dead; who went up to his Father, and will come again in glory to judge the quick and the dead. We believe also in the Holy Spirit. Even so we believe that each one has his own being, that the Father is really Father, the Son really Son, the Holy Spirit really Holy Spirit, as our Lord in sending out his disciples to preach also said, Go forth and make disciples of all peoples through baptism in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. And we are determined so to hold and so to think, and to remain faithful in this faith until death, as we also anathematize every Godless heresy.

Now outside of all these Nicene controversies this is a pretty stiff creed. Unitarians today would abominate it, the semi-Unitarians in our orthodox churches could not abide it, and no Ritschlian in the world could sign it. It would create fearful dismay if read in a Liberal Religious Congress. To call Christ the Logos of God, God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life, the only begotten Son, as the middle party were willing to do, is to call him all that one can call him. It is a Trinitarian confession through and through. In the light of that, the other expressions which have an Arian look may be interpreted. “The firstborn of all creatures” is a scriptural expression (Col. 1:15; cf. Heb. 1:5, 6) and refers to the incarnation, fore-ordained in the very dawn of creation. “Begotten of the Father before all time” may refer to Christ’s sonship as in thought looking forward from eternity to the incarnation, or it may be simply an equivalent for “in eternity,” as before time is eternity.

Still the Arians were ready with their interpretations, and as they seemed to be willing to accept that creed—probably to stave off something worse—the Athanasians were in a quandary. They were

<sup>2</sup> The text of this creed and of its enlarged form as adopted by the Council will be found in the appendix to Athanasius’ *De Decretis*, and in the “Church Histories” of Socrates i, 8, Theod. i, 11, etc. See notes of Hahn to both, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln*, 3 Aufl., 1897, §§123, 142.

willing to accept the creed of Eusebius, but they must introduce a few changes so as to exclude all possibility of error. They wanted "the Logos of God" changed to the "Son of God;" they wanted to strike out the "firstborn of all creatures;" they wanted to change "begotten of the Father before all time" to "He was begotten of the Father;" they wanted to place the expression "only begotten" at the end, and finally instead of "Life of Life," which of course they believed, they preferred the words "true God of true God." They also wanted to add two or three things not given in the Caesarea creed, so as to make assurance doubly sure against Arius: (1) They were anxious to put in, "who is from the essence (or "being," *οὐσίας*) of the Father;" (2) they added "begotten, not made;" and (3) they clinched the whole thing by the words, "of the same essence with the Father" (*ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ*). Now all these three additions were really included in the original "God of God, only begotten Son," etc., but for fear the Arians did not think so the Athanasians were bound to have them in. They also added "and in the Holy Ghost."

But these strong characters who were fighting the battles of the divine Christ against Arius at that council were not even content with these explicit declarations, though they might well have been content. For the victor to press his foe too hardly may cause a reaction, may hasten returning sympathies. To carry your views to their farthest analysis, and then to stuff all your inferences down your opponent's throat, may be stalwart orthodoxy, but it may have consequences that will return to plague you. At the same time it is fair to say that the slipperiness of the Arians in seeming willing to accept strong expressions of Christ's divinity which they interpreted in a way suitable to themselves made the stalwart party determined to exclude their view (Athanasius, *Ad A/rios*, 5). At any rate the Athanasians not only insisted on the above additions, but they added a list of the Arian errors, ending with an anathema upon them—fateful anathema! Thus revised and enlarged the Eusebian confession was made the Nicene Creed, the first great deliberately formed creed in history, and it was as follows:

We believe in the one God Almighty Father, the creator of all things visible and invisible, and in the one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, the one only begot-

ten from the Father, and of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father, through whom all things exist which are in heaven and which are on earth, who for us men and our salvation came down and became flesh, took on the form of a man, suffered, and on the third day rose from the dead, and went up into heaven, and comes again to judge the living and the dead, and in the Holy Spirit.

Those who say, There was when he was not, or, He was not before he was begotten, or, He was made out of nothing, or, He was begotten out of another substance or essence, or, The Son of God (is created or) is changeable or alterable—these the Catholic (and apostolic) church anathematizes.

Now the remarkable thing is that this strong Athanasian Creed won the assent of nearly every member of the council. Only two men stood by Arius and refused to sign (one account says five, of whom two repented and signed). Why this success of the right wing?

1. The fact that the middle party became convinced that their creed (see above) was in absolute agreement with these Athanasian additions, required them for its proper explanation. This comes out in Eusebius of Caesarea's letter of explanation to his church (*Socr. H. E.*, 1, 8). This letter shows the deliberation and discussion which these additions received and the fact that they were accepted only because they were the fair inference of their own faith, which in fact they were ("we received them," says Eusebius, "when in mature deliberation we examined the sense of his words, and they appeared to agree with what we had originally proposed as a sound confession"). The remark made about forcing one's inferences upon others must not lead us to suppose that the center were precipitately induced against their will to receive the additions. On the contrary, the sources show their calm deliberation, and their ultimate and voluntary conviction of the truth of those additions. The Origenists were in the half-way house to the Athanasians, and they must either go backward or forward. Their reluctance to follow the logical implications of their creed was their dread of Sabellianism and their dread of losing the historic Jesus, and they did well to dread both.

2. The profound religious interest which centered in the Athanasian view. The Arians had a cosmology, and their view (really semi-gnostic) fitted admirably into it. But they had no soteriology, no philosophy of salvation. But Athanasius' theology was built on the background of Calvary. It was interwoven with his soteriology.

It is necessary to religion, he argued, that an actual real connection or union should exist between man and God, between heaven and earth. There is no help for us in a God who is over us in a vast universe, without taking hold of us. If we should express the faith truly we must declare the actual incarnation of God, that Jesus Christ really went out from the highest Lord of the heavens. Only then can we be confident in our redemption. It was the feeling of Athanasius—and he evidently made all his party feel it also—that the very existence of Christianity as a religion of redemption was bound up with the acknowledgment of Christ as truly divine. History has shown that he was right there. If the first step is a letting-down of Jesus' divinity the second step is bound to be an explaining away of his atonement. It was this tremendous religious interest—"for us men and our salvation"—of the right wing which made them victorious at Nicaea.

It was not for a word or a formula [says Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, III, 140, 141, finely] that Athanasius was concerned, but a crucial thought of his faith, the redemption and raising of humanity to divine life through the God-man. It was only from the certainty that the divinity manifest in Jesus Christ possessed the nature of deity (unity of being) and was on this account alone in a position to raise us to a divine life that faith was to receive its strength, life its law, and theology its direction. . . . Behind and beside him existed a speculation which led on a shoreless sea, and the ship was in danger of losing its helm. He grasped the rudder.

3. It was a tribute to personality. Eusebius of Nicomedia was not a strong character, did not have a single eye, or he would not have drawn up an Arian creed and at length signed an Athanasian one. The head of the middle wing, Eusebius of Caesarea, was a cultured and learned man, but he had—like Erasmus—the scholar's mind, not the theologian's, and his whole inner nature, his religious experience, was not so absorbed in his Christology that he felt he must stand by one view rather than by another. He was therefore really open to conviction from the Athanasian side. I have already said that the mass of the council were men either open to conviction from the strongest arguments or to pressure from the strongest arm. It is not necessary to say who possessed the arguments.

On the other hand the Athanasians had men of positive influence. Athanasius himself, in the conferences of his party and in the outside

meetings and casual debates with the middle and left wings, must have exercised an enormous influence. In the council itself there was Eustathius of Antioch, a great and notable man. There was Alexander of Alexandria who was no mean antagonist, but a clear, strong thinker. There was Marcellus of Ancyra, who was a man of iron will and immense power of resistance, whose presence among the Athanasians meant a great deal. There was Hosius of Cordova, an intimate friend of the emperor, who possessed power in conciliation and persuasion, and who well supplemented the theological work of his colleagues with his diplomatic and skilful mediations and explanations.<sup>3</sup> A doctrine that could train and inspire men like these deserves to win.

4. The Athanasian party were not only convinced, but they were united, and this, with the additional fact that they possessed the apostolic seats—Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria (traditionally St. Mark's), Rome, etc.—must have at length made an impression on the majority and on the emperor.

5. This leads me to say that another reason for the Athanasian victory was the convincing of the assembly that the older and sounder tradition was on that side. Eusebius says that he "did well to assent" to the idea that Christ was one in essence with the Father because "we were aware that even among the ancients some learned and illustrious bishops and writers have used the term 'one in essence' in their theological teachings concerning the Father and the Son."<sup>4</sup> Harnack agrees with this, and says (III, 141, 142) that "there was nothing new in the common sense of the word" in Athanasius' views; "he had really on his side the best part of the tradition of the church. New alone was *the fact*, the energy and exclusiveness of his view and action at a time when everything threatened to undoing and dissolution."

6. The emperor. We cannot eliminate him from the victory at Nicaea. He was not mainly responsible, but he was in part respons-

<sup>3</sup> The Arians are later represented as ascribing immense influence to Hosius in this matter. See Athan., *Hist. Arian.*, §42. "He put forth the faith in Nicaea," they are supposed to say, though as remarked by Loofs, *D. G.*, 4 Aufl., 241, not rightly.

<sup>4</sup> See his epistle to his church in Caesarea in appendix to Athanasius, *De Decretis*, and compare Athanasius' own statements as to "testimony from their fathers, ancient bishops," etc., in *Ad Afros*, 6.



ible. "He advised all present to agree to" the Caesarean creed, says Eusebius, and in his *Life of Constantine* (III, 13) he—doubtless with a courtier's exaggeration—makes him alone responsible for the final unanimity, "urging all to unity of sentiment, until at last he succeeded in bringing them to one mind and judgment respecting every disputed question." But why did the emperor come over to the right wing, when with his paganism and his court influences at Nicomedia he would naturally have been borne toward Arius? His conversion is to be explained. Was it his homage to strength, his feeling that the men on the right had the deepest convictions, and that finally these convictions thus strongly held by the strongest men must eventually prevail? Was it a dim perception that, after all, the arguments of Alexander's party were the more convincing, and that Christianity to be a winning religion over against paganism must have an absolutely divine Savior and Lord? His own letter to the Alexandrians after the Council (Socr., i, 9) shows that the almost unanimous decision of so many impressed him deeply ("for that which has commended itself to the judgment of 300 bishops cannot be other than the judgment of God," he says; "seeing that the Holy Spirit dwelling in the minds of so many dignified persons has effectually enlightened them respecting the divine will").

Bernoulli (*Herzog-Hauck*, 3 Aufl., XIV [1904], 15) says that for their victory the Athanasians must thank their own energy. But he also says that that victory was due in part to a successful intrigue. When we come, however, to specification as to what the intrigue was, we are left in the dark. He accuses the Athanasians of two things: (1) of cutting out the biblical formulas from the Caesarean symbol, and in their place setting in theological statements which guaranteed the exclusion of Arianism in the sharpest way. But if these biblical expressions were used unbiblically to teach unbiblical doctrines, and if the Athanasians must preserve at all hazards the actual deity of Jesus, were they to blame for insisting on their own formulae? (2) of using their influence on the emperor for the victory of their side. This, he says, was their intrigue. But nothing further is alleged. He does not say they used their influence badly or unfairly. The emperor had to decide for some side. The fact that he did not decide for the side he would naturally have favored speaks for stronger

reasons on the side that prevailed. "It was not necessity which drove the judges to their decision," says Athanasius (*Ep. Aegypt.*, 13), "but all vindicated the truth from deliberate purpose."

It is the custom long since to decry the historic creeds and to depreciate the men who made them. Certainly all will admit that the appealing and binding power of the creed is its truth alone, which truth must not be burdened with the methods of its advocates. At the same time this must be said: speaking after the manner of men, the Nicene Council and Creed saved the Christian religion. At that council two conceptions of Christianity were in a death struggle, one that a created mediator was given to help men, the other that the eternal Son of God himself was incarnated to redeem men and to unite men and God. One gives an ethical religion, a finer Stoicism, a gnostic demiurge-theosophy, which would have been utterly helpless in the storms that were to come; the other is the religion of the Incarnation, of redemption, of salvation through faith, of eternal life in the Eternal Son. The parties in that struggle at the bottom were two only, the Arians and the Athanasians, and it was the great service of the latter that they stuck to their guns until they carried the middle party, whose deeper principles they saw logically led to their own views, made that party see that such was the case, and brought almost every man of them to their own Caesarean creed as now first logically expressed. But would it not have been better to have done that by argument, by the force of truth itself, without a council and creed? Doubtless. But that method was then historically impossible. To the fact that the believers in the deity of Christ fought their fight at that council as God gave them opportunity we owe it today that Christianity exists not alone on ancient records but as a regnant and regenerating force in humanity.

## CHRISTOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES IN THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER

REV. JOHN COWPER GRANBERY, PH.D.  
Philippi, W. Va.

The First Epistle of Peter presents, in the words of Wrede, "eine Reihe von Schwierigkeiten und Dunkelheiten."<sup>1</sup> The difficulties are created by the address and the conclusion. Harnack solves the problem by removing the address and the conclusion altogether, understanding 5:1 (μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων) not in a literal sense.<sup>2</sup> According to this view, the author was a prominent teacher and confessor of about 90 A. D., perhaps earlier, who did not pretend to be Peter. Another, probably the author of Second Peter, invented the beginning and the end of the epistle in order to give it apostolic authority. The view of McGiffert<sup>3</sup> is similar, except that he holds to its true epistolary character (1:3, 4, 12; 2:13; 4:12; 5:1-5, 9). The epistle was, he thinks, originally anonymous, like Hebrews, Barnabas, and the Johannine epistles, and the name of Peter was attached in the second century, some scribe probably writing it on the margin of the manuscript, because he thought he saw reason for regarding it as the work of Peter. If we take the epistle as it stands, the more likely theory is that of pseudonymity, unless indeed we make Silvanus responsible for the epistle in the name of Peter. That was an age in which men could think it a virtue for a writer to withhold his own name in favor of some great master. It must be acknowledged that this straightforward epistle does not bear such palpable marks of pseudepigraphy as, for example, Second Peter. But in view of the pseudepigraphic customs of the time, it is conceivable that a Roman Christian, wishing to issue a letter of consolation to his persecuted fellow-Christians of Asia Minor under an apostolic title, chose the name of Peter. In

<sup>1</sup> "Bemerkungen zu Harnack's Hypothese über die Adresse des I. Petrusbriefs," *Zeitschrift für die N. T. Wissenschaft*, I, 1900, S. 75-85—an able reply to Harnack.

<sup>2</sup> *Chronologie*, S. 451-65.

<sup>3</sup> *Apostolic Age*, p. 396.

fact we know six early Christian writings connected with the name of Peter—the two canonical letters, the Acts, the Gospel, the Preaching, and the Apocalypse of Peter. Great as are the difficulties in connection with the authorship of First Peter, the most difficult hypothesis is that Peter, the apostle of the circumcision, even with the help of Silvanus, wrote this letter in fairly good Greek, saturated as it is with characteristic Pauline thought and vocabulary, to gentile churches of Asia Minor founded chiefly by Paul.

The conditions set forth in the epistle, reflecting a general persecution of Christians as such (4:15, 16; 5:9), are best satisfied by the reign of Domitian (81–96 A. D.), and the doctrinal affinities are mostly with the literature of this period. But we must leave open the possibility of a date within the reign of Trajan (98–117 A. D.), either about 100 (Jülicher) or about 112. The fact that one suffered *ὡς Χριστιανός* (4:15) reminds us of the famous letter of Pliny to Trajan regarding the treatment of Christians, about 112 A. D., and if we take the word *ἀλλοτρίεπισκοπος* in the same verse to refer to the judicial informer, the delator, which is not necessary, this late date is confirmed. But this would take the epistle far down toward the *terminus ad quem*, the letter of Polycarp (*ca.* 116 A. D.), which makes frequent quotation from First Peter. If the use of First Peter by Clement of Rome could be established, the year 95 A. D. would be the *terminus ad quem*, but the numerous striking resemblances (for example, *ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν*, I Pet. 4:8 and I Clem. 49:5) may be explained by proximity of date and place of composition.

The epistle was written apparently from Rome<sup>4</sup> (so far as we know, Babylon played small part in early Christian history)<sup>5</sup> to Christians of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia (1:1)—five provinces that comprise the whole of Asia Minor north of Mount Taurus. Though *παρεπίδημοι Διασποράς*, the readers were in general gentile believers (1:14, 18; 2:9, 10; 4:3, 4). The purpose of the epistle is to admonish and encourage (*παρακαλεῖν*, 5:12) its readers patiently to endure sufferings that have come upon them on account

<sup>4</sup> 5:13 (Apoc. 14:8).

<sup>5</sup> See Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, 2d ed., 1908, II, pp. 142–52.

of their Christian confession and to live in every way worthy of the Christian name. The incentives to this course are to be found in the hope of a blessedness to be obtained through suffering and obedience, and in the example of Christ. The common church doctrine is employed wherever it will serve the practical aim. While the object is not indoctrination, for the writer the Christian world-view lies behind all right thinking and right conduct. The epistle offers no original doctrinal contribution to the development of early Christianity, but it does bring incidentally to light ideas that are not given definite expression in other writings that have come down to us from the period to which it belongs.

The epistle is then not to be understood as in any sense representing the most primitive Christianity—either as actually pre-Pauline, or as Petrine with comparatively slight Pauline influence. We find here no genuine personal reminiscence of Jesus and no echo of the old controversies about the law and faith and the relative standing of Jew and Gentile. The permanent Pauline contributions to Christianity are presupposed throughout, but by this time the sharp points of Paul's system have been worn down. Some of his characteristic expressions and ideas are employed, especially from the Epistle to the Romans; but the specifically Pauline thoughts of justification by faith, freedom from the law, dying to the flesh and living in the Spirit, mystical union with Christ, are wanting. Paul's use of baptism in Rom. 6:3: "All we who are baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death," recurs after a fashion in I Pet. 3:21. In this chapter Paul continues in his striking and profound mystical manner (Rom. 6:6 ff.): "Our old man was crucified with him, that the body of sin might be done away, that we should no longer be in bondage to sin, for he that has died is justified from sin," etc.; whereas in I Pet. 4:1 it is expressed: "He that has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin." On the other hand the consciousness of the value of Christianity, of the high and peculiar calling of God's people, of the greatness and preciousness of the promises, of the sacred obligations of the Christian profession, are no less clear and impressive than with Paul.<sup>6</sup>

We now inquire what is central in the doctrinal background from

<sup>6</sup> So Pfeiderer, *Das Urchristentum*, 2d ed., 1902, II, S. 506.

which this practical homily proceeds. That which for the writer comes first is the revelation of God and a way of life in Christ. His religious world is the Christian world, his view of God is that which has historically come from Christ; he worships "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1:3), God is a faithful Creator (4:19), is mighty (5:6), is holy (1:5), is judge of living and dead (4:5), is one who judges righteously (2:23) and without respect of persons (1:17), is one who foreknows the elect (1:12), is one who resists the proud (5:5); but he is above all Father (1:17) and the God of all grace (5:10), is longsuffering (5:20) and merciful (1:3). The means by which this grace is communicated is the preaching of the gospel, the word of good news (1:12, 25). This then is the first and most general item in the writer's Christology: the God he worships is, as he thinks, the God of Jesus, and his readers are οἱ δι' αὐτοῦ πιστοὶ εἰς Θεόν (1:21). In Christianity, in Christ, he finds a helpful, satisfying experience of God, and as a correlate of that faith the true way of life.

The second item in his christological faith is the redemptive death of Christ. "For Christ also died once for sins as the righteous one for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God" (3:18). He "bore our sins in his body on the tree, that having died unto sins we might live unto righteousness; by whose bruise you were healed" (2:24). This language means just what it seems to mean; namely, that, as it is expressed in Heb. 9:28, Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and it is here added that the cross was the altar upon which he was offered. The writer constantly uses the conception of Isa., chap. 53. To be sure, there is introduced an ethical significance: in Christ's sacrificial death there is an example for our imitation; those to whom he writes were redeemed from their vain heathen life handed down from their fathers, with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without spot and without blemish (1:18, 19), and in suffering for them Christ has given them an example, that they should follow his steps (2:21). But fundamental is the thought of the expiatory death, though the use made of the death of Christ is ethical.

An ever-present thought is that of the coming glory of Christ, when he is revealed, and in this Christians shall share. Its certainty rests on his resurrection and exaltation. God has begotten us again unto a living hope through the resurrection of Christ from the dead

(1:3). This hope has been awakened by the preaching of the *gospel*, and the readers have been begotten through the living and abiding *word* of God (1:23). The test and fruit of Christian faith and hope are to be found in obedience, which consists in a holy life after the pattern of God (1:14-16); more especially in patient endurance of suffering, and in fervent brotherly love, which covers a multitude of sins (1:22; 4:8).

The christological peculiarities are the doctrine of the inspiration of the prophets through the spirit of the pre-existing Christ, and of the descent of Christ to Hades for the purpose of preaching to spirits in prison. The present paper seeks to interpret these special ideas.

1. Upon the first topic—the inspiration of the prophets through the pre-existing Christ—the following are the passages to be considered before us:

For this Christ was indeed destined before the foundation of the world, he has been manifested at the end of the times for your sake (1:20).

To this salvation the prophets, who prophesied in regard to the grace which was to be yours, directed their inquiries and researches, seeking to find out to what season or what kind of a season the spirit of Christ within them was pointing, testifying in advance to the sufferings which would befall Christ and the church which would follow; and to them it was revealed that not for themselves but for you were they performing this service in regard to truths which had been announced to you through those who, by the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, have brought you the good tidings—matters into which angels are longing to gaze (1:10-12).

In the first of these passages we find contrasted the foreknowledge of God of Christ before the foundation of the world and his manifestation at the end of the times. As the translation given here implies, foreknowledge (*προεγνωσμένου* is the form here) is not the same as the passage as elsewhere in the Scriptures ("Before I formed thee in the womb I knew thee"—Jer. 1:5) is not colorless prescience, but a previous designation to a position or function.<sup>7</sup> The idea of Christ's designation before the foundations of the world were laid is a familiar one, finding frequent expression both in Jewish messianism and in Christian literature (Eph. 3:11; II Tim. 1:9).

<sup>7</sup> See Hort, *Commentary on the First Epistle of Peter*, in *loc.*

"Foreknown" by itself does not of course necessarily imply the personal pre-existence of the object foreknown; the expression is used of believers in I Pet. 1:2. But pre-existence is taken for granted, and the second clause places it beyond all doubt. That which is manifested existed in a state of concealment before its manifestation. Nowhere is it said of believers that they were first foreknown before the foundation of the world and then manifested. In some of the passages either in a primary or a secondary sense Pauline, it is the mystery concerning Christ which is manifested, as in Rom. 16:25, 26: "the mystery kept in silence through times eternal, but now manifested;" but in the passage before us it is Christ himself who is manifested.

Both clauses find an exact parallel in Enoch 48:6, 7: "And for this reason he has been chosen and hidden before him before the creation of the world and forevermore, and the wisdom of the Lord of Spirits has revealed to him the holy and righteous;" and again 62:7: "For the Son of Man was hidden before him and the Most High preserved him in the presence of his might and revealed him to the elect." To these may be added Apocalypse of Ezra 12:32: "This is the anointed one, whom the Most High has kept to the end of days, who shall spring up out of the seed of David, and he shall come and speak to them and reprove them for their wickedness and their unrighteousness, and shall heap up before them their contemptuous dealings." In I Tim. 3:16 we have a fragment of an early Christian hymn, of which the first line is: "He was manifested in the flesh" (*ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*). The idea is common in the Johannine writings: John 1:14, 31: I John 3:5, 8, for example.<sup>7</sup>

In the second passage it is stated that the prophets of old who foretold the messianic salvation sought to fathom its meaning and to determine at what appointed date it would come; the Spirit of Christ within them pointed out the sufferings that would come upon Christ and the glories that would follow them, and it was revealed to them that the realization of their vision was not for their own time,

<sup>7</sup> It will be seen that First Peter is using not the Pauline conception of an incarnation but the messianic conception of a revelation. For Paul, Christ's appearance was not a mere *φανερούσθαι* but a *κερούσθαι*, *ταπεινούσθαι*, and *πρωχεύειν*. See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 328.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Exod. 32:28, in the narrative on the golden calf, the received text gives 3,000 as the number of slain Israelites. As variations B-M quote: *εἴκοσι τρεῖς χιλιάδες ἀνδρῶν*, 1 *Ξ* *Ξ*<sup>72</sup> (*vid.*): *χιλιάδες τρεῖς καὶ εἴκοσιν*, Cyr.-ed.: *χιλιάδες εἴκοσι τρεῖς*, Cyr. cod.: *χιλιάδες τρεῖς*, Cyr. cod. Before vs. 6 they had quoted from the New Testament, I Cor. 10:7, but here they fail to quote the sequel, vs. 8, "and fell in one day three and twenty thousand"; of course because they see in it a reference to Num. 24:9, "twenty and four thousand." Likewise they omit a quotation from Philo, V, 186 (ed. of Cohn-Wendland), *τέσσαρες πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι*. But both passages, that of Philo and that of Paul, especially the latter with its 23,000, refer also to Exod., chap. 32, like the quotation from Cyril.

But I must cut short the discussion of detail. The praises given in the first notice to printers and publishers and to the care of revising must be repeated; some misprints I have corrected in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*. One desideratum is that the publishers might add to the next part a book-marker with the list of symbols, like those in Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica* or in my Greek Testaments; at present everyone is obliged to turn to the first part, if he has forgotten the meaning of one of the symbols.

And now some gleanings from the rich apparatus. The mountain of the law, which we are now accustomed to call *Sinai*, but which we ought to call *Sinā*, is spelled *Σιναι* consistently through Exodus and Leviticus only in the MS *r*, and in Leviticus (not in Exodus) in *g*. Where did this spelling originate? And does the difference in *g* prove the work of two different copyists? Examples of the *Iota adscriptum* are found in A, Exod. 28:28; 36:31. Or does the spelling *ωια* hint at a pronunciation *ōia* (with *diaeresis*)? By the way, this *diaeresis* ought to appear in the word *βοῖσκος*, where the ending is long; compare 36:33, *βοῖσκων*, which might be read as a diphthong, with *βοῖσκος*, vs. 34. In the latter form the *diaeresis* is not necessary, the accent marking the pronunciation. The Hebrew *shekel* is spelt *σίτλος* instead of *σίκλος* in *x* everywhere in Exodus (7 times), and in 39:7 this spelling is presupposed by the misrendering *columnae* of the Bohairic translation. The copyist of the Old Latin introduces "Pompejus" into the law for the day of expiation, Lev. 16:8, *ad dimissionem pompeio*. In the same law the Greek MSS might be classified by the use of *χιμαρος* and *τράγος*.

Very important is the agreement of A, not only with *γ*, but also with *b* and *w*; compare Exod. 38:8, 11, 12, 22; 39:1; 40:7; Lev. 7:2. For this agreement shows that the MS A or its ancestor stood under the influence of Lucian; a most welcome evidence for the theory of von Soden concerning the New Testament part of this MS.

A special study might be made of the passages in which numbers occur. In which way are the numbers written, by figures or letters? And how are the variations to be explained which are found there? For instance, in Exod. 37:13 the MSS Bah have *ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα*, all the rest have *πέντε καὶ δέκα* (d ιε) *℣<sup>m</sup> decem*. How did B come to have the number 150?

In 39:1 we find *εἴκοσι* Bah; *καὶ εἴκοσι* (iqux); *τριάκοντα* p℣; *καὶ τριάκοντα* all the rest except 71, which has *καὶ τριακόσια*. In 39:4, B alone repeats *ἑκατὸν*, which is omitted by all other witnesses. On 12:40, 41 (B alone + *πέντε*), on 32:38 (3,000 or 23,000 or 24,000) see above.

To the notice of the first Part I was able to add the notice of a *Grammar of the Septuagint* (by Helbing; see p. 448); it is now a still greater pleasure to supplement this notice of the second part with a word about a second grammar of the Old Testament in Greek, which is in every respect superior to the former, that of Thackeray.<sup>3</sup> It is the work of the very limited leisure time of a public official during the last eight years, but it embodies the most thoroughgoing collations and researches. In the Introduction the editor dwells on the classification of the various translations and translators united in the Septuagint; then he adduces reasons which seem to prove that not only for the work of translation, but also for the task of copying, a single book was intrusted to different hands. As to the two translators of Jeremiah, he comes now to the same results as Köhler (see *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1909, p. 449) apparently without knowing him. As to his remarks on Ezekiel (pp. ii, 139; Ez. α writes *ἐπιγνώσονται διότι ἐγὼ κύριος* where Ez. β has *γνώσονται ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος*), we may mention a special paper devoted to this question.<sup>4</sup> Very careful are his observations on the question as to how closely we can argue from the orthography and language of our great uncials to that of the autographs. He finds, for instance, a decided contrast in the use of the declension of *μάχαρα* between the Septuagint and the New Testament, and says (p. 142):

The contrast between the LXX and the N.T. is instructive and indicates the value of the uncial evidence. Whereas we have seen that in the LXX there are only 2 undisputed instances of the η form out of 79, in the N.T. *μαχαρη* (η) are read by WH in all the 8 passages where the cases occur; and almost exclusive use of the η forms is found in other N.T. words on ρα (WH ed. Vol. II, App., p. 163).

<sup>3</sup> *A Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint*. By Henry St. John Thackeray, M.A. Vol. I, "Introduction, Orthography and Accidence." Cambridge: The University Press, 1909. xx+325 pages. 8s.

<sup>4</sup> Schäfers, *Ist das Buch Ezechiel in der Septuaginta von einem oder mehreren Dolmetschern übersetzt?* ("Theologie und Glaube," 1909, 3.)

This distinction between O.T. and N.T. is borne out by the papyri, which show that it is one of time not of country (Egypt and Palestine). The  $\eta$  forms are absent from papyri of the third century B.C.; examples of words in  $\rho\alpha$  begin at the close of the second century B.C. with  $\delta\lambda\omega\rho\eta\varsigma$  (118 B.C.),  $\mu\alpha\chi\alpha\iota\rho\eta\varsigma$  ( $\eta$ ) (114 and 112 B.C.). On the other hand, under the early Empire these forms are practically universal.

For some of these questions it would have been agreeable to have the examples in tabulated form from the whole of these uncials, Old Testament and New Testament together; it would then be easier to decide whether these observations are really borne out by the facts. Take the question of  $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  for  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$  (pp. 173-75):

There are a number of instances in the LXX where  $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  appears to be used for  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$  (acc. sing.). A solitary example of this use of  $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  in the papyri rescues it from the suspicion of being a "Biblical" usage.

In a note (p. 175) we learn:

This use of  $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  appears clearly to go back to the translator or an early scribe of Ezekiel  $\alpha$ ; Ez  $\beta$  on the other hand writes  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ .

But nowhere are we informed whether it occurs outside the LXX, say, in the New Testament or elsewhere.<sup>5</sup>

It seems a pity that Thackeray did not treat the Greek Bible as a whole, including the N.T. Still what he has given us is very satisfactory. We look forward to the second volume with great interest. I mention some smaller contributions by Burkitt,<sup>6</sup> Dahse,<sup>7</sup> Ruelle<sup>8</sup>.

With the negative part of Burkitt's paper I fully agree, namely that Lucian's  $\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\gamma\sigma\epsilon\nu$  has not preserved the original text ( $\text{יְהִי־יָרֵךְ}$ ) and that  $\epsilon\gamma\gamma\omega\rho\iota\sigma\epsilon\nu$  of  $\Theta$  cannot be  $\text{יְהִי־יָרֵךְ}$ ; but the conjectural restoration of the original Hebrew text of Solomon's invocation I cannot accept ("Sun, shine forth in heaven!" and "I have indeed built thee a celestial palace. For Thy dwelling at the New Moon Feasts," or "For Sabbaths and for New Moon Feasts.") I fully agree again with the general remarks on the text-critical value of the recensions of Lucian and B. Burkitt's closing words are: "Very few

<sup>5</sup> Cf. my reference (*American Journal of Theology*, July, 1909) to the Psalms of Solomon 3:10; 8:23, Cod. V.

<sup>6</sup> "The Lucianic Text of I Kings 8:53<sup>b</sup>," *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1909, X, 39, 439-45.

<sup>7</sup> "Zur Herkunft des alttestamentlichen Textes der Aldina," *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XXIX, 1909, 177-85.

<sup>8</sup> "Un passage des Septante dans le Parisinus 2841, en partie palimpseste," *Revue de philologie et d'histoire anciennes*, Avril-Juillet, 1909.

scholars have realized till lately the terrible extent to which the text of B is disfigured by unskilful sporadic correction from the Hexapla."

Dahse's paper is not quite conclusive as to the questions which it investigates, because he was not able to go to Venice to compare the new MSS, to which he calls attention. My own wrong results about the origin of the MSS H-P 31 and 83 were due to working only with the materials to be found in Holmes-Parsons and Lagarde. I was not aware that there were other MSS of the Septuagint at Venice. It appears now to me a great pity that the MSS Ven. 15 and Ven. 534 have not been allowed to contribute to the larger Cambridge Septuagint. I can but indorse the hope expressed by Dahse, that a new collation of the MSS at Venice will finally settle the question. At present I am not yet fully convinced that I was wrong. If one of the MSS mentioned has  $\tau\eta\ \delta\chi\theta\eta$  (Gen. 41:2, 18) for  $\tau\omega\ \delta\chi\alpha$ , and  $\text{ιδου}\ \delta\lambda\eta\lambda\omicron\iota$  for  $\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\iota$ , I was wrong and the origin of this part of the Aldina is determined. Who will help to settle the matter?

Perhaps the help may come from Göttingen. Lagarde has not worked in vain. As evidence we may quote two short pages.<sup>9</sup> They are signed "Die Commission für das Septuaginta-Unternehmen," and tell that in 1907 Professor Rahlfs, developed a provisional plan for a scientific edition of the Septuagint to be edited by the help of the Academy of Berlin, the Royal Society of Göttingen, and the Prussian Ministerium of Instruction. The work began with the collection of all manuscripts in Greek, Coptic, Ethiopic, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, Georgian, and Slavonic. The Latin MSS are left to the Pontifical Commission for Revising the Vulgate. After the MSS come the Church Fathers. Dr. Hautsch, whose notice of the larger Cambridge Septuagint I mentioned above, has gone through Theodoret's *Quaestiones in Octateuchum*, to ascertain the biblical text used by that father. Finally, communications were opened with some scholars abroad that suggest good prospects for the future. The undersigned can but entertain the hope that these arrangements will also include the leaders of the Cambridge undertaking, that both may help each other. What an encouraging outlook!

A most important textual publication is that on Ecclesiasticus which we owe to J. H. A. Hart and The Cambridge University Press.<sup>10</sup> It has a long history. From photographs provided by the Hort Fund the text of

<sup>9</sup> "Erster Bericht über das Septuaginta-Unternehmen" (Berichtjahr 1908), *Nachrichten der K. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*. (Geschäftliche Mitteilungen, 1909, Heft 1.)

<sup>10</sup> *Ecclesiasticus*. The Greek Text of Codex 248 edited with Textual Commentary and Prolegomena. By J. H. A. Hart, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press, 1909. xviii + 378 pages. 10s. net.



this MS (Vat. 346; in the present edition, pp. 1-71) was printed in the year 1900 and by the kindness of the editor and the assent of the Pitt Press, I was able to make use of it for the article "Sirach" in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible* (see Vol. IV, 1902, especially p. 544a). Then the editor compared the Syro-Hexaplar with the Text of B (here pp. 73-88). It would have been convenient if he had marked those readings of the Syriac version which agree with 248. Then follows in the present book a Textual Commentary, pp. 89-228, printed in September, 1903; and finally the Prolegomena, pp. 231-370, in which Hart attempts to prove that the "book was written and translated before the date commonly assigned to it; that in its fullest form the Greek version contains primitive but specifically Pharisaic teaching, and that the ancestor of the uncial manuscripts formed part of such a work as Origen's Hexapla." This last sentence, quoted from the Preface (p. ix) shows the importance of the book, especially of its last part. In the Textual Commentary, also, many emendations are proposed for the Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Syriac texts which must not be overlooked. A curious omission is in the fact that Hart nowhere states that his MS 248 was the basis of the Complutensian Polyglot, and that from this source most of the additions to the text of Ecclesiasticus, which are contained in Codex 248, came into the version of 1611 A.D., and were then excluded from the R.V. on the strength of the chief uncials (cf. pp. 272 f.). These additions are "fragments of the *Wisdom of a Scribe of the Pharisees* and contain tentative Greek renderings of many of the technical terms and watchwords of the sect" (p. 279). Under headings such as "Accuracy," "Nobility," "Reception and Rejection," "Repentance," "The Promise," "Hope," "The World Which Is to Come," "Recompense," "Fear and Love of God," "Glory," "Things Indifferent," the contents of these additions are discussed. There follows a special chapter on "The Quotations of Clement of Alexandria" (pp. 321-45); and finally, a chapter on the "Conflict of the Rival Greek Versions" (pp. 346-70), in which it is shown that the text of the four great uncials goes back to Origen; while that of the cursives, especially that of 248, was used by Clement and later writers. The title *Ἑκκλησιαστικός* given to the book in this manuscript is still unparalleled in Greek. The whole first chapter of the Prolegomena, not less than forty pages, is devoted to a most careful analysis of the Prologue. Its results are: The Epistle of Aristeeus preserves a nucleus of facts; one of these facts is, that both Demetrius of Phalerum and Ptolemy Philadelphus gave their countenance to the undertaking of a translation of the law for the Jews of the Dispersion. "The younger Ben Sira came to Egypt in the year 247 B.C., and

took part in the translation of the Wisdom Literature which was then proceeding. His contribution was probably more than the rendering of his grandfather's composition" (p. 271). With these assumptions it is interesting to compare what is said upon these points in Thackeray's recently published *Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint* (p. ix): "The versions of most of the 'Writings' [Books] (Psalms perhaps excluded) . . . ." seem notwithstanding "the oft-quoted statement in the Prologue of Ben Sirā, to belong to a period not earlier than the first century B.C." This difference shows how desirable a renewed study of these questions is. Hart has contributed a most reliable basis for such a study, and a powerful incitement thereto.

MAULBRONN, GERMANY

EBERHARD NESTLE

### TORREY'S EZRA STUDIES

In 1896 Professor Torrey published an interesting and valuable pamphlet on *The Composition and Historical Value of Ezra-Nehemiah*. In that monograph a pretty advanced position was taken, a position held for a time by a few foreign scholars, but from which the trend of critical opinion has turned back to greater conservatism. The author complains because his contentions have been so generally ignored by subsequent writers on these books. He cites case after case of scholars who have given no heed to his arguments; but he certainly has not given credit to all that have used his material. My article on "Ezra-Nehemiah" in *Hastings' Dictionary* was written before Torrey's work appeared; but in the later article on Nehemiah his views were stated so far as they were germane to the subject.

However lightly others have regarded the radical conclusions, Professor Torrey himself finds nothing to take back; for a recently published and considerable volume<sup>1</sup> is an amplification of the little pamphlet, and furnishes additional arguments for the position taken fourteen years ago.

The volume offers a great wealth of scholarly material, and reveals at every point the author's critical insight; but it is somewhat marred by an unpleasant dogmatism, and by a manifest impatience with those who seem to be blind to conclusions of which the author is so convinced. To cite a single example, he quotes from an article by von Orelli to the effect that the Chronicler revised the memoirs of Ezra to such an extent that they are marked by his peculiar style, and then adds, "but those who attempt this explanation show that they neither realize the extent of this revision nor have an acquaintance with the Chronicler's editorial methods" (p. 241).

<sup>1</sup> *Ezra Studies*. By Charles C. Torrey, professor of Semitic languages in Yale University. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. xv + 346 pages. \$1.69.

Some of the most important contributions in this book are those which deal with the Greek versions. The author agrees with Sir Henry Howorth that I Esdras is the original Septuagint of a part of the Chronicler's history of Israel, and he gives fresh and forcible reasons for this conclusion. He regards this so-called apocryphal book as a happily preserved fragment of the original Greek text of Chronicles—Ezra—Nehemiah. The obvious difficulty is the presence of the story of the Three Youths (I Esd., chaps. 3-5). That story can hardly be a part of the primitive text. How then could it be in the earliest Greek version and be wanting in the latest?

Torrey holds that in this section we have a vital portion of the Chronicler's history which is lacking in the canonical books. That portion is I Esd. 4:47-5:6. Torrey notes that there is an apparent gap between chaps. 1 and 2 of our Ezra and maintains that here we have the missing material. He takes a just pride in thus restoring "a lost half-chapter to our canonical Old Testament." The story of the Three Youths was not originally Jewish, according to Torrey, but a popular tale of the Persian court, originating near the Greek period, and written originally in Aramaic, of which last point our author finds absolute demonstration. Apparently the tale was appropriated by the Jews, and the winning contestant was named Zerubbabel (I Esd. 4:13). Then the story was incorporated into one of the two editions of the Chronicler's history which were current for a time, the edition which was used by the translator of the Septuagint proper.

If I Esdras contains the original Greek rendering the question inevitably arises, what translation have we in the ordinary Greek texts? Torrey answers confidently that we have the version of Theodotion, and he gives as usual many reasons to support his claim. Thus we have at all events a consistent accounting for the versions as they stand.

One of the hard problems of Ezra-criticism is the disjointed story of Ezra, which is partly in Ezra, chaps. 7-10, and partly in Neh., chaps. 8-10. Now it is well known that in I Esdras there is no record of Nehemiah's work at all, and that Ezra's history so far as it goes is continuous; that is, after the narrative of the divorce, Ezra, chap. 10, there follows directly the account of the reading of the Law (Neh., chap. 8), though the history breaks off abruptly in the middle of a sentence (Neh. 8:13). Torrey holds that the original Chronicles was made up thus: I and II Chron.; Ezra, chap. 1; I Esd. 4:47-5:6; 4:62-5:6; Ezra 2:1-8:36; Neh. 7:70-8:18; Ezra 9:1-10:44; Neh. 9:1-10:40; Neh. 11:1-7:69; 11:1-13:31.

"By a natural mistake" some of the chapters belonging to the story of Ezra were transposed and became a part of Nehemiah. An interpolator had introduced the story of the Three Youths, at the same time adapting

it to Jewish purposes. But this story did not suit the ideas of the people at the beginning of the second century A. D., and a new edition was issued, retaining the transposed passages, but excising the old Aramaic story. Unfortunately the excisers in their zeal to rid the sacred books of a manifest interpolation, took out too much, and therefore in the canonical book a part of the original history was lost.

It is to be noted that Torrey contends that the reading of the law in the original edition of Chronicles preceded the divorce story (Ezra, chaps. 9 f.). In this respect even I Esdras shows a rearrangement of the original material. The ground for his transposition Torrey finds in the fact that the divorce was demanded on the plea that the mixed marriages were a violation of the Law, and that such an appeal would have been meaningless before the promulgation of the Law. The implication is certainly plain that the people were ignorant of the prohibition of foreign marriages before this public reading of the Law. Now as a matter of fact the story of Samson shows a decided objection to foreign wives (Judg. 14:3), and the express legal injunction is found in the certainly pre-exilic book of Deuteronomy (chap. 7). All the more since the Israel of this period is confidently assumed to be, not returning exiles, but those who have always remained in Judea, it is hard to see how they could have been ignorant of that part of the Law. It is true that Torrey's order is a quite natural one, and there is a probability that he is right. But the point emphasizes a feature of the *Studies*, that what is probable and what is certain are not always sharply distinguished.

The author gives a fuller view of the Chronicler than he does in other works. His statements will lay him open to the charge that he gives with one hand, and takes away with the other. One of the longest chapters in the *Studies* is on "The Chronicler as Editor and as Narrator." On the one hand he says that he is "one whose importance as a composer of Hebrew material seems to have remained everywhere unnoticed . . . he is an original author, and possessed of some striking literary excellences, which appear in every part of his unaided work" (p. 208).

To take only Ezra-Nehemiah, "the unaided work" appears to Torrey to be all except the Aramaic section (Ezra, chaps. 5 f.) and the memoirs of Nehemiah (Neh., chaps. 1 f.; 4:7—6:15). If the greater part of these books was composed by the Chronicler what is its historical value? Absolutely nothing! is the answer of Torrey. He insists that he had no sources from which he drew, or he would have incorporated them as he did elsewhere. The Chronicler therefore belongs to the class of historical novelists. Even his lists of names are made up from the records of his own day,

and such an elaborate list as we find in Ezra, chap. 2, is deliberately repeated in Neh., chap. 7. Why this ancient author, who is said to have done no unnecessary labor, should have deliberately repeated such a long list of names, is not apparent either from a study of the books or from a perusal of these *Studies*, studies which by the way no future writer is likely to ignore!

L. W. BATTEN

ST. MARK'S CHURCH  
NEW YORK CITY

## PREUSCHEN'S DICTIONARY OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK

Both the author and the publishers are to be congratulated on the prompt accomplishment of their task.<sup>1</sup> For some time there has been a real need for such a work, and the author has wisely made it not only a lexicon of the New Testament books but also of the apostolic Fathers and the extra-canonical gospel fragments. The texts used have been Nestle's *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Gebhardt-Harnack-Zahn's edition of the *Apostolic Fathers* and Preuschen's *Antilegomena* (2. Aufl.). The Papias fragments are not reckoned in the second class nor have all the apocryphal fragments contained in the author's *Antilegomena* been used. The selection is *Aegypterevangelium* (AE), *Ebionitenevangelium* (EbEv), *Hebräerevangelium* (HE), *Logia Jesu* (LJ), *Naassener Evangelium* (Naass Ev), *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (V, 840), *Petrusapocalypse* (PA), *Petrusevangelium* (PE), and miscellaneous *Agrapha* (Agr).

In the execution of his task Preuschen has aimed at completeness, conciseness, and brevity. This gives the volume an attractive appearance and makes it convenient to use, yet it will be a matter of regret to many that the author has not drawn more largely upon the lexical materials now available. He wisely economizes space by omitting reference to classical writers, but he is unfortunate in having to excuse himself from using the papyri. Septuagint and Hebrew usage, as well as the Aramaic background of early Christianity, have been drawn upon for some help. This brevity is relieved by well-chosen references to current literature. Good judgment is shown in the choice of critical conclusions in the field of word-study, but in general the author is conservative in this respect, and sometimes he is content with a reference to the commentaries when he might have expressed a more definite opinion.

In several places further information seems desirable. It is not certain

<sup>1</sup> *Vollständiges Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur.* Von Erwin Preuschen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. viii+1184 cols. M. 13.20.

that the meaning of ἀνέσιός should be restricted to *Vetter*. Ἀπό in Gal. 2:12 (cf. I Cor. 11:23; Heb. 13:34) calls for comment upon the weakened force of this preposition in the late Greek, especially its use in speaking of the representatives of a school or sect. It is doubtful whether *wild, finster*, quite brings out the significance of the context in which αὐχμηρός, PA 21, stands. The "parched" (*dürr*) character of that region in contrast with the luxuriant vegetation where the righteous abide seems to be the idea. The difficult διχοτομῶ (Luke 12:46; Matt. 24:51) is rendered in the usual way, *mitten entzweischneiden*. Perhaps a lexicon is not the place to speak of it, but the Aramaic idiom as seen in Syr. Sin., certainly helps to relieve the difficulty. By taking μέρος as the object of the verb, the rendering becomes more natural, "cut (i.e., 'assign') him his portion." A good example of ἐς used as the indefinite article might have been drawn from PA 10. Also its rather exceptional use as an ordinal is illustrated in PE 5, *before the first day of their feast*. The idea is not brought out quite distinctly enough in Preuschen's rendering *am Tag vor ihrem Feste* (*Antileg.*, p. 146). Light could have been thrown upon the use of ἐκ in Rev. 18:20 by citing the similar Aramaic construction with ܐܝܢ in Ezra 7:26. Ἐκ in PA 22, 24, hanging by the tongue, by the feet, is interesting enough to be mentioned. Further information is needed on Ἰουδα in Luke 1:39. It is doubtful whether *wie drängt es mich* is the best rendering of συνέχομαι in Luke 12:50. Wellhausen's *wie ängste ich mich* brings out better the personal anxiety of Jesus implied in the context. In the *Antilegomena* σύρω, PE 6, was given its primary force, *hinschleifen*; now it is classed with Acts 8:3, *verhaften*. But this is even less appropriate to its context. What follows implies that σύρω is equivalent to διασύρω, *mock (spotten)*. In PE 9, νύσσω is rendered *schlagen* instead of *stossen* as in the *Antilegomena*. This change is not necessary, as κάλαμος must in either case be taken in its secondary sense, and "poke with a stick" preserves the idea of ridicule very well.

It is regrettable to have to note some inaccuracies of detail. In other works these might remain unmentioned, but in a work designed to be an authoritative reference book it is important that they should be corrected. Several words are out of alphabetical order: δίδως before αἰδέομαι, αἱματεκχυσία before αἱμαρροῶ (but is not this a misspelling of αἱμορροῶ? If so αἱματώδης is misplaced), ἀναιδία before ἀναιδένουμαι and ἀναιδής, ἐπικεικία too early by two columns (but evidently to be corrected to ἐπιεικία), ἔτοιμασία and ἔτοιμος before Ἐτοιμας, κάμέ before καμάρα, Κίς before κιννάμωμον, Κολασσαί and Κολασσεύς before κάλασις, κοινοτωδία before κοῦμ, μονῶ before μονόφθαλμος, πότος before ποτόν, ραδίως (not after

its adj.) before *ῥαδιούργημα* and *ῥαδιουργία*, *σῆρικος* before *σῆπω*, *σκορπισμός* before *σκορπίος*, *Ταουία* before *τάξις*, *φαρμακεύω* before *φαρμακεύς*, *χίς* before *χιόνινος* and *Χίος*. *Δευτερόπρωτος* before *δευτερονόμιον* and *περικάθαρμα* before *περικαθαίρω* are corrected in the "Berichtigungen." "*Φαιλόνη* s. *φελόνη*" should be *φαιλόνης* s. *φελόνης*.

In several particulars there is a lack of uniformity, as in the variety of abbreviations for the same expression: PA frag.; PA fr.; PA, Fr.; or, Ev Naass and Naass Ev; or Dav. Adv. and Davon Adv. The general scheme of entering the adverb immediately after its adjective is not always observed, e.g., *ἀφρόνως*, *πρώτως*. When an adverb so entered is brought out of alphabetical order it is occasionally, though not generally, given a second insertion. To take examples within a few pages of each other, *ἀληθῶς* and *ἀρκούντως* get a second entry while *ἀξίως* (before *ἀξιῶ*) and *ἀσφαλῶς* (before *ἀσφαλίζω*) do not. If *βαθίως* (according to Preuschen a gen. of *βαθίς*, Luke 24:1) is entered separately, why not *πραίως* (as a gen. of *πραῦς*, I Pet. 3:4)? Nor have words always been listed as spelled in the texts used, e.g., *παλιν γενεσία* (Matt. 19:28, Nestle) and *ἐμφανίζω* (PE 43, Preuschen) but only *παλιγγ.* and *ἐμφ.* are entered in the lexicon. The diaeresis is not used uniformly: *δίδοσθιμι* and *περίδοσθιμι*, *πραῦς* (col. 955) and *πραῦς* (col. 956). Again, under *ἀθά* reference is made to *μαραναθά*, but the entry appears as *μαρὰν ἀθα* (accent!).

The author has used a (\*) to indicate that all passages have been cited (*σκορπισμός* marked (\*), but with only one citation, must be a misprint), and (†) to indicate that the word occurs only once, as cited, in all the literature covered by this lexicon (p. viii, end. *οἰκοῦν*, *συγκοιμάομαι*, *ὑπερβαίνω*, *ὑπόκειμαι* are wrongly marked (†), as more than one citation for each is given). Thus he hopes the lexicon will serve for all practical purposes as a concordance. This would have been a valuable feature had it been carried out with accuracy, especially for the apocryphal writings. For these we have nothing like Moulton and Geden's *New Testament Concordance* and Goodspeed's *Index Patristicus*. But Preuschen's lexicon does not fill the gap. Some words are not entered: *ἀνθηρός* (PA 10), *ἀποτίκτω* (PA, Fr. 3), *μνημοσύνη* (PE 54), *ξίφος* (PA 30), *φυτόν* (PA 15); and according to the general plan also *ἀμείνων* (PA, Fr. 2 bis), *ἀνωτέρω* (PA 24), *αὐτοσώρας* (PE 20), *ἔμπροσθε* (PA 6). Occasionally incorrect references are given, if the author's *Antilegomena* (2. Aufl.) is used: *γεῦσις*, EbEv, 3 for 2; *δόκιμος*, Agr, 10 for 11; *εἶδος*, EbEv, 4 for 3; *ἐπικατάρατος*, Agr, 7 for 8; *εὐνουχία*, Agr, 17 for 18; *καλῶς*, AE, 2 for 1b; *καταλύω*, AE 6, for 2; *ἀρσην*, *θῆλυς* and *πατέω*, AE, 3 for 1c. Some words are marked (†), omitting their occurrence in the apocrypha, e.g., *ἀνατρέχω*

(PA, Fr. 2), ἀντικρυς (PA 26), εἶωθα (PE 50), ἑκάτερος (Agr. 2), ἐνθα (PE 56), ἐξάλλουαι (Naass Ev. 6), ἐφοράω (PA 25), μῖασμα (PA 24), οἰκήτωρ (PA 17 and 19), παροργισμός (Agr. 30 *bis*), στήθος (PE 28), τημελοῦχος (PA, Fr. 3). More than one occurrence of a word in the same context is not indicated, e.g., γαμέω, Agr. 18 (four times); and ἰχώρ, PA 26 *bis*, marked (†). Moreover, a casual reading shows about a hundred instances where an asterisk has been used in the lexicon and the usage of the apocrypha left unrecorded. Sometimes this reference would have been a fortunate illustration, as μονή, PA, Fr. 3 beside John 14:2, 23; at other times it would have called for further definition, as ἀνατρέχω, PA, Fr. 2 (add *hinlaufen*) and ἐξάλλομαι, Naass Ev 6 (add *hervorspringen*).

It would be very unfair to convey the impression that this lexicon lacks genuine merit. Notwithstanding the numerous minor defects, which it is to be hoped may early be corrected by a new edition, the author has placed students of this literature under great obligation to him. His main interest has been in the specific body of literature before him, not in the Greek language as a whole and in these writings as historically related to the whole, consequently his lexicon will not meet all the needs of the specialist. But in fairness to the author it should be remembered that he aimed to produce a book suitable for more general use; and in this respect he has rendered excellent service.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### THE PAULINE EPISTLES

Dr. Scott's book on the Pauline epistles<sup>1</sup> is pleasant to read but impossible to accept. The author's object is "not speculation," but to determine from a critical study of "internal data, mainly theological ideas and literary style," the authorship of fifteen New Testament epistles. To all this there can be no objection. One may perhaps agree in part with the author also when he says that "the requirement of the critic of the epistles or gospels is not imagination loaded with extensive learning, but sure vision cognizant of truth and sensitive to difference." However, this word about "sure vision" sounds rather ominous, for, naturally, as the author considers this the chief requirement of the critic and as he gives us a critical volume on the New Testament epistles, we must suppose that he, by implication, claims to have the "sure vision cognizant of truth and sensitive to difference." A "sure vision" would indeed be a most excellent outfit, but since this

<sup>1</sup>*The Pauline Epistles: A Critical Study.* By Robert Scott. Edinburgh: Clark, 1909. 376 pages. \$2.



gift has never yet been certainly found among critics, a word may be said for the value of enlightened judgment and general knowledge both of the documents and of what other investigators have accomplished.

The Preface whets the reader's interest by saying that the chief value of the volume may perhaps be found, not in the settlement of the authorship of the New Testament epistles, but in the light it may throw on the authorship of the First Gospel and on the mind of the writer of the third.

Now although the author eschews "speculation," his book seems to me to be speculative in an unusually high degree. Let a few points be noted. It is said (p. 60) that Paul, after his conversion, "retired into Arabia, re-studied the Scriptures, re-interpreted history and the ways of God and purposes of grace." This may be a *probable* conjecture, but a conjecture it surely is. Again, the process by which Ephesians and Hebrews and I Peter are assigned to Silas is thoroughly conjectural. Grant that Ephesians was not written by Paul and that it *might* have been composed by Silas; it is nevertheless at the outset a matter of pure conjecture that Silas composed it. We must obviously judge in the same manner of the view that assigns Colossians to Timothy and the Pastoral Epistles to Luke. Whatever may be said of the various arguments by which the author seeks to support the hypothesis that Silas, Timothy, and Luke were the authors of certain important letters, it is clear that he begins with bold conjecture. This is not necessarily wrong, but if one's work rests on conjecture, it may be well to acknowledge it, or at least not to affirm the opposite.

For a book that deals with questions of authorship which are to be settled by differences of doctrine, often scarcely apparent to the ordinary reader, and by nice stylistic inequalities, it may be said that this discussion is too positive in its conclusions. Thus we are said to have "conclusive" proof that the author of I Peter and Ephesians depended on II Corinthians in the resemblance that they reveal to the opening words of II Corinthians and its use of ἀρραβών. Again, we have the declaration (p. 96) that such a number of salutations as we have in Rom. 16 "could not have been dispatched to an unknown place." Thus summarily is the old question settled! Dr. Scott is not exactly in agreement with a good many other students of Paul when he affirms that "his doctrines are stated with an intellectual vigor which makes them clear to all except those who would wish them to be somewhat other." Dr. Hoennicke, e. g., whose book we have just noticed, does not think that Paul's doctrines are "clear to all," or that they ever were.

Take yet another illustration of this feature of the book before us. The author is speaking of I Thess. 2:15, 16, which reads as follows:

"Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and the prophets, and drove out us, and please not God, and are contrary to all men . . . the wrath is come upon them to the uttermost." "Are these," he asks, "the words of the man who was ready to be accursed from Christ for the Jews' sake? Or could Paul have drawn the first two parallel lines; or any of these lines? The judgment that says so is judged." The tone of this statement reminds one again of that "sure vision cognizant of truth," to which reference was made above.

But we will not dwell on this point. The field of criticism chosen by the author is one in which it is rarely possible to be dogmatic without doing violence to the data.

Another point which is rather characteristic of the book is the license it exhibits in dealing with the synoptic tradition. Thus, e. g., the Beatitudes of poverty of spirit and of meekness seem to be assigned to Silas because of the similarity between them and Eph. 4:2. The reward promised to the pure in heart, that they shall see God, is attributed to the same source because of its resemblance to Heb. 12:12 (should be 11:27). The phrases "light of the world," "good works," and "glorify your Father" are said to "accord with the second group," that is, the group of letters assigned to Silas, and because of this accord they are given to him. In Matt. 13:17 there is reference to the forward look of men of old, and this, because of the reappearance of the same thought in I Pet. 1:10, 11 and Heb. 11:13 is classed with the evidence that the author of I Peter and Hebrews was the reviser of Matthew.

Now this method of dealing with the text of the words of Jesus seems altogether unjustifiable. The combination of lowliness and meekness in Eph. 4:2, instead of indicating that the author of Ephesians was the reviser of the Sermon on the Mount, may more easily be regarded as a simple echo of the Beatitudes. So should we judge in each of the other cases mentioned. The words of the Master colored the words of the disciple.

The argument of the book as a whole seems to me to be characterized by great subjectivity. Its results lack the quality of conclusiveness. It is bold and at times decidedly interesting, but the reader who looks up the references and compares the passages is left at last unconvinced. The objections that spring up at once to the view that Ephesians, Hebrews, and I Peter, together with the ecclesiastical and theological additions to Matthew, were the work of one man and that man a loyal disciple of Paul; to the view also that I Thess., chaps. 1-3, II Thess., chap. 3, and Colossians, with the final editorship of Mark's gospel, are to be credited to Timothy;

and to the view that the Pastoral Epistles with "many terms and some clauses in all Paul's epistles" are to be assigned to Luke, are not overcome by the reasons which are advanced in support of the hypothesis.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

### MODERN VIEWS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BIBLE

Two recent books dealing with the Bible are not so important as they are interesting.<sup>1</sup> They are both written by writers who have been on terms of intimacy with the Bible from childhood, though their personal attitude to the Bible is very different. To Professor Clarke it is the book which "still brings me the light and inspiration in which I work." To Mr. Picton Christianity itself and therefore the Bible also finds its value in the potency of its "influence in the age-long evolution from fetishism to Pantheism."

Mr. Picton writes in a discursive not to say excursive style. One involuntarily finds oneself wishing for the privilege of listening to him converse. It requires a good deal of determination to keep the thread of the argument. So far as the reviewer has been able to do so, he has found the author laying the gravamen of his work on these four points. First, the Bible played an abnormal part in the life of civilized man, particularly in the life of Protestants, in the latter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries. Second, during the preceding Christian centuries the reverence of men had been directed, perhaps more wisely, to the church. A discussion of this interesting point occupies about 125 pages. It is admitted that the great leaders of the church drew their inspiration from the Bible, but it exercised only a mediate influence upon the people and was not delivered into their ignorant and untutored possession. Third, the influence of the abnormal supremacy of the Bible, regarded as the infallible Word of God was neither wholly good nor wholly bad. It inculcated charity for all, veracity, liberty, freedom, the worth of the individual, but it fostered the vagaries—the author abstains from saying the dishonesty—of allegorical exegesis, unworthy ideas of God, the bad morals of justification by belief, the approval of compromise, the submission of reason to authority, the evils of introspection, and indifference to the progress of science. The apostle Paul looms large in the author's

<sup>1</sup> *Man and the Bible: A Review of the Place of the Bible in Human History.* By J. Allanson Picton, M.A. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1909. 334 pages.

*Sixty Years with the Bible: A Record of Experience.* By William Newton Clarke. New York: Scribner, 1909. 259 pages. \$1.25.

mind. It is he who is held responsible for the justification by belief, for approval of compromise by the notorious vow he took at Jerusalem, and for the evils of introspection, as Christian readers of his epistles tried to find duplicates in their own experience of his standard emotions. By his unwarranted vengeance upon Elymas, he shares with Peter, unduly arrogant with Ananias, and with the author of the Fourth Gospel, who paints a dictatorial and unreasoning Christ, the guilt of demanding irrational subordination to clerical authority. Fourth, notwithstanding its defects and contrary to the extravagant assertions of the radicals, the Bible has an abiding value in the history of humanity as a living record of an important part of the struggle toward purity, freedom, and light and as an unfailing arsenal for the supply of condensed statements of truth, of which Spinoza, the spiritual master of the author, approves.

While Mr. Picton is careful to show that "as contrasted with the vastness of humanity contemplated as a whole . . . the extent of the influence of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures has been almost infinitesimal," he has not been so careful to show their influence in molding the ideals of the present human race which the literature of the leading nations of the world reveals. Although pointing out the dominating influence of the Bible on Chrysostom and Augustine and Luther, he curiously omits all reference to its decisive influence over Francis. His singular interest in proving that, in the time of these imposing Christian men, the Bible exercised only a mediate influence, obscures the fact that it was precisely through their appreciation of the neglected Bible, that they attained their spiritual power and historical significance. Though grateful to the author for many an apt allusion and for his mellowness of spirit, the reviewer is forced to regard his book as a collection of footnotes for some future more adequate treatment of the proposed theme.

Professor Clarke indeed in treating the modest subject of his own personal experience with the Scriptures supplies Mr. Picton with some unusually suggestive material. He points out how the view of the Bible which Mr. Picton assails forced intelligent men, who believed that God could never speak a useless word, to give their most painstaking attention to recondite passages, thus obscuring in their own minds and in the minds of their congregations and pupils the simpler truths of the gospels. He recalls our attention to the mischief of the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation, and one of the most impressive paragraphs in the book is the restrained and reluctant statement that God, for Dr. Clarke's own mother, was bound to assume the character of the Giver of the Jewish law precisely as much as the Father of Jesus Christ.

*Sixty Years with the Bible* is a most lucid account of the steps in the journey the author took from saying "The Scriptures limit me to this" to saying "The Scriptures open my way to this," or, as it is expressed again, from "using the Bible in the light of its statements" to "using it in the light of its principles." But the book is a disappointment to those who hoped from it some adequate appraisal of the religious value of the Bible under modern conditions. Beginning with the prevalent opinion of his boyhood that the Bible was the inerrant and infallible Word of God, this record of his experience shows how one piece of authority after another was stripped from it until it becomes to him valuable chiefly if not altogether for its testimony to Christ. His two most comprehensive statements of the matter are as follows: "The glory of the Bible for my purpose as theologian is that it gives me Christ whose revealing shows me God the center of the system, that it instructs me in the Spirit of Christ which is the organizing principle, and that it provides me with abundant congenial material for the building-up of doctrine." This professional judgment of the worth of the Bible is paralleled by another more human one. "It is certain that the Bible gives us knowledge of Jesus, and that Jesus gives us knowledge of God, and that God as Jesus reveals Him in the true light of life."

But to those of us who have sat in grateful reverence at the feet of Amos and Hosea and Jeremiah and the "Second Isaiah" to mention but the greatest, and who remember the reverence of Jesus before Moses and the prophets, this statement falls far short of the truth. As a matter of fact the Bible introduces us to the souls of the spiritual progenitors of our race to whom if men will not listen they will not be persuaded though one rose from the dead. The modern conception of the Bible puts at the disposal of men the enduring springs of the religious life. It is the salt which prevents them from spreading that "death and miscarrying" which the books under review prove was borne to other ages from the Holy Book.

A. W. VERNON

BROOKLINE, MASS.

## THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES

An interesting and valuable contribution to the question as to the part which university scholarship plays in the evolution of religion is furnished by two competent scholars.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jordan writes Part One—under the

<sup>1</sup>*The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities.* By Louis Henry Jordan and Baldassare Labanca. London, Edinburgh: New York, Toronto, and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1909. 324 pages. \$1.44.

title of "An Experiment"—treating of the inauguration of this study, its earliest official teachers, and subsidiary university departments. This is a suitable introduction to Part Two which is a careful translation of Professor Labanca's *Earlier and Later Hindrances Confronting the Study of Religion in Italy*. He shows Italy's apathy toward the study of religion. Earlier hindrances are found in Italy's excessive reverence for the past. Later hindrances appear in questions raised by modern philosophy and science. He also discusses the abolition of the theological faculties, and closes with some reflections and conclusions. Mr. Jordan then contributes Part Three on "The Outlook" in which he treats of the modernist movement, and some significant signs of the times. The above outline gives a general idea of what the reader will find in the book.

Between the religious apathy of the Italian people and the steadfast opposition of the Roman church to all progress in religious and philosophical thought, the Italian universities have made very little advancement in the scientific study of religion. A few superior minds like Mariano and Labanca have done excellent work that will tell when at last Italy shall in good earnest take up the study of religion in its broadest sense.

Labanca, while not an enemy of religion or even of a true Catholicism, is nevertheless an ardent defender of the historico-critical and comparative methods of study. He is well posted on the results reached by a large and brilliant group of Italian scholars—philologists, orientalists, philosophers, archaeologists, and students of folklore. All these contributions will be of extreme value as soon as it shall be possible to utilize them.

But perhaps readers of the *Journal* will be chiefly interested in Mr. Jordan's chapter on modernism. Notwithstanding all that has been written on modernism it appears that there is no very generally accepted definition. It may be that this chapter will prove to have contributed something to the subject. Modernism has a long ancestry. It did not originate in any sense of irritation, and it came to maturity among those who, thoroughly loyal to the church, were in sober-minded fashion fitting themselves for the priesthood. But they caught the spirit of modern inquiry, and were gradually led to seek the adaptation of Romanism to new and well-established concepts and modes of thinking. Modernism, while not a movement peculiar to the Church of Rome, "represents a distinctly Catholic movement and possibly a great turning-point in the history of a faith that has exercised agelong and worldwide sway" (p. 204). It is consciously at war with Protestantism. It is in revolt against certain features of Catholicism, but it is tenfold more in revolt against Protestantism (p. 218). While it has its counterpart in

certain features of Protestantism the two movements are essentially distinct. Lutheranism begged for freedom to believe; modernism begs for freedom to think (p. 217). Lutheranism was in many respects crude, hesitant, and narrow; modernism is educated, confident, and overwhelmingly Catholic. Some features of modernism are : (1) modernism claims the right to pursue its present preliminary studies; (2) to think for itself; (3) to be recognized as one of the true lineal successors of that teacher who is so often summoned to refute it—Thomas Aquinas (pp. 253, 254). These catch sentences may serve to indicate the drift of the argument. One of the reasons why modernism is not more effective is that so many of its champions keep hidden. The reasons for this are obvious; nevertheless, would it not be better to come out in the open and take the consequences? That is the way in which all great causes are won.

Mr. Jordan states that if this work should be accorded a favorable reception "it will be followed by others dealing in succession with the study of religion in the universities of the different countries of Europe." The present reviewer hopes that the good work may continue.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### THREE BOOKS ON THE ATONEMENT<sup>1</sup>

Though the three volumes before us differ in their size and in their treatment of the problem, they possess sufficient features in common to justify one in grouping them together. The Chicago book is by far the ablest and the most comprehensive. It exhibits briefly (a) the exegetical or historical sources of the atonement conception, (b) the dogmatic presentation or religious philosophy, and (c) the social or ethical application of the doctrine. Mr. Walker's treatment of (a), which is characterized by his well-known breadth, is confined to the New Testament, and his pages upon (c) are less pointed than those of the American theologians. President Hyde's little book is in fact a searching and impressive exposition of social duty as the Christian obligation, and Professor G. B. Smith is equally alive to this aspect of the question in his paper (269-319) upon the significance of the biblical teaching upon the atonement. Like the others he succeeds

<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Ideas of Atonement: Their History and Significance.* By Ernest DeWitt Burton, John Merlin Powis Smith, and Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. 335 pages. \$1.

*The Gospel of Reconciliation, or At-one-ment.* By Rev. W. L. Walker. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. vi+245 pages. \$2.

*Sin and Its Forgiveness.* By William DeWitt Hyde. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. 116 pages. \$0.50.

at any rate in presenting a view of the cross which can be preached. Incidentally he uses a phrase to which Mr. Walker devotes an entire chapter (15-31): "Is there any real atonement which does not involve at-one-ment with the sacrificial spirit of the cross?" Atonement not only verbally but in reality is interpreted by all these writers as the process of eliciting a moral sympathy with the purpose and character of God as revealed in Jesus, or of impressing the heart and conscience with a due sense of the divine will. The interesting thing is to have this view presented as the real biblical doctrine and not as a belief which requires Paulinism, for example, to be set aside. It is exegetically propounded by Professor J. M. P. Smith and Professor Burton. Both, after a fresh and scholarly résumé of the Old and New Testament teaching, agree that even the atoning ritual of the Jews is "sacred as a great educational agency inculcating in the hearts and minds of the participants and spectators right conceptions of the sinfulness of man and the holiness and mercy of the just God" (252), while it is argued that the death of Jesus is viewed by the New Testament writers as fundamentally a revelation of God's love for men and hatred of sin as well as of the ideal life of self-sacrificing devotion which all should lead. Mr. Walker, quoting and following Erskine of Linlathen, reaches practically the same result, although he words it differently. His argument is that Jesus, the representative and head of humanity, exhibited by his death the sinfulness of human depravity and God's judgment upon sin. To quote his own words, "Christ holds such a relation to the race as its head, and his acceptance of his cross had such a direct relation to man before God, to the worst consequences of man's sin, to the manifestation of God's righteousness in the doom that sin brings on humanity, and to God's loving will for man's salvation, that, like his person, this sacrifice is unique and representative as that of no other person can possibly be" (163). Mr. Walker properly insists (89) that Jesus did not come into the world simply to die. "The idea that he came just to die, and that before ever he went forth to preach he was convinced that this preaching would be rejected, makes this whole life and pleading with men quite unreal." The trouble is that this is the impression of Jesus left on the mind of many people by the Pauline theology, and that most if not all of the sayings in the Synoptic Gospels which indicate a redemptive purpose have been attributed to the influence of a more or less modified Paulinism. Professor Burton handles this crucial question, in his contribution, with a combination of frankness and acuteness which is all to the good. In the discussion of the atonement in non-canonical Jewish literature, however, one would have welcomed a larger range of fact from which to draw inferences. The



rabbinic doctrine of mediation, for example, is both rich and important enough to deserve notice at this point, especially as it bears on Paulinism. Also, the problem of eschatology enters in, if the proportions of the subject are to be preserved. The conceptions of God's wrath and of the new messianic era inevitably determined the forms of apostolic thought upon the death of Jesus. Similarly, one misses any adequate reference to the atoning significance of Jesus for the world of spirits, a phase of Paul's thought which is too vital to be passed over as a merely imaginative expression of his cardinal view. These *lacunae* I mention, not in any carping spirit, but simply to indicate the difficulty of treating an idea like that of the atonement in isolation from cognate conceptions such as those of the spirit, the resurrection, the flesh, regeneration, immortality, and the physical universe.

Professor Burton incidentally offers a most ingenious explanation of John 1:29 (101 f.). He argues that when John the Baptist spoke in the Synoptic Gospels about the stern coming one, his language was that of expectation, not of observation; after he saw what Jesus was, he said "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." His view, that is to say, was altered by his experience of Jesus. But the universalism of the Johannine logion remains a stumbling-block in the path of this theory, and it is extremely difficult to understand how such a deep impression could disappear, as apparently it did, if we are to judge from the later (synoptic) message sent by John from prison.

The exegesis of Paul, I must confess, leaves one greatly unconvinced. It yields religious applications of real value, but there are elements in Paulinism of which it hardly takes account. If the apostle meant by "redemption from the curse of the law" nothing more than "deliverance of the mind from a misconception of God's attitude toward men" (186), how can one explain his passionate devotion to Jesus Christ, his conviction that but for "the Son of God who loved him and gave himself up for him" he would have been lost in the guilt and bondage of sin, his heartfelt belief that he owed life itself to nothing but the sacrifice of Christ? Professor Burton makes out a stronger and more persuasive exegetical case than any other writer I am aware of for the thesis that "the fundamental significance of the death of Jesus, as Paul conceived of it, is in the revelation which it effects" (195). From many passages in Paul, I admit, this is all that the modern Christian conscience can retain, under normal circumstances. But these are abnormal circumstances. Sin is abnormal and sin is more than a sense that our social relationships are sadly out of gear; it is the conviction that God and the sinful soul are out of their true relations to

one another. The death of Christ reveals God's attitude to sin as one of hatred to sin and of love to the sinner; but may we not argue that this revelation is the result of a transcendent manifestation of God, which indeed enables man to do what he could not do for his fellows without the help of Christ but which also does for him what only God in Christ could have done?

In the last chapter of his book, for example, President Hyde tests his theory by an interpretation of Matt. 18:18: "Verily I say unto you what things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." This means, the author argues, that "while God eternally forgives, and Christ revealed the divine forgiveness once for all, yet it remains for Christian men and women to embody and express, individually and as a community, this divine human forgiveness toward every person who needs it, and is fitted to receive it" (105-6). The application of the moral is excellent, and it is driven home with exceptional vigor. But I doubt if it has the text behind it. Apart from the critical difficulties about the relation of Matt. 18:18 to Matt. 16:19, when practically the same functions are reserved for Peter, the point of the saying is the disciplinary authority of the early church, either in the matter of interpreting the requirement and conditions of the new law, or specifically in excluding an impenitent offender from its membership. The church has the right, in God's home, of absolving the penitent and of refusing absolution to the recalcitrant. Even in John 20:23 it is ecclesiastical censure and absolution, rather than individual action, which is intended. This hiatus between President Hyde's moral and his text is the less serious, however, as the former is true to the spirit of the gospel and even of the context. Matt. 18:10-14 would suit his argument admirably. As Mr. Montefiore admits candidly in his comment on the passage,

The honor paid to repentance, the desire shown by God that man should repent, God's willingness to receive the penitent, are all characteristic features of the rabbinical religion. What is new and striking in the teaching of Jesus is that this process of repentance takes on *active* form. Man is bidden not merely to receive the penitent gladly, but to *rule out* the sinner, to try to redeem him, and to *make* him penitent.

The italics are Mr. Montefiore's and the thought is the germ of Dr. Hyde's inspiring pages. Only, the New Testament finds the source of this redeeming love of man for man, not in any new impulse upon man's part to reproduce the inspiring example of Jesus, but in a sense of absolute indebtedness to him. The tendency of the books under review is to contest this

reading of the New Testament, and to plead that at bottom it is wrong views which keep man from God. But, however difficult it is to state or to enforce the precise nexus between faith in Christ as the redeemer of men and a life of moral obedience, a nexus there must be, and one hesitates to admit, even after reading these volumes, that the effort to realize the divine ideal of Jesus can afford to dispense with the conviction that Jesus Christ placed men in a relationship to God which furnished them not simply with new moral and spiritual ideals but with a new nature for their realization. What is Paul's view of the spirit, e.g., but an attempt to state this from his own standpoint?

To sum up: The sacrificial language of the New Testament, whatever we do with it, does not seem to me to yield naturally the sense required by this theory of the atonement; and the moral data of the religious consciousness, in the light of history and experience, hardly appear to be met by such a view of the functions discharged by Jesus Christ. When one reads, for example, that Jesus "gave his life a sacrifice for sin in no sense in which he did not ask that we also give our lives in sacrifice," or that "the difficulty largest in size is our lack of redeemers," or that the universal significance of Christ's death lies "in its revelation of the principle that it is the duty and privilege of the righteous to suffer innocently for the wicked, and by such suffering to win them to righteousness," is it lingering traditionalism or something else that makes one feel a twinge of discomfort? Does the truth underlying these statements meet all the elements of the situation? The ethical passion of these books is invaluable for an age in which selfishness disguises itself even under Christian robes, and their pages throb with a spirit of intense practical Christianity. The elements of the cross which they urge are not only essential but timely. Still, is the analysis complete? Sin is more than selfishness, in the last analysis; there are regions of spiritual experience which the discharge of social duty cannot cover, phases which are not always morbid, and agonies of despair and sorrow and misgivings which (one cannot help surmising) some natures will never be able to allay by any efforts to be unselfish and devoted, or even—to quote Mr. Walker—by "consenting to take up their right relationship to" Christ, their rightful head. They will need what Paul put first in his preaching, the truth that *Christ died for our sins*, and they will need it to subdue and thrill and transform them as it never could if it simply meant that he died in the same spirit of trust and unselfishness as they should try to live.

JAMES MOFFATT

BROUGHTY FERRY, SCOTLAND

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY IN THE LIGHT OF  
RECENT BIOLOGY

The conclusions reached in Frank's recent book<sup>1</sup> are such as to arouse the interest of anyone who has reflected upon the problem of immortality. For the author has demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the most recent and radical results of biological science not merely harmonize with, but even furnish support for, belief in immortality. He accepts Haeckel's monistic conception of the universe, regarding it as the expression of a unitary substance which finds parallel manifestations in matter and spirit. As the living organism is composed of a myriad of individual cells so its soul is constituted of the combined psychic activity of these many cells. The true seat of the soul is not the visible body, however; for this is largely dead matter. The soul resides rather in the vital substance proper—those invisible particles of protoplasm, endowed with the active functions of life, which pervade the organism. This living material composes a "transparent, invisible replica of our exterior frames which we have seen occupies a thin layer of space throughout the continuity of our organism just exactly like it in configuration yet ever invisible on the plane of matter." This invisible duplicate of our exterior frame consists of vital matter that has never known death, having been transmitted to our personal organism from the first bit of living substance that was formed on this planet. Now the soul which is a function of these bioplasts is more than the aggregate activities of them all. It is this "plus the additional and triumphant quality that follows complete organization." Thus the personal soul is endowed with an individual capacity far superior to that of the sum of cell souls constituting it. In man where there is distinct self-consciousness, and particularly in those men in whom reason and will are most exercised, the capacity of the soul as an organized unity is very highly developed. It is in this power of organized intelligence to dominate and control the matter in which it resides that the author finds ground for believing that immortality is possible—at least for those of requisite spiritual attainment. "May we not suppose that if the principle of self-consciousness has been in the individual life developed to a sufficiently high degree, it may be able to carry over and hold in organic aggregation such highly developed cells as shall continue to function in conscious activity after the dead exterior has dissolved in thin air?"

These ideas are interesting and suggestive. The author has tried to do

<sup>1</sup>*Modern Light on Immortality.* By Henry Frank. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1909. 467 pages. \$1.85.

his work thoroughly, taking pains to make every step in the argument clear and buttressing every assertion by copious references to recent biological works. In the discussion of the light thrown by modern biology on the problem of immortality, the book is valuable and stimulating. It is a pity that the author has given this, the main portion of his work, such an introduction. He has, he informs us in the preface, "wholly freed himself from whatever traditional and superstitious disposition toward the subject he might have inherited from ancestral and hereditary influences." He may have succeeded, but he contracted in their place a set of new prejudices—the prejudices of the scientific propagandist of 25 years ago when the controversy over evolution was hottest and there were exaggerations and misunderstandings on both sides. The first half of the book is devoted to a history of the conception of a future life. In these chapters the author betrays a constant animus against both theology and philosophy, seeming to assume that they are enemies of all sound science. His account of Greek philosophy is quite arbitrary and misleading—containing such blunders as that of calling Anaximander an atomist and of asserting that the world-view of the pre-Socratic physicists was better balanced and more synthetic than that of Plato and Aristotle. Modern idealism as he represents it is a ridiculous caricature of the views of men like Caird and Royce. It is amusing to find that after rejecting with scant courtesy the attempts of great modern philosophers to adjust the conflicting claims of the mental and the material he finds a satisfactory synthesis in Haeckel's "philosophy of substance," the inconsistencies and contradictions of which are glaring and notorious. It is to be hoped that before the author writes his proposed second volume he will make the acquaintance of some of the leading philosophers and psychologists of the present—men who take the fact of evolution for granted and welcome every fresh discovery of science, but who by their training are better prepared for the work of synthesis and final formulation of results than are scientific specialists, no matter how great their knowledge may be of a particular field. The exponent of objective idealism should not complain too much, however; for this work gives unconscious testimony to the strength of his position. For it is in its capacity of self-consciousness, in its power of active organization that Mr. Frank finds best evidence of the soul's immortality.

HENRY W. WRIGHT

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE  
LAKE FOREST, ILL.

## THE PERSON AND PLACE OF CHRIST

In the preface to *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*,<sup>1</sup> Dr. Forsyth reminds the reader that the book is a series of lectures, not a systematic treatise; that it does not extend "the frontiers of scientific knowledge"; that it is not meant "for scholars, but largely for ministers of the Word."

In the attitude of the lay mind, and the method and work of the religious-historical school, Dr. Forsyth sees two forces which tend mightily to shatter the foundations of Christianity. The former is more interested in "schools, hospitals, temperance, and boys' brigades" than in those "deeper things that dawn upon the experts of the Soul" (p. 17); and it thus champions the ideals of scientific rather than those of evangelical theology. The latter is bent upon making evolution normative in the study and interpretation of the history of religion; and thus threatens the finality of Christ. Both have certain things in common: they treat sin lightly, and accordingly do not stress redemption; they virtually separate the religion of Jesus from the gospel of Christ; they make love rather than holiness central.

But according to the author Christianity emphasizes sin as guilt and proclaims a redemptive message. In a moral act, God in Christ saves man at the Cross; and thus this evangelical experience becomes the key to Christology. Upon reflection the redeemed man observes that every act of Christ is a moral act; and that his person and work ought therefore to be interpreted in terms of ethical, rather than in terms of physical, categories. He observes, furthermore, that there has always been a descending movement of God to man, and an ascending movement of man to God. He accordingly attempts to effect in Christ the necessary union, not of two natures, but of two personal movements. His redemptive insight discerns that, in the unique historic Christ, the Cross characteristically represents the ascending movement and the Incarnation characteristically represents the descending movement. Further reflection makes it evident that an Incarnation demands a personal pre-existent Christ; that pre-existence necessitates a *kenosis*; and that a *kenosis* involves a *plerosis*. Were it not for the doctrine of pre-existence we would have neither a guarantee that the very Godhead became incarnate in the fulness of holy love and thus secured our eternal redemption, nor an objective absolute basis for Christ's heavenly as well as earthly obedience and sacrifice. Were it not for the *kenosis* we could neither adjust the pre-existent Christ to the facts of history, nor the facts of history to that supreme heavenly act in which Christ chose, not to

<sup>1</sup> *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*. The Congregational Union Lecture for 1909. By P. T. Forsyth. Boston and Chicago: The Pilgrim Press. xix + 357 pages. \$2.00 net.

renounce his divine attributes, but to retract "their mode of being from actual to potential" (p. 308). Were it not for the *plerosis* we could neither account for Christ's gradual growth and moral reconquest of his submerged attributes, nor discern the redemptive significance of the various moral acts that lie at the basis of Christology. Thus the redeemed man persuades himself that the world's moral and religious conflict has been resolved in Christ; that God and man meet in action rather than in being; and that the work of Christ is to be appropriated in a moral act of faith.

Dr. Forsyth has introduced the fundamental category of movement into his discussion of the christological problem. The descending movement represents the divine, or the active out-going of God's holy love; the ascending movement represents the human, or man's active reception of God's holy love; and the peaceful and eternal reconciliation of these two personal movements represents Christ, the God-Man, or "perfect revelation and perfect religion perfectly interpenetrating" (p. 348). The category of movement, furthermore, is employed to ground, on the one hand, a prehistoric act of Christ in heaven; and, on the other, various concrete acts of Christ on earth.

In Dr. Forsyth's discussion of the metaphysical act it is clearly evident that his psychology lends no assistance. We may have a psychology of metaphysics, but "metaphysical psychology" (p. 296), at least as far as mortal man is concerned, is a contradiction in terms. In his discussion of the various concrete acts it is very evident that scholastic metaphysics rather than social psychology is regulative; for he definitely conditions the value of the various concrete acts upon the value of the metaphysical act (p. 282). Such a solution, however, is invalidated not only by the facts of history, but also by psychological considerations: all concepts, metaphysical, theological, and christological included, are to be interpreted in terms of their concrete origin, their genetic history, and their practical value. In other words, just as the self and the world grow up together and the one tends to modify the other so the concrete and the metaphysical grow up together and the one tends to modify the other. Dr. Forsyth, in his contention that ethical categories must be substituted for physical categories, has in part recognized this principle of modification; but his failure consistently to work out the logical implications, not only of the category of movement, but also of the implied principle of *mutual* modification, has necessitated his passionate ecclesiastical warnings, his frequent appeals to mysticism, and his unsuccessful attempt to establish an organic relation between the metaphysical and psychological points of view.

Dr. Forsyth's typical reference to the fact incarnate, the fact interpreted, and the fact enthroned (p. 159), inasmuch as this "fact" is characteristically a "superhistoric fact" (p. 3), reveals at once his unquestioned metaphysical interest, his forensic method of argument, and his essentially unscientific approach to the problem. Such an approach will never satisfy the critical mind. Will it satisfy "the ministers of the Word"?

C. A. EXLEY

CHICAGO

---

### THE NATURE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

Münsterberg's *Psychotherapy*<sup>1</sup> is one of a series of books in which the author intends to discuss for a wider public the application of modern psychology to practical life. It is to deal primarily with the relation of psychology to medicine, and its aim is not "to stir up interest in this topic but to help in bringing this interest from mere gossip, vague mysticism, and medical amateurishness to a clear understanding of principles" (p. viii).

The author chooses to address a "wider public," not only the physician but *all* those who are interested in practical psychotherapy. This mode of procedure probably accounts for the presence in the volume of much superfluous material. A complex problem is to be solved and is given into the hands of both the experienced and the inexperienced. The inexperienced person will be interested by a mere curiosity of reading about the mysterious and miraculous records of cures, brought about by hypnotism and suggestion, which are stated in the second part of the book, and perhaps by the general discussion, in the third part concerning the application of psychotherapy to various walks in life. This the author himself recognizes when he says in his preface, "To those who seek a discussion of life's facts alone the whole first part will of course be a tedious way around; they may turn directly to the second and third parts." The physician will feel a certain disappointment also on account of the lack of systematic and scientific analysis of facts and principles, and on account of the loose, light, and disconnected treatment of the material in hand. Two separate books, one for the public and one for the physician, would have been more satisfactory.

The first part is entirely given up to principles of psychology. In place of laying down clearly at the beginning the simple facts and principles of psychology and then proceeding to the complex, there is a long rambling discourse on the aim of psychology, mind and brain, psychology

<sup>1</sup> *Psychotherapy*. By H. Münsterberg, M.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D. New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1909. xi + 401 pages. \$2.00.



and medicine, suggestion and hypnotism, and the subconscious, the mixture of which is quite bewildering and leaves one with but a few clearly defined principles. The law of "psychophysical parallelism" (pp. 33-50) is presented and elaborated in an interesting and attractive manner, but the discussion which follows it on the unity and freedom of our inner life (pp. 51-54) seems somewhat unnecessary, and detracts from the point in hand. The chapters on the "Aim of Psychology," and "Psychology and Medicine," ought to have been left out entirely or placed in the second part of the volume which deals with that phase of psychotherapy. The following chapter on "Suggestion and Hypnotism" is about the most profitable one in the book. Suggestion is reduced to the simple principle of the suppression or inhibition of negative tendencies and impulses. It is shown that every action has a direct opposite, that the curative power of psychotherapy lies in the process of induction of opposite and positive mental states and inhibition of negatives, through suggestion. The cathartic influence of suggestion is based on the simple "principle of opening certain channels of discharge for the purpose of closing the opposite channels" (p. 93). By simple words of advice or by persuasion, opposite channels may be opened, and the body and mind made to function correctly to the exclusion of unclean habits or abnormal tendencies. The same principle is involved in hypnotism. "There is no sharp demarkation between suggestion in a waking state and suggestion in a hypnoid state" (p. 124). Here the process is improved by the introduction of a more powerful form of attention. Hypnotism is not an induced sleep, as many are wont to call it, but simply the result of a state of over-attention to certain objects or persons (p. 118). It is characterized by a selective narrowing of consciousness in which the patient's sensitiveness and memory is rather reinforced than decreased, and the result is an increased activity in response to suggestive influence (p. 115). Especially good is the point which Münsterberg makes in regard to the commonplace power of suggestion. "Let us be clear from the start that suggestion is certainly nothing abnormal and exceptional; nothing which leads us away from our ordinary life, nothing which brings us nearer to the great riddles of the universe. There is no human life into which suggestion does not enter in a hundred forms. Family life and education, law and business, public life and politics, art and religion, are carried on by suggestion" (p. 86). The closing chapter of Part I is on the "Subconscious." In this the author tries to remove the false conception, prevalent among many, of a twofold division of the mind, the conscious and the subconscious. This he does in a sensational manner by beginning: "The story of the subconscious can be told in three words: There is none"! (p. 125). The following thirty-two pages are given up to

a sarcastic and entirely useless quibble over the word "subconscious." This gives the whole book a bad temper, partially destroys the effect of the preceding chapter, and leaves a light impression of the point which is to be made.

The second part is given over to a discussion of the practical work of psychotherapy, its field, its methods, and its results. The material appears to be slightly misplaced, and "mental and bodily symptoms" are somewhat onesided. General methods are given before specific methods and facts are known, and the cases of mental symptoms are a mere cataloguing of only successful cases, without systematic analysis or application. In "bodily symptoms" no cases are cited at all, but there is just a general discussion as to what might be done in the way of curing the various organic diseases by removing the functional causes of the disturbance through suggestion and hypnotism. On the whole the field of disturbances, mental or bodily, in which psychotherapy and its methods might be of influence to the cure, is well covered, and, despite the loose treatment, one gets a good perspective of the large field which psychotherapy must reach.

The latter part of the book dealing with psychotherapy and the church, the physician, and the community is interesting on account of the historical treatment of suggestion in religion, the evolution of hypnotic suggestion, and the sane standpoint which is taken in regard to the duties of the community when public welfare and health are concerned. Mental hygiene is as essential as physical hygiene. A sound character and a sound temperament should be developed alongside of a sound interest, and to produce this, a harmonious development of intellect and character should go on even after the schooldays (p. 391). At this point the duty of the community should begin. "The means of suggestion through education and art, through the church and through public opinion, through example and tradition, and even through fashions and prejudices, are a million fold, but not less numerous are the channels for antisocial and antihygienical tendencies" (p. 395).

The author has betrayed in this volume a peculiarity of mind, to which his readers have already become accustomed, of pressing distinction between ideas and standpoints to an artificial degree. As an illustration, the distinction in this book between psychotherapy and psychiatry is unduly exaggerated. Can not and does not psychiatry, in the curing of mental disease use psychotherapy daily in order to remove causes of the disease through suggestion, and is not psychotherapy one of the most important methods in psychiatry? It seems that it would be very hard to tell just where psychotherapy ends and where psychiatry begins. Another illustration is that of purposiveness and causality, which runs throughout

this entire volume. To remove the confusion which *might* arise between morality and mentality Münsterberg entirely forbids the physician to move in any other but the causal sphere, and the minister to move in any other but the purposive sphere. "It is never the task of a minister to heal a mind and never the task of a physician to uplift a mind. One moves in the purposive sphere, the other in the causal. Their friendship can seriously endure only as long as they remain conscious of the fact that they have two entirely different functions in the service of mankind" (p. 369). "Where the physician believes that the psychomedical treatment demands a new equilibrium to be secured by religion, there the minister should be called for assistance" (p. 346). The physician should never let his knowledge of the purposive life slip in to aid the cure. A word of encouragement should not be given in the same way that a minister or a friend would give it. He should draw it out of his case, and administer it in the same way as he would a pill or a chemical solution. In place of speaking in a confidential, heart-to-heart manner he should say in an indifferent tone of voice: "My friend, be courageous and faithful" (p. 58). Thus man, to the physician, would become nothing less than a machine governed by causal laws. On the other hand the minister should never lower himself so much as to go out of his purposive sphere to help along his fellow-man, for fear it would cheapen his sacred calling. What knowledge he has of causality should remain within him "silent as a sphinx." He should never make use of it, unless it first passes through the hands of a physician. This would indeed be a happy combination! If the physician should never use his purposive knowledge, and the minister should not develop a causal knowledge, then how can we bridge over the chasm? The causal is but a small factor in the larger purposive life, and if the physician is to keep in check the larger viewpoint and narrow himself to the smaller, how is he going to be able to discriminate just when to administer the purposive pill? If the minister has no knowledge of causal relations, how is he to know just how large to make the pill and what effect it will have? Neither minister nor physician would lose by having a knowledge of both spheres. It would neither cheapen religion nor degrade the medical profession for the advocates of each to know something of the other's sphere. Professor Münsterberg is already establishing a record for being able to transcend these distinctions which he has seen fit to make in the interest of clearness. One may safely predict that at some time in the future he will present to the public a treatise on "Psychology and the Minister."

H. G. SCHAEFER

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA  
IOWA CITY, IA.

SERMONS IN THE NEW THEOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

There is evidence in a volume of sermons by the Meadville Theological Faculty that the modern preacher begins to graduate in the school of austere scientific thought without losing reverence and an intimate familiar clasp of things divine. The unknown of science and the eternal problem of philosophy—God—is not here treated as alternately shuttle and thread in the homiletic loom. The confession of the central mystery in the recognition of which rational worship begins is the keynote of the opening sermon. Didactic, unimaginative, devoid of anything like spiritual glow, Mr. Gilman's *fin de siècle* homily yet points a useful lesson and deserves a place in this volume.

The sermons throughout bear the characteristics in common of a happy freedom from trite religious and theological phraseology and a strong insistence upon the humanities.

Here and there, as in Professor Christie's peculiar emphasis upon the heavenly citizenship or Professor Bowen's unaccountable failure to grasp the genuine realities of the pressing social question of the hour, there are reactionary, if not obscurantist, tendencies; but, on the whole, the public will be thankful for a volume breathing everywhere a reverent, scholarly, human piety. Perhaps the clearest, simplest, most popular sermon is that by Walter Green who, in saying that "the highest way in which God helps us is when He speaks to us through some personality," seems to furnish his more philosophic, but not more clear-sighted, colleague, Professor Doan, with a text to the two great sermons which of themselves give permanent value to this volume. Dr. Doan's style is haunting as a classic and while it appeals to the musing, meditative mind there are keen soul-thrusts ever and anon that keep the pleased reader from a mere literary enjoyment.

In "The Present God" Dr. Doan inverts the usual order of liberal theological teaching. It is not man becoming God, but rather God becoming manlike that is the overmastering theme of this new preacher who is destined, in the reviewer's opinion, to influence powerfully not only the thought of his own communion, but also set a-thinking in new and vital lines the masses, literate and illiterate, who are outside all the churches. In "The Invisible Humanity of God," he writes, "Genuinely to believe in this invisible humanity of God brings into the human life a wonderful sense of perfect communion with God. Do you find the conditions of life hard? They are infinitely harder for God, my friend." Again, "God alive appears only to him whose search begins and ends in a pure and brave humanity.

<sup>1</sup>*Religion and Life.* Chapel Sermons and Addresses by Members of the Faculty of Meadville Theological School. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1909.

Let the purity and heroism disappear from a man's belief in God and he will find himself stolidly worshipping the wooden deity of a schoolman.

Dr. Henry Preserved Smith writes instructively as ever on "The Religion of the Prophets." President Southworth discusses with his customary breadth the ideal of a school of theology and seems to hint at a more important place being given to sociology taught by a live teacher inspired with a sense of the church's pentecostal obligations to her proletarian founder. Mr. Fish, of the Meadville Unitarian Church contributes an interesting sermon on "Atonement."

E. T. KERR

MEADVILLE, PA.

### IDEALISM AS A PRACTICAL CREED

In his recent lectures on philosophy and modern life delivered before the University of Sydney,<sup>1</sup> Professor Jones, of Glasgow, advocates the application of the principles of absolute idealism to the problems which confront the modern commonwealth in its effort after a larger measure of freedom. It is not when mere emancipation from the bonds of tradition has been achieved that true freedom exists, but only after morality has been so socialized and society so moralized that law and liberty coincide. For guidance toward this end a sound philosophy is needed. Good results followed from the practical application of Bentham's universalistic hedonism—a very imperfect ethical philosophy; much better results might be looked for from the use of idealism as a practical creed. Only the idealism of love, the consciousness of brotherhood, of unity amid differences, can furnish an adequate principle of conduct in national as in individual affairs.

But while idealism is offered as a practical hypothesis to be progressively verified by enduring the strain of a nation's practice, a theoretical proof is claimed as well. Implied in all the sciences, imaginatively presented in all great poetry, cherished as the faith of all true religion, idealism becomes explicit, real and certain knowledge only in philosophy, which finds the identity of the real and the rational to be the absolute postulate of all knowledge and all morality. Here the author exhibits that confusion of the possible with the real which is common to all dogmatic idealists—a confusion naturally following from the dogma of the unreality of time. It is true that in the cognitive and moral processes man makes *regulative* use of the ideals of complete knowledge and

<sup>1</sup> *Idealism as a Practical Creed*. By Henry Jones. Glasgow: Maclehose; New York: Macmillan, 1909. 299 pages. \$2.00.

perfect morality respectively. But instead of recognizing that, so far as logical inference is concerned, knowledge simply involves the *possibility* of rationalizing the existent, and morality the *possibility* of realizing the ideal, the idealist commonly assumes forthwith that complete knowledge and perfect morality *constitute* the only really existing world. The logical and moral difficulties of this position have often been pointed out. The author contends that the alleged bad moral consequences logically deducible from this absolute, idealistic optimism do not, as a matter of fact, follow; but may not this be because certain features of idealism do not enter into the *practical* creed even of idealists?

DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

The translation of Rudolf Eucken's *Problem of Human Life* into English<sup>2</sup> and its publication, handsomely printed and appropriately bound, is an event of first importance to the serious reader in America. This work was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1908. It is a type of book all too rare among us, and the attention it receives will serve to indicate the amount of genuine philosophic interest which recent discussion and improved facilities of instruction have awakened in intelligent circles of this country. For in it the author seeks a solution of the philosophic problem not by applying a catchy formula or by exploiting the "latest discovery" of natural science or sociology but by reviewing the history of human thought in so far as this has dealt with the ultimate problem of human life itself. And this historical survey, accompanied by intelligent interpretation and criticism, proves to be more than an introduction to the problem; it clearly indicates the nature of the solution toward which man is being driven by the irresistible force of his own intellectual development.

All students of contemporary thought know of Rudolf Eucken as the staunchest champion of idealism in Germany today. He bases his idealism upon historical rather than logical or ethical grounds. The achievements of humanity in developing a "spiritual life"—a community of intelligence in which the individuals pursue ends of universal worth in the intellectual, aesthetic and practical spheres—seem to him the best proof that spirit is the fundamental reality and is destined to subdue the material world to its own purposes. Philosophy he believes to be the fittest vehicle

<sup>2</sup> *The Problem of Human Life*. By Rudolf Eucken, professor of philosophy in the University of Jena. Translated from the German by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce-Gibson. New York: Scribner, 1909. 582 pages.

for the articulate expression of this life of the spirit, "the champion and enforcer of the necessities of the spiritual life." Hence the history of philosophy is to a large degree a record of the development of the spiritual powers of mankind. In the study of Greek philosophy with which the book begins the author finds its chief characteristic to be its conviction of the power of the human soul—that "the origin and essence of activity lie within man himself; his own force must awaken the divinity of his nature and guide it to victory over his lower self." The second part of the book is devoted to a philosophic interpretation of Christian solution of the life-problem. Many readers will welcome a more thorough and sympathetic treatment of Christian principles than is to be found in the chapter on the mediaeval period in most histories of philosophy. In the teachings of Jesus the negative note is strongly sounded—that of sacrifice and renunciation as far as the world of immediate existence is concerned. But joined with this is a more convincing affirmation of the "living presence of a new world of independent and triumphant spirituality." Practically all modern thinkers before Kant are treated as belonging to the enlightenment. This period is dominated by an unqualified confidence in the power of man's natural reason—but reason abstractedly separated both from other human faculties and from the objective world. Hence while there was great intellectual advance it was accompanied by growing superficiality and formalism. In the reaction to the enlightenment begun by Kant and continued by the German idealists we find the human spirit attaining a larger view and a more adequate expression. Justice is done to the whole of human personality and this is seen in its relation to the Universal Spirit which is immanent in nature and in history. This movement represents the culmination of modern idealism "which sought to hold fast to the spiritual inwardness of the old view of life, but at the same time aimed at extending its range over the whole of human existence thereby raising it to a higher level." But during the whole of the modern period hostile forces have been at work seeking to divert man's attention from subjects of spiritual concern and fix it upon his material environment and the control of natural forces in the interest of his physical comfort and happiness. These forces, gaining strength, succeeded in dispossessing idealism from sovereignty over European thought by the middle of the nineteenth century. The second half of the last century was therefore dominated by a conquering realism which, as evolutionism, introduced new conception of nature and, as social democracy, demanded a regeneration of society. Against this movement idealism has as yet made little headway. Consequently our age, despite its great show of material prosperity and wonderful advance

in commerce and industry, is spiritually impoverished and pervaded by a profound feeling of unrest and sense of dissatisfaction. Man's inward life seems to have collapsed and he is on the point of abandoning his ideals. Either this must happen or there must come as the result of the present struggle and defeat a stronger and fuller assertion of the spiritual powers of man in a new idealism which shall not be the possession of the cultivated few but shall elevate and transform the whole of human society. A review of the past with its record of spiritual achievement leaves us confident that the human soul will again reassert itself and, on the ground gained by past victories, create an order in which its ideals shall find realization. For man's soul is the fundamental fact which must take precedence over all others.

One can scarcely read this work without having his enthusiasm aroused and his inspiration renewed. The idealist has been represented in recent philosophical literature as a sentimental dreamer who, lacking the courage to face the actual situation, seeks consolation in a vision of absolute perfection. Doubtless many have been misled into accepting this caricature for the reality, and to these this book will be a source of enlightenment. For Eucken's idealism is of the militant type, eager to enter into conflict with actual conditions and to demonstrate its power to transform them in the interest of man's highest welfare. The book should have a wide circulation.

HENRY W. WRIGHT

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE  
LAKE FOREST, ILL.



## BRIEF MENTION

## OLD TESTAMENT

EISELEN, FREDERICK CARL. *Prophecy and the Prophets*. In Their Historical Relations. New York and Cincinnati: Eaton & Mains, 1909. 331 pages. \$1.50 net.

Professor Eiselen says that in writing the book now under review, he "had in mind especially adult Bible classes in the Sunday school or young peoples' organizations" (p. 6). He arranges the Old Testament prophets in chronological order—the order now usually maintained by the best progressive scholars—and then discusses, in paragraphs covering about a half to a whole page each, the chief themes which a popular treatment of the given prophet would require. These themes cover historical, biographical, analytical, theological, and predictive areas of thought. The book presents facts well known to specialists, but designed in this work for the layman in Bible study. To facilitate its use as a textbook, it is provided with a series of review questions covering fourteen pages, also with a list of books for further study on the prophets of the Old Testament.

WARREN, W. F. *The Earliest Cosmologies: The Universe as Pictured in Thought by the Ancient Hebrews, Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Iranians and, Indo-Aryans*. New York and Cincinnati: Eaton & Mains, 1909. 222 pages. \$1.50 net.

The author of *The Cradle of the Human Race* has here made an attempt to introduce the reader to comparative cosmology. He discards the older representations of the Hebrew conception and allies himself with the so-called pan-Babylonian theory. Even Schiaparelli's work practically counts with him for naught. The Babylonian cosmology is so important in his estimation that it "is the key to an understanding of the Indo-Aryan" cosmology. His treatise picks up and treats the Egyptian, Homeric, Indo-Iranian, and Buddhistic universes in the light of the latest utterances of specialists in the several fields. But there is so much conjectural and hypothetical in it all, such a fine display of genius in harmonizing differences, that we must "lay it on the table" until further light bursts in on this perplexing and elusive question of the ancient world-view.

WINTER, J., UND WÜNSCHE, A. *Mechiltha: Ein tannaitischer Midrasch zu Exodus*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. xxix+390 pages. M. 11.50.

This is one of the scores of works issued on the occasion of the five-hundredth anniversary of the University of Leipzig. It is dedicated to the theological and philosophical faculties. This *Mechiltha* derives much of its value from the fact that it contains explanations whose collection dates from the first quarter of the second century, and whose origin reaches still farther back. In fact we find here some of the earliest specimens of biblical exegesis. The real gain from this work is found in its retouching the life and times at the beginning of the Christian era. The authors have provided their work with an instructive introduction on *midrashim* and on the material presented in the body of the work. The Hebrew text from which their translation was made was published by Friedmann in Vienna, in 1870. Where the translation pure and simple does

not convey the full meaning, explanatory words are added in brackets. This translation covers the *midrash* of Exodus 12:1—35:3. The rabbinical interpretations, explanations, and disputations are very characteristic, and often give us a flashlight view of Jewish ideas in the centuries far back of the scientific methods of our day.

---

NEW TESTAMENT

LEWIS, AGNES SMITH. *Codex Climaci Rescriptus*. Fragments of Sixth-Century Palestinian Syriac Texts of the Gospels, of the Acts of the Apostles, and of St. Paul's Epistles. Also Fragments of an Early Palestinian Lectionary of the Old Testament. [Horae Semiticae, VIII.] With Seven Facsimiles. Cambridge: University Press, 1909. xxxi+201 pages. \$3.50.

Four years ago Mrs. Lewis secured a Syriac parchment manuscript of the *Scala Paradisi* of John of Sinai, written in the ninth century. For copying this well-known work the Syriac scribe had used six earlier manuscripts, Greek and Syriac, some of them of remarkable interest. These supply considerable parts of the gospels in continuous form, not rearranged as lections, in the Palestinian Syriac; and, still more notably, parts of the Acts and the epistles of Paul in the same language. These leaves are assigned to the sixth century, and show that a Palestinian Syriac version of the greater part of the New Testament existed at that time. These texts are printed with Nestle's Greek text on the opposite page, and the variations of the Syriac noted in Greek in the margin. One of the Greek manuscripts employed by the Syriac copyist contained a harmony of the gospels, written in two narrow columns in a sloping hand. Mrs. Lewis prints sections from Matthew and John, in which the omissions and the marginal section numbers, which reach nearly to 800, seem to confirm her view that the work is a gospel harmony. Yet it does not at all agree with what we have of Tatian's harmony (Ciasca, Fuldensis, etc.), and the question arises whether it represents that hardly less famous ancient harmony made by Ammonius in the third century, on the basis of Matthew. It is to be hoped that Mrs. Lewis will decipher and publish all the pages of her palimpsest that belong to this harmony. Altogether, this work supplies new and important textual materials for the Old and New Testaments.

HAWKINS, SIR JOHN C. *Horae Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem*. Second edition, revised and supplemented. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. xvi+223 pages. 10s. 6d. net.

Ten years have passed since Sir John Hawkins, at the instance of Professor Sanday, first published his very useful and convenient presentation of the chief facts bearing upon the interrelations of the Synoptic Gospels: a presentation doubly helpful because uncontrolled by any theory of their significance. These tables, lists, and observations, somewhat revised, are now again put forth in a convenient volume, to continue to serve the cause of unbiased synoptic study. Indeed, one of the best ways to approach the Synoptic Problem is through Hawkins' skilfully collected material. On the identity of the Logia of Matthew with the "second source" of Matthew and Luke he is more cautious than in his first edition, out of deference to the growing disposition of scholars to regard it as an anonymous discourse source ("Q"). He is not blind indeed to the difficulty of explaining all the non-Markan common material of Matthew and Luke by

a single source: for a most careful examination has failed to elicit any expressions which he can "definitely label as characteristic of Q" (p. 113). The difficulty suggested by this fact is not lost upon Canon Hawkins, although he does not seem conscious of the solution offered by Professor Burton, in his *Principles of Literary Criticism and Their Relation to the Synoptic Problem*. It is possible that Hawkins has conceded to oral tradition a slightly larger part in the formation of the gospels than the facts really warrant (p. 217), though here as elsewhere he speaks with scholarly caution.

ALEXANDER, GROSS. *The Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians*. ["The Bible for Home and School."] New York: Macmillan, 1910. vii+132 pages. \$0.50.

Dr. Alexander regards both these epistles as authentic works of Paul, written from Rome probably about 62 or 63 A.D. Ephesians was a circular letter to the churches of Asia. In both the author designed to set forth the full significance of the Christian revelation. The introductions are in general concise, and intelligent. Dr. Alexander's affinities are with the older interpreters oftener than might have been expected. His style is occasionally rather too informal (pp. 9, 53). The bibliographies are not always accurate; e. g., H. T. Holtzman, H. J. Holtzman, H. J. Holtzmann (pp. 9, 65).

SICKENBERGER, JOSEPH. *Pseudo-Cyprianus De XII abusivis saeculi*. Von Siegmund Hellmann. Fragmente der Homilien des Cyrill von Alexandrien zum Lukasevangelium. [Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, XXXIV, 1.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 108 pages. 75 cents.

The tract *De duodecim abusivis saeculi*, which has long gone under the name of Cyprian, is really of Irish origin. It was written between 630 and 700, for it shows acquaintance with works of Isidore of Seville on the one hand, and is itself included in the Irish Collection of Canons, of the year 700. This date is the more interesting when it is remembered how slight the literary remains of this particular period, between Isidore and Bede, are. Hellmann discusses the origin and influence of the tract and republishes the text, critically edited on the basis of nine manuscripts, with an apparatus of readings.

The scattered fragments of Cyril's Homilies on Luke are collected and published by Sickenger. He has supplemented the materials of earlier editors of these Greek fragments by the use of Nicetas' extensive *Catena on Luke*, in which Cyril's homilies were freely used. The parts of the Homilies recovered deal mostly with the ninth and tenth chapters of Luke. By a misprint the English scholar J. R. Crowfoot is referred to as Crawford, p. 68.

SCHWARTZ, EDUARD. *Eusebius Kirchengeschichte*. Bearbeitet im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Die Lateinische Uebersetzung: Bearbeitet im gleichen Auftrage von Theodor Mommsen. Dritter Theil: Einleitungen, Uebersichten und Register. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. ccxlviii+216 pages. M. 12.

The third part of the Prussian Academy's great edition of the Greek text and the Latin version of Eusebius' church history adds to the critical texts already published a series of useful introductions, discussions, and indices. The manuscripts, translations,

and ancient editions, the orthography, and the chronology and arrangement of the work are successively treated. There are also useful indices of the biblical and literary references, of names of persons and places, and of the more important Greek words. The whole forms an invaluable appendix to the edition, which promises to be the standard for many years to come.

**Χρυσόστομος:** Studi e Ricerche intorno a S. Giovanni Crisostomo. A cura del Comitato per il XV° Centenario della sua morte. Fascicolo I. Roma: Libreria Pustet, 1908. 242 pages.

The fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the death of Chrysostom (407-1907) has been celebrated by the publication of a series of papers relating to his life and works. These studies and essays have been prepared by Italian, English, French, German, Armenian and Austrian scholars, and the topics treated bear additional witness to the vast range of Chrysostom's influence. Four papers deal with Chrysostom in Armenian, Arabic, Georgian, and Russian literature. Naegele discusses his relation to Libanius, Sabatini his social work, and Butler the authorship of the *Dialogus de vita Chrysostomi*. The whole is handsomely printed and constitutes a notable contribution to the literature that gathers around the great preacher of Antioch and Constantinople, whose influence still operates in the modern world.

---

#### CHURCH HISTORY

**CLARK, FRANCIS E. AND HARRIET A.** *The Gospel in Latin Lands. Outline Studies of Protestant Work in the Latin Countries of Europe and America.* New York: Macmillan, 1909. 315 pages. \$1.50.

An ambitious attempt to compress a large subject into the limits of a mission study textbook, with not very satisfactory results. The book appears to have been made to order, with no true assimilation of the material. Its usefulness will depend upon the teacher into whose hands it falls. It is equipped with maps, chronological tables, bibliography, "topics for further study," and illustrative selections.

**PATON, L. B. (EDITOR).** *Recent Christian Progress.* Studies in Christian Thought and Work during the Last Seventy-five Years, by Professors and Alumni of Hartford Theological Seminary in Celebration of Its Seventy-fifth Anniversary, May 24-26, 1909. New York: Macmillan, 1909. xiv+597 pages. \$3.00.

The range of subjects in this volume is wide as the world. They are subsumed under ten general categories, viz.: (1) Preliminary Studies, (2) Old Testament, (3) New Testament, (4) Church History, (5) Systematic Theology, (6) The Modern Churches, (7) Church Work, (8) Allied Agencies, (9) Home Missions, (10) Foreign Missions. The treatment of the themes within the first five of these divisions naturally takes the form of a bibliographical survey of the last seventy-five years. The selection of books worthy of mention in such a noble array of literature is on the whole admirable, and the judgment of the reviewers is for the most part discriminating and well balanced. One can only regret that American scholars have not contributed more that is worthy of enumeration. The remaining divisions call for a historical survey of the work actually

done in the various fields of Christian activity. One rises from the reading of a volume like this with an increased wonder and admiration for the zeal, the ability, and the versatility of the Church of God. It is distinctly worth while to pause occasionally and take stock. Careful study of the labors and progress of the past can but contribute to a more intelligent use of the opportunities of the present and the future.

KUAČALA, J. *Thomas Campanella, ein Reformator der ausgehenden Renaissance*. Berlin: Trowitsch & Sohn, 1909. xvi + 164 pages. M. 5. 20.

This monograph constitutes the sixth part of *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche*, edited by Professors N. Bonwetsch, of Göttingen, and R. Seeberg, of Berlin. The author has devoted several years to the study of the life and writings of Campanella. In 1906-7 he published in Russian seven different treatises on this subject. Campanella is one of the most interesting and one of the most problematical characters of the age of the Counter Reformation. It is the task of Kuačala to trace the sources of Campanella's philosophical and theological opinions, to define these opinions as accurately as possible by a comparative study of his writings, and to give a just estimate of the man. So far as one can determine without a study of the sources like that of the writer, his methods are correct and his judgments trustworthy. That Campanella was a freethinker of the most pronounced type and utterly at variance with scholastic theology there can be no doubt. It is equally clear that he favored political and social reform to an extent that would have swept away feudalism, and royal absolutism, and would have revolutionized society. Writing as he did under constraint and often seeking by indirection to influence the pope or the king of Spain in his own favor, straightforwardness and consistency could hardly be expected. The most discreditable of his performances, from our point of view, was his provision for the utter extirpation of Protestantism in the world-wide empire which he pictured for the king of Spain. In the same work (*De Monarchia Hispanica*) he advises the utmost freedom in scientific research and philosophical speculation. It seems clear that he was urging the kind of toleration that would meet his own case and seeking at the same time to make good with the Spanish and Roman Catholic authorities by showing his utter hostility to Protestantism in every form. There is no reason to believe that he sincerely accepted Roman Catholic dogmas or the fundamentals of Christianity. The impression we receive of his ethical principles is highly unfavorable, these having much in common with contemporary Jesuitism. "Although a monk," says our author, "he was verily far removed from sainthood." That he was sincere in his advocacy of social reforms of a revolutionary character there is no reason to doubt. A good exhibit of the literature of the subject follows the preface.

HEITZ, TH. *Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Bérenger de Tours à S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Gabalda, 1909. xv + 176 pages. Fr. 3. 50.

This fine piece of work seems to be a Doctor's thesis prepared under the guidance of professors of the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and speaks well for the philosophical and theological training given in Roman Catholic universities. Following Scotus Erigena, a century and more in the past, Berengarius of Tours and Roscellinus attempted to apply philosophical conceptions to theological problems with the result, as our author thinks, that they were led into error by giving to philosophy too large a place. But they prepared the way for Abelard and his successors, who more care-

fully defined the relations of faith and philosophy and who for the most part accorded to faith the foremost place. Berengarius of Tours insisted that by virtue of the possession of reason man can be said to have been made in the image of God and that reason must be freely used in the handling of theological problems. His disciple Roscellinus equally maintained the right and dignity of reason and was accused by Anselm of refusing to believe anything that he could not comprehend by his imagination and of deriding those who believed. Defining "person" as "rational substance" he came near to a tritheistic conception of deity. Following in their footsteps and abler by far than either, Abelard sought to vindicate the rights of reason and to work out and promulgate a rational theology; but he was so beset with misfortunes and ecclesiastical tyranny that his spirit became broken and he dared not publish all that was in his heart.

In his discussion of the attitude of Peter Lombard, Peter Damiani, Anselm, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, Heitz seeks to exhibit genetically the shaping of opinion on the relation of faith and philosophy during the scholastic age under the influence of the Aristotelian and Arabic philosophy. Thomas Aquinas, who is still regarded by the Roman Catholic church as its most authoritative theologian and philosopher, made the function of reason purely ancillary and denied any merit to faith that depends upon rational demonstration. Heitz quotes abundantly from the writers he discusses in the original Latin as well as in translation and paraphrase.

---

#### DOCTRINAL

BRAASCH, A. H. *Die religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart*. ["Aus Natur und Geisteswelt," 66. Bändchen.] 2<sup>te</sup> Auflage. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. 140 pages. M. 1.25.

That there has been a demand for a second edition of this popular exposition of modern religious movements is an indication of the success with which the author has interpreted our age. The first two chapters deal with the inheritance of Protestantism and the new forces of our day. The third deals with the progress of biblical criticism, giving especial attention to the *Leben-Jesu-Forschung*. The final chapter expounds briefly the significant movements of our day in both Catholicism and Protestantism.

SCHAEDEr, ERICH. *Theozentrische Theologie*. Eine Untersuchung zur dogmatischen Prinzipienlehre. Erster, geschichtlicher Teil. Leipzig: Deichert, 1909. iv + 197 pages. M. 4.

This preliminary study, dealing with the development of theology in Germany during the past century, is to be followed by a constructive work. Schaeeder holds that Schleiermacher, who has so powerfully influenced the past century, diverted attention from the proper object of theology—God—to the psychology of religious experience. Since his time the constant effort of theologians has been to derive theology from "experience." This anthropocentric ideal must be supplanted by a theocentric point of view, for Schaeeder believes that we can never pass from human experience to God. We must believe in a God who has revealed himself prior to our experience. A somewhat repetitious survey and criticism of the various types of theology serves to emphasize this thesis. The second volume will be awaited with interest.

BURN, A. E. *The Nicene Creed*. ["Oxford Church Text Books."] London: Rivingtons; New York: Gorham, 1909. 118 pages. 1s.

Dr. Burn's previous volume on the Apostles' Creed in this series guarantees wide learning and accurate scholarship in his treatment of the Nicene Creed. The point of view taken is that of a loyal churchman, concerned to defend the Nicene doctrine against all objections. In spite of his purpose to expound the creed in the light of its historical development, he has furnished statistics and citations rather than any real insight into the meaning of the religious thought of the age. The book presupposes too much familiarity with the history to serve as a popular introduction, and is too brief to constitute an adequate historical study.

BALLARD, FRANK. *The True God: A Modern Summary of the Relations of Theism to Naturalism, Monism, Pluralism, and Pantheism*. London: Cully, 1907. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1908. 176 pages. \$1.00 net.

In this volume appears a revised and abbreviated edition of *Theomorphism True*, reviewed in the issue of this *Journal* for April, 1908. The writer has eliminated the quotations which were so prominent in the first volume, and has stated his argument afresh and with greater brevity, and strengthened his work. From a philosophical viewpoint similar to that of Lotze or Bowne, he presents with some clearness and force, in the manner of progressive traditional apologetics, a theistic as against a pantheistic and a monistic as against a pluralistic view of the world.

---

#### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

DEUSSEN, PAUL. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1907. vii+70 pages. 48 cents.

This is a condensation and popularization of the author's more elaborate treatment of Indian philosophy as found in his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie und Das System des Vedānta*. It consists of two short treatises, the first of which outlines the history of Indian thought from the origin of the Rigveda to the formulation of the technical philosophies; while the second treatise confines itself to a more detailed account of the Vedānta.

MM. ALLIER, R., BELOT, G., LE BARON CARRA DE VAUX, CHALLAYE, F., CROISSET, A., DORISON, L., EHRHARDT, E., DEFAYE, E., LODS, AD., MONOD, W., PEUCH, A. *Morales et Religions: Leçons professées à l'école des hautes études sociales*. Paris: Alcan, 1909. 290 pages. Fr. 6.

This most readable and suggestive volume contains as many as could be secured of a course of lectures treating the relations between religion and morals as indicated in various historical religious or moral systems. Prepared for popular instruction, the lectures are devoted to a summary of results rather than to specific investigations. The introductory lecture by M. Belot is a rarely penetrating analysis of the essential resemblances and differences between religion and morality. Religion is shown not to be the mother of morality. Both religion and morality are developed to meet social needs. The modifications in ethics and theology which occur in history can be explained by observing the social changes which demand the revision of these important human interests. The other lectures are devoted to the exposition of the morality of the Old

Testament, of classic Greece, of Jesus, of Paul, of the Alexandrian school, of Islam, of Luther, of the Quakers, and of the Japanese. If the admirable method outlined in the first lecture of presenting morality in the light of its social origin had been consistently followed, the volume would have been of exceptional value. As it is, most of the lecturers treat their themes in a statistical and homiletic way. A notable exception is the treatment of Greek morality by Croiset. The chief value of the series consists in the clear, effective, sympathetic fashion in which the fundamentals of each type of morality are expounded.

#### SOCIAL QUESTIONS

PEABODY, FRANCIS GREENWOOD. *The Approach to the Social Question*. An Introduction to the Study of Social Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1909. 210 pages. \$1.25.

Professor Peabody is at his best when he takes his position in the thick of the social question and speaks out his perceptions from that standpoint. His voice is unfamiliar and his thought does not carry when he stands on the outside of the social question and tries to tell how to approach it. Fortunately for the value of this volume the author does not consistently speak in his assumed character. The book abounds in aphorisms of moral insight with which any reader might enrich his life. It would leave the inquirer as to the precise way of approaching the social question just where he was when he applied for help, so far as intellectual classification is in demand. He would probably have become more convinced, however, that an approach to the social question is a noble pursuit.

The book invites the reader to judge how far social science, sociology, economics, and ethics, respectively, can go toward answering the social question. The reaction of the investigator, whatever his special means of research, to the author's presentation of the case, must necessarily be that two hundred pages cannot possibly contain information enough to qualify the least sophisticated of those addressed to form a respectable opinion. At the same time the man who is working at the social question with either of the instruments named must find that the procedure of which he knows most has been too summarily treated.

In brief, persons to whom this guide to the social question would seem adequate really want results, not processes. On the other hand, some at least of those readers who would enter most objections to the book as it stands would cordially sympathize with a methodology of social decision worked out along the lines which Professor Peabody suggests.

McFARLAND, C. S. (ed.). *The Christian Ministry and the Social Order*. Lectures Delivered in the Course in Pastoral Functions at Yale Divinity School, 1908-9. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1909. viii + 303 pages.

The chief significance of this volume of lectures is its timeliness. It may be regarded as one of the signs of the times, that in a majority of the divinity schools in the United States courses in applied theology are remodeled, so as to include the study of modern social problems. It augurs well for the vitality of Christianity, that the leaders, once they see the mistakes of ultra-conservatism, are anxious to furnish for the men who are to minister to the religious needs of the present a point of view and method that shall enable them to take the lead in the inevitable readjustment of the



church to the needs of the work-a-day world. The lectures give "inside information" on such important subjects as the "Labor Unions," "Industrial Organization," "Wage-Earners," "Immigrants," "Rural Community," "Men," "Mental Healing," and the "Peace Movement." In the group of lecturers are ministers, operators, and John Mitchell, who, in the judgment of the reviewer, is in a class by himself. It may not be amiss to call attention, in connection with this book, to a recent investigation of the "Place of Sociology in Academic Instruction," published, for the American Sociological Society, in recent numbers of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

---

MISCELLANEOUS

MILLER, IRVING ELGAR. *The Psychology of Thinking*. New York: Macmillan, 1909. xxv+303 pages. \$1.25.

In this work, which presupposes some familiarity with the simpler facts and principles of psychology, we have a clear exposition of, and in many respects an admirable introduction to, the functional psychology which has associated itself with the name of Professor John Dewey and the Chicago school of philosophy. The dominant interest throughout is pedagogical as well as psychological, the main aim being to show the actual working of the mind as it struggles with problems in the concrete life of the individual and the growth in control over forces of the world and of life that comes through the development and perfection of thinking. Especially satisfactory is the explicit repudiation of certain common misrepresentations as to the implications of functional psychology. While the point of view is frankly biological it is insisted that life is not to be thought of as reduced to its lowest physical terms, but as inclusive of all those values which make existence worth while. The charge of materialism is also held to be unjustifiable, inasmuch as the functional psychologist as such makes neither affirmation nor denial with respect to such questions as the immortality of the soul, having limited himself in his investigations to the strictly empirical field.

DEVINE, EDWARD T. *Misery and Its Causes*. New York: Macmillan, 1909. xi+274 pages. \$1.25.

This is the fourth volume in the "American Social Progress Series," and contains in essence the author's lectures on the Kennedy Foundation, delivered before the School of Philanthropy in New York. The importance of this book to the student of social conditions is twofold. It is based on an extensive study of cases; 5,000 dependent families having been selected by the author, from his official work as head of the Charity Organization Society of New York, and these cases forming the basis of his economic and philosophical deductions.

The fundamental proposition of the book, as elaborated in chap. i is that misery, except in a few pathological cases, is due to economic causes, and that therefore an economic readjustment is needed to do away with poverty. Suicides, prisoners, prostitutes, and dependents are studied closely in order to bring out contributory causes. Here the conclusion is, that these forms of "surplus misery" have their rise in a complexity of causes, necessitating a complexity of preventive measures. Preventive medicine, probation, the indeterminate sentence, more general education, and a franker public honesty, are among the remedies suggested.

Chap. ii, "Out of Health" is significant, because it is in direct conformity with the line of endeavor of the American Medical Society, and suggests many avenues

of escape from misery-producing illness. The lecture "Out of Work" is probably the clearest exposition available at present of the desirability of manual training in the elementary and secondary schools. A wider apprenticeship is here advocated also.

Of great significance is the author's summing-up of a preventive policy, in the case of misery, which should contain at least the following factors: "sound heredity; protected childhood; prolonged working age; freedom from preventable diseases; elimination of professional crime; indemnity against the economic losses occasioned by death, accident, illness, and unemployment; rational education; wise standards of philanthropy; normal standards of living; and social religion."

PERRY, RALPH BARTON. *The Moral Economy*. New York: Scribner, 1909. xvi + 267 pages. \$1.25.

Professor Perry has given in this book a very attractive introduction to the study of ethics from the empirical point of view. He has omitted discussion of historical theories or technical definitions, and has devoted himself to an exposition of ethics as the practical problem of valuing and organizing the various interests of humanity. Advancing from the problem of preserving a simple interest from either excess or atrophy, he passes to the problems caused by conflicting interests both in the individual and in society. Ethics is the rational determination of a universal system of interests. Two final chapters deal with the ethical aspects of art and of religion as tested by the principles of the "moral economy." The book is exceptionally readable, and abounds in suggestive interpretations, especially in the correlation of the idealistic tendencies of art and religion with the empirical tests outlined in the analysis of morality.

EMERSON, EDWARD WALDO, AND FORBES, WALDO EMERSON (editors). *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, with annotations. 2 vols. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. xxv + 394 and xvi + 542 pages. \$1.75 per volume.

These two valuable volumes give extracts from Emerson's journals between the years 1818 and 1832, covering his student days in Harvard, his brief experience as teacher, his divinity-school life and his pastorate of the Second Church. These glimpses into the private life of Emerson show how from the beginning he was more interested in the inner life of the spirit than in outer events. Indeed, it is difficult to trace a "development" of his thought; and the journals contribute less than might be expected to our knowledge. Quotations from authors he had been recently reading, lists of words, aphorisms, meditations, letters, comments on some theme which struck his fancy, poems, and suggestions and outlines for articles or sermons or books follow one another with no connection save that of accidental succession in time. The traits of his essays appear in all these personal meditations—intense idealism, scrupulous intellectual honesty coupled with mysticism, hero-worship, and optimism. In a characteristic meditation recording his call to the pastorate of the Second Church, he says: "What is the office of a Christian minister? 'Tis his to show the beauty of the moral laws of the universe; to explain the theory of a perfect life; to watch the Divinity in his world; to detect his footsteps; to discern him in the history of the race of his children, by catching the tune from a patient listening to miscellaneous sounds; by threading out the unapparent plan in events crowding on events. . . . The world to the skeptical eye is without form and void. The gospel gives a firm clue to the plan of it. It shows God. Find God, and order and glory and hope and happiness begin."

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Gesenius, Wilhelm. Hebräisches und Arämaisches Handwörterbuch über das Alten Testament. In Verbindung mit H. Zimmern, W. Max Müller, u. O. Weber. Bearbeitet von Frants Buhl. Fünfzehnte Auflage. Leipzig: Vogel, 1910. 1,006 pages. M. 18.
- Jeremias, Alfred. Das Alter der babylonischen Astronomie. Zweite erweiterte Auflage mit 15 Abbildungen und astronomischen Zeichnungen. (Im Kampfe um den Alten Orient, 3.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 92 pages. M. 1.60.
- Kautzsch, F. Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments. Tübingen: Mohr, 1909. 64 pages. M. 0.80.
- Rothstein, G. Lesebuch zum Unterricht im Alten Testament für reifere Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1909. 114 pages. M. 1.20.
- Smith, Samuel G. Religion in the Making. A Study in Sociology. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 253 pages. \$1.25.
- Thomsen, Peter. Palästina und seine Kultur in fünf Jahrtausenden. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. 108 pages. M. 1.
- Torrey, C. C. Ezra Studies. The University of Chicago Press, 1910. xv+346 pages. \$1.50.
- Wiener, Harold M. Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company, 1909. 239 pages. \$1.50.

### NEW TESTAMENT

- Alexander, Gross. The Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians. (The Bible for Home and School.) New York: Macmillan, 1910. 132 pages. \$0.50.
- Anderson, Edward E. St. Matthew's Gospel with Introduction and Notes. (Handbooks for Bible Classes and

- Private Students.) New York: Scribner, 1909. 243 pages. \$0.75.
- Bacon, Benjamin W. The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate. A series of essays and problems concerning the Origin and Value of the Anonymous Writings attributed to the Apostle John. New York: Moffatt, Yard & Co. 1910. 544 pages. \$4.00.
- Burkitt, F. Crawford. The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus Christ. (Modern Religious Problems.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 131 pages. \$0.50.
- Codex Alexandrinus (Royal MS 1 D v-viii) in reduced photographic facsimile. New Testament and Clementine Epistles. London: Printed by order of the Trustees of the British Museum, 1910. 30s.
- Feine, Paul. Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 714 pages. M 12.50.
- Geffcken, J. Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. 126 pages. M. 1.25.
- Goguel, Maurice. L'évangile de Marc et ses rapports avec ceux de Mathieu et de Luc. Paris: Leroux, 1909. 348 pages.
- Hawkins, John C. Horae Synopticae. Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem. Second edition, revised and supplemented. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909. xvi+218 pages.
- King, Henry C. The Ethics of Jesus. (New Testament Handbooks.) New York: Macmillan, 1910. 293 pages. \$1.50.
- Mathews, Shailer. The Social Gospel. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1910. 168 pages. \$0.50.
- Moffatt, James. Paul and Paulinism. (Modern Religious Problems.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 76 pages. \$0.50.
- Peake, Arthur S. A Critical Introduction to the New Testament. (Studies

in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1910. 242 pages. \$0.75.  
 Steinmann, Alphons. Aretas IV. König der Nabatäer. Freiburg: Herder, 1909. 44 pages.

## PATRISTICS

Clemens Alexandrinus. Band III. Stromata Buch VII und VIII—Excerpta ex Theodoto—Eclogae Propheticae—Quis dives salvetur—Fragmente. Herausgegeben von Otto Stählin. Mit Einleitung und drei Handschriftenproben in Lichtdruck. (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, Band 17.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. xc+231 pages. M. 11.  
 Connelly, R. H. The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai. (Texts and Studies.) Cambridge: University Press, 1909. lxxvi+176 pages. \$2.00.  
 Justin, Dialogue avec Tryphon. Texte grec, traduction française, introduction, notes, et index par Georges Archambault. Tome II. (Textes et documents pour l'étude historique du christianisme.) Paris: Picard, 1909. 396 pages. Fr. 3.50.  
 Reichardt, Walther. Die briefe des Sextus Julius Africanus an Aristides und Origenes. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 84 pages. M. 3.

## CHURCH HISTORY

Cockshott, Winnifred. The Pilgrim Fathers, Their Church and Colony. New York: Putnam, 1909. 348 pages. \$2.25.  
 Doumergue, E. Iconographie Calvinienne. Lausanne: Bridel, 1909. 275 pages.  
 Flick, Alexander Clarence. The Rise of the Mediaeval Church. From the Apostolic Age to the Papacy at Its height in the Thirteenth Century. New York: Putnam, 1910. 623 pages.  
 Fouqueray, Henri. Histoire de la compagnie de Jésus en France des origines à la suppression (1528-1762). Tome I. Les origines et les premières luttes (1528-1575). Paris: Picard, 1910. xxv+673 pages. Fr. 10.  
 Français, J. L'église et la sorcellerie. Paris: Nourry, 1910. 272 pages. Fr. 3.50.  
 Gromer, Georg. Die Laienbeicht im Mittelalter. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Geschichte. München: Lentner, 1909. 93 pages. M. 2.40.

Guignebert, Ch. La primauté de Pierre et la venue de Pierre à Rome. Paris: Nourry, 1909. 391 pages. Fr. 6.  
 Harnack, Adolf. Monasticism: Its Ideals and History, and The Confessions of St. Augustine. Translated into English by E. E. Kellett and F. H. Marseille. (Crown Theological Library.) New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1909. 171 pages. \$1.50.  
 Hauser, Henri. Etudes sur la Réforme Française. (Bibliothèque d'histoire religieuse.) Paris: Picard, 1909. xiv+308 pages. Fr. 3.50.  
 Lake, Kirsopp. The Early Days of Monasticism on Mount Athos. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909. 117 pages.  
 Regnault, Henri. Une province procuratorienne. Au debut de l'Empire Romain. Paris: Picard, 1909. 144 pages. Fr. 4.  
 Stiefenhofer, Dionys. Die Geschichte der Kirchweihe vom 1-7 Jahrhundert. München: Lentner, 1909. 141 pages.  
 Valois, Noël. Le pape et le concile (1418-1450). Tome premier et Tome second. Ouvrage orné de dix planches et figures. (La crise religieuse du xv<sup>e</sup> siècle.) Paris: Picard, 1909. xxx+408 and 426 pages. Fr. 20 each.

## DOCTRINAL

Buckham, John Wright. Personality and the Christian Ideal. A Discussion of Personality in the Light of Christianity. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1901. 263 pages. \$1.50.  
 Burn, A. E. The Nicene Creed. (Oxford Church Text Books.) London: Rivingtons, 1909. 118 pages. 1s.  
 Fairbairn, A. M. Studies in Religion and Theology. The Church in Idea and History. New York: Macmillan, 1910. xxxii+635 pages. \$3.50.  
 Forsyth, P. T. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ. The Congregational Union Lecture for 1909. London: Congregational Union of England and Wales; Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1909. 357 pages. \$2.00.  
 Gardner, Percy. Modernity and the Churches. (Crown Theological Library.) New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1909. 314 pages. \$1.50.  
 Holzhey, Carl. Fünfundsiebzig Punkte zur Beantwortung der Frage: Absolute oder relative Wahrheit der hl. Schrift?

- München: Lentner, 1909. 48 pages. M. o. 90.
- Inge, William R. Faith and Its Psychology. (Studies in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1910. 244 pages. \$o. 75.
- Kohler, Kaufmann. Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage. Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1910. 383 pages.
- Rashdall, Hastings. Philosophy and Religion. (Studies in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1910. 189 pages. \$o. 75.
- Schmidt, Wilhelm. Der Kampf um die Seele. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909, 406 pages. M. 6.
- Shumaker, E. Ellsworth. God and Man. Philosophy of the Higher Life. New York: Putnam, 1910. 408 pages.
- Peters, John P. Modern Christianity, or The Plain Gospel Modernly Expounded. New York: Putnam, 1909. 323 pages. \$1. 50.
- Selby, Thomas G. The Divine Craftsman, and other sermons. London: Culley, 1909. vi + 320 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Thiele, Rudolf. Die Augsburgische Konfession zum Gebrauch an höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, für Studierende und Kandidaten der Theologie erklärt. Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1909. 162 pages. M. 2.

## MISCELLANEOUS

- Hastings, James (editor). Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. II. Arthur-Bunyan. New York: Scribner, 1910. xxvii + 901 pages. \$7. 00.
- Horton, Robert F. Great Issues. New York: Macmillan, 1909. 384 pages. \$1. 50.
- Il Rinnovamento. Rivista critica di idee di fatti. Fasciolo V-VI. London: Williams and Norgate, 1909.
- Marsten, Francis Edward. The Mask of Christian Science. A History of the Rise and Growth of the System, together with a Comparison of Metaphysical Healing with Matters Scientific, Christian, and Biblical. New York: American Tract Society, 1909. 192 pages.
- New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Vol. VI, Innocents-Liudger. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1910. xv + 505 pages. \$5. 00.
- Parsons, John. Each for All and All for Each. New York: Sturgis & Walton, 1909. 390 pages. \$1. 50.
- Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques. Paris: Gabalda, 1910. 232 pages.
- Ritson, J. H. Abroad for the Bible Society. London: Culley, 1909. 304 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Stelzle, Charles. The Church and Labor. (Modern Religious Problems.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 95 pages. \$o. 50.
- Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Katholische Blätter. Jahrgang 1909. 10. Heft. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1909. 473-600 pages.
- Ströle, Albrecht. Thomas Carlyle's Anschauung vom Fortschritt in der Geschichte. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909. 202 pages. M. 3. 60.

## ETHICS

- Hall, Thomas C. Social Solutions. In the Light of Christian Ethics. New York: Eaton and Mains, 1910. 390 pages. \$1. 50.
- Rand, Benjamin. Classical Moralists. Selections illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 797 pages. \$3. 00.

## COMPARATIVE RELIGION

- DeGroot, J. J. M. The Religion of the Chinese. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 230 pages. \$1. 25.
- Jordan, Louis Henry. Comparative Religion. A survey of its recent literature. Second Section, 1906-1909. Edinburgh: Otto Schulze & Co., 1910. 72 pages.
- Naville, Edouard. The Old Egyptian Faith. Translated by Colin Campbell. (Crown Theological Library.) New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1909. 321 pages.
- Underwood, Horace Grant. The Religions of Eastern Asia. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 264 pages. \$1. 50.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Ainsworth, Percy C. The Blessed Life. Short Addresses on the Beatitudes. New edition. London: Culley, 1909. 170 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Ainsworth, Percy C. The Pilgrim Church and Other Sermons. London: Culley, 1909. 253 pages. 3s. 6d.

- New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Vol. VI, Innocents-Liudger. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1910. xv + 505 pages. \$5. 00.
- Parsons, John. Each for All and All for Each. New York: Sturgis & Walton, 1909. 390 pages. \$1. 50.
- Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques. Paris: Gabalda, 1910. 232 pages.
- Ritson, J. H. Abroad for the Bible Society. London: Culley, 1909. 304 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Stelzle, Charles. The Church and Labor. (Modern Religious Problems.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 95 pages. \$o. 50.
- Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Katholische Blätter. Jahrgang 1909. 10. Heft. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1909. 473-600 pages.
- Ströle, Albrecht. Thomas Carlyle's Anschauung vom Fortschritt in der Geschichte. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909. 202 pages. M. 3. 60.

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XIV

JULY, 1910

Number 3

## THE ORIGIN OF THE MESSIANIC HOPE IN ISRAEL

---

PROFESSOR HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, D.D.  
Meadville Theological School, Meadville, Pa.

---

Frequent seditious attempts of the Jews in the first century of our era are evidence of an intense hatred for their rulers such as may be expected when a conquered people is harshly treated. But they are evidence of something more than this common and natural hatred. Josephus says that in the crowning struggle his countrymen were moved by an oracle which predicted that about that time one from their land should become ruler of the world. The very day that Jerusalem fell into the hands of the besiegers a prophet proclaimed that the people should go up to the temple there to receive signs of their deliverance. Reports had spread as far as Rome itself that the fates would give the rule of the world to men from the East. Josephus,<sup>1</sup> writing after the disastrous issue, could perhaps persuade himself that the oracle was, as he calls it, ambiguous. He can hardly have believed that it referred to Vespasian though he is bold enough to assert this. A Jew familiar with the Scriptures could not seriously think that the prophets looked for a gentile Messiah. The historian was willing to flatter the ruling house, and also to count on the ignorance of his readers. The material in our hands enables us to say that the messianic hope which inspired the revolt in the year 70, and the even more remarkable one sixty years later, was anything but ambiguous, and to say also that it did not refer to a Roman monarch.

<sup>1</sup> The material from Josephus, Tacitus, and Suetonius has often been cited and discussed, recently by Lagrange, *Le messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris, 1909), 1-27.

Its strength and vitality are attested by the later history of the Jews. Although the rabbis learned not to try to set up the kingdom by force their expectation of a deliverer has never abated. This expectation passed over to the church, not only as something fulfilled in Christ, but as something yet to have its consummation in his second advent. It helped to convince Jews and Christians that Mohammed was the crown and seal of the line of prophets. It persists in Islam in the dream of a Mahdi, and the enthusiasm with which almost every century welcomes a pretender to that title shows the tenacity of the idea.

The vitality of the messianic hope has made messianic prophecy an important subject of study among Jews and among Christians. The Talmud affirms that the prophets spoke only of the days of the Messiah,<sup>2</sup> and Christian scholars have assumed this to be self-evident and have built their systems of interpretation upon it. The early disciples of Jesus naturally found the main importance of the Old Testament in its adumbrations of their Savior. The allegorical method of interpretation enabled them to find these adumbrations in many places where a more sober exegesis cannot follow. How firmly rooted the tradition became may be seen in any Roman Catholic treatise of the present day<sup>3</sup> or in the more conservative Protestant discussions. The most elaborate presentation of the material from this point of view is still that of Schöttgen,<sup>4</sup> who confutes the Jews by showing how their rabbis have in all points affirmed the Protestant orthodoxy of the eighteenth century. More recent scholars have freely drawn upon Schöttgen, and the traditional theory was vigorously reasserted by Hengstenberg, whose elaborate *Christology of the Old Testament* avows that "the beginnings of messianic prophecy go back to the earliest times; that in every period the prediction breaks out

<sup>2</sup> Sanhedrin, 99a. In connection with this, mention is made of a certain Rabbi Hillel who held that Israel had its Messiah in the days of Hezekiah—an attempt to find a historical interpretation for Isaiah's Immanuel. But the theory is mentioned only to be rejected.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Hetzenauer, *Theologia Biblica*, I, 574-611 (1908), or Lémann, *Histoire complète de l'idée messianique chez le peuple d'Israel* (1909).

<sup>4</sup> Christiani Schoettgenii *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae in Theologiam Judaicorum de Messia impensae*, Tomus II, 1742. The substance of this second volume of Schöttgen's great work was published by himself in German in 1748.

afresh; that the prophetic writings present it not sporadically and occasionally only, but that it forms the soul and center of all their declarations."<sup>5</sup>

The older rationalism had already entered a protest against the exegetical methods of the scholastic theologians. Herder pointed out the unnaturalness of making isolated verses predictive of the Messiah, without regard to the context in which they are found.<sup>6</sup> One of the earliest treatises to bear the title "Biblical Theology" says: "We make a mistake when we prove too much, make everything predictive of the Messiah, and claim to understand all that the prophets have said, when in fact we do not possess the discourses of the prophets in their original order."<sup>7</sup> What the author means he makes clear when he further says that it is an unprofitable employment to force unwilling prophecies to describe Jesus' vestment, his place of birth, or his triumphal entrance into Jerusalem. Much better is it to show that the hand of Providence is convincingly manifest in the whole Old Testament economy preparing for the advent of Jesus. Radical thinkers, however, were not willing to concede even this much, and at least one of them went so far as to deny that there was a well-defined messianic idea in Judaism at the advent of Jesus. So extreme a statement was easily shown to be false.<sup>8</sup>

The mediating theologians of the last century saw that many of the traditional positions must be given up, but they seem not to have been able to take a really historical view of the problem. Too often they expelled the old allegory only to admit it again under the name of a type.<sup>9</sup> Our own time is better able to appreciate the problem because our critical results are more assured, because we distinguish more sharply between religion and dogma, and because our knowledge of the ancient East is more complete. It falls to us to distinguish clearly the various elements which tradition heaped up, labeling the whole as messianic. Without hesitation we lay aside as irrelevant

<sup>5</sup> *Christologie des alten Testaments*<sup>2</sup>, III, 2, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See the eighteenth of his *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend*.

<sup>7</sup> Ammon, *Biblische Theologie*<sup>2</sup>, II (1801), 22, 25.

<sup>8</sup> The statement of Bruno Bauer is known to me only by Zeller's refutation in his *Theologische Jahrbücher* for 1843.

<sup>9</sup> The best representative of this school is perhaps Riehm whose essay on "Messianic Prophecy" was first published in the *Studien und Kritiken* in 1865 and 1869.



a considerable number of texts which have been classed as messianic, such as the *Protevangelium*, and the Blessing of Noah.

Further, in order to get a clear view of the messianic hope in Israel we must leave out of view all that Christian theology has affirmed about a suffering Messiah. Whether the doctrine of vicarious atonement was held by Old Testament writers is an inquiry of the greatest importance. But it must not be confused with the inquiry into the messianic hope. There is no evidence that the Jews ever conceived of a suffering Messiah until after Bar Kochba had failed in his attempt to set up the kingdom. Even then the conception was so foreign to tradition that two Messiahs were postulated—the Messiah ben Joseph is to fall in the war against Gog, and thus prepare the way for Messiah ben David. But this Messiah ben Joseph is not the atoning Savior of Christian belief, although it is possible that Christian insistence on the messianic interpretation of Isa., chap. 53, may have turned attention to the need of such a prophetic personality.<sup>10</sup> In any case he does not belong in a discussion of the messianic hope in Israel. It need hardly be added that the phrase “birth pangs of the Messiah” found in Jewish authors has nothing to do with the sufferings of the Messiah, but refers only to the woes which precede his advent.

The expectation of the Jews at the beginning of our era is most definitely set forth in the passage which follows, and which must have been known to Josephus for he was a member of the Pharisaic school:

“Behold, O Lord, and raise up to them their king, the son of David, in the time which thou, O God, knowest; that he may reign over Israel thy servant; and gird him with strength that he may break in pieces the unjust rulers; may purge Jerusalem from the heathen which trample her down to destroy her; in wisdom and righteousness may he thrust out sinners from the inheritance, crush the proud spirit of the sinners as potter’s vessels; and with a rod of iron shall he break all their substance. He shall destroy the ungodly nations with the word of his mouth so that at his rebuke the nations shall flee before him, and he shall convict the sinners in the thought of their own hearts. And he shall gather together a holy

<sup>10</sup> The most recent discussion of rabbinical theories is given by Klausner, *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten* (1904). The work of Lagrange already cited covers a wider range. The Kabbalistic theories of atonement on which Schöttgen laid so much stress, as confirming Christian doctrine, are now known to be of mediaeval origin, and they show dependence on Christian speculation.

people whom he shall lead in righteousness, and shall judge the tribes of the people that has been sanctified by the Lord his God. And he shall not suffer iniquity to dwell in the midst of them; and none that knoweth wickedness shall abide with them. For he shall take knowledge of them that they are all sons of their God, and shall apportion them in the land according to their tribes; and the stranger and the sojourner shall dwell with them no more. He shall judge the nations and the peoples with the wisdom of his righteousness; and he shall hold the nations under his yoke to serve him. And he shall glorify the Lord in a place to be seen of the whole earth; and he shall purge Jerusalem and make it sacred even as it was at the beginning; so that the nations shall come from the ends of the earth to see her glory, bringing as gifts her sons which had fainted, and they shall see the glory with which God has glorified her. And he as righteous king, taught by God, shall be over them, and there shall be no unrighteousness among them in his days, because they are all holy and the Messiah of the Lord is their king."<sup>11</sup>

As we read these words and the rest of the psalm of which they are a part, we realize the vitality of the hope which sustained the Jews under so many trials, and which was ready to respond to the proclamation of the Baptist. Certainly there is here more than the interpretation of some ambiguous oracle. But when we try to follow this hope backward to discover its genesis and growth we find that in its definite form, as the expectation of a king of David's line, it was by no means a constant factor in Israel's religion. To this extent the treatment of messianic prophecy by the theologians has been misleading. In the canonical books of the Old Testament the name Messiah is nowhere applied to the expected deliverer unless in one or two of the Psalms. The hope of the people was fixed rather on the kingdom of God than on the Son of David. And under this broad term—the kingdom of God—were included various and heterogeneous details. One writer will be content with the return of the scattered sons of Israel to Palestine; another sets his heart on the purification of the land from gentile defilements; a third pictures the temple rebuilt with more than its pristine splendor. The catalogue would include the divine protection of Jerusalem from invasion, a supernatural chastisement of invading armies, the subjugation of the nations under Israel, the constant performance of the Levitical ritual without flaw, the physical reconstruction of the land so that the temple mount shall dominate the whole region, the fruitfulness of the land heightened to the marvelous, and the visible presence of

<sup>11</sup> Psalms of Solomon 17:23-36.

God himself in his sanctuary. The restoration of the line of David is, in comparison with some of these, rather an inconspicuous feature of the program. Very rarely is a single member of the dynasty singled out and clothed with something of superhuman brightness. To be really fruitful our study of the subject must not attempt to combine all the features into a single messianic picture, but must try to discover which one was prominent in any particular period of Israel's history.

The great prophets of the eighth century found the hope of a better future already cherished by the people at large. The remarkable thing is that they set themselves against it as a delusion. Its existence is easily accounted for. Tradition delighted to tell of the warlike deeds of Yahweh, Israel's leader in the conquest of the land. The storm which caused the rout of Sisera was Yahweh's charge at the head of the hosts of heaven. Joshua's great victory at Beth Horon was due to the direct intervention of the God to whom he prayed. When Jonathan made his single-handed attack on the Philistines an earthquake spread terror in the enemies' camp. Yahweh had the extraordinary forces of nature at his command and there will come a time when he will use them effectively for the vindication of his people in some decisive action. Such was the popular expectation of the day of Yahweh.<sup>12</sup>

The opposition of the great prophets to this expectation was not motivated by any doubt of the power of Yahweh. In faith they were at one with their contemporaries. Where they differed was in the conception of God's ethical requirements, resulting in a vivid sense of sin. In the people's hope they found the great obstacle to their preaching—to encourage the hope of prosperity would have been to cut the nerve of their own message. They held that Yahweh's resources of storm and earthquake would be drawn upon not for the deliverance but for the punishment of Israel. Amos makes the day of Yahweh the reverse of what the people were looking for—a day of darkness rather than light. Isaiah makes the day a day of visitation on all that is proud and lifted up: "And the loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man shall be humbled and Yahweh alone shall be exalted in that day."<sup>13</sup> There is no evidence

<sup>12</sup> See the study entitled "The Day of Yahweh," by J. M. P. Smith, *American Journal of Theology*, V, 505-33.

<sup>13</sup> Isa. 2:12-22, cf. Amos 5:18-20.

that in the prophet's thought the exaltation of Yahweh required the preservation of Israel. Quite the contrary; the exaltation of Yahweh will be complete in that his justice is visited first on the nation most near to him: "Yahweh of Hosts is exalted by justice, and God the Holy One is seen to be holy by righteousness." And what this means is made clear: "I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard; I will take away the hedge thereof and it shall be eaten up; I will break down the wall thereof and it shall be trodden down; and I will lay it waste, it shall not be pruned nor hoed; but there shall come up briars and thorns; I will even command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it."<sup>14</sup> It is difficult to see what would be left of a vineyard after such treatment. Many parallels might be cited to show, what this passage shows plainly enough, that these prophets refused to entertain the thought of future deliverance.

Those prophets who voiced the popular optimism were branded as false prophets. Jeremiah gives us explicit testimony as to the message of a true prophet: "The prophets which were before me and before thee of old prophesied against many countries and against great kingdoms of war and of evil and of pestilence; the prophet who prophesies of prosperity, when the word of that prophet comes to pass then shall it be known that Yahweh has sent him."<sup>15</sup> Micah was in full accord with this declaration and the words in which he announced the destruction of Jerusalem and the desolation of the temple hill were long remembered. In the mind of all these preachers, fidelity to the ethical character of Yahweh involved as a logical necessity determined opposition to the optimism of the people at large.

There was then no messianic hope among these earlier prophets, and the doubts expressed by many critics as to the date of so-called messianic passages now imbedded in their books are well founded. We should be wrong in requiring of these men a cast-iron consistency; they were men like ourselves and keenly alive to the signs of the times. Jeremiah reveals to us the struggle between the yearnings of the patriot and the dictates of conscience. Hope may sometimes have kindled in them when the people showed a better mind. The very faith which prompted to a dark view of Israel's future suggested that even-

<sup>14</sup> Isa. 5:5 f.; cf. vs. 16.

<sup>15</sup> Jer. 28:8 f.

handed justice would at some time call the Assyrian to account, and thus give Israel some relief. The perception that a few in Israel remained faithful among the many faithless led Isaiah to reflect on the remnant that would escape the impending catastrophe. He had also a band of disciples to whom he committed his instruction<sup>16</sup> in the confidence that the future had something in store for them. He called his son Shearjashub to intimate his faith that a remnant would repent.

But a moment's reflection shows how far short this falls of what we call the messianic hope. That a mere remnant will repent only throws into prominence the mass which refuses to repent, and which must perish; that a small circle of right-minded men will care for the prophetic word and preserve it to future generations does not imply that either the nation or the kingship will survive. The most explicit declaration which we can with some confidence ascribe to Isaiah is this: "I will turn my hand upon thee and thoroughly purge away thy dross, and take away thy baser metal; and I will restore thy judges as at the first and thy counsellors as in the beginning; afterwards thou shalt be called City of righteousness, Faithful Town." Some maintain that such an expression implies the continuance of the kingship, but this is far from obvious. The traditions of Israel knew of a time when there was no king. The tone in which Hosea alludes to kings and princes shows that he had no tenderness for the monarchy. Nahum, Zephaniah, and Jeremiah have no care for any political institution. Deuteronomy allows the people to choose a king but evidently does it as a concession to human weakness. These facts speak plainly enough; the earlier prophets had no clear and consistent hope of a messianic kingdom even in the broad sense of the term. If the people cherished the idea that Yahweh had bound himself by a covenant to preserve and strengthen Israel the prophets were quick to show that a covenant broken by one party ceases to be binding on the other.

The predictions of disaster were abundantly fulfilled in the fall of Jerusalem, and with that event prophets of the old school lost their vocation. It is to the eternal credit of Ezekiel that he understood the emergency and rose to it. Having begun his career as a prophet

<sup>16</sup> Isa. 8:16-18.

of calamity he changed his tone to meet new conditions when the catastrophe actually fell. We are at first sight tempted to think that the hope of a restoration was simply the old confidence in the day of Yahweh. But it is a question whether that hope was strong enough to survive the events of 586. As long as Jerusalem stood the exiles cherished the old hope, as we know from Jeremiah's denunciations. But with the fall of the city the hope disappeared. The people said: "Yahweh has forsaken the land." They believed themselves to be suffering the penalty for the long series of sins committed by their ancestors: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." They saw nothing to hope for: "Our transgressions and our sins weigh us down; how then can we live? . . . . Our bones are dried up and our hope is lost; we are clean cut off." To meet such a state of mind the prophet needed more than the discredited hope of a day of Yahweh. To promise that disheartened band of exiles a new Gideon would have been grotesque even to their apprehension.

We have every reason to suppose therefore that Ezekiel's program of restoration was the product of his own vital religious faith confronting the facts of the exile. He believed with the others that Yahweh had forsaken his land, but he could not believe that he would permanently remain away from it. Living among the heathen the prophet was compelled to realize, as his predecessors had not realized, that Yahweh's name suffered from the scoffs of his enemies. They said: "These are the people of Yahweh yet they had to go out of his land." The honor of Israel's God suffered under these aspersions and must be vindicated: "Not for your sake do I act, O house of Israel, but for my sacred name which you have profaned among the nations whither you have gone. And I will sanctify my great name which has been profaned."<sup>17</sup> The nations which supposed Yahweh too weak to protect his own must be convinced by some signal example of his power. And this means much more than the old "day of Yahweh." A victory over the gentiles would not guarantee the sanctity of the Name which Ezekiel has at heart; that must be secured by a radical overturning in the physical world and an equally radical renewal in the hearts of men.

<sup>17</sup> Ezek. 36:20-23 and elsewhere.

The reason why Ezekiel could not conceive Yahweh to be permanently a voluntary exile from Palestine must be sought in the priestly habit of his mind. To the ritualist a sanctuary has a *character indelebilis*. Yahweh having once chosen his dwelling at Jerusalem that place became forever sacred. To think of it as permanently given over to pollution would be a constant pain to the devout soul. Moreover, to Ezekiel there was special fitness in Yahweh's choice of Palestine. It was in his geography the central point of the whole earth, from which Yahweh could best supervise his universe: "This is Jerusalem; I have set her in the midst of the nations and the countries are round about her."<sup>18</sup> Even the temporary absence of Yahweh could not deprive his land of its sacredness. The sacredness had been polluted by Israel and Judah; hence the judgment that had been meted out to them. But to suppose that the choice of God can be nullified by the action of man is impossible.

It is probable that Ezekiel was influenced by the primitive conception of the covenant between Yahweh and his people. According to the earliest narrative Yahweh agreed to go into the land with the people, on condition that they make the land a fit place of residence for him. But this was precisely what they had not done; they had eaten with the blood, had worshiped other gods, had brought uncircumcised foreigners into the temple, had buried the corpses of their kings under the walls of his house. If these things are avoided in the future there is no reason why Yahweh may not again dwell in the land. And to guard against these things is the object of Ezekiel's regulations. What he seeks is not a kingdom of God but a sanctuary properly served by a priesthood and guarded against the intrusion of anything profane. Israel's vocation is to be the temple-keeper of Yahweh. A prince is set over them and he is to continue the line of David, but he is only incidental to the priestly function of the nation—he is sort of temple steward to provide decent material for the sacrifice. Some police duties are also assigned to him, but he is really an insignificant figure in the new commonwealth.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> 5:5. The navel of the earth is still pointed out in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

<sup>19</sup> It cannot be said that Ezekiel had any enthusiasm for the line of David, and it has even been suggested that the allusions to David (34:23 f. and 37:25) are later interpolations. But this is a precarious supposition.

Almost if not quite all the details of Ezekiel's program are intelligible from the premises with which he starts out. The vindication of Yahweh's name requires some exemplary judgment on the heathen. This necessity is met by the vision of Gog. The purification of the land requires the expulsion of the Edomites. The preservation of the temple's sanctity must be guarded by its change of location and by the settling of the priests and Levites about it. We cannot now discuss these matters; the thing of importance is that the firm faith of the prophet inspired his fellow-exiles and they began to cherish his hope. In the fragments of their literature which had survived the catastrophe they found it recorded that their God was gracious and forgiving. Ezekiel himself had assured them that he had no pleasure in the death of the wicked. The first activity of the exiles, we may suppose, was to scrutinize the records of the past to find food for hope. The promises made to the patriarchs were read as though they did not refer only to the first conquest of Canaan. The oracle ascribed to Balaam mentioned a star out of Jacob and a scepter out of Israel which should smite all the corners of Moab. It might well be that this word of God was yet to be fulfilled. Isaiah had predicted punishment for the proud heart of the king of Assyria. The equal pride of Babylon must in like manner call down the divine vengeance.

With these thoughts in mind we can see the exiles scanning the political horizon for some sign of the expected deliverance. At the appearance of Cyrus before Babylon a poet among them uttered the joyful cry which now appears among the discourses of Isaiah.<sup>20</sup> The author sees the day of Yahweh approaching. Israel's God has summoned the Medes to perform his purpose upon Babylon. The doomed city is to meet the fate of Sodom and Gomorrha. Instead of being populous with men it will be the haunt of the desert demons and of savage beasts. The restoration of Israel will follow: "They shall take them captive whose captives they were, and shall rule over their oppressors." The leading thought is not that of Ezekiel but is purely political, and the taunt song in which the restored Zion exults over the humiliation of her enemy savors much more of human passion than of religious enthusiasm. The old hope of a day of Yahweh

<sup>20</sup> Isa., chaps. 13 and 14:1-22.



seems to have asserted itself. The long denunciation of Babylon which is now appended to the book of Jeremiah, breathes the same spirit.<sup>21</sup>

Religiously this national and particularistic hope is of small value. As a welcome contrast we turn to the elevated and spiritual poems which now form the second half of the book of Isaiah. This writer takes Ezekiel's thought of Yahweh's return to dwell among his people but frees it from its ritual limitations. Israel's God will reveal himself as the true God by himself leading his people back home. They will go forth in joy; the mountains will break forth before them into singing; the nations will see the glory thus revealed; Jerusalem will be rebuilt in splendor, her foundations of precious stones; the sanctity of the city will be inviolable, for no uncircumcised or unclean person will enter there. This might be construed as a more poetical presentation of Ezekiel's vision. But we read further that Israel will be a priestly nation for all the world, a light for the gentiles, and a bringer of salvation to all the earth. The picture becomes transcendental when it shows us a new heavens and a new earth; that the city will need no light from sun or moon; that Yahweh will be her everlasting light and her God her splendor.

Along with Deutero-Isaiah we may consider the kindred passages which speak of the return of paradise, and of all nations coming to the house of Yahweh to be taught of his ways.<sup>22</sup> In one we read of Yahweh's vengeance upon Edom and the accompanying wrath upon all nature. The theophany is accompanied as in the old days by convulsions in heaven and earth. There follows a transformation of the desert so that the ransomed of Yahweh may return and come to Zion with everlasting joy upon their heads.

The sketch shows, if it shows anything, that the originators of the messianic hope pay scarcely any attention to a messianic king. Ezekiel accepts a prince as a necessary evil; Deutero-Isaiah ignores him altogether.<sup>23</sup> But the hope of a restoration once having been formulated the thoughts of the exiles naturally turned to the monarch. If in the ideals of early Hebrew writers the tribal organization was thought to be the best, contact with the great oriental states showed

<sup>21</sup> Chaps. 50 and 51.

<sup>22</sup> Isa., chaps. 34, 35; Isa. 2:2-4 (Mic. 4:1-4).

<sup>23</sup> The only reference to David in Deutero-Isaiah is a purely historical one—55:3.

how impracticable was any other political system than the kingship. In an autocracy the welfare of the people depends in large measure on the character and ability of the monarch. In the fine phrase of Hammurabi, the king is commissioned by the gods "to let justice prevail in the land, to destroy the wicked and the evil, to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak." Some at least of the kings of Judah had interpreted their vocation in this way. David was the national hero, and his dynasty was the object of loyal devotion. The long captivity of Jehoiachin conferred upon him the glory of martyrdom, and the tragic fate of Zedekiah gave him a special place in the hearts of his countrymen. It cannot surprise us then that the hope of a return brought with it the idea of the restoration of the dynasty. The imprudent action of Haggai and Zechariah in hailing Zerubbabel as the expected one shows that the expectation was already formulated.

How the expectation had become current is evident from several passages now imbedded in the prophetic books. We have already noticed that the exiles turned to the remains of their literature for consolation, if haply they might find some word of hope among the messages of the prophets. The more obscure of the early oracles would perhaps receive the most attention. The venerable poem put into the mouth of the dying Jacob assured the scepter to Judah and gave him right to the obedience of the nations.<sup>24</sup> The Jew in exile could hardly rest in the thought that this inspired prediction had exhausted its meaning in the brief triumph of David over Edom and Moab. It now received a messianic interpretation.

Among the prophecies of Isaiah was one about the child Immanuel which gave opportunity for study. The original purpose of the prophet was no more than to assure Ahaz of speedy relief from his foes. The historical exigency was a matter of no moment to the later reader, but the mysterious child continued to occupy his thoughts. The meaning of the name was in itself a comfort to the believer.

Knowing ancient literary methods as we do we are not surprised to find this Immanuel prophecy overlaid by accretions of late date which more or less distinctly show that it had received a messianic

<sup>24</sup> Gen. 49:10. It is not necessary to enter into a discussion of the obscure reference to Shiloh. The more than forty dissertations known to Schöttgen on this passage have been followed by numerous later studies without discovering a satisfactory interpretation.

interpretation. The most distinct is now the climax of the section.<sup>25</sup> In the belief that the day of redemption has already dawned the writer hails the child who is born with the lofty name—Wonder-counsellor, Hero-God, Father-of-eternity, Prince-of-peace. He adds that there shall be no end of his welfare on the throne of David. Here for the first time we have a full-fledged messianic prediction; a member of the house of David is about to re-establish the royal power and to rule with justice and righteousness. As Yahweh's representative he may claim the loftiest titles, which moreover are quite in accord with oriental court usage. What was expected of him is made clear by the prediction of a shoot from the stock of Jesse: "With righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide with equity for the meek of the land."<sup>26</sup> Many scholars accept this passage as a genuine word of Isaiah the son of Amoz. But it is immediately followed by an evidently post-exilic passage, its description of the expected paradise is evidently of the tenor of Deutero-Isaiah, and the phrase "stock of Jesse" seems impossible in the mouth of the older Isaiah. All these indications date it in the later rather than the earlier period.

We may bring into connection with these two passages some other insertions in the prophetic books. Hosea's assurance that the children of Israel will repent and seek David their king<sup>27</sup> must be one such insertion. At the end of the book of Amos we read a promise that the ruined tent of David shall be again erected, and that the exiles shall be brought back to their land.<sup>28</sup> The book of Jeremiah repeats the prediction of a righteous branch for David<sup>29</sup> in two places whose late date must be obvious to every reader. That the hope of the author fixed itself on the dynasty must be evident from the direct assertion that David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel. Another writer declares that a king shall rule in righteousness and princes shall rule in justice, making it evident that he looked for a just administration rather than a supernaturally endowed individual who should hold the throne for an indefinite period.

Our review shows us that in the exilic and post-exilic period there was a definite expectation of the restored Jewish commonwealth of

<sup>25</sup> Isa. 9:1-6 (vss. 2-7 in the English).

<sup>26</sup> Isa. 11:1-10. <sup>27</sup> Hos. 3:5. <sup>28</sup> Amos 9:11-15. <sup>29</sup> Jer. 23:5-8; 33:14-18.

which the dynasty of David should have the rule. This expectation received new life and a different form in the Maccabean persecution. Testimony is given by the Book of Daniel. Here we find an anxious inquiry for the date at which the kingdom of God will come. The seventy weeks are derived from the seventy years of Jeremiah which had long passed without having brought the promised redemption. The broader outlook of the author on the world's history and his deep conviction of the degeneracy of his times cause him to seek something more than the traditional restoration of Israel to its own land. In his view the purpose of God must include the destruction of the gentile empires and the universality of the rule of Israel: "The kingdom and the greatness of the kingdom shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High."<sup>30</sup> The stone which is cut out of the mountain grows until it fills the whole earth. After the great beast is destroyed one like a man is brought near the Ancient of Days: "And there was given him dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve him." It should be clear that this figure *like a man* is a personification of Israel. Such a personification is in strict accord with the rest of the vision, and in his own explanation of the vision the writer makes his meaning clear.

The largeness of his scheme, but not the prominence of a personal Messiah, is the advance made by this writer. His idea of a dramatic judgment of the nations is part of his larger scheme, and this impressed other thinkers of about the same period. In a passage now incorporated in the Book of Isaiah we learn that the judgment reaches the unfaithful or disobedient angels. Another pictures the Name of Yahweh coming from afar burning with anger, to wreak his vengeance on the heathen, for whom a fire is prepared. A supplement to the same book naïvely sets forth the gratification of the saints when they look upon the bodies of transgressors burned in the unquenchable fire and gnawed by the undying worm.<sup>31</sup> This implies that the judgment is held at Jerusalem, which in fact is asserted by Deutero-Zechariah, and apparently by Joel.<sup>32</sup> The only reference to a messianic king in all this apocalyptic literature is Zechariah's announcement of a king coming in lowly guise as Prince of Peace.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Dan. 7:27; cf. 2:44; 12:1-3.

<sup>32</sup> Zech. 14:12-15; Joel 3:12-16.

<sup>31</sup> Isa. 66:24; cf. 24:21 and 30:27-33.

<sup>33</sup> Zech. 9:9 f.

When we turn to the Book of Psalms we find a vivid hope of the kingdom of God, but little about a Messiah. The kingdom is conceived as already present, in so far as Yahweh is rightful king and judge of all the earth. His throne is in the heavens, and his kingdom rules over all; from that throne he looks down upon the children of men; he gives food to the hungry, frees the prisoners, opens the eyes of the blind, executes justice for the oppressed, and turns the way of the wicked upside down. The hard facts of life seem indeed to contradict the theory, but the believer comforts himself with the thought that in a little while the judge will ascend the throne and gather the nations around him, there to decide their fate and vindicate his people. The impassioned prayer that Yahweh will intervene actively with shield and spear, will bow the heavens and come down, will renew his mighty deeds of old, show the inward struggle of those who were holding onto their faith amidst the taunts of an unbelieving world.<sup>34</sup> In very few cases is the Messiah mentioned, and in some at least of these it is evident that the term is applied to the nation rather than to an individual. This is not strange when we think of the meaning of the word—the Anointed. Who could so truly lay claim to the title as the faithful people whom Yahweh had chosen for himself, and had appointed to do his work in the world? It is Israel therefore who sits upon the sacred hill of Zion, and boasts of the divine decree. The parallelism in such a verse as this—"Yahweh is strength to his people, and a fortress of salvation to his anointed"—is sufficient to show the author's thought.

Still the ideal king, whom we have already met as a member of the Davidic house, is occasionally mentioned. The well-known seventy-second psalm is a prayer for his success as warrior and ruler, culminating in the wish that his name may endure forever. In other psalms Yahweh is reminded that his covenant with David promised him an enduring throne and is then asked where is the fulfilment.<sup>35</sup> The restoration of the dynasty is the utmost which the writers expect or desire. The most distinctly individualistic of all the so-called messianic psalms gives the monarch priestly as well as kingly power, but it is doubtful whether the author had the Messiah in mind at all.

<sup>34</sup> The passages are so familiar that it is needless to give references.

<sup>35</sup> Pss. 89 and 132.

The Old Testament Apocrypha show the messianic expectation in the form which we find in the Book of Psalms. Yahweh is king; he will reign in Jerusalem; the righteous will dwell there and the nations will bring gifts. Tobit expects the streets to be paved with sapphire; Baruch looks for a day of judgment; Ben Sira hopes for a return of the exiles, the rule of the house of David, and an everlasting covenant. The Books of Maccabees allude to the throne of David, and the raising-up of a prophet to guide Israel. According to Wisdom the righteous are to judge the heathen, and the God of Israel will be king.<sup>36</sup> In the circle in which these books originated the messianic hope cannot have been very ardently cherished.

Among the Pseudepigrapha however we find some passages of special interest. Among them we should put first the one from the Psalms of Solomon already quoted. In the disorders from which Palestine suffered after the death of Pompey, when the weakness of the Hasmoneans became evident, the thoughts of the pious turned with ardent longing to the promise of a Davidic king. This psalm describes the Maccabean princes as usurpers who laid waste the throne of David and who were punished for their presumption. Then follows the prayer for the expected son of David, who will restore the purity of Jerusalem and so enable the holy nation to accomplish its mission as God's own people and the guardian of his worship. This is the logical culmination of the messianic hope in the proper sense of that term. It looks for a king possessed of the divine grace, powerful enough to secure the independence of his nation, and wise enough to rule with justice. He is not more than David himself had been, according to tradition, and if the author reflected at all upon the length of life allotted to him he doubtless thought of him as reaching a good old age and then being gathered to his fathers, leaving a son to succeed him and carry on his reign of peace and righteousness. In other words this character has nothing transcendental about it.

Very different is the picture presented by some apocalyptic writings of this period.<sup>37</sup> Chief of these is the collection which passes under

<sup>36</sup> Tobit 13:10 and vss. 16-18; Baruch 2:34 f. and 4:36; Eccclus. 47:11; I Macc. 2:57; 4:46; 14:41; II Macc. 2:17 f.; Wisdom 3:8.

<sup>37</sup> It is unnecessary to cite those passages of the Sibylline books which allude to the messianic time. They really add nothing to our knowledge.

the name of Enoch. That this book is made up from several sources is generally recognized and is evident from the various views of the Messiah which it presents. At the culmination of the animal vision, which is dated with some confidence in the latter part of the second century B.C., the Messiah appears as a white bull.<sup>38</sup> Whether an individual is intended or whether the dynasty is presented in this form, is open to doubt. The figure is not important to the author's scheme, for it takes no part in the judgment, or in the conquest of the heathen. A great advance on this view is marked however by a section which we may call the messianic book of Enoch and which is dated about the middle of the first pre-Christian century.<sup>39</sup> In his vision Enoch sees the Elect One of righteousness and faith. "And I saw his dwelling place under the wings of the Lord of Spirits and all the elect before him are resplendent as lights of fire." This passage alone would not prove that the Messiah is pre-existent, for Enoch is seeing what is to come to pass at the end of days. But in the second similitude we learn that the name of the Son of Man was named before the Lord of Spirits *before the stars of heaven were made*, and that he has been chosen and hidden before him before the creation of the world and forever more. This is more than an ideal pre-existence. The Son of Man has now become a heavenly being, and it is he who will judge the world: "He will raise the mighty from their thrones and will grind to powder the teeth of the sinners."<sup>40</sup>

That the Messiah is the Son of God is intimated in a single passage of Enoch, and is more fully developed in IV Ezra, where we read: "For my Son the Messiah will be revealed and all those who are with him, and will rejoice those who remain four hundred years. Afterwards my Son the Messiah will die, and all who have human breath."<sup>41</sup> After this comes the universal resurrection.

In a later chapter of this book we read that the Messiah who rebukes the Roman Empire has been kept by the Most High for the end of days, and that then he will bring the nations before his judgment seat and after rebuking will destroy them; but he will redeem

<sup>38</sup> Enoch 90:37 f.

<sup>39</sup> Chaps. 37-71.

<sup>40</sup> Chaps. 46 and 48; cf. 51:3 and 61:8. The identification of Enoch himself with the Son of Man in 71:14 is a vagary not yet satisfactorily explained.

<sup>41</sup> IV Ezra 7:28 f.; cf. Enoch 105:2.

the remnant of the Jews<sup>42</sup> and give them joy until the end, the Day of Judgment. In still another passage it is said that the man who ascends from the sea is the one whom the Most High has kept for a long time by whom he will redeem the creation, and he is again called My Son.<sup>43</sup>

We have now traced the messianic hope in Israel from its beginning down to its completion in the first century of our era. The question inevitably suggests itself whether this hope is something which we may claim as distinctively Jewish, or whether it is only a part of the oriental view of the universe, originating in Babylon and borrowed by the Hebrews. To answer this question correctly it is necessary to do more than to point out some details in which Babylonian and Hebrew thought resemble each other. Our endeavor ought first to approach the subject from the point of view of Hebrew religion and see whether the messianic hope is intelligible as part of the system which Jewish thinkers were providentially called to work out for the world. Putting the question in this way, we need not hesitate to say that the messianic hope is a necessary part of the Jewish religion.

It is not of course possible to deny that Israel shared the views of its neighbors on many points where we moderns have very different ideas. What is sometimes called the oriental view of the universe was only the view common to all mankind until the time when modern science compelled men to a new cosmology. All mankind until recently held that the earth was the center of the whole universe; that the gods were principally concerned with what goes on here; that there was a certain correspondence between the movements of the stars and the fate of nations and individuals. The idea of predictive prophecy was not confined to the Hebrews. The whole ancient world was full of presages and oracles; the foretelling of events had a larger place in the history of Greek cities than in that of Israel. In Egypt there were recorded forecasts of national success or disaster—one such was given by the mouth of an inspired lamb. In Assyria and Babylonia divination was reduced to a science.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> IV Ezra 12: 32-34. The words of the Syriac, "Who shall arise out of the seed of David," are not in the Latin.

<sup>43</sup> 13: 26; cf. vs. 37.

<sup>44</sup> Gressmann, *Allorientalische Texte und Bilder*, I, 205-9; *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, VI, 69.



The Sibylline books are evidence that at the beginning of our era intelligent people were ready to give credence to such oracles all over the Roman world. Josephus claims prophetic gifts for himself, something which strikes us as ludicrous, but there is no reason to suppose that he does not take himself quite seriously.

This general scheme of things was held by the Hebrews in common with their neighbors. It was not a question of one borrowing from the other. And the same is true of the belief that God is most clearly revealed in the extraordinary events of nature. Hebrew religious faith saw in Yahweh the Savior of his people, who came to their help in the storm and the earthquake. So the Babylonian found in Marduk the conqueror of forces hostile to man, and related the myth in which he triumphed over Tiamat. Allusions to Yahweh as smiter of the dragon, of Rahab, and of the crooked serpent,<sup>45</sup> show that similar stories circulated among the Hebrews. But why should we say with a recent author that the "prophetic eschatology uses symbols which are mythological in their nature and not Israelitic"? Why should the religious faith of Israel not be vital enough to picture its God as a warrior victorious over a dragon? A real religious faith must have an active God as its object.

We underrate the vitality of faith when we insist that all its expressions must be literary reminiscences. In the particular case of the messianic hope we may be sure that the men who were looking for salvation from the miseries of the Exile were very little concerned about literary reminiscences. This is eminently true of the two men to whom we owe the messianic hope—Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah. Ezekiel we see to be a man saturated with traditional ideas, the last man, one would say, to borrow Babylonian mythological conceptions. Recent scholars are inclined to see in his vision of Gog remains of a myth. But Ezekiel in his youth had known of the Scythian invasion which came to the very border of Judah. In vision he sees over again that terrible enemy threatening to overflow the land, this time to be checked by an act of Yahweh which would vindicate his power and secure the peace of his people for all time. No other source for this and the other visions need be sought than the prophet's firm faith in the power of Yahweh and in his fidelity to his chosen people. And

<sup>45</sup> Isa. 27:1; 51:9; Amos 9:2.

the same is true of Deutero-Isaiah. The theory of an extra-Israelite origin for the hopes of these two great prophets finds no justification in the facts.

The passages inserted in the earlier part of Isaiah's book need some attention. It has recently been urged, for example, that the Immanuel prophecy has the appearance of something "designed to meet an expectation already in the air."<sup>46</sup> By this is meant that the people of Jerusalem were already looking for a deliverer, a hero to be born of a virgin, and that Isaiah encouraged them to believe that he was about to appear. But if this were so, how obscurely the prophet expressed himself! Could not the great orator have said in a few words that this was his meaning? Even if he had said that the expected wonderful child was about to be born, would that have given Ahaz assurance that the impending siege of Jerusalem would come to nought? When we make the prophet a framer of enigmas we deprive him of his merits as a clear expounder of the will of God.

With somewhat more of probability an eschatological tradition of extra-Israelite origin is by some discovered in the ninth chapter of Isaiah.<sup>47</sup> The program of the author is the one already familiar to us: First comes a great overturning, and the people that has walked in darkness sees a great light; the yoke of the oppressor is broken; the garment rolled in blood and the arms of the invader are given to the flames. Then comes the birth of the deliverer, the child of wonderful name, and the kingdom of peace is ushered in. No reason can be assigned for making this a foreign importation except the exalted name given the child. To understand this name we need only remind ourselves that even the common man in Israel did not hesitate to call his child "Brother-of-Yahweh" or "Son-of-Yahweh," and that in the royal family we meet such names as "Strength-of-Yahweh" and "Righteousness-of-Yahweh." Moreover, the king was in all Hebrew tradition the Anointed of Yahweh, his representative, partaking of his sanctity. If now at some great crisis a seer had the confidence that the ideal king was at hand there was nothing extravagant in his use of the words of the text. Extra-Israelite tradition is not needed to account for his language.

<sup>46</sup> Burney, *Journal of Theological Studies* (1909), 582.

<sup>47</sup> Gressmann, *Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, 279; Oesterley, *Evolution of the Messianic Idea in Israel*, 222.

Descriptions of the good time coming which we now read in the eleventh and the thirty-fifth chapters of Isaiah are sometimes supposed to be borrowed from gentile descriptions of the Golden Age. To understand these chapters we must notice that each forms the climax of a group of prophecies. The editors of the prophetic books evidently planned to conclude each section with an encouraging prediction. Thus Amos, Hosea, Zechariah, and the several sections of Isaiah end each with a messianic prophecy. We have seen reason to believe that these editors wrought subsequently to the great Deutero-Isaiah; in fact they all used Deutero-Isaianic ideas, adding however a more distinct expectation of the messianic king. Now, the features of the two chapters we are considering which seem to be borrowed from pictures of the golden age, are precisely those of Deutero-Isaiah. But these we have decided to be the fruit of a strong religious faith expressed with the glow of a poetic temperament.

Up to this point, therefore, we have reason to believe that the messianic hope is an original production of the Israelite prophets. With the Book of Daniel, to which we now come, the case is somewhat different. At the time of its writing the Jews had long been in contact with Persian and Greek thought, and that they had been influenced by the ideas of the people among whom they lived is shown by evidence in our possession. We are prepared to find traces of such influence even in so thoroughly a Jewish book as Daniel. The author bases his scheme of history on the Number Four—the great image is made up of the four metals: gold, silver, bronze, and iron. We are reminded at once of the sequence of the four ages of the world in Greek writers. The Persian eschatology also knows four ages of the world each of three thousand years. The coincidence is too striking to be accidental. Yet we may say that the author of Daniel uses the scheme in a way to show his originality, for he does not make the whole duration of the world consist of four periods, but only the time from the reign of Nebuchadrezzar to the Maccabean Age.

The Number Four appears again in the vision of the beasts, and the beasts themselves look so like mythological survivals that we suspect gentile influence. Yet it would be easy to make too much of this superficial resemblance. The comparison of a hostile invader to a savage beast is so natural that it had been used long before Daniel.

The earlier prophets had likened the enemy to a lion issuing from his lair, or to the wolves of the desert. One detail in Daniel, however, does not accord with the figure—these beasts come out of the sea, which is not the home of lions or leopards. This we may admit to be a survival from Babylonian mythology, which makes Tiamat, the personified ocean, the mother of all sorts of monsters. The fourth beast of Daniel also looks like a mythological monster, “a beast terrible and powerful, which had great iron teeth; it broke in pieces and stamped the residue with its feet.” We are justified in saying that there is here also a possible survival from early myths. But we must remember that the gentile influence was not direct; the myths had passed into folklore and had long ceased to be recognized as what they had been in their origin. In fact it would have horrified the apocalyptic writers to think that they were in any way influenced by heathen ideas.

The Persian religion had a well-developed theory of the last things, including a judgment at the end of the present age, a resurrection of the dead, the coming of a Savior, the creation of a new heaven and a new earth, and the setting-up of the kingdom of the good divinity. This scheme is known to us only through post-Christian documents, and its earlier stages are still under investigation. It is impossible to say therefore what influence it exercised on Jewish thought. In almost every respect the ideas of Daniel are less developed. Daniel knows of no personal Messiah; he expects only a partial resurrection; he ignores entirely the picturesque bridge over which according to the Mazdeans the souls are to go after death. We must conclude that direct Mazdean influence on Daniel is slight.<sup>48</sup>

The phrase “Son of Man” used by Daniel is supposed by some to be a mythological survival. The language of Daniel is “one like a son of man” which, as is well known, means simply “one like a man.” As was shown above, this figure is a personification like the animals which appear in the same vision. The author chooses a man to represent the restored nation of Israel in order to show that this kingdom is as superior to the empires of the world as a man is above the beasts. The only thing that needs to be explained is the

<sup>48</sup> This is the opinion of Charles, *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, 136. This author recognizes also that the doctrine of a resurrection found in Isa., chap. 26, cannot be derived from a Persian source.

coming on the clouds of heaven. Because of this feature some scholars identify the Son of Man with an angel, perhaps Michael, the guardian angel of Israel,<sup>49</sup> while others think of a pre-existent judge and ruler of the world, originally a god, now an emanation of the godhead.<sup>50</sup> Neither hypothesis is convincing. The author thought of the Israel which was to receive the kingdom as dwelling at a distance from Jerusalem; that the exiles should fly as a dove to their home was a thought familiar to all readers of Deutero-Isaiah; to bring the man out of the sea whence the beasts had ascended would seem to make him no better than the heathen powers. An angelic figure would have come *with* the Ancient of Days, and not have waited until the judgment was past. Giving due weight to all these considerations we see that this Son of Man is explicable as an organic part of the vision and is not a loan from gentile sources.

Finally, the pre-existent Messiah of Enoch and Ezra is explicable as an exegetical development from the Son of Man of Daniel and the Son of Yahweh of the second psalm. That the apocalyptic writers busied themselves with the earlier literature needs no demonstration. The figure of the Son of Man when once interpreted of an individual was sure to attract devout speculation. The ideal pre-existence of many things became about this time a postulate of the scribes. The ideal existence of the mysterious deliverer and ruler easily objectified itself as a real existence under the wings of the divinity. In this case therefore as in the others we are not compelled to assume gentile influences to account for the exalted messianic expectation.

Our conclusion is that the messianic hope in its various forms is a product of Hebrew and Jewish religious faith. This faith rested upon the mercy and fidelity of Israel's God and on his election of a people in whom his glory should be manifested. In the struggle which this faith went through to maintain itself under heathen oppression the hope gradually developed until it reached the transcendental form which it assumes in the latest documents. Here and there, in minor details, it may have been influenced by mythological survivals, but these survivals had already passed into folklore and do not in any case affect the substance of the hope.

<sup>49</sup> Schmidt, *JBL*, XIX, 22-27.

<sup>50</sup> Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*, 117, 122.

## THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN THE TEACHING OF PAUL

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, PH.D.  
Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.

Was Paul a traditionalist, a rationalist, a mystic, or a pragmatist? Or, if he was not any one of these to the exclusion of the others to what extent did he, in the construction of his ethical and theological doctrines, depend upon tradition, speculation, mystical or quasi-mystical experiences, and the test of practice, respectively? The present purpose is to discuss this question, with special reference to the last-mentioned element, viz., the pragmatic.

With all his anti-traditionalism, Paul owed an immense debt to tradition. From the Old Testament and Pharisaic Judaism he had derived his monotheism, predestinationism and ethical pessimism, his angelology and demonology, and his apocalyptic eschatology and messianism, none of which, perhaps, as general features of his system did he ever at any time seriously question. That he was influenced much more than he realized by the fundamental ideas of the Greek mystery-religion and by the Logos-philosophy and ethics of the Stoics, as well as by other contemporary non-Jewish and non-Christian traditions, can scarcely longer be disputed.<sup>1</sup> And especially it must not be forgotten that, with all his independence, the apostle to the Gentiles was so dependent upon the primitive Christian community that, apart from its proclamation of the crucified Jesus as the risen and glorified Messiah, his conversion to Christianity is historically inconceivable.<sup>2</sup> And indeed we find in Paul much more than a mere tacit acceptance of traditional elements. In the course of his polemical arguments he makes constant appeal to the Old Testament, quoting it, after the manner of the rabbis, as a verbally inspired external authority.

<sup>1</sup> Bacon, *The Story of Paul*, 310-20; A. Meyer, *Jesus or Paul?* 42; J. Weiss, *Paul and Jesus*, 129.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, 57.

But this is not to prove that Paul was a traditionalist. Indeed, in formulating his new-found Christian convictions he was much more independent than dependent. It was with clear consciousness of his break with the past that he remembered how "exceedingly jealous" he had formerly been for the traditions of his fathers (Gal. 1:14). He now made use of "the oracles of God," not so much to arrive at new conclusions as to prove his conclusions to others, and it is at most an exaggeration of the fact when Wrede says:<sup>3</sup> "He generally extracts from Scripture that which he himself has read into it . . . thus escaping the yoke of the letter without derogating from its sanctity" (cf. Gal. 3:16; 4:24-31; I Cor. 9:9, 10; II Cor. 8:15; Rom. 1:17; 11:9, 10). His real independence is especially manifest in his attitude toward "the law." Not only did he know himself as emancipated from its externalism; he was determined that the Gentile converts should not be entangled in the yoke of its bondage. Christ was the end of the law for righteousness to the believer. Moreover, in the matter of observing the statutes of the law, each individual Christian was to be "fully persuaded in his own mind" (Gal. 5:1; Rom. 8:4; 14:5; cf. Col. 2:4-20). More striking still is the apostle's strenuous insistence, in his letter to the Galatians (chaps. 1, 2) that he is not repeating in a traditional fashion any gospel in which he had been instructed by the first Christians, or by any man. And above all, his dependence upon the external authority of the historical Jesus himself is so slight as to constitute one of the most striking problems of New Testament study. His claim to be guided by the mind of Christ (I Cor. 2:16) is not a reference to traditional authority; he professes to know nothing of Christ "according to the flesh" (II Cor. 5:16). It is true that Paul seems not always at least to have taken special precautions to prevent *Paulinism* coming to be held in a merely traditional fashion; he praised the Corinthians for holding fast the traditions even as he had delivered the same to them (I Cor. 11:2), and the most striking feature of the "pastoral" epistles is the evidence which they present that a hard-and-fast Paulinistic traditionalism soon came to be established, in which the "form of sound words" received from the great apostle was regarded as of primary importance. (II Tim. 1:13). Still, so far as Paul himself was con-

<sup>3</sup> *Paul*, 78-79.

cerned, this later development was the result of an oversight, rather than something either foreseen or intended.

If then Paul is to be thought of as being in the main an independent thinker within the realm of Christian doctrine, can this independence be attributed to a somewhat rationalistic interest in philosophical speculation? There is, it is true, a certain speculative element in the apostle's teaching. At least he was no stranger to the common human interest in consistency, rationality. His extended exposition of the parallelism and contrast between Adam and Christ, law and grace, sin and righteousness, death and life (Rom. 5:12-21), is but one of the many examples of his intricate analogical reasonings (cf. Rom. 7:1-6). He is conscious of using natural reason as a guide, and urges others to do the same (I Cor. 11:13, 14; II Cor. 5:14; cf. Acts 17:25, 29). He could, upon occasion, carry out the logical implications of his premises to the bitter end (Rom. 9:14-24). And it is not in method only, but even more in the content of his teaching, that Paul betrays the philosophical interest. He had his own world-view and philosophy of history—showing the influence of Hellenic culture, indeed, but his own, nevertheless (I Cor. 15:28; Col. 1:15-26; Eph. 1:10, 21-23; cf. Acts 17:28). And, in particular, in his remarkable christocentric cosmology with its incipient Logos-Christology, we have what Wernle chooses to call the first great Christian interpretation of the universe, a theology for mature Christians, a Christian gnosis resting in considerable part upon a speculative basis.<sup>4</sup>

But it would be even more misleading to classify Paul as a rationalist than as a traditionalist. Against cases of speculation at variance with tradition can be matched instances in which tradition sets definite limits beyond which speculation must not venture (Col. 2:6-8), and the Old Testament as a source of religious knowledge is regarded as vastly superior to natural reason (Rom. 3:1). Indeed, human wisdom is, in the sphere of religion, essentially untrustworthy (I Cor. 1:17-2:5; 3:18-20), and there is danger in philosophy (Col. 2:8). "It may even be safely maintained that St. Paul scarcely ever speculated in the interests of pure knowledge and abstract truth."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Beginnings of Christianity*, I, 227, 333; cf. J. Weiss, *Paul and Jesus*, 68, 77.

<sup>5</sup> Wernle, *op. cit.*, I, 321.



"He *can* be, but he does not wish to be, a philosopher."<sup>6</sup> In other words, Paul did not *indulge* in speculation; he *employed* it when he found that it could serve his polemic purpose against a lingering Judaism or an incipient Gnosticism. And, we may add, the anti-speculative utterances of the Pastoral Epistles could hardly have been, at such an early date, attributed to the apostle, if he had been favorable to religio-philosophical speculation for its own sake.

The secret of Paul's religious independence is not to be found in any tendency to speculation, but in his appeal to experience. It is commonly recognized that there is a mystical element in Paul's teaching, and it is natural to seek an explanation of this by reference to those mystical or quasi-mystical experiences to which he so frequently appeals. Of these by far the most important was the Damascus-road experience, which marked his conversion to Christianity. Never thereafter did he doubt that he had been in communication with the crucified but risen and exalted Christ. This was to Paul a typical instance of "revelation" (Gal. 1:12, 16)— "not a gradual illumination but the marvelous event of a definite point of time."<sup>7</sup> But there were other "visions and revelations" of "exceeding greatness." Trance, ecstasy, and "spiritual gifts," such as the gift of tongues and the gift of working "signs and wonders and mighty works" in the healing of disease were among the experiences of the apostle in which he believed himself to be in immediate contact with the power of God and of the Christ, his Son (I Cor. 14:18; II Cor. 12:1-12; Rom. 15:18, 19; cf. Acts 22:17; 28:8, 9). Similarly he interprets certain emotional experiences, energizings of the moral will as "joy in the Holy Spirit" and being "filled with the Spirit." These special religious experiences were the source of much of Paul's theology. The central doctrine of his gospel he owed to the first of these great "revelations." As Weinle says, "The experience of seeing the crucified Jesus as the Messiah is the starting-point of Paul's dogmatic thinking,"<sup>8</sup> and Wernle, "The Pauline gnosis proceeds from the Spirit."<sup>9</sup> Naturally the doctrine of the union of Christ

<sup>6</sup> Bacon, *op. cit.*, 318.

<sup>7</sup> A. Meyer, *Jesus or Paul?* 44.

<sup>8</sup> *St. Paul, the Man and His Work*, 301.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 323.

with his people is made fundamental. Salvation comes through mystical union with the crucified and risen Christ in the process of his death and resurrection. Christ or the Holy Spirit indwelling the believer is the source of his illumination and strength, and the basis for his hope of final glory (Gal. 2:20; 5:16, 22; Eph. 3:17-19; 6:10; Rom. 8:9, 14, 16; II Cor. 5:17; Col. 1:27).

But Paul was far from being a mere and unmitigated mystic. He "valued mystical experiences in proportion as they generated spiritual force."<sup>10</sup> "Manifestations of the Spirit" were "to profit withal" (I Cor. 12:7). "Spiritual gifts" must be exercised and "revelations" imparted, only when it was "unto edifying" (I Cor. 14:26). Thus while Paul's *theoretical* test of revelation was its having been *inspired* by some unusual psychic experience, *practically* his test was its value in *inspiring to* ethico-religious activity. And Johannes Weiss argues forcefully that the claim to have the "mind of Christ" (I Cor. 2:16) and to be "persuaded in the Lord Jesus" (Rom. 14:14) did not mean that the apostle's certainty in particular judgments was "mechanically deduced from the mystical substratum," but that he believed himself to be judging and acting in accordance with the spirit of Jesus' teaching.<sup>11</sup> At any rate, Paul is no more to be charged here with uncontrolled mysticism than with servile traditionalism. Indeed the Johannine exhortation, "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits, whether they be of God" (I Jno. 4:1-3) might have been, and perhaps originally was in substance, uttered by Paul himself. At any rate he had other norms of doctrine than that of mystical states of consciousness.

It begins to be evident then that Paul's appeal to experience as the basis of his religious independence was not exclusively or even fundamentally to abnormal personal experiences. Superior to these was the test of practice in the interests of spiritual values. Activity and practicality were prime characteristics of the life and mind of the missionary apostle. It was but natural that his ethics and theology should be strongly activistic. He appreciated the Gospel not as being traditional or rational, nor even chiefly as according with certain private experiences of his own, but primarily as dynamic: it

<sup>10</sup> J. M. Campbell, *Paul the Mystic*, 21.

<sup>11</sup> *Paul and Jesus*, 115, 116, 123.

was the power of God unto salvation to every believer (Rom. 1:16; cf. I Thess. 1:5, 9). For this reason he would adhere to it, though an angel from heaven were to preach a different message (Gal. 1:8). The "foolishness of preaching" was accredited by its saving power as true and divine wisdom (I Cor. 1:21, 24). Its value was a vindication of its truth, and seemed to justify the making of all reasoning processes instrumental to the Christian life, the bringing of "every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (II Cor. 10:5).

No one would claim, of course, that Paul was a conscious pragmatist, but it cannot be disputed that he made great use of the pragmatic test of moral and religious truth. So far as particular duties were concerned, he was guided by a sort of transfigured or spiritual utilitarianism. As Weinel says, "Morality for St. Paul has no other aim than to keep the community and the individual in a condition of purity and of faith."<sup>12</sup> His ambition was "to present every man perfect in Christ" (Col. 1:28); all that could serve as means to this end was imperative; all that bore no relation to this purpose, no matter how ancient the tradition authorizing it, was unimportant. This proved in some respects a most revolutionary principle in ethics. Where there had been compulsion there was now liberty. (Gal. 5:1; I Cor. 10:23; Rom. 14:13). The old distinction between the ceremonially clean and unclean was obliterated, and the former observance of sacred days was left to individual conviction (I Cor. 8:8; 10:25, 27; Rom. 14:5, 14; Col. 2:20-23). Baptism as a Christian ordinance was lightly esteemed (I Cor. 1:17), but inasmuch as it was an established practice in the Christian community, it was retained and utilized in the interests of the Christian life through an emphasis upon its symbolic and hence ultimately ethical value (Rom. 6:1-14; Col. 2:12, 13).

But while this new test of moral distinctions brought new liberties, it also brought new obligations. All things were lawful, indeed, but all things were not *expedient*. Though one might with perfect impunity eat meat offered to idols, since an idol is nothing real, one must be careful lest the exercise of his rational liberty in such matters should prove a means of injuring his less enlightened brother. If

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, 330.

the welfare of another should require it, one must consider himself under moral obligation to forego his own personal liberty (I Cor. 6:12; 8:1-13; 10:23-28; Rom. 14:13-21). Under certain circumstances it became a Christian duty to withdraw fellowship from an individual *as an expedient* to induce him to repent (II Thess. 3:14, 15; I Cor. 5:5). The pragmatic test is immediately decisive against all casuistical speculations (Rom. 6:1) and also, as we have already seen, in criticism of all supposed revelations and inspirations (I Cor. 14:6-40).

There were some of Paul's contemporaries apparently, to whom this pragmatic criterion in ethics seemed very dangerous. He was charged with teaching the boldest opportunism, the use of evil means for the securing of good ends. But this charge the apostle indignantly repudiated as *slander* (Rom. 3:8)—the very word that a well-known pragmatist has recently used of a similar charge against his own pragmatic view of truth. What Paul did believe and act upon was that there were many acts of which, considered as ends, the moral character was neutral, but which, when useful for promoting the acceptance of the gospel, became a duty, and when a hindrance thereto morally evil. In such cases he felt free to regard the most politic course as morally right; he became all things to all men in order that by all means he might save some (I Cor. 9:18-23). According to the particular situation confronted a certain act might be good, bad, or indifferent. With this distinction in mind it will not be found necessary to assume that there was any inconsistency between Paul's rebuke of Peter for "dissembling" at Antioch (Gal. 2:11-14) and his advice to the Corinthians and Romans concerning the eating of meat offered to idols (I Cor. 8:1-13; 10:20-29; Rom. 14:13-21). Eating such meat with Gentiles was in itself a matter ethically indifferent; a man was neither better nor worse for eating or for refusing to eat. But if to eat would be to encourage a "weak brother" in participating in what was to him idolatry, it was to be avoided as evil. And, on the contrary, if to abstain from eating would be to play into the hands of the Judaizing Christians in their effort to impose the yoke of Jewish legalism upon the Gentile converts, to persist in eating as before must be regarded as a sacred duty. In the same way the apostle's attitude toward circumcision can easily be shown to have

been free from inconsistency. Abstractly it made no difference morally or religiously whether a person was circumcised or not (Gal. 6:15). But if, as in the case of the circumcision of Timothy (Acts. 16:3), observance of this Jewish custom would remove prejudice against the heralds of the gospel and at the same time impose no unfair burden upon any, it became a duty to use the expedient. And when, on the other hand, legalists insisted that circumcision should be required of all Gentile Christians, Paul deliberately left Titus uncircumcised (Gal. 2:3-5) and later insisted that to be circumcised under such circumstances would be to lose the value of the Christian gospel (Gal. 5:2). In external things neither conformity nor non-conformity was valued for its own sake, but the one or the other according as it could better serve the ends of spiritual religion.

In any estimate of the Pauline ethics this pragmatic or telic characteristic must be kept in mind. Some of the apostle's injunctions were mere temporary expedients, and were recognized by himself as such. For example, changes of vocation and estate are advised against "by reason of the present distress" (I Cor. 9:26). Other rules of merely temporary and perhaps only local validity were laid down, apparently without their limitations being fully recognized, as when there was imposed as a universal law the injunction that women keep silence in the churches—a much-needed precaution for the mitigation of the "confusion" prevailing in the Corinthian church (I Cor. 14:33-35; cf. I Tim. 2:11, 12). But even the most universal of the ethical principles enunciated by Paul had often strikingly obvious application to the particular case in hand, so that it seems not unreasonable to suppose that, universal as they may be, they were first suggested and formulated and initially verified where and as we find them, in the attempt to relieve some merely temporary tension in the local situation. For example, love is greater than faith or hope (I Cor. 13:13)—*especially* for a church strong in faith and hope (I Cor. 1:7; 13:2) but full of division, jealousy, and strife (I Cor. 1:10, 12; 3:3). But the great principles of Christian morality which Paul reiterates throughout the hortatory portions of his epistles had been tested over and over again within his own personal experience and observation, and, as thus verified and held by him, were as empirical and pragmatic as they were Christian.

Paul's theology, too, was strikingly pragmatic. It was, as Wernle says "a missionary theology, the theology of an apologist."

St. Paul developed his soteriology as well as his anti-Jewish apologetic in the midst of his missionary labors and for purely practical purposes. In order to win over the Gentiles Jesus had to be presented to them in a wider, more comprehensive and intelligible system; and furthermore this system had to be defended against the attack of Jews and Jewish Christians. . . . All his propositions—even the most abstruse—served the practical purposes of missionary life, and were never put forward without reference to them.<sup>13</sup>

In the genesis of the Pauline Christology three stages may be marked. First of all, probably, was the selection by the young Pharisee of the tradition that the Messiah was to be "the Man coming with the clouds of heaven," and spoken of as "the Son of God," in preference to the common Jewish expectation of an earthly world-monarch of the Davidic line. This may have been, as Arnold Meyer suggests<sup>14</sup> a deliberate choice between opposing views with the intention of squaring his messianic ideas with his presupposition that the flesh is inherently evil. The second stage was the attaching of this Christ-predicate to the crucified and risen Jesus. This was not, of course, a purposive judgment, to begin with, at least, but a more or less unexpected datum of the trance-experience. The third stage, however, was clearly purposive and pragmatic. The exalted Christology of the later epistles (Col. 1:13-17; 2:9; Eph. 1:21-23; 3:9) was a weapon whetted for the imminent conflict with Gnosticism, and at the same time a series of independent religious value-judgments, expressing with considerable "expansion of feeling" the apostle's appreciation of the heavenly Christ. Paul's Christology, therefore, while to some extent and in some of its aspects traditional, speculative, and mystical, was also strongly pragmatic.

No less so was his interpretation of the death of Christ. In the first place there was the apologetic necessity of explaining why God should have allowed the Messiah to suffer death. For Paul himself this problem was especially acute, for in his view death was the penalty of sin; the law was a law of sin and death (Rom. 5:14; 6:23; 8:2)—no death without sin, no sin without death. Jesus' suffering of death, therefore, must have been a part of his messianic work for the salva-

<sup>13</sup> Wernle, *op. cit.*, 226, 321; cf. 328-29.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, 48.

tion of sinners.<sup>15</sup> This vicarious suffering of the death-penalty of sin must have been either that the people of Christ should not die, or else that death—the perishing of the outer man, merely—might have no terrors for them (Gal. 3:13; Rom. 5:6-10; II Cor. 5:21). Of this interpretation the resurrection of Christ afforded at once confirmation and explanation. Thus it was found that what had originally presented itself as a “stumbling-block”—the idea of a crucified Messiah—had great value as a spiritual dynamic; it was the “power of God” (I Cor. 1:23, 24).

In tracing further the use which Paul made of the death of Christ in his theology, it is not always easy to say whether he proceeded from the practical need to the instrumental theory, or from the suggested meaning to its practical application; but in any case the practical value of the doctrine was what determined its survival. Possibly it was by two originally separate lines of thought proceeding in opposite directions concerning the death of Christ that Paul forged his most powerful weapon against the attacks of the Judaizers. If the Messiah suffered the death penalty of sin on behalf of his people, that penalty of a broken law could no longer be required of them; the law was therefore no longer binding in any external fashion upon them. In spite of the dangers of this conclusion to the Christian himself, arising out of unwarranted antinomian inferences, it was too valuable a weapon against “the enemies of the gospel” to be discarded. On the other hand, the necessity of supporting against criticism the thesis that the Jewish ritual observances (for example and *especially*, the sacrifices) must not be imposed upon the Gentile converts, seems to have led to some such reflection as the following: the sacrifices are no longer necessary since the Messiah has come, *especially* in view of the death of the Christ, for that death was the true sacrifice, which, having been offered (I Cor. 5:7), convinces us that God is propitious, *especially* since it is God himself who has provided the propitiatory offering (Rom. 3:25); in this we see the grace of God, who was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (II Cor. 5:19). In this way Paul found not only additional anti-Judaistic considerations, but the basis of a powerful presentation of the gospel (II Cor. 5:20; cf. Rom. 5:10).

<sup>15</sup> Shailer Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, 196.

Coming to the doctrine of justification by faith, we find that Wrede interprets it in such a way as emphasizes its instrumental character, even to the point of exaggeration. Paul, he claims, had two purposes, viz., to free the mission from the burden of Jewish national custom, and to assure the superiority of the Christian faith in redemption over Judaism as a whole, and he adds, "The doctrine of justification is nothing more than the weapon with which these purposes were to be won."<sup>16</sup> He contends further that Paul did not derive the doctrine of justification from his conversion, but that it had its immediate origin, as indicated, in the exigencies of his mission to the Gentiles. "In this case theory was the child, not the parent of practice."<sup>17</sup> This view of Wrede is undoubtedly an exaggerated emphasis upon a generally neglected factor in the genesis of the doctrine in question. But instead of accounting for this justification-doctrine either, as is commonly done, solely by reference to the conversion-experience, or, as Wrede does, solely by reference to the anti-Judaistic propaganda, one should probably relate it definitely to both. There is still much to be said for the view that the spiritual struggle depicted in Roman 7:7-25 reflects Paul's own moral history previous to his conversion.<sup>18</sup> Ambitious to be found blameless in righteousness at the coming of the Messiah, the young Pharisee had realized his purpose so far as the external details of the law were concerned (Gal. 1:14; Phil. 3:5, 6; cf. Acts 26:5). But this self-centered and superficial course did not satisfy the ethical demand nor subdue the impulses to evil in the ardent, youthful nature. With the fanatical zeal born of inner unrest he turned in defense of the traditions of his fathers to a relentless persecution of the new sect of the Nazarenes (Gal. 1:13, 14; Phil. 3:6; cf. Acts 26:9-11; 8:1-3; 9:12). The effect of this anti-social crusade of devastation and slaughter must have been but to accentuate still further the impulses of the lower nature, and consequently to aggravate the inner tumult and self-dissatisfaction. Then came the conversion-experience. Filled with remorse at the thought of his former persecuting-activity and entering for that reason with double energy into the new evangelism of proclaiming the crucified

<sup>16</sup> Wrede, *Paul*, 127.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>18</sup> Stevens, *The Pauline Theology*, 12-20.



Jesus as the risen, exalted, and returning Messiah, and seeking now by this means to save men, rather than as before to destroy them, a new love and joy and peace took the place of the former hate and inner discord. This would inevitably come to the young convert-missionary as a consciousness of reconciliation to God in spite of his own previous bitter but unwitting antagonism to the cause of God and of the Messiah, his Son. It came as a sense of harmony with God and an assurance for the future that had never been experienced through the previous diligent attention to the requirements of an external law. And just as inevitably did this new relationship to God and to man bring such a measure of victory over internal evil as had hitherto seemed altogether impossible. All this had come through an active response to the "revelation" of Jesus as the Christ.

Then must have come the period of reflection over the significance of the death of the Messiah, as outlined above, with the consequence that the new religious assurance and moral triumph which had resulted from faith in Jesus as the Christ were now interpreted in juridical terms as *justification* through Christian faith. For the apostle himself this idea was in no special danger of leading to the lowering of moral standards, for the reason that it was simply the religious interpretation in juridical terms of an experience which, as we have seen, *included* moral achievement. But for the hearer there was the danger of its proving misleading through its liability to misinterpretation, and it is doubtful if the doctrine, in the form in which we have it, at least, would have come to occupy such a prominent place in the apostle's preaching as it did, if it had not been for the counter-propaganda of the Judaizing Christians.

There is probably then at least this much of truth in Wrede's contention that justification by faith as a definitely formulated and propagated *doctrine* had its origin in the endeavor to guard the Gentile churches from becoming entangled in the yoke of Judaism. As an *idea*, however, it must have figured in the readjustment which took place in Paul's own mind as a consequence of his conversion to Christianity. Still, much of the apostle's certainty with reference to the doctrine was doubtless produced by the discovery of its value in refuting the legalists. And we may add, in further concession to Wrede,

that this subsequent use of the general idea may have had much to do with its final exact content; for every idea that is successfully applied in a radically new situation tends to be not only further verified but at the same time perceptibly modified as a result of the process. In any case, however, Paul's doctrine of justification is seen to have been eminently pragmatic.

But the bold proclamation of the emancipating doctrine of justification made more imperative than ever an emphasis upon the ethical aspects of the new religion. To be sure the new doctrine of justification by faith favored such moral qualities as gratitude (I Cor. 6:20; II Cor. 9:15) and humility (Rom. 3:27, 28), and this last was taken as a further point in its favor; but the apostle felt keenly the necessity of setting forth in a more comprehensive way a complementary truth that should emphasize the ethical aspects of the gospel. This explains the immediate juxtaposition of the material found in the fifth and sixth chapters of Romans. The thought of spiritual union with Christ is that upon which main reliance is placed for this moral dynamic. Thus we see that the most mystical of Paul's doctrines, his doctrine of the Spirit, is perhaps even more fundamentally pragmatic than mystical. To be sure the apostle enforces his exhortations to personal purity of life by referring to the approaching day of judgment and future punishment (I Thess. 4:3-6; 5:2, 6, 23; I Cor. 6:9, 10; II Cor. 5:10), but it was only with difficulty that this appeal could be reconciled with the doctrine of the justification of the Christian through faith (I Cor. 3:11-14), and the main dependence was upon a consideration more easily harmonized therewith, viz., the thought of spiritual union with Christ (Gal. 5:18; Rom. 8:1-17). The mystical experience may have suggested this idea, but its practical value was what gave it its chief significance in the apostle's estimate and its undoubted prominence in his teaching. According to the justification-doctrine it was doubtless true that the greater the sin had been, the greater was the manifestation of grace in the justification of the sinner (Rom. 5:20), but this doctrine had its value in connection with past, not future sin. The transfer of attention from past to future must be accompanied by a transition to the doctrine of spiritual union with Christ (Rom. 6:1, 11). The Christian must not use his freedom from the law as "an occasion to the flesh," but

being "in Christ" he must "walk in the Spirit" and not gratify the desires of the flesh (Gal. 5:13, 16, 24). He must have regard for the spiritual significance of his baptism as meaning such an intimate union with Christ in his death and resurrection that the one so united must count himself to be dead to sin and risen with Christ to newness of life (Rom., chap. 6). As indwelt by Christ, the Spirit, the Christian is to regard himself as the temple of God and to keep himself accordingly free from all impurity (I Cor. 3:16, 17; 6:15-20), thus at the same time receiving and achieving sanctification (Eph. 5:26, 30; II Thess. 2:13; cf. Phil. 2:12, 13). Further confirmation of the view that Paul's interest in his doctrine of the Spirit was pre-eminently because of its ethical value, is found in his emphasis upon the "fruits of the Spirit"—that long list of graces and virtues beginning with love and ending with self-control (Gal. 5:22, 23)—and the relative insignificance he ascribes to the so-called gifts of the Spirit, especially the speaking with tongues. The more edifying of such "gifts" are to be earnestly desired, but the most excellent way of all is the way of the greatest of the ethical fruits of the Spirit, viz., Christian love (I Cor., chaps. 12-14). The language of Dr. Moffatt is scarcely too strong, when he says: "The Spirit came to represent not so much an ecstatic as an ethical power to Paul; it was the vital principle of the Christian life, rather than an endowment for special occasions, and he verified it, not in sudden raptures or transient fits of religious emotion or any mysterious excitement of the personality, but in the normal life of the Christian within the church."<sup>19</sup>

But it is in connection with the doctrine of the resurrection that Paul's pragmatism becomes most overt. While ordinarily his *motive* in making a religious affirmation was the consciousness of its practical religious and moral value, this consciousness was also ordinarily a motive leading him to seek other *reasons* why it should be believed. Its value was felt to be something not coincident with but additional to its truth, although its value was itself an additional reason for believing in its truth. But when he comes to argue for the resurrection—and by this term we are to understand Paul as meaning, not the reanimation of the physical body, but the triumphant entrance of the whole personality of the Christian into the full measure

<sup>19</sup> *Paul and Paulinism*, 40.

of eternal life at some time after physical death—here the apologetic procedure becomes different. In this connection the value becomes the reason; the motive to the belief is frankly confessed and made its justification. Now if this procedure were to be made the basis of a generalization, that generalization would be manifestly false; it is not true that all motives to beliefs are sufficient reasons for the same. But where other proof is inaccessible and yet action is demanded, the motive leading to a belief may be good enough to justify, under the circumstances, the “will to believe.” The best reason then that can be given for the belief in question is the motive, the purpose for the realization of which the belief is essential. Paul’s main argument for belief in the resurrection is to the effect that it is so valuable, *if* true, that it *is*, it must be, true. If it is not true, the gospel is false, there is no salvation, and the Christian is in a most pitiable plight (I Cor. 15:13–19). But there must be a resurrection, for Christ must surely have been raised, and this because there are so many evils, death included, which must be destroyed, and which can be destroyed only if it is true that he has risen from the dead (vss. 20–26). The apostle refused to give up his belief in the resurrection, for then he would have to believe that all he had done and suffered had been in vain (vss. 30–32), but he felt sure that his labor had not been in vain (vs. 58). It was further asserted in the course of the argument that belief in the resurrection was necessary to keep the moral standard from degenerating into that base epicureanism whose motto was, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” (vs. 32). This last amounts to an assertion of the ethical justification of the postulate of immortality; it is a necessary truth in the sense that it is ethically necessary to humanity. This is pragmatism, not abstractly propounded, of course, but concretely exemplified.

But this argument for the resurrection was simply the most conspicuous expression of the enthusiastic assurance of the apostle’s faith—an assurance which, for lack of a better term, we may call his fighting optimism. Without questioning his pessimism so far as the natural man is concerned—a pessimism which he had inherited from Judaism and confirmed in his own personal experience (Rom. 7:7–25) and observation (Rom. 1:18–3:20)—it may be said that as a Christian his practical attitude was somewhere between “meliorism”

and absolute, dogmatic optimism; the realization of the highest good was to him something more than merely possible, something less than absolutely inevitable. Recognizing the moral value of hope (Rom. 8:24, 25), and realizing that through faith the Christian hope becomes a working certainty, he preached a doctrine more religious than the meliorism of Professor James<sup>20</sup> and more morally stimulating than that soporific modern optimism which tends to make life one continuous "moral holiday." This inspiring melioristic optimism found marked expression in connection with the ideas of—to use a later terminology—"special providence," "perseverance of the saints," and "the final consummation."

Paul's doctrine of providence was but the expression of the faith he lived by, the enthusiastic confidence through which, when perplexed, he was not in despair, and when smitten down, he was not destroyed (II Cor. 4:8, 9). He met the external tribulations of his experience with steadfast purpose, supported by that optimistic faith of which his invincible joy was at once a factor and a product (see Rom. 5:3). All experiences, he maintained, were for the Christian's benefit; even what militated against physical well-being was for his spiritual and eternal good (II Cor. 4:15-17; Rom. 8:28). He claimed that the Christian did not ordinarily trust God for things great enough (Eph. 3:20); when we pray, he answers us better than we ask, for he overlooks the limitations of our understanding and answers according to the spirit of every truly Christian petition (Rom. 8:26, 27); he who gave us Christ will give us all things that we need (Rom. 8:32). So complete was Paul's confidence in the providence of God that he did not hesitate to affirm that his life would be spared as long as his presence was needful for the churches (Phil. 1:24, 25).

With reference to the Christian's perseverance Paul's doctrine was so shaped as to include the vital and dynamic features of confidence in the triumph of God's purpose for his people on the one hand, and the sense of human responsibility for moral achievement on the other. In bringing any individual into the first stages of the Christian experience the purpose of God is to develop his character into conformity with that of Christ (Rom. 8:29, 30), and this gracious purpose

<sup>20</sup> *Pragmatism*, 285 ff.

he never abandons (cf. Rom. 11:29); having begun the work, he will continue it "until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6); nothing on earth or in the heavens or in the abyss, nothing that is or ever will be, can separate the "chosen" from the love and care of God (Rom. 8:35-39). But the human side is also emphasized. God's goodness continues to be manifested only to those who continue in his goodness (Rom. 11:22). Those reconciled to God through Christ will be presented "holy and without blemish and unreprouvable" on condition that they continue steadfastly in the Christian faith (Col. 1:22, 23). Paul himself, with all his confidence, was careful to exercise self-control, lest he himself should be rejected (I Cor. 9:25-27). Thus both joyful confidence and prayerful diligence, "both for himself and those who call him friend," should characterize the Christian (I Thess. 5:16-18; Rom. 12:12; Eph. 6:18). This two-fold attitude was exemplified in Paul himself with reference to the Galatians. "Did ye suffer so many things in vain?" he asks, and then adds, "If indeed it be in vain." Again he says, "I am afraid . . . lest . . . I have bestowed labor upon you in vain." But finally he expresses his "confidence in the Lord" that they will be "none otherwise minded" than he wishes them to be (Gal. 2:4; 4:11; 5:10). He is confident that there is no temptation over which the Christian may not be victorious (I Cor. 10:13), no trial over which he may not be more than conqueror through the power of Christ (Rom. 8:37). Contemplating the character of his Lord and being thus transformed gradually into the same image (II Cor. 3:18), every Christian may "rejoice in hope of the glory of God" (Rom. 5:2). It is a working, fighting optimism.

Rightly understood the Pauline eschatology in its essence and final form is neither depressing nor enervating, but stimulating to the last degree. That Paul intended his doctrine concerning "last things" to be dynamic is shown by his pedagogical emphasis of the particular phases of his belief which the life and thought of his readers seemed to require. In his first letter to the Thessalonians, in order to comfort those who feared lest their believing friends who had died might not share in the privileges of the to-be-established kingdom of Christ, he assures them that the dead in Christ will rise at the Parousia and will be forever with the Lord (I Thess. 4:13-18).

He also makes impressive use of the idea of the imminence of the second advent of Christ, as furnishing a motive to morality (I Thess., chap. 5). Assuming that Second Thessalonians is also from the apostle, we find him in this letter correcting the impression which seems to have been made by the former one, to the effect that the coming of Christ was so near that all ordinary occupations might well be discontinued (II Thess. 2:2; 3:10, 11); to counteract this he teaches them that the Christ is not immediately to appear, but that there will be a falling away first, and that the "man of sin" will be revealed, "the lawless one whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the breath of his mouth" (II Thess. 2:1-12). The effectiveness of these teachings as a means of directing the life of the church is readily seen; the sincerity of the apostle's own belief is, of course, indubitable; the only question is whether in some cases the immediate practical value of the idea may not have been the final weight that turned the balance of his judgment in its favor.

For Paul there were three great epochs of outstanding importance in connection with eschatology. The first was the resurrection of Christ as the "first fruits" (I Cor. 15:20); the other two were still future, being the second coming of Christ and "the end," the "final consummation." With Christ at his coming would be those from among the dead who were his people (I Cor. 15:23), they having been raised to be with him in his kingdom. These would include those of the Jews and of the Gentiles who had become believers during their earthly lives (Rom., chaps. 9, 11). Whether the "dead in Christ" who "rise first" (I Thess. 4:16) include any who may have believed as a result of Christ's descent into the abyss (Rom. 10:6, 7), or any who may have been benefited by the baptism for the dead (I Cor. 15:29) Paul does not say. Those remaining alive, however, would be changed and caught up to meet the Lord in the air and to be with him in his kingdom (I Thess. 4:17; I Cor. 15:51-53). This kingdom or rule of the Christ is to last till "love's redeeming work is done,"—"till he hath put all his enemies under his feet," having abolished all "rule" and "authority" and "power," including at last even death itself (I Cor. 15:24-26). This goal of confident expectation is to include the salvation of all Israel (Rom. 11:26)—a consummation which Paul had devoutly wished and prayed for (Rom. 10:1), and

which he now postulates in faith as to be realized. But this was not all. The fulness (*πληρωμα*) of the Gentiles will come in (Rom. 11:25; cf. Eph. 1:9, 10), for God's mercy will be shared by all (Rom. 11:32); everyone in the heavens, on earth and in the abyss, will revere the name of Jesus and acknowledge him as Christ and Lord (Phil. 2:10, 11; cf. Rom. 10:9; I Cor. 12:3); and so in Christ shall *all* be made alive (I Cor. 15:22). Even the redemption of the "whole creation" from the "bondage of corruption" is to be accomplished (Rom. 8:19-22). This is "the end" (*τὸ τέλος*, I Cor. 15:24)—the *goal*, "the one divine, far-off event, to which the whole creation moves," when, his work finished, Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the Father (vs. 24), unto whom are all things (Rom. 11:36), in order that God may be all in all (I Cor. 15:28).

But there are certain elements of contingency attached to the fulfilment of this confident prediction. In any case the time to be covered by this rule of Christ before the final consummation is age-long (*αἰώνιος*, II Thess. 1:9), an indefinitely long period, during which the sinful and unbelieving suffer punishment; the only alternative to this view, apart from the hypothesis of interpolation, is to hold that Second Thessalonians as a whole, if written by Paul, represents an earlier and afterward transcended point of view in the Pauline eschatology<sup>21</sup>—a supposition as unnecessary to make as it is difficult to prove. But more striking still is the fact that the salvation of all Israel, which is predicted in full assurance of faith as a central element in the final glorious consummation, was just previously spoken of as conditioned on their not continuing in their unbelief (Rom. 11:23). It seems a fair inference, then, to conclude that, abstractly considered, the final salvation of all was, in Paul's judgment, contingent both as to time and as to the fact itself; but that his faith in Christ was so unlimited that he confidently believed that he would finally accomplish this, which was the purpose of his, as well as of the Father's (Col. 1:19, 20; Eph. 1:9, 10) universal love.<sup>22</sup> Paul recognized that universal salvation of persons possessing the power to continue in

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, II, 279.

<sup>22</sup> Kennedy, who argues for a different interpretation of Paul's doctrine of the Consummation, admits that the apostle taught the universal scope of the divine *purpose* of mercy (*St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, 309).



unbelief, is, in the nature of the case, hypothetical; but he nevertheless firmly believed in its future realization, because he believed that Christ would never abandon his undertaking until he should see of the travail of his soul *and be satisfied*. Remembering that Paul held that Christ works out his redemptive purposes for the world in part, at least, through those whom he has already saved (I Cor. 9:1; 16:10; Col. 1:29; Eph. 3:20), so that steadfast continuance in the work of the Lord was an essential factor in bringing to pass the desired result (I Cor. 15:58; cf. II Thess. 3:13; Gal. 6:9, 10), one cannot well conceive an eschatology more dynamic and vital or more manifestly pragmatic.

It would seem then that it was the pursuit of his great ethico-religious purpose (personal and missionary) that not only in large measure gave rise to the great, central doctrines of the apostle but also furnished him with his supreme test of their truth. Now, in this, Paul at any rate *practiced* what the modern pragmatist preaches.<sup>23</sup>

Was Paul then a pragmatist? Apart from the incongruity of the name, it is further true that Paul was not fully conscious of the pragmatic method of his theological thinking, except perhaps in his argument for the resurrection. His own theory of his thinking would have made him out to be what the modern man would call a mystic, rather than a pragmatist. But as we have seen, the pragmatic criterion is constantly made superior to the mystical. It is perhaps best to say that Paul was a *vitalist*, so far as the method of his thinking was concerned; his theology was constituted primarily of those judgments which he discovered to be essential to the best type of religious life.

Now there is nothing abnormal about this method. It is the genuinely and freely human way of arriving at moral and religious convictions. Of course Paul's view of man and the world was pre-scientific, and much of the form of his doctrine was ephemeral, chiefly on that account. Besides this it must be acknowledged that "several of Paul's arguments lost much if not all of their original point once they were carried beyond the radius of his polemic against the Jews and Jewish Christians of his own day."<sup>24</sup> That is, some of his teaching was of but temporary value, just because of a pronounced

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Schiller, *Humanism*, Preface and pp. 6-8.

<sup>24</sup> Moffatt, *Paul and Paulinism*, 72.

but *narrow* pragmatism. But it is likewise true that the permanent (because universally vital) element in his teaching found place there mainly because of its *broad* and profoundly human pragmatism. The mere fact of the employment of the pragmatic method is no guaranty of truth, especially in the spiritual realm; it must be employed with great comprehensiveness and insight and discrimination. But the vital kernel of the Pauline system: God as the God and Father of Jesus Christ; reconciliation to the gracious Father through ethical faith; morality as the free expression of unselfish love, in place of legalism; the ethical immanence of God in the spirit of the truly Christian man; immortality as essential to the validity of the highest morality, and finally, his working Christian optimism—these are our permanent possessions just because they are so genuinely pragmatic, so vital, so deeply and essentially human.

## THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT

---

REV. JOHN J. MARTIN, PH.D.  
Chicago, Ill.

---

The doctrine of the atonement in history has taken two distinctively main courses, represented by the names of Anselm who may be looked upon as the author of the objective theory, and Abelard who, inasmuch as he was the first to look upon the work of Christ as purely a revelation, may be named the father of the subjective theory. Between these two schools of theological thought discussion has oscillated until our own day.

Recently interest in the doctrine has revived, and necessity for a new statement has been commandingly felt. Among the forces making this imperative have been: first, new conceptions of the principles and methods by which God acts vitally in the world and spiritually in history; second, the evolution of a specialized social sense, evolved out of recent social revolutions and from modern commercial and industrial changes; third, a better and more accurate knowledge of biblical theology; and, fourth, a keener and more adequate appreciation of personality. These are changes which the religious thinker who would escape moral censure can neither ignore nor evade.

This article does not presume to express all that may be said on the atonement. Its main purpose is to bring into relief certain of its essentially constituent elements. We shall therefore introduce our details by a number of general statements by means of which irrelevant questions may be forestalled, our thoughts become more directly focused, and our mental eye trained for the important thing.

### I. GENERAL STATEMENTS

First, the atonement is not a definition or doctrinal formula. It is a spiritual fact and principle. If therefore we are helpless to give to it philosophical harmony and unable to find an acceptable mode in which to express it, the thing itself is not in the least thereby

affected. Experience of moral and spiritual values does not begin nor is it increased with definition.<sup>1</sup> By its very nature it is entirely independent of our mental keenness for logical distinctions.

Second, the atonement, to be effectually preached, must be realized as a present power with meaning. It cannot otherwise excite and sustain intelligent devotion. It is the great central fact of Christian experience, and experience being what it is, it imperatively challenges interpretation. No one can pass beyond the alternatives of Christian infancy into the reflections of Christian living without meeting the question of Anselm, Why God in man? and also the great fact homed at its heart. The church is saying that the destiny of men is wrapped up with Christ and his work, and the question inevitably erects itself, How? The preacher tells men that Jesus Christ produces those dynamic conditions in which human life is brought from its lowest registers of vitality to its richest promise and fullest expression of power. And men ask, How? And they cannot well believe until in some measure, at least, the matter is brought livingly home to mind and conscience and heart. The demands of these questions are natural and inevitable, and the moral strength and spiritual efficacy of the church of Christ is regulated by the freshness with which she makes her answer to these religious inquiries. Her power with God and among men is proportioned by her mental grip, her moral appreciation, and her spiritual appropriation of this great central fact and basic principle, so appropriate to human need.

Third, the nature of the atonement will not easily come to view, so long as particular world-views are allowed to intrude themselves. When we are thinking of the personal relations of the soul to God, we can well afford to lay our world-views aside. The world-views of Greek and Roman thinkers, to whom the Cross was a foolishness and a world-scandal, have done more through Augustine and later through the neo-Platonism of Spinoza to shape the ideas of the church than has been to the interests of the kingdom of God or the comfort of men. Today we are imperiled by a paralysis of thought, so far as the atonement is concerned, through monistic world-views, which resolve God into a dull, diffusive, impersonal force, find the Cross a difficulty rather than a revelation, have no place for penitence and the forgive-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. Theo. Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 29, 30.

ness of sin, and prescribe a priori the limits which must bound the person of Christ.<sup>2</sup> The atonement is a great imperial fact and force in human experience whose reality must be conceded by the concrete effects for which it is the one adequate known cause.<sup>3</sup> The word of the Cross is a salvation, not a mental speculation; the power of God, not the wisdom of a school, a sacramental and dynamic reality, not a metaphysical and mechanical theory, an eternal truth independent of philosophy, known primarily, neither by documentary criticism, nor philological inquiry, nor archaeological discovery, but by self-dedication to the doing of God's will. Here, at least, is a region where spiritual verification follows the moral venture of the total personality, and experience follows experiment. Here is a region where the dedication of self is absolutely indispensable to the acquisition of knowledge, and without it "nothing worthy proving can be proven, nor yet disproven."

Fourth, the only adequate category in which the atonement can be conceived is that of personality. Jesus never departed from this either in thought or activity. He assumed the fatherhood of God, and the life he lived among men attested that this meant vastly more to him than the mere symbol by which he warmed up a philosophic conception of the universe. His use of this term connotes the supreme Personality with whom he was constantly in the most intimate and friendly correspondence. The supremacy of God's will in all things formed the presupposition of his conduct. He assumed likewise the supreme significance and transcendence of human personality. He recognized in it the creative idea of God for it, and to him it was of infinite value. He disclosed its kinship with the heavenly Father, unfolded the creatively mutual relation between the will of man and the will of God, and conceived it as his supreme task to remove every obstacle which prevented a perfect correspondence between the two. Jesus never operated in the juridical realm. He came into the world not to condemn it. The terms "legal," "penal," and "satisfaction," for example, are foreign to his life and discourse, and native only, so far as they relate to the atonement, to the later days of theological debate. They do not belong to man's

<sup>2</sup> Paul Mezger, *Das Kreuz u. d. modernen Denken*, 1909.

<sup>3</sup> W. W. Peyton, *The Three Great Forces*, Vol. I, Bk. I, chaps. v and vi.

experience of the atonement. They do not belong to the essential Pauline gospel. These terms are forensic technicalities and these as well as philosophic abstractions are impotent to minister any dispensation of the personal God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Christianity, of which, as we must never weary of saying, the atonement is the central fact, is based upon great personal principles, and outside the concrete relations of personality it is unintelligible. "God is Spirit."<sup>4</sup> And what is the spirit of God with whom Christians hold communion? "It is," as Professor Dubose says, "no abstract or impersonal, physical or metaphysical, attribute or concept or symbol or influence of him—but himself, in us as the deepest personal truth of ourselves."

God himself is not wisdom or power or cause or substance, he is not truth or beauty or goodness—he is himself, he is God. And God himself is the spirit he is of; he is what he is to all other beings. Above all other being, spiritual being is "being in relation" and in relations. The perfect personal relation is that of perfect Love and the true physical or metaphysical as well as spiritual definition or expression of God as Personal God is Love.<sup>5</sup>

We must keep consistently to this category of personality in our ideas of the atonement, else, lacking this singleness of eye, our whole minds will become full of darkness. It is the only escape from the fictions attaching to the objective theory and the weaknesses inherent in the theory of moral influence.<sup>6</sup> The atonement is a personal matter initiated and perfected by the Almighty Personal God in behalf of his impotent personal creatures who cannot help themselves, initiated and carried on now for the purpose of bringing them into fellowship with himself and for no other.

Fifth, man is radically a social being. His personal redemption, therefore, is the key to social redemption. If right and adequate motives possess one man, the benefit will spread to all men. "Love to one creates love to all, and the courage inspired by my single pure affection will at last become my courage for every danger of my

<sup>4</sup> John 4:24.

<sup>5</sup> *The Gospel according to St. Paul*, 19, 20. Cf. also Rufus M. Jones, *The Double Search*, 47; and D. Erich Schaefer, *Schriftglaube und Heilsgewissheit*, 18, 19.

<sup>6</sup> Professor B. P. Bowne, *Studies in Christianity*, 173.

brother man."<sup>7</sup> "We love, because God first loved us."<sup>8</sup> It is only in the love of God, that spiritual individualities become harmonized and moored to one another.<sup>9</sup> If the whole creation needs redemption, and Paul seems to think that it does,<sup>10</sup> its redemption must come through the principle of solidarity, or what is the same thing, through the radically social nature of man, as the sequel of man's personal redemption. In the sacramental and dynamic unity of the Bible this is made emphatic. In faithful and obedient Abraham all nations of the earth are to be blessed.<sup>11</sup> Upon the insight of one man into the divinity of his Person, the thrill of achievement went through the currents of Christ's life, and in the elation of his spirit he exclaimed, "Blessed art thou Simon Bar Jonah! Upon this rock will I build my church!"<sup>12</sup> The apostle Paul interprets his sacramental life that seemed utter madness to his many critics as the result of Christ's constraining love which was in him the ruling dynamic of his conduct.<sup>13</sup> On no other grounds than on the grounds of the radically essential social nature of man can the concentration of Christ's earthly ministry be explained and rationalized.<sup>14</sup> Given this, and Christ's methods sparkle with the luster of reason, for, granted that man is by nature essentially social, then once baptize this essentially social nature in the divine fires, and the individual's affections will expand and his conscience widen to include the whole scope of life, and every social need will become an imperative call to service and every social sin will carry with it the unendurable sting of personal guilt. The differentiations between individual and social salvation, of which we hear so much today, for Christ simply did not exist.

Sixth, the atonement has to do only in a related way with the consequences of sin. The energy of the atonement is focused upon the sinner, and the effects of his transgressions are left to the outwork-

<sup>7</sup> George Matheson, D.D., *The Representative Men of the New Testament*, 102.

<sup>8</sup> I John 4:19.

<sup>11</sup> Gen. 12:1-3.

<sup>9</sup> Dorner, *Dogmatics*, I, 76, 77.

<sup>12</sup> Matt. 16:18.

<sup>10</sup> Rom. 8:19-22.

<sup>13</sup> II Cor. 5:14.

<sup>14</sup> "He so bent himself," says Principal Forsyth, "on his one work of grace that he is accused of leaving whole sections of life and even doctrine, out of his world. One thing he pursued, and it was a thing he did; but it had in it the power and promise of all things else."—*Hibbert Journal*, July, 1906.

ing of God's great organic laws which according to their original and eternal design ever operate for the good of man and the glory of God. Forgiveness of sins does not cancel or neutralize the consequences of sin mechanically. Christ did not come to remove us from the natural system of being for which God created us. Experience shows that when the souls of men are correctly polarized, life as a whole tends quickly to adjust itself. The history of Christianity is the story of how rapidly individual conditions and social relationships correct themselves when the wills of men are brought under bondage to the will of God. The great hopeful anticipations of a brighter future which characterize Christian faith are the sure prophecies of a corrected present spiritual condition of being and not the fancies of a delirious mind that by the magic of his hand God will ultimately perfect his kingdom. The function of the atonement is to bring us to God, not to save us from hell nor to bring us to heaven. It is the power by which God subdues all things to himself but he does it as he subdues the heart of man to himself and not by treating sin as though it had not been. There is no doubt but that sin can be absolved and that the potent affectional virtues of God's love will heal every malady of the most diseased and sin-stricken soul. No thoroughly Christianized mind would think of limiting the rearrangements possible to the chemistries of faith in God's grace. But no really Christian man, by virtue of the relation into which the atonement brings his will with the will of God, will desire chiefly to escape the consequences of his misdoings. His chief desire will be the sovereign beauty of the divine will, and rather than waste his powers in vain regrets and fears, he will seek to become a willing bondservant to co-operate with God in bringing order out of his previous disorder and to restore the places he has laid waste, no matter what the pains. The river whose streams make glad the city of God flows from within those who believe on God's works as well as on God himself.<sup>15</sup> And no one can dream that this method of treating the atonement extenuates and palliates sin. The only way in which sin can be intensified and

<sup>15</sup> As Professor Kähler has said in a somewhat different connection: "In Gottes neuer Schöpfung wie in seiner alten steht Lebung nicht in Widerspruch mit geschaffenen Mitteln, mit Begrenzungen und Bedingungen; vielmehr steht es in ihrem rechten und vollen Gebrauche."—*Angewandte Dogmen*, 166.



accentuated is by personalizing it in the individual conscience. The Cross of Christ does this by showing that all sin is ultimately sin against the personal God, and not the mere disregard of what seems an impersonal law. It makes sin personal by showing us how impossible it is to outrun conscience, for it reveals the deadly radicality of God's opposition to sin as well as visualizes the never-ceasing urgency of God's love.

Seventh, the atonement presents no problem in the being of God. It is a principle that proceeds from God. The household of God is not divided against itself.<sup>16</sup> To speak of the atonement as the work of a subordinate party in the Holy Trinity to bring about a condition whereby another and superior party in the Holy Trinity can act favorably to men is to exhibit a mind fettered by outworn and inadequate categories. Such language is foreign to the New Testament. It is out of accord with Christian experience. Such a conception can remain in vogue only so long as men's ideas of redemption are shaped by juridical law rather than personal relationships. As known through Christ, to quote a recent fresh interpreter of Christian experience, "God is great and holy and just and good, and he is love not in addition to these things, but through all these things; for in them all he is ever seeking to make us one with himself."<sup>17</sup> To say: God's holiness is not at enmity with love, but works through it, is equally true and intelligible. We must not fail to unify our ideas of God and also of ourselves. God giveth not his Spirit by measure, nor does he act by departments any more than do we who are made in his image to witness him. In Christ the total God acts upon the total man to reconcile the whole man to himself. "God's thought for man, God's will, God's actual life, were really every moment reproduced in him,"<sup>18</sup> and now his Spirit stands ready to exercise a

<sup>16</sup> "Vor allem aber liegt nun in der Gesamtbedeutung, die sich Jesus für Israel und die Menschheit zuschreibt, das Bewusstsein einer so völligen inneren Einheit und Gemeinschaft mit Gott, dass jede Annahme auch einer geringsten inneren Auflehnung wider ihn damit unverträglich ist. . . . Aber die Einheit zwischen Vater und Sohn ist doch so völlig, dass Jesus das Reich Gottes sein eigenes Reich nennen (Matt. 13:41; 20:21, 23; Luc. 22:29, 30) und von der Erbauung seiner eigenen Gemeinde reden kann (Matt. 16:18)."—Johannes Steinbeck, *Das Göttliche Selbstbewusstsein Jesu nach dem Zeugnis der Synoptiker*, 26, 27. Cf. also Robert Law, B.D., *Tests of Life*, 178.

<sup>17</sup> H. W. Clarke, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, 93.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

complete spiritual parentage over the spirits of men who yield themselves to him so that they become born from above. It was to do the will of the Father that Jesus came, and all he did was always pleasing to the Father.<sup>19</sup> He interprets his own inner consciousness to himself in terms of divine benefits to men. "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor."<sup>20</sup> He came into Galilee, saying, Repent and believe the gospel, as the condition of immediately experiencing the beneficent reign of God.<sup>21</sup> Before he died or had suffered at the hands of men, he bade them to trust God, to pray to their heavenly Father for the coming of his kingdom, and to ask that the obstacles which kept them from coming into fellowship with him might be removed, all of which obstacles were in them, while the kingdom and the power and the glory were with God.<sup>22</sup> His whole life and work presuppose the favorable attitude of God to men. Christ was no mere herald declaring terms of peace to a belligerent host, but God manifest in the flesh, laying hold of the seed of Abraham to bring them help.<sup>23</sup> If our Christ is to us any other than God reconciling the world to himself, then we are not yet reconciled to God and we are still without the appropriate means of reconciliation. This is a fact which many who yield their faith in the deity of Christ for something not nearly so profound fail to appreciate. The atonement is not man's, but God's task, and the Bible consistently makes this emphatic as also does human need. When the disciples called upon Christ in prayer, they did so, not as a displacement of prayer to God, but they did so to the glory of God the Father.<sup>24</sup> Christ is not merely "the value of God" to us, whatever that may really mean; he is not demi-God; he is the Son of God.

## II. THE NEED OF ATONEMENT

From these general statements we pass to details and further approach our conception of the nature of the atonement by noting the need of atonement. Man discovers this need first within his own nature. We of western civilization either dogmatize or keep silent upon the subject of demonic possession. To keep silent is the wiser

<sup>19</sup> Matt. 12:28; Luke 11:20; Mark 5:19; Luke 17:18.

<sup>20</sup> Luke 4:18. <sup>21</sup> Mark 1:15. <sup>22</sup> Matt. 6:9-13; Luke 11:2-4. <sup>23</sup> Heb. 2:16.

<sup>24</sup> See Phil. 2:11; Kähler, *Angewandte Dogmen*, 164.

course, and the one which we must take on the subject until we know more accurately than we now know how spirit in any of its forms animates and controls matter. But of one thing we are as sure and positive as they of any other civilization, past or present, that the natural man has within himself no sufficient unifying force, that human nature is subject to oppressing and depressing moods, violent splits, terrific conflicts, warring elements, which in some lives act like the marshaling of legions to do battle. We who are heirs to all the ages, inheritors of accumulated moral momentum—we, even, are startled, as we look critically within ourselves to discern how far our individuality is oppressed “by a legion of impulses and conventionalities which leave us nothing personal, nothing essential and characteristic, nothing that deserves a name.” Plato describes the schism of man’s inner nature under the figure of a pair of winged steeds that pull different ways, whose management the charioteer finds exceedingly difficult and exasperating.<sup>25</sup> Paul, who sounded the abysses of human nature as profoundly as anyone, says the same thing, and gives us a strikingly lucid description of the soul’s paroxysms and counter currents.<sup>26</sup> The Oriental feels the need of unity within himself and sees no other way of securing it than by quenching desire; and, striving to do this, he reaches a stunted individuality and a paralyzed personality and makes a static and stagnant civilization. The Stoic’s “dull passion of endurance” is his affirmation of internal as well as external unmanageable elements. The Epicure’s abandonment of all order is his expression of the same experience. It says our effort to bring peace is useless, and so it affirms the mutiny of the soul. The neo-Platonist of ancient times tried to suppress these inner tumults by pure contemplation. Plotinus, according to Porphyry, rose only four times above the turbulence of sense and intellect. The modern neo-Platonist, in the vanity of his mind, seeks to put down what to him are mere phantom riots of the soul, by bowing reverently before the idol of self-suggestion. Both ancient and modern alike affirm the inner conflict, only the modern calls it “mortal error” and “nervous trouble,” while to the ancient its existence was a bit more actual and radical. The consuming passion

<sup>25</sup> *Phaedrus*, 246, 254 (Jowett’s Trans., I, 452, 465).

<sup>26</sup> Rom. 7:7-24.

of both, however, is not to attain the sonship of God in strength of character, no matter though it must be by way of the Cross, but to evade pain, the ancient by pure contemplation, the modern by seeking a doctor-God, and striving to find a therapeutic gospel.

The conclusion of this whole matter is that men need first and foremost in their experience some inner unifying force to bring them under authority and to organize them into a kingdom, priests unto God. And we need not talk in the terms of biology and say that the emerging soul needs a new environment in which to outgrow the old life, nor in the language of our youthful psychologies which record the behavior of split and dual and multiple personality and offer no adequate treatment. The phraseology of the common people is sufficient. Man is without spiritual self-control, and unless there shall be given to him some overmastering principle, not inherent in his natural birth, his life is not only incomplete, but it is a chaos, without form and void. Not until man is brought under the authority of some commanding personality to whom he can look up and say, "My Lord and my God,"<sup>27</sup> will there ever come to him that unity whose effect is peace. The natural man sins. He is under the principle of sin. Sin disorganizes, disintegrates, destroys; sin is anarchy in the spiritual realm. The atonement, as known by its fruits, is the power of God which emancipates, organizes, augments the lives of men, the power that brings order and is destined to raise human life to its highest functioning efficiency.

The second need of atonement is man's need of reconciliation with the world-order in which he lives. A recent periodical gives the soul history of a little motherless girl, who was matured in matters of feelings and spirit beyond the apparent wisdom of her years. When her mother died, her kind but unskilled friends kept from her every suggestion of her mother's decease. During the funeral she was sent to the park. Painful subjects were avoided in her presence, and she was played with like an infant. The thing that happened under such spiritual treatment was the inevitable. She moaned and knew not why she moaned. There first developed an undefined but a very real emptiness of life. She had always been her mother's most intimate friend. Now the object of her love was gone—How? She had

<sup>27</sup> John 20:28.

no means of telling. Where? She did not know. Life became vacant and the highest functionings of her soul remained unsatisfied. Then there developed a second symptom of disorder, viz., a new, violent and frightful mutinous temper, which was the natural expression of her pent-up and helpless loneliness. Her soul was stricken with a great sorrow which found outlet neither in ideas nor in words and consequently not in concordant emotions. There followed therefore, thirdly, the development of a physical derangement which brought on acute indigestion, resulting from an overfed stomach and a famished soul.

There is in this experience much that belongs to the race. The thing that forms the greatest puzzle in history grows out of the fact that lives surrendered to reason often seem void of rational significance. The Greek mind tasked itself to the utmost with this problem and after lavishing upon it its wonderful energy of sustained thought for generations gave up in blank disappointment and failure.<sup>28</sup> The practical Hebrew philosophers maintained the utilitarian view that success in the ordinary pursuits of life is the outcome of wisdom, and failure that of folly. Actual experience, however, did not support it, but conflicted with it, and among the Hebrews also, the profoundest problem of human life arose—that of human suffering. The advisement, "Curse God and die,"<sup>29</sup> is not a woman's counsel. It is a mood common to the souls of all men in great and protracted crises. Great souls had gone out in pursuit of promises and obtained them not. A rational order was discerned in life to which man should correspond, at least to which he must submit. But the wicked man flourished while the righteous man seemed to have been forsaken of God and his fellows. This erected a question that more than taxed the religious insight, poetic genius, and practical philosophical instincts of Israel's best spirits. It is true that the great prophets saw in the national disasters the hand of God, and heard his call, but no permanent reconciliation ever came to the nation. Conceptions of life which were pessimistic enough developed, and were indeed welcome to many minds, out of the people's own brooding and quite inde-

<sup>28</sup> Cf. T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics*, chap. i, and references, p. 3; Plato's *Rep.*, 496 E; Justin Martyr, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, chap. ii; Lucian, *Hermotimus*, chaps. lxxii ff.

<sup>29</sup> Job 2:9.

pendent of outside influence.<sup>30</sup> Ecclesiastes (of which Driver says, "It is not earlier than the latter years of the Persian rule, and it is quite possible that it is later") tells us repeatedly that life is vanity and the pursuit of wind.<sup>31</sup>

No more forceful illustration of man's need of reconciliation with the world-order is at hand than that which a psychological analysis of the darkness that entombed the disciples upon the death of their Lord would afford. The enterprise to which they had given themselves with complete abandon had failed utterly, and the spouse of their hearts had been ruthlessly torn from them. Bereavement, disappointment, disenchantment, unmitigated despair, are words which but feebly reflect the denseness of their mental and spiritual eclipse. If Jesus had not reappeared their faith must have remained forever paralyzed. And this need is not merely ancient. It belongs to all generations from everlasting to everlasting.<sup>32</sup> The great catholic experiences which come to the poor man's cottage still stupefy his mind and often leave him dazed and dumb, while the thought and feeling stimulated in the more cultured minds by the revolutions of the past fifty years are well precipitated in the lines:

. . . . We know not for we spin the lives of men,  
And not of Gods, and know not why we spin!  
There is a Fate beyond us. <sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> See Barton, *Ecc.*, 43.

<sup>31</sup> "In spite," says Professor Driver, "of some of the author's utterances, the general tone and drift of his meditations is unmistakable. Life under all its aspects is dissatisfying and disappointing: the best that can be done with it is to enjoy—not indeed in excess, but in a wise and well considered moderation, and as a gift intended by God to be enjoyed—such pleasures as it brings with it. . . . Even at the end of his book the description of the decay of the body in old age, until 'the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it,' is followed not by any thought of the beatific vision which may there await it, but by the refrain which is the keynote of the book, 'Vanity of vanities: all is vanity.' Not life in the body merely, the life of the spirit even, including its return to God, appears thus to be counted by him as 'vanity.'"—Int. to *O. T. Lit.*, 469, 470, 473.

<sup>32</sup> In a correspondence with Mr. Herbert Spencer in 1903, Mr. Andrew Carnegie wrote: "You come to me every day in thought, and the everlasting 'Why?' intrudes." And Mr. Spencer replied, "The Why? and the Why? and the Why? are questions which press ever more and more as the years go by."—*Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, I, 221.

<sup>33</sup> Tennyson, "Demeter and Persephone."

The Herculean efforts of geniuses like Browning and Tennyson and their forerunners in poetry and like Watts in art as they have wrought upon what may be expressed in the epigram, "The love of immortality and the immortality of love," show how keenly this need of which we speak is felt in this our day. A great need springs up with the existence of every man for a power or an agency to reconcile him with the order of the world in which he lives. And one must add that no philosophic judgment or concept, no matter how warmly you may clothe it with borrowed morals and with borrowed symbols—no such concept as that in the main the world is friendly to us—will avail to satisfy the structural demands of the soul which have come to be under the exciting causes of actual experiences and not out of pure contemplation, nor will it excite the faith and moral daring necessary to the production of heroic spirits. Nowadays, as in Canon Mozley's day, any amount of high morals is at hand to every philosopher and he does not hesitate to plaster them on no matter how atheistic his philosophy.<sup>34</sup> But for morality there must be a God.

The third ground need of reconciliation then is the need of reconciliation with God. From point of view of motive as well as pure reason this, of course, is fundamental. It underlies all that has been already said in preceding paragraphs. Until the veil is removed and the obstacles are taken away which hide God from the immediate vision of the soul, until man's ideas and thoughts of God are touched with emotion, life remains an insoluble enigma, and all attempts at reconciliation with one's self and with one's world are futile. According to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus made much of having made God known. "This is life eternal that they may know thee, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."<sup>35</sup> This is life eternal because it brings men into those relations that are eternal wherein the life of God becomes in them the effectual saving hope.<sup>36</sup> The great text in Jude makes the love of God the starting-point of all soul history.<sup>37</sup> It can build on nothing else, for this is the foundation of faith. The curriculum for human experience as given in John's great epistle is "to take as the starting-point the gift of God in Christ, the forgiveness of sins and the knowledge of the Father. Then to advance, with this

<sup>34</sup> *University Sermons*, 46.

<sup>35</sup> John 17:3.

<sup>36</sup> Rom. 8:18-37.

<sup>37</sup> Jude, vss. 20, 21.

as our strength and the Word of God as our weapon, to faithful and victorious warfare."<sup>38</sup> Life cannot be successfully worked out without this starting-point. Man needs to know God as to the inwardness of his being before life can be what its excellences portend it was meant to be. "The ultimate foundation of all morality lies in our knowledge of the Divine Being."<sup>39</sup> Man needs to know that God is able to make all things work together for good and is pledged to do so.<sup>40</sup> This he needs to know with vital certainty. He needs to realize by an inward burning conviction that there is no element in life beyond the management of God. He needs to realize with an inward conviction that there are great divine principles on which he can count in the world in which he now lives his life and in any world into which he may yet come and in which he may yet live his life. Man must know—and on this I would put all the emphasis I could command—man must know that God loves him better than himself. The structure of man's make and the nature of faith demand this as an indispensable prerequisite to atonement or reconciliation, and the Cross answers this cry that rises out of the depths of the human soul. No matter how joyous and beautiful the world, if we know not the heart of the universe in terms of never-altering pity and love there is no foundation for faith and holiness. The thought of the Greeks that the gods were envious and jealous is not so fanciful or infantile a notion as we sometimes assume it to be. Ambiguous experiences discomfit the most reasonable lives at their most prosperous times and in their most rational conduct. Men are therefore coerced to inquire what the mind of God actually is, and their findings are determined, according to the law of judgments, by the data with which their minds are furnished. The morality of the prophets came out of their visions of God. The banished apostle saw a great white throne and it sustained him. Paul felt himself to be something more than a victor, but it was through him that loved us with a love from which no power nor creature, principality nor angel, present or yet to be, could separate us.

<sup>38</sup> *The Tests of Life*, 313.

<sup>39</sup> Mary Wollstone-Craft, quoted by George Adam Smith in *Forgiveness of Sin*, 41.

<sup>40</sup> As Professor Kähler remarks: "In der Heiligkeit des offenbaren Gottes, allein wurzelt unausrotbar die Heilsgewissheit jedes berufenen Heiligen."—*Angewandte Dogmen*, 26.



What human experience calls for is a God of love who feels and cares, not an absent potentate, not a God standing apart, watching the game of life, out of touch with human suffering, and to whom aspiration is alien, but a God who is for men—a God tabernacled with men, militantly and agonizingly taking their part and identified with their immediate suffering and problems and wounded by their sins and iniquities. Out of the depths men have cried for this, and it is this which makes so humanly rational the yearning of the apostles, pre-eminently the apostle Paul, to know Christ in all His cosmical relations, what the power which is in his resurrection is and what the fellowship which is in his sufferings signifies, to be conformed to his life, death, and rising again.<sup>41</sup>

### III. THE MASTER-FORCE OF THE ATONEMENT

Herbert Spencer says: "Whatever amount of power an organism expends in any shape is the correlate or equivalent of the power that was taken into it from without."<sup>42</sup> This biological principle thus expressed suggests the method by which the nature of the atonement is most clearly perceived. New Testament thought on the atonement, as on other vital matters, both in its Godward as well as its manward aspects, radiated from the experience it produced in man, from "the power that worketh in us."<sup>43</sup> The thought of the Apocalypse, which revolves around the atonement idea, moves out and up from the writer's inmost experience. The sequence of apostolic consciousness is organic. The apostles' knowledge of what the atonement meant for God ascended to its distinctness out of what it meant in and for them. To reverse this order is to remove the matter from the region of experience and to reduce it to the emptiness of mere scholastic speculation. Any thoroughgoing and comprehensive discussion of the atonement must move toward the discovery of its objective element, that is, toward what the work of Christ meant in and for God, but it must do so by grading our thoughts up from what it means for man. Now in the life of man, the atonement appears as a master-force, response to which results in certain concrete experiences, the description of which aids materially in

<sup>41</sup> Phil. 3:10. See Forrest, *Christ of History and Experience*, 174 ff.; cf. Schopenhauer, I, 343.

<sup>42</sup> *Principles of Biology*, I, 57.

<sup>43</sup> Eph. 3:20.

perceiving the nature of the atonement, and this is the next task. We confine ourselves to three details.

First, Christ emancipates and enables the will. This is where the strongest activities of the strongest human efforts have fundamentally failed in unifying human life. Ideals have not been wanting, but they have always been remote and there has been no means of making them energize the always weakened will. Speaking of the ethical failure of Greek thought, T. B. Strong says:

If the ideal itself proved charming, there was still the inveterately irresolute and indecisive will to be strengthened to the point of persistent struggle with circumstances that made against all determined action or principle. There was no motive strong enough to force the will to conform itself to a standard, . . . externally imposed, however fully its moral beauty may be allowed.<sup>44</sup>

How keenly the same thing was felt by the great spirits of the Old Testament is appreciated through a study of their pleadings and prayers and hopes. The Psalms and the prophetic books are full of it, and their final hope rested upon a coming time when the law should be within and every man should know the Lord as an enabling power within himself.<sup>45</sup>

In all his dealings with men Jesus moved in the region of the will. Principal H. J. C. Knight, speaking on the nature of Christ's temptation, says: "In particular we see him dealing with four wills and toward each he assumes in his ministry a distinct and deliberate attitude."<sup>46</sup> These four wills are the will of God, his own will, the will of the devil, and the will of man. Some of us may refuse to grant any personality to the Prince of Darkness. What is popularly called his will may be nothing but the will of man prostituted to unholy ends and fettered in the locks of human solidarity. Be that as it may, we are familiar with the essential meaning of Principal Knight's classification. We know also what those attitudes were which Jesus assumed toward these forces. Toward the Father's will, resolute filial submission, and hence his life becomes the perfect norm of God's will for man. Toward the will of the devil, his attitude was that of regnant, decisive, unceasing hostility. He resisted

<sup>44</sup> *Bampton Lectures* (1895), 11.

<sup>45</sup> Jer. 31:31 ff.; Ezek. 36:25-27; 37:14.

<sup>46</sup> *Hulsean Lectures* (1905-6), "The Temptation of Our Lord," 44, 45.

unto blood, and thus having despoiled the principalities and the powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in the Cross.<sup>47</sup> Toward the will of man his attitude was that of profoundest respect. Israel's sweet singer and Germany's great philosopher both alike looked upon the starry heavens above them and the moral law within them as the two greatest wonders. But the greatest awe-inspiring reality is the dignity with which Christ clothes the individual soul. Before each man's will he halts and says: "What wilt thou?"<sup>48</sup> He recognized the will, on the one hand, as the seat of all the disorganizing, disintegrating, destroying forces with which human nature is assailed, and to which man is liable to fall a complete victim. On the other hand, he recognized it as the indestructible element which forms the basis of all moral conduct, and therefore the power to be evoked in man's salvation. Never once did he win an illicit ascendancy over the will of man, or adventitiously yield to man's morbid curiosities. His respect for the integrity of human nature, his knowledge of its hidden excellences, his certainty of its potentialities, always prevented him from treating man as unmoral or condescending to any of his inferior desires.

Any trustworthy study of his temptations and of his treatment of the craving for violent interruptions in nature would put this beyond debate. To those who would follow him, he made the conditions of discipleship emphatic. "Foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head,"<sup>49</sup> said he to one would-be candidate for discipleship. Nothing, however dear, must be allowed to insinuate itself between them and himself.<sup>50</sup> That relationship must be supreme, kept inviolate, supersede all other interests, even life.<sup>51</sup> And so out from his followers, with the approach of the Cross, were sifted all those who followed him because of the incomprehensible and the wonderful, all those who followed him because the crowd did, all those who saw in him merely the great

<sup>47</sup> Col. 2:15.

<sup>48</sup> . . . (He) stands away  
As it were a hand-breadth off, to give  
Room for the newly made to live,  
And look at Him from a place apart,  
And use his gift of brain and heart.  
—"Christmas Eve," V.

<sup>49</sup> Matt. 8:20 f.; Luke 9:58 f.

<sup>50</sup> Mark 9:43.

<sup>51</sup> Luke 14:25 f.

teacher, and only those remained with him in his passion whose wills had come under the elemental sway of his creative personality. It is the property of human nature to choose its motives, and it is this indestructible element in human nature that forms the basis of the society of the kingdom of God. It could not be built upon an "irrational disease of the mind." Its nature is disclosed at the outset. God could not prostitute his love. The kingdom of God is no swindle. The wise man is permitted to count the cost before he begins to build. With his appeal to the judgment and the will, God rests his case.

This brings us to our second detail in describing the master-force of the atonement. What was the adequate exciting cause by which Jesus transformed and organized and augmented the lives of men? Presumably the motives he employed were manifold. He clarified and broadened their idea of God. He redeemed the mind of man from thinking of God as a Diffusive-Essence or an indifferent Potentate by making them feel his Fatherhood. He touched man's thoughts of God with holy emotion. He taught men that God loved them better than himself and exercised over each man a specific care. He taught them to count upon his laws and to believe in his reign. He taught men the transcendent value of man. He unfolded the kinship between man and God, and said, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."<sup>52</sup> He taught that weakness and sin are not essential parts of human nature and thus redeemed it from the scandal that to sin is human. He taught men that they were brothers and should not hate and devour one another, but should love one another even as He had loved them. He filled men with the fittest social ideals, and gave them an effectual sense of worldwide fraternity by undermining their national prejudices and international hostilities. He made an open show of sin on the Cross. As to the theory of sin and the origin of evil, he said nothing, but he made men's sense of sin unbearable by powerfully sensitizing their well-nigh petrified consciences, and he instituted effectual remedies for all social ailments. He sanctioned man's love of immortality and proved the immortality of love.

All these ideal truths Jesus taught by pedagogical methods not yet superseded. He touched the emotions and imaginations of men as

<sup>52</sup> Matt. 5:48.

no other teacher has ever done. But the exciting cause by which he changed the habits of men's minds and transformed the disposition and bias of men's souls consisted neither in his pedagogical method nor in the substance of what he taught. It was in himself. The teachings of Jesus did not add so much to the fund of man's knowledge, but they quickened the spiritual nature of man, and this because they were personalized. "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life."<sup>53</sup> "The last Adam became a life-giving spirit."<sup>54</sup> The things which Jesus taught were focalized and took on specific form in his person. The abstract thoughts, the vague longings, the dim and unsubstantial feelings became concrete and poignant in the environment of his presence. We say therefore that the mediating force of the great truths which he taught, that which humanized the great ideals, that which focused them, that which pressed them deep down into the souls of men, and excited a response was Christ's person, Christ himself. He baptized men with the Holy Ghost and with fire. He exercised upon the hearts of men, not an infinite pressure, but a personal power. In what other way could spiritual natures be redeemed? The unseen forces of heart and conscience, of mind and will can only be opened and inspired by the power of a person. It is the person of Christ that does the work. If we are unwilling to start with his person in the solution of the problem before us then we must walk in darkness. The only way of getting from abstraction to personality is through personality. It is only when we get beyond Christ's person in our broodings upon the nature of the atonement, that is, only when we get beyond what is furnished to our reason, out into questions for whose solution we have no data and no mental equipment, that we wander in con-

<sup>53</sup> John 6:63; I Cor. 15:45; cf. John 5:21; 6:33, 39, 40, 54, 57. The point of view contained in this article requires only for its proper use that the Fourth Gospel be a true literature of the veritable normal experience of Christian faith. That it meets this requirement, the writer feels, is certain from its persistent place in the conscious life of the Christian church.

<sup>54</sup> Says Wendt, in speaking on the "Begriff der Lehre Jesu": "Es war weder ein bloß angelerntes Wissen, noch das Produkt einer bloß verstandesmäßigen Reflexion. Es beruhte vielmehr ganz auf seinem eigensten inneren Erleben. Es war die unmittelbare Aussage dessen, was er selbst fortdauernd empfand und erfuhr. Es stand in vollster Harmonie mit seinem gesamten persönlichen Sein und Verhalten."—*Lehre Jesu*, 3.

fusion. The nature of the atonement can never be understood apart from the incarnation.<sup>55</sup>

This rubric is so essential that I venture to enforce it by two familiar items. The first is the fact that Jesus concentrated his activity upon the task of rooting in the minds of a few the conviction of who and what he was.<sup>56</sup> This was his most sacred task, and furnishes the only adequate explanation of New Testament faith.

The second item I mention in showing that the exciting cause with which Christ moved the will of men was his person, and which I feel puts it beyond all dispute, is the desolation which possessed the souls of the disciples during that little interim that he was absent from them. What happened in the heavens during those three days of Jesus' vanishment we have no means of knowing; we know, however, as a matter of historic record, into what state the minds of the disciples had fallen. It was a state of orphanage. Parentless ideals and hopes haunted them, and their lives which had been so augmented began to contract and they turned again to their old pursuits. Not until the return to them again of their Lord did their lives revive or emerge from the dreadful eclipse. With his return, however, there evolved what one has called "a specialized spiritual faculty." The joy of God was in them and their joy was made full. They obtained a new and an augmented vision of God and God's relation to men, and with Christ's accession into the Godhead from the conditions and limitations of human experience, they waited receptively for the release of the new power. This brings us to the third detail.

At the outset we stated that the atonement to be preached with efficacy must be realized as a present power with meaning. This

<sup>55</sup> Browning is both supporting and suggestive on this point:

"I say, the acknowledgment of God in Christ  
Accepted by the reason, solves for thee  
All questions in the earth and out of it,  
And has so far advanced thee to be wise.  
Wouldst thou unprove this to reprove the proved?  
In life's mere minute, with power to use that proof,  
Leave knowledge and revert to how it sprung?  
Thou hast it; use it and forthwith, or die."

—"A Death in the Desert."

<sup>56</sup> See P. Carnegie Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*, chap. i; also Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen*, p. 91, Eng. Trans., 2d ed., p. 93; and Keim, *Jesus von Nazara*, I, 448.

means, of course, that it must be a present experience, a fact not so much emphasized in our times as one might expect. For a century and a quarter, or a little better, Christian scholarship has been concentrated upon getting back to Christ, but, according to Dr. Albert Schweitzer's able work of three years ago, with no gratifying success so far as bringing Christ into immediate touch with our present life is concerned.

There is nothing [says Dr. Schweitzer] more negative than the result of the *Leben-Jesu-Forschung*. The Jesus of Nazareth who appeared as Messiah, preached the morality of the kingdom of heaven on earth and died to consecrate his work, never existed. He is a figure, devised by rationalism, vivified by liberalism and clothed by modern theology with historical science. This figure has not been destroyed from without, but has in itself collapsed when confronted with the historical problems raised by thorough investigation.<sup>57</sup>

The results of the historical method have by no means been quite so barren as this paragraph might suggest, but it shows how impossible it is to know the real Jesus by historic research alone. It is no wonder that the result of pure learning, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, falls so dead-born. No religious impress of a merely historic person, no matter what his religious value of God, can liberate and organize the unseen forces of men's souls into a kingdom of praise unto God. The exciting cause is too remote. "The hour cometh and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth,"<sup>58</sup> not at some sacred place or some hallowed date. We do not so much need to go back to Christ today—imperative as that need always is—as we need to go forth to him in obedience to his call. "When he hath led them out he goeth before them."<sup>59</sup>

The atonement can never be realized as a present power with meaning, as it must be if effectual, if it be merely something with a date. Chronology may become a curse. If, with Christ's passing into the heavens, God, to whom we must be atoned, is to become increasingly distant with the passing centuries, and therefore the love of God become less active and urgent upon the souls of men—for the power of love is as the spiritual nearness of persons—then Christ's

<sup>57</sup> *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, p. 396. The translation is from Professor Marcus Dods's review in *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, II, 235.

<sup>58</sup> John 4:23.

<sup>59</sup> John 10:4.

going away could not have been expedient.<sup>60</sup> Christianity does not consist solely of what Jesus did before and in his crucifixion. Christianity sprang out of and is sustained and grows by a living faith in a living Lord with whom men are daily in correspondence—a faith which was begotten by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead and by his passing into the unseen presence of the Father; for then did he give gifts to men. The death of Christ apart from the person and resurrection of Christ does not save.<sup>61</sup> It is a mere martyrdom. Its simple effect is the stupified condition of bereavement, not the freeing power of an appropriately efficient inspiration. Christ's death receives its power from his rising again. He rose from the dead, not indeed subjected to the laws and conditions and limitations of his human experience in the flesh, but with these transcended, taking with him the thoughts and imaginations of men. It was then that the disciples could behold him as the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world. The death of Christ was an event in history, but it was the revelation in time of something eternal. It expresses the eternal opposition of God to sin and his timeless agony over the wrongdoing of his children. The death of Christ on the Cross expresses in time the timeless and ever-present urgency of God's love. The atonement is an eternal process. It is going on now. It shows us God suffering in the midst of and with and for his children. Sin hurts God just as much today as it did nineteen hundred years ago. Is not his spirit just as tender, as wise, as loving, as holy, is he not the same yesterday, today, and forever? If not, all men fall under the bondage of fear forever.

Christianity is social, that is, it is spiritual, personal. It will fit no other concept. It presupposes a Supreme Personality and created finite personalities within the system of his world. We would not

<sup>60</sup> "Bleibt der Christus der Geschichte uns fern, wird er nicht durch Gottes Geist in unsere nächste Nähe gehoben, dann bleibt uns Gott mit seiner ganzen rettenden Gnade fern. Denn er gehört mit ihr zum Christus der Geschichte, Christus ist ihr Träger, ihr Mittler. Wir haben dann keine wirkliche Gnadengemeinschaft mit Gott. Unserer Heilsgewissheit fehlt der eigentliche Kern. So gehören Heilsgewissheit oder heilsgewisser Glaube und Christumystik zusammen. Oder Heilsgewissheit und richtig verstandener Besitz göttlichen Geistes." D. Erich Schaefer, *Schriftglaube und Heilsgewissheit*, 21.

<sup>61</sup> "Death was for him only the entrance upon the endless career of his redemptive work, the unhindered fruitfulness of his life (John 12:24)."—*Tests of Life*, 97.



say with Lidgett that these created personalities are "finite centers of independent existence."<sup>62</sup> They are distinct beings, but cannot sustain themselves independently. "He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it."<sup>63</sup> Men are foreordained by God to become mutually related to himself, receiving from and responding to himself. Their existence is never independent of God, no matter where they are, in the uttermost parts of the earth, in heaven, or in hell. "In him we live and move and have our being."<sup>64</sup> Herein rise the torments of sin and also the effects of righteousness. The language and properties of Christianity are those of social intercourse and carry with them the coercive presumption of the permanent existence of individual life. "Two spirits thinking and speaking alike will be forever two and not one. . . . Communion implies the existence of two spirits, and is destroyed when the union between them passes into identity."<sup>65</sup> Love is not a general quality of the human heart, it is the specific force which binds men to God and one another in perfect personal relationships.

The atonement of Christ is the urgent power of God's love, or God's nature, or God's Spirit, pressing upon the individual lives of men through a variety of agencies, but especially through the church, and ordained of God to make men what they were predestined to become in relation to himself and one another. The return of Jesus from the tomb, though he had transcended the limitations of human experience in the flesh, nevertheless revealed to the disciples that he was still in organic touch with them, and when he passed into the heavens, and the renewing, freshening, emancipating, augmenting powers of Pentecost came upon them, they realized an experience like that which was theirs when he was with them, only larger, and the power they felt they could not but interpret as the outpouring of the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of God. Christ had become their perpetual correspondent, commanding, inspiring, and enabling them. What he was to them, the same is he to us and the same must he

<sup>62</sup> *The Christian Religion—Its Meaning and Proof*, 229.

<sup>63</sup> Matt. 10:39.

<sup>64</sup> Acts 17:28.

<sup>65</sup> Rev. Dr. H. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, 36.

become through the activity of the church to all men, and I close by quoting from the closing sentences of Dr. Schweitzer's work:

As an unknown and nameless One, he comes to us as he came on the shore of the lake to those men who wist not who he was. He utters the same word, "Follow thou me," and confronts us with the problem which we in our time must solve. He commands. And to those who hearken, be they wise or unwise, he will reveal himself in that which they are able in his fellowship to do and to suffer and as an unutterable secret will they learn who he is.<sup>66</sup>

And, I add, learning who he is, one will come to know what the nature of the atonement is.

<sup>66</sup> *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 401; translation from the review of the book by Marcus Dods in *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, II, No. 4, p. 235.

## THE POSSIBLE IDEALISM OF A PLURALIST

PROFESSOR ALFRED H. LLOYD, PH.D.  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

There is the richest sort of humor in an event that a few months ago held the attention, not merely of the philosophers, but also of the thinking public generally. Professor William James, reaching—if I may recall one of his own figures—a new twig whereon to perch in his flight, published his notable book, *A Pluralistic Universe*. For many a day he and his many followers of all sorts and degrees, who were perhaps more boldly assertive than their leader, had not lost an opportunity to laugh if not even to scoff at the Hegelians and at the idealists and absolutists of all shades and these somewhat exposed and unprotected objects of the usually good-natured thrusts have even enjoyed the wit and the insight directed against them. All others aside, who could resist Professor James and his soft impeachments? Who could withstand his adventurous style and his intellectual license or abandon? Everybody loves a mystic. Moreover, let this man fly long enough, or rather, as he would have it, often enough, and whatever truth might lie in the standpoint which was assailed would come only the more surely to its own—as has been proved. For could anything be more freely and boldly or more immediately Hegelian and idealistic and even absolutistic than this incarnate paradox: *A Pluralistic Universe*? Consummate Hegelianism! Transcendental idealism! Truly he laughs best who laughs last! And, best of all, in all probability, no one would be more ready to join in the last laugh than Professor James himself!

But I may seem to be writing in enigmas and in a humor somewhat strained. Then let me explain in the following pages how for pluralism and for the peculiar realism of the time and the empiricism and the experimentalism, all being various phases of what in a most comprehensive and hospitable term is known as pragmatism, there is *at least quite possible, if not logically necessary*, an idealistic interpretation. Granted, of course, that viewed casually the pluralism seems

hopelessly to have betrayed the belief in unity or continuity, to have abandoned the notion that logical integrity is somehow a test both of truth and of reality, or no longer to accept the so-called postulate of harmony which so much philosophy, the idealistic philosophy, as well as so much theology and so much ethics, has proceeded from and has constantly depended on. Granted, too, that empiricism now so extreme and flagrant as to be almost unrecognizable to its old acquaintances, apparently has dethroned reason or rational restraint once for all and that experimentalism, among other changes, has turned so wide and free that it would quite resent the slightest suspicion of teleology. Also the new realism, at times so radical as actually to have come to call itself—I dare not say to be—"naïve" and in this boasted character to have replaced all the splendid subtleties of eminently respectable philosophy with most obvious commonplaces, seems to be insisting so confidently on the reality of experience and the immediacy of reality that not only certain quondam concessions to idealism, certain idealistic conditions such as, for example, the apriori forms of Kant or even the dialectic of Hegel, but also the very remotest chances of any idealistic implications whatsoever, however slight or however innocuous, are absolutely cut off. Granted, in short, that at least to outer view the new realism and experimentalism and empiricism and pluralism have turned audacious and independent without measure. In the name of pragmatism—used doubtless in all reverence although easily profaned—have they not broken loose as never before and even burned every bridge behind them? Still it remains true and it is, again, what I would explain in these pages, that although pragmatism will not or cannot retreat, in spite of all the difficulties idealism is ready and altogether able to follow.

Empiricism and idealism, to take these now as representing the two sides of the question in which James and many others have awakened so much interest, are of course as old as reflective thought and in the current controversies are giving such signs of vigor and vitality as to suggest for them both a very long or even an end'less future. Indeed, to digress a little, their perennial conflicts seem only to have enhanced their hold on life. Perhaps, too, the bare fact that they and their differences have been and bid fair to continue

so persistent and that, as was so natural under the circumstances, they have always determined each other's changes of ground and in respect to these changes have never failed each to find in the other's implications or innuendoes something of positive value for its own support and development, has not been duly recognized and appraised. With due appraisal that fact might have suggested that the two, like so many other things that have been inseparable as well as persistently opposed, were not merely just inseparable and opposed but also in nature and intent strangely and intimately commingled. Proximity plus difference has ever been a most effective mixer. But, to return, however commingled, empiricism and idealism have always recounted, each in its own way, the character and particularly the manner of experience or the relation of conscious and thinking man to the world of his experience. Thus, the latter, idealism, has represented man as virtually legislating for his world, as prescribing the reason and order of its going, while the former, empiricism, has shown him in a skeptical or at least in a strictly *laissez-faire* attitude, all legislating or ordering, if any there be, being left to an outer or objective nature. Now—and this only for an analogy or illustration—through the Middle Ages, as every student of history knows, there was a most vigorous rivalry between the temporal and the spiritual powers, manifest at one time as the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic church, and it remains still an interesting question as to which of the two was really the more temporal or worldly, which the more spiritual. The doctrine of the divine right of kings—not of popes or not merely of popes—was one of the first efforts at an answer, although in implication that had really been anticipated many years earlier by the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, as if of the man with the God, or by the addition of the famous *filioque* clause to the creed. But also, similarly, with regard to the relation of empiricism and idealism and with renewed suggestion, too, of their possible commingling there is a question quite parallel to that about the spiritual and the temporal. Thus, even when empiricism is very extreme, being flatly negative as to any chance of valid rational experience, and when idealism, on its side equally extreme, insists that true experience is possible and is both innate and rational, the law or

reason of all things being subjective, even then which of the two not merely puts man or, if one must speak only hypothetically, would put man nearer to and more *en rapport* with a real reason and order of the universe, but also really would make or show man himself in his own nature and his own right more truly and essentially a rational being? Which would more effectually make him and his life irrational and disorderly? The usual meanings and claims aside, which of the two truly is the more idealistic? Which the more empirical and factual? Just like asking, objects some one, and just as absurd as asking: Which is darker, which lighter, day or night? So it is, and a better comparison would be hard to find. Certainly day and night are commingled as well as inseparable and opposed. Each, too, not by just getting out of the way, but in itself *is* the possibility of the other. Moreover, in general, if things which are opposed may ever be, or be informed or potential with each other's nature, say even, however remotely, with each other's maximum, superlative, or infinity, then to the above questions the paradoxical answers *at least may be* the right answers.

As to the particular case of empiricism possibly being even more idealistic than idealism itself, I would at once suggest that the order and reason of the universe, the absolute law or will, assuming that there be such, would be at least freer, it would be more secure in the life of just being and maintaining itself as well as of affecting and informing human activity for empiricism, however skeptical, than for the usual, would-be prescriptive and legislative idealism which in spirit if not in specific letter is unavoidably narrow and unnaturally rigorous. In fact, if this be not mere repetition, the more skeptical, the more assertive against the possibility of experience ever being at once real and rational empiricism is, the truer is that which has just been said. Thus, among the pragmatists, who are the extremists, the assertion has been made, in the first place, that all positive experience, although in single abstracted portions showing logical consistency or rational and systematic character, when taken as a whole always has its contradictions, or is formally irrational or deficient logically; and, in the second place, as if this fact about experience were final evidence about reality also, that reality itself is quite illogical or irrational, being broken or discontinuous instead of possessing

solidarity. So does empiricism drink its cup to the very dregs. Among other things, too, such a pluralism as James's is the inevitable conclusion. But also at the same time such extreme empiricism is deeply idealistic. To begin with, it is idealistic because it infers the nature of reality from the formal evidence of experience. Still more significantly, however, it is idealistic because it clearly implies, if it does not recognize or assert, as something that moves or that may be moving in experience and so that in its turn may represent reality, a reason or a law or a harmony that only is too large and too deep and too free ever to be the immediate burden of anything formally and definitely in consciousness.

That the deeper and freer reason so implied must be in some sense transcendental will hardly be questioned. In what sense, however, will need to be considered carefully hereafter, for many are quite likely to contend that a transcendental reason is no real reason at all. Indeed that contention is the real point. *The* reason truly is no reason or not *a* reason and, more than this, for its depth and freedom it must depend on the very sort of an experienced world, only partially orderly, in whole manifestly never without broken or plural and illogical character, which the pragmatist has reported. Ever positively to find unqualified consistency and conformity or to regard these as ever findable either in practice or even in theory would be to compromise their real absoluteness or the absoluteness of the infinite reason or order to which the manifest inconsistency and non-conformity, so characteristic of all finite consciousness, are constantly testifying. Can a finite experience be consistent? Must not inconsistency bear witness to infinity? This suggests doubtless a strange fate, at least to first thought, for idealism, but it shows idealism, not indeed asserting, but assertively trusting reason. To me, further, it looks like idealism losing its whole world only to gain its own soul. In religion there is the familiar attitude expressed in the words: "Not my will but God's be done." This means, plainly, when fully expressed: "I will that not my will," etc., and it is accordingly a volitional, self-assertive act or attitude after all. It is, or it contains the opportunity of being infinitely volitional, that is, of making one's will include and sanction whatever may happen. In like manner then, empiricism—the more radical it be the better—is assertively

a subjective attitude and in its refusal or virtual refusal to assume that the subject formally makes or constructs the world or to view as true that in consciousness which simply conforms to something outside of consciousness it is only an attitude which declares unequivocally, not that reality is absolutely illogical, but that it is so only relatively to any known or knowable reason, only in all actual or possible positive experience, the forming or informing reason of reality never being any single reason or any formulable reason. No positively discovered or discoverable reason ever being the absolute reason, all experience or the whole world of experience must be irrational or illogical and so, again, always broken and pluralistic. This, however, truly is, or at least may be construed as being, idealism and assertive idealism at that. It is idealism only at its limit or become heroic. It is idealism spiritualized by the empirical attitude of *laissez-faire*. It is idealistic without being doctrinaire.

The pragmatists are very frequently taken to task for their test of truth, to which some reference has been made already. Thus, to consider this specially, they would have it that not internal consistency nor external conformity makes the truth or validity of knowledge or experience. Only that is true which "works" and neither consistency nor conformity ever does work freely or unqualifiedly or without compromise. But here, conspicuously, besides its accord with the facts, an accord which some critics refuse to face, the position taken is distinctly idealistic—again without being doctrinaire, without subjecting things to any set form or order. What could be more idealistic than the test of working? Strangely enough, too, and I think well worth observing, this test is only a most obvious as well as a most appreciative conclusion from the *reductio ad absurdum* of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*. That brilliant textbook of so many idealists is certainly quite emphatic as to the only phenomenal character of *all* experience. As we are told in so many words, there is no realistic experience, no experience that puts the subject formally in direct touch with reality, with things-in-themselves, because no experience whatsoever—and note the sweeping character of the assertion—is ever internally consistent (thanks to the antinomies) or externally conforming (thanks to the things-in-themselves). This, however, is a most absurd result. It proves far too much for its own



truth. Such a comprehensive principle of experience, if itself sound, must mean something besides phenomenality. Probably no Cretan would ever take occasion to say that all Cretans were honest, but certainly without the Kantian absurdity no Cretan ever could say that all Cretans were liars, and by the same token the assertion of universal phenomenality can be made only to need immediate revision. Instead of discrediting the possibility of true knowledge or valid experience, it only discredits, by exposing as quite absurd, the assumption that the final test is internal consistency or external conformity. Experience, being denied realistic value or truth, when judged by either of those tests, has no choice but to demand some other test. And what other is there? Even so good an idealist as Kant found another: the test of his so-called "practical reason." In other words Kant, the "transcendental idealist," for his transcendentalism and for his idealism so offensive to the pragmatists and immediate realists, had his way—it did lack some of the more recent bluntness and "naïveté"—of saying that only such experience as works is either true or real and I have yet to hear the *Critique of the Practical Reason* charged with being less idealistic than that of the Pure Reason. On the contrary, was it not an extreme idealism? Was not its reliance on reason *par excellence*, on *the* reason, the *infinite* reason, which is always superior, not to forms, but to any set forms, instead of on a reason which, because using set forms however "universal" and "a priori," was still virtually finite, being only the hypothetically enlarged or generalized case of the finite? To quote a bit freely from Thomas Moore, evidently, although so far as I know he had never read the second *Critique*, a wise philosopher as well as a poet:

You may name, you may christen a form in full glory,  
But the form is still formal though it be "a priori."

Poetry and parody aside, the second *Critique* was Kant's reaction upon what I have called the *reductio ad absurdum* of the first and in it *directly from the standpoint of idealism* he has said substantially what we are nowadays hearing, as if it were only empiricism, from those who would at least appear to have little if any use for Königsberg's philosopher. Moreover, unless my reading has been seriously at fault, in his third great work, the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant's idealism became so deep and so broad and so free as virtually to

identify reason and sense and the identification should please no one more than our end-of-the-century or twentieth-century realists—of these realists, however, more hereafter.

But this going back to Kant, even to Kant, as many may think, too freely interpreted, is unkind. "Any death but that," I hear the radical empiricists and experimentalists and immediate realists and pluralists exclaim. "Don't," they implore earnestly, "don't turn our cherished isms into the newest and freshest pronouncements of neo-Kantianism. It was quite bad enough to dub James's *Pluralistic Universe* an incarnated Hegelianism, but this is far worse. Do grant us euthanasia at least." Surely, as a matter of common humanity, such a petition as this must be heeded. Let me leave Kant, then, to bury his Kantianism, as if it as well as he were really dead, and let me now appeal to the evidence of very common-place experience. To this appeal no empiricist can possibly object. Thus, how well all men know that no man ever can be practical and at the same time wholly logical and consistent! And also that their ideas never are either identical with the pertaining things or formally like those things! Compromise, then, always involving inconsistency, is a general condition of all conscious *action* and as for the incongruity between ideas and things, if the former were literally and formally the latter, there would certainly be no occasion for the self-assertion which all conscious action implies. To the appreciation of all this each one of us is trained from his infancy. But are we, therefore, naturally and properly only empiricists? If idealists, holding still to some form of subjectivism, are we misled and abnormal? The essence of idealism, I believe, lies for last analysis, in assertion of the self or subject. Idealism stands for the *action* of the self, not for any mere status or condition, be this a knowing or a being. Action, however, or self-assertion, as already indicated, is just what inconsistency and non-conformity always induce; nay, they are marks of its presence and of the subject's participation in it. As representing the character of positive, formal experience at any time they are but a cross-section of some present activity or, in terms formally static but because of the negatives not really so, they are a definition of the action—in any other way so undefinable. Consistency and conformity, on the other hand, may constitute "exact" experience, such

as in highly developed form is afforded by mathematics or logic, but at very great cost. They make experience abstract, hypothetical, artificial, mechanical. They rob it of real movement as well as of real or actual content or object. They may, as possibly in the case of this present article, provide it with a medium or instrument of expression, but alone they cannot constitute its reality or meaning. All experience must have content or object and inconsistency is one of the conditions of that; and must have movement, and non-conformity is needed for movement. So, once more, inconsistency and non-conformity are seen to mean activity. Of course, as with any other negatives, they imply that their corresponding positives are also present and involved. But, to pass over for the moment this idea of negatives that include what they would deny and now to come back to the issue between idealism and empiricism, inconsistency and non-conformity evidently mean an activity of the self—then idealism—or an activity in which the self is involved—then empiricism—or, as possible and equally valid points of view, both of these—then for the self at any time a choice between idealism and empiricism. Only, choosing empiricism, in a sense already indicated here the self is still assertive and idealistic, being, however, not complacently but heroically so, being “idealistic without being doctrinaire,” being idealistic with the Stoic’s conformity to an infinite reason.

There is, furthermore, a fact—I certainly think it is a fact—about all volition, or assertion of self, that may well be mentioned, for it cannot but be of much help in the present task. Thus, to begin with, the self has as much right to claim as its own the activity in which it finds itself involved as it has to claim the consciousness or the self-consciousness incident to that activity and, not to go back of this right, all the conceits of volition must be founded upon it. But, in an important addition, no volition is ever without some sense of an opposition between its own formal purpose or reason and a larger, more fundamental purpose or reason, or, again, as a result of the foregoing, is ever without some deference to what, relatively to its formal purpose, is a more or less alien and non-conforming environment. “I will this” always means: “At least the spirit, not necessarily the exact letter, of it,” and also, stoically: “Now let come what will; let nature or environment, do whatever it must; I am

ready." Volition thus always implies, not only assertion of self, but also assertion that involves *both the heroic and the empirical*. And so from one more point of view, namely from the constant association of the heroic and the empirical in all volition, there is important evidence of no necessary conflict between idealism and empiricism.

In very brief summary, then, of what has been said so far, it is now clearly important to distinguish between dogmatic or doctrinaire idealism, the idealism that either literally and openly or only virtually holds reason to some program or letter or system of "forms," and rationally skeptical or spiritual idealism, the idealism that refuses to sacrifice reason to form, spirit or principle to any letter, freedom to the visible law or—synonymously—to an only manifestly rational necessity. In the latter sense and only in the latter sense pragmatism, as if building better than most of its architects have seemed to know, is idealistic or this at least: *It is quite amenable to idealistic interpretation; one can, if one only will, make idealism, a deep, heroic, infinite idealism, of it.*

But now with so much understood, it is necessary next to consider quite directly the peculiar relation of skepticism, always such a faithful handmaid of empiricism, to idealism and, this done, to face squarely the particular case against idealism which pragmatism has seemed to have. With regard to skepticism, then, judged historically, it has commonly been of two distinct sorts or degrees, consisting, for the first, in doubt or even in complete denial of the evidence of the senses, as, for conspicuous examples, at Athens during the fifth century B.C., and in Europe during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries A.D., and, for the second, in doubt or even complete denial of the evidence of thought or reason, as during the period after Aristotle and more or less widely at the present time. Moreover, strange to relate, the deeper skepticism of the second sort seems to have restored or to be restoring to significance and authority the previously discredited senses. Witness as to this the period, already mentioned, the Graeco-Roman period, when sense and spirit, which took the place of reason, working together, made at once a great world-power and an epochal religion, and the present time, when sense and spirit are at least nearing a new alliance perhaps, as the years or the centuries pass, for even greater achievement. But, this restoration of sense—

what does it mean? How can it be explained? To answer these questions will be to get some understanding of the inner motive of the skepticism. That the first skepticism led to materialism and mechanicalism, whether in their ancient or their modern forms the philosophical bases of empirical science, is an old story, but not less certainly as well as not less in common knowledge it led also to a contemporary idealism, to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, for example, to the Cartesians and Leibnitz, to Kant also and Hegel. Observe, too, that the issue between the materialism and the idealism was that of an asserted and visionary naturalism set over against a sublimated humanism, the latter by its exaltation of the universal freeing man's attention from local and temporal form or institution and the former opportunely calling his attention to the mechanical or institutional character of nature or even of the whole universe. In short, the two, instead of being hopelessly opposed, were really working together, their active difference only suggesting, to venture a somewhat bold metaphor, the co-operating action against each other of the right and the left hand.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, working thus together they were bound sooner or later to become reconciled or identified, thereupon to lose all ground or motive for their assertive rationalism, the human reason being supplanted by or finding itself in—which should I say?—the larger, freer reason of nature, and so to end in a skepticism of the second sort, which abandons reason, that is, assertive, formal reason, whether of an assertive idealism or of an assertive naturalism or mechanicalism, puts spirit<sup>2</sup> in reason's place, and restores sense.

This restoration of sense, however, is still our problem and while in part it may now have been explained, since spirit as larger and freer

<sup>1</sup> A bold and far-fetched metaphor doubtless; but it tempts the speculative mind. Is it possibly not merely a metaphor? Are the right and the left hand normally the hands respectively of the human and the natural, the ideal and the empirical, the purposive and the mechanical? If so, then not invariably but as a rule left-handed people might be expected to lack originality or initiative but be good machines or instruments. This possible conclusion, however, is less important than the general idea of the difference between the two hands, one being, so to speak, the hand of the will, the other the hand of the environment.

<sup>2</sup> At least, as here used, spirit can be only a name for the larger reason, the free reason, reason as superior to any formal conditions or say to any distinction between the human and the natural, in short for the informal reason of a life that identifies them both. Any identification is always a violation of some form; a liberation of some spirit.

than any formal reason can not but be more hospitable, embracing even the apparent unreason of sense, nevertheless there is more that needs to be said. Thus nothing is more pertinent to remark in just this place than that the assertive rationalists have taken their peculiar skepticism, their negative attitude toward the evidence of the senses, *quite too sensuously*. A puzzling remark, of course, but easily explained as follows: Whatever may be said of the materialists and mechanicalists, it is certainly true of the idealists, even of such as Plato and Kant,<sup>3</sup> that they have not really left sense behind. Not only have they been too consciously opposed to sense or have they actually envisaged their rationally ideal worlds sensuously, but also in their theory they have made those worlds, while not sensuously perceived or perceivable, yet the objects of a sort of imaginary or hypothetical sense known sometimes popularly as the mind's eye or in Kantian phraseology as intuition of the understanding or reason. Aristotle and Hegel, as compared with Plato and Kant, are perhaps less obviously given to compromising their idealism or their transcendentalism in this way—the compromise, once more, consisting in making of thought or reason or understanding only a sort of other world or ideal world sense, a sublimated sense, which objectively perceives universals instead of particulars or laws instead of things; and, also, I may be charged with some superficiality or unfairness in my interpretation even of Plato and Kant on this point; but for my own part the fallacy or compromise here in question seems inherent in the very situation, logical or psychological, which any sensuously skeptical, assertive idealism or rationalism presents. What we might call the inner logic of the whole situation involves that fallacy. Given the skepticism and the assertion, and there must follow, not necessarily in name, but at least in fact, the positing of a universal *sense* and, interpretations of particular men aside, this is all that is here and now involved. So, as was said and with the meaning which I may hope has been made clear, the idealists—the same, I am sure, is true of the materialists<sup>4</sup>—being skeptics of the first sort have taken their opposition to

<sup>3</sup> In his *Critique of the Pure Reason*.

<sup>4</sup> Materialism, or mechanicalism, as a philosophy, is only a visionary or sublimated naturalism, quite analogous to idealism already referred to as a sublimated humanism. But materialism, although or because on its side sensuously skeptical, also implies a universal *sense*. What else do the instruments of precision devised for

sensation too sensuously. Count Tolstoi would doubtless remind them that the only way in which to oppose, that is, in which really to transcend sensation, is the way of non-resistance and this view, I think, has the truth of the matter in it, although there is room for question as to whether the good count himself really brought the whole truth of it out. But, evidently, to sum up, our conclusion is just this: The dogmatic idealists have not been heroic enough; the very skepticism prompting their assertion needs to be more radical by being directed also against that universal sense, the mind's eye, or against its object as certainly no better than just one more particular, the "universal" particular, as well as against the ordinary senses and their objects that were first attached. In other words, in their rationalism, which let it be always remembered is shared with the materialists, the idealists need also to be more thorough or more radical by making reason really supreme, by recognizing a reason that truly is non-sensuous, being not aloof from sense, for such a reason falls short of being non-sensuous, but even in and through the very life of sense itself. Rationalism, I say, if it would save itself, needs courageously to restore sense, even sense as formally or manifestly irrational, and just such a saving restoration comes through skepticism of the second sort or, let me now add, may come through pragmatism and its interesting retinue of current isms, radical empiricism, pluralism, experimentalism, immediate realism, and so on, all of these being, as was said above and as probably did not need saying at all, rationally skeptical and all also with more or less directness and emphasis restoring sense.

We come, then, to the second matter that was to be considered, namely, the case, actual or possible, which pragmatism has against idealism. If I be not greatly in error, the real objection, implied when not expressed, is that idealism or that rationalism in general is ordinarily too small—as men are said to be "small." Rational consistency or conformity must always make for smallness. So must any form of that transcendentalism which has seemed to be involved

measuring objectively—perceiving in a sublimated way?—the sense qualities, heat, sound, light, weight, etc., mean? But these instruments are indispensable to empirical science and they indicate the point of view of empirical science, on the basis of which, of course, a materialistic philosophy is erected.

at least in all ordinary idealism or rationalism and which has meant aloofness of either the human or the natural from the actual. So, too, must the opposition to sense which transcendentalism is in the habit of deceiving itself with. And so must the conceit that unity can have no dealings with plurality. But—and very commendably too—the pragmatist insists when not in what he actually says, then in what he implies, on being large, not small; on gifting mankind, as it were, with a large experience; on leaving both man and the world the real freedom of their supposed size—size, of course, including depth, intension, vitality, not mere external magnitude. And, such being the pragmatist's real or virtual demand, it is to be observed that the large, deep experience thus insisted upon is actually provided by pluralism, irrationalism, experimentalism, realism and the various other pragmatisms. It is actually provided if—and this is the *possible* meaning of pragmatism—all the negatives, expressed or implied in these various isms, are such negatives as the recent discussion of skepticism and the restoration of sense afforded a view of and as were indeed mentioned even earlier, being negatives, not of mere antagonism or denial, but of something far superior and much more heroic, that is, negatives, not of exclusion, but of inclusion and completion, the plurality, for example, being only the content or medium of a complete or an infinitely large and deep unity, the irrationality as a conflict of rational orders being only a witness to the greater reason of the including whole, and so on. But with this meaning, with its negatives so understood, as they certainly may be understood, pragmatism appears, once more, as supremely idealistic. In pragmatism idealism has only met an opponent that enables it to see if it will, as never before, all that it ever meant.

And I would make the meaning of the foregoing paragraph more nearly complete by adding a few words upon two or three of the several things suggested. Idealism postulates unity, harmony, law; but the unity surely is small, finite, only partial, if standing outside the world of many things or if in any way setting a limit either to the number or the individuality of the many. Two distinctly different things must always make a larger, fuller unity, at least in possibility, than one thing or than an unlimited number of things all alike and if the number of different things be carried beyond two, the possibility



for a large full unity is only so much enhanced. So, above, plurality was referred to as the possible medium of a large, deep unity. The one and the many, the general and the particular, are indeed opposed, but, when all is said, the one needs the many for its great size or say for its infinity. In like manner, also, the reason needs a manifestly irrational world for its deep, essential order. This dependence, however, of unity upon plurality, of the general upon the particular or of the reason upon constant irrationality, raises again the problem of transcendentalism. Thus evidently the most transcendent unity of the most transcendent reason is not that which stands aloof but is that which transcends plurality or irrationality by inclusion and so, suffice it to say, however paradoxically, that there is a supreme transcendentalism even in the "naïve" or the immediate pluralistic realism of the day. Often such extremes really do meet; rest, for example, and motion at infinite velocity. A point *a* on the circumference of a wheel is instantaneously or immediately in its given position, whether the wheel be quite without motion or be revolving at infinite speed. Only, I suppose, the term "immediately" or "instantaneously" really would be meaningless in the case of no motion. The rest of that point, however, plainly has two possible meanings. And, similarly, although I well know I may be over-taxing the ordinary imagination in suggesting such a thing, an immediate or naïve realism, besides being the simple thing commonly supposed, is or in meaning may be transcendentalism *par excellence*. There is a static immediacy and there is a dynamic immediacy; a child's naïveté and the naïveté that admits mature men into the kingdom; and, outwardly, though in reality so different, the two appear very much alike; but one is just realism, the other is *supremely* idealistic or transcendental. Whatever is, too, is right, as well as real, but this time-honored formula is plainly that of either an idle realism or a supreme moral enthusiasm and idealism, heroic to the point of so believing in the superior reality of the ideal as to bring the ideal back to earth and to make it actually take to itself whatever the earth, however earthly, may happen to contain. In a word, as in so many other ways, so now in one more way, namely, on the score of its peculiar realism, that at least *may* mean dynamic immediacy and mature or realized naïveté, pragmatism is seen to be quite amenable to idealistic inter-

pretation. As empiricism, as pluralism, or as realism, not to mention its other rôles, pragmatism may be idealism also; being heroically idealistic or idealistic without being doctrinaire; pluralistic for the sake of a large unity and a free reason, and realistic through—admittedly a cumbersome phrase—the immanent transcendence of the ideal.

And, in conclusion, this *possibility* of idealistic interpretation is, I think, the most idealistic quality of all which can be ascribed to pragmatism or to the world as the pragmatist views it. Given the bare facts, that is, again, the empiricism, the pluralism and the realism, and one need not be an idealist, one need not construe the facts idealistically, but, if one will, one may do so. In general, as a matter of course, what is only possible cannot be said to be actually and necessarily real or true, but, being possible and at the same time not being necessary, it may be willed and whatever, instead of having visible and demonstrable reality or existing through sheer necessity, depends on being willed is, not merely real, but both real and ideal, *being willed real*.

The pluralist, or pragmatist, call him by any of his names you choose, has in his philosophy just this possibility or opportunity of a *willed idealism*, the very acme of idealism. Pragmatism has not slain the Absolute absolutely; it has only provided a successor to the throne and changed the ruler's prerogative. The essential right and authority of the Absolute lie in possibility, not in a flat actuality. Is the king dead? Long live the king!

## ESTIMATES AND COMMENTS

---

### THE LATE PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE

The death of Dr. Borden P. Bowne is a severe loss not only to Boston University and to American Methodism, which he served with distinguished ability for considerably more than a quarter of a century, but to American philosophy and theology as well, in which he has been for many years a conspicuous figure. His technical writings cover almost every important branch of philosophy, including psychology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion and upon all these subjects he wrote with ability and force. While some of his earlier works have been superseded at points in the progress of psychological and philosophical scholarship, they are all of them striking examples of philosophical erudition, and of the rarest sort of expository and dialectical skill. Gifted with an extraordinarily lucid mind, he was the sworn enemy of every form of obscurity and logical inconsequence. His intellectual honesty made him impatient of literary sham, of the form and parade of knowledge without the substance thereof. Himself a connoisseur in the art of putting things, he did not believe in darkening counsel with a multitude of words, and his trenchant and luminous style stands as a wholesome example to the younger generation of American philosophical writers (their name, if we are to believe Professor James, is legion) with whom an awkward and wordy style does service for insight and genuine scholarship. He was intolerant of every form of pretentiousness and bigotry, whether it shielded itself under the magical name of modern science or under the cloak of religion, and the fierceness of his polemical onslaughts, in no way mitigated by a withering sarcasm, made him an opponent much to be dreaded.

Professor Bowne's place in the history of American philosophy it is perhaps premature to estimate in any final way. He was known as a follower of Lotze, under whose influence he had come as a university student. Together with Ladd he was perhaps the leading exponent of this type of thought in America. His leading philosophical ideas were thus not original with him, in any strict sense, but are the common possession of a whole school of thinkers, the school of personal idealism. Reality, according to this school, is not definable in terms of physics or force, but in terms of consciousness. Consciousness, moreover, is not a mere collection

of passive and passing states, mere momentary and shifting ideas, as Hume had taught; consciousness, when adequately defined, can only be a conscious self or subject, the permanent and independent source of experience and of life. The universe is immaterial, conscious, and personal in its ultimate constitution: this is the grand formula of personalism! With an initial doctrine of such depth and scope, numerous special problems of philosophy and religion are solved in advance. Mechanistic naturalism which recognizes nothing in the universe or out of it but mass and motion and unbending law, that terror of timid hearts, is seen to be merely a shadow of the mind's own throwing, an abstraction of half-educated science and philosophy. The real world of experience is a world of immediate perception with its real things and qualities; the world of mechanism is a product of our analyzing and abstracting intellect, mere mass points, accelerations, and other scientific abstractions by the aid of which we hope to simplify and thus control the overwhelming complexity of living experience. Natural laws are nothing more nor less than approximate uniformities discovered within experience which we can then roughly predict and to which we can successfully preadjust ourselves. The abstract world of mechanics is a world from which all efficiency has been emptied out; the real world in which we live is a world of living personalities, pregnant with purposive agency and will, the theater of ideas and ideals, of moral imperatives and responsibilities.

Under such an interpretation of the world, also, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, as two mutually exclusive realms, is seen to be a spurious one. It is not as if nature did the bulk of the world's work while God is reserved for interruptions and interpositions. If God's power is reserved to account for breaks, exceptions, and "things science cannot explain," then the scope of God's power will be constantly restricted as the range of knowledge is extended with the progress of science, and these fugitive facts are one by one brought into relation with a general system of natural law and moral order. No, the natural roots in the supernatural, and the supernatural in turn manifests itself in the ordinary, everyday facts and forms of our living experience. This is the divine immanence which has become such a leading feature of modern thought, and upon which Christianity, according to the too sanguine view of Professor Bowne, has always insisted.

On this view, too, evolution ceases to be an object of apprehensive interest to the Christian theist. For what is evolution but the natural and orderly way of God's working? In the view of Bowne, in which the present writer fully concurs, the mere fact of evolution is, in advance of a

knowledge of its special character and direction, not capable of either theistic or antitheistic interpretation. Evolution is as such mere change, and mere change, apart from a knowledge of the character of the change, is absolutely without significance for religious theory. The important question is not by what method the world and our life have been produced, but rather what the particular method employed has effected. Is the world as we know it such that we may realize fairly well our legitimate interests and purposes in it? Are the conditions and prospects of life such that we are enabled to pronounce the world good on the whole? To put it Browning's way, do we find in this evolving world merely a wasteful and unethical display of power, or do we find love in it too? The important religious question, then, is not, Is there evolution? but, Is there progress?

Further, evolution, in the significant sense of progress, implies an end or plan in the progressive realization of which evolution consists. Evolution becomes recognizable as such only as it is the progressive approximation to some end or goal. So far from being able, therefore, to explain completely the later products of evolution by the earlier, life and mind, for example, by their lifeless antecedents, as was once the prevailing fashion, we may be obliged to explain the earlier by the later, or, more accurately, by reference to the plan involved in the process as a whole, and implicit at its every stage. Man's lowly origin in the form of his temporal antecedents has often been made the occasion for belittling his present status and his future possibilities. But this is both unphilosophical and unfair. "We have lost the memorials of our extraction," says the Roman Stoic; "in truth it matters not whence we come, but whither we go."

If once but dust or ape or worm,  
A growing brain and then a soul,  
Sure these are but prophetic germ  
Of that which makes our circle whole.

Such are the leading ideas, freely reproduced, which formed the core of Professor Bowne's thought and teaching. During the later years of his life his literary activities consisted mainly in the popular exposition and the practical application of these germinal ideas in several theological books of a popular kind, a species of literature in which he was a veritable past master. His sound scholarship and high ideals, mated with a tactful conservatism, the token of ripe wisdom secure in its strength, made him a safe and strong leader in that uncertain period of theological reconstruction through which American theological thought has just passed. Nothing can be finer or more calculated to guide public opinion to sane and healthy

views on religious questions than the little booklets, the last products of his busy pen, *The Christian Revelation*, *The Christian Life*, and *The Atonement*, books which won the generous recognition of no less a thinker than Professor James,<sup>1</sup> and his two last books, addressed to a somewhat larger audience, *The Immanence of God* and *Personalism*. Views expressed in these writings concerning the meaning and authority of the Hebrew scriptures, the atonement, the future life, the divine immanence, and other current theological problems, brought him into unpleasant conflict with the ultra-conservative element in his denomination, and charges of atheism, heresy and breach of trust were brought against him by persons who probably neither understood his views nor the implications of the terms they so lightly employed. The views held by Professor Bowne were and are the commonplaces of enlightened religious thought, and if Professor Bowne erred he erred on the side of conservatism rather than on the side of too radical reinterpretation of the theological doctrines in question. These admirable last utterances reveal him as a man not only of scholarship, but as a man of tactful wisdom and discerning sympathy as well.

Had Professor Bowne chosen to devote his undivided energies to pure scholarship as his generous endowment would have suggested, the highest academic distinctions would doubtless have come to him. It is known that he actually declined professional preferment, choosing to remain in the ranks of the people who had nourished his spiritual life, and to whom, as he thought, he owed his services. He has his reward in the grateful recognition of a large host of those who have profited from his busy and fruitful thought and from his example, and who admire him for his large attainments and his fearless leadership.

Professor Bowne's scholarly and active achievements loom particularly large when compared with his personal and social life, which, according to all accounts, was one of quiet modesty and self-effacement. He was a man of unobtrusive manner, a true friend and delightful companion, fine-grained and courteous to all he met (barring always rabid theologians and "atheists," in whose presence the scholarly gentleman in him was transformed into the soldier in action); a man "of singularly pure and lovable personal character and a practical Christian experience of the most convincing kind."

EMIL C. WILM

WASHBURN COLLEGE  
TOPEKA, KAN.

<sup>1</sup>" . . . those wonderfully able rationalistic booklets (which everyone should read . . . )."—*Varieties of Religious Experience*, 502.

## THE FIRST GREAT CHRISTIAN CREED: A FURTHER WORD

In view of the able and penetrating remarks of my learned friend, Professor Francis A. Christie, on my article in the January (1910) number of *The American Journal of Theology* I would say: (1) I was not unaware of the fact that between Arianism and Athanasianism modern Unitarians preferred the latter (see Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit* [Boston, 1877], 74-78; Allen, *Christian Hist.*, Vol. I [1882; 3d ed., 1889], 119-21; Chadwick, *Old and New Unitarian Belief* [Boston, 1894], 147-48). (2) We all believe in the Fatherhood of God, but after all, men are men and God is God, and the modern Unitarian breaking with the old attempts to be true to some sense of the divine mystery and majesty of Christ does not help us much, because it shuts us off at a stroke from the religious experience of the past. That experience certainly voiced itself in the doctrine of the deity of Christ. "There were certain elements in Christian experience," says Principal James Drummond in his Hibbert Lectures for 1894 (*Via, Veritas, Vita*, p. 203), "which when taken up and interpreted by Greek philosophy, necessarily resulted in this doctrine; and though we may believe that the form and terminology of the doctrine were derived from a foreign source, we may nevertheless admit the reality of the fundamental Christian facts which imparted to it all its religious vitality." (3) The Logos idea was not simply and only a philosophical conception, but a conception involved in the Christian faith, as given in its documents and its life, but with philosophical antecedents and echoes. (4) I could not at all admit that the faith in the absolute deity of Jesus was not fundamental with such men as Bernard, Luther, Edwards, Wesley. He was the life of their life. Not that they needed in their preaching or writing to be always talking about his deity or explaining it, but both their experience and their work rested upon it. This does not mean that they stood for any special metaphysical interpretation or phraseology, but only for the fact as guarded at Nicaea. The reader will recall that bold challenge of Calvin in the assembly in the St. Francis Church in Lausanne on May 11, 1537 against Caroli, who had accused him and his preachers of being loose in the doctrine of the Trinity, and who would not be convinced of their soundness until they should sign the Three Creeds.

The preachers [says E. Stähelin] refused most decidedly to do this, not that they rejected these creeds in themselves, but, first, because Caroli had thus intended to bring their faith under suspicion and get the appearance of victory over them, and, second, because they would not by their example bring in such a tyranny in the Church that one would pass as a heretic who declined only to speak with the words, or according to the pleasure, of another. And when

Caroli still insisted that in the symbol of Athanasius [the falsely-called Athanasian Creed] it read that he who would be saved must think of the matter thus, Calvin did not hesitate to declare that this itself is a reason why he would not sign that creed. He and his friends had sworn to faith in one God, and not to the faith of this presumed Athanasius, whose sentences a true Christian Church would never have assented to (*Johannes Calvin*, Elberf. 1863, I, 137).

The words of Wesley are well known where he refused faith in the *manner* or theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, and holds only to the fact (London ed. of his *Works*, VI, 204). Nor would he limit sincere piety to believers even in that minimum (XIV, 293). But the "knowledge of the Three-One God," he says, "is interwoven with all true Christian faith, with all vital religion" (VI, 205). (5) Unless we set aside a good deal of the New Testament by subjective criticism—as is becoming the fashion now—the substance of the doctrine of the Trinity is in both the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline epistles. If I remember rightly, that was acknowledged a few years ago by Rev. O. B. Frothingham and Rev. Dr. George E. Ellis; and on account of the pressure of that fact, the former, I think, gave up his ministry. (6) As to the religious value of the absolute divinity of Jesus as established at Nicaea, which in my judgment historically and humanly preserved Christianity as a saving power, I had no thought of the eucharist or of coercion. Magical theories of the former and the latter were only incidentally related to the matter. The devoutest Quaker could be the most enthusiastic Athanasian. In fact, he could present a pretty strong argument that our consciousness of the fulness of the divine power, peace, and victory over sin which we have by faith in Jesus logically cuts up by the roots all high sacramentarian doctrine. And as to persecution, that, alas! was in the politico-ecclesiastical relations of the times, in which all parties were implicated.

JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
MADISON, N.J.

### CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN INDIA<sup>1</sup>

The Editors of the *American Journal of Theology* have kindly sent me a proof of Professor Burton's article in the April issue on "The Status of Christian Education in India," and have asked me, as one who has had experience of the subject with which his paper deals, to make such remarks

<sup>1</sup> Editorial Note.—The editors of the *American Journal of Theology*, mindful of the possibility that views of educational conditions in India based mainly on a brief



on it as I may consider to be called for. Being not only in broken health but also blind, I find it very difficult to comply with this request. At the same time, both the importance and the present urgency of the question raised in the article induce me to do the little that is in my power in the way of setting down such criticisms on the article, and such modifications of the opinions expressed in it, as suggest themselves to one who has taken part in Christian education in India for more than forty years. All that I desire is to state some aspects of the case which ought to modify in some not unimportant respects the views to which the article gives expression. I very heartily approve of the tone and spirit of the article, and of some of the practical conclusions to which it comes. There are points of view, however, neglected by Professor Burton, which inevitably suggest themselves to one who has had intimate acquaintance with the facts of Indian life and society. But indeed it could hardly be expected that, however fair minded, one whose acquaintance with India has been necessarily second hand should adequately grasp all the considerations which present themselves to those who have made Christian education in India the work of their lives.

I may allude, in the first place, to some matters which in themselves are of secondary importance, yet are not without a certain bearing on some of the questions discussed in the article under consideration. The article treats of India far too much as if India were a coherent unity. It appears to hold that principles of action which are possible and advantageous in some places are therefore applicable to all. It takes little account of how greatly the sentiments and tendencies of the educated community in one part of the country differ from the sentiments and tendencies of that community in other parts. For instance, strong things are said in it about the chief result of all western education being to turn out an army of disappointed office-seekers who are easily led on toward sedition. That there

visit to that country might easily be one-sided or otherwise seriously incorrect, submitted the article in the April issue entitled "The Status of Christian Education in India" to three educators of long experience in India and requested their criticism of it. The replies of two of them are published herewith, no answer having been received from the third. Rev. William Miller, D.D., LL.D., C.I.E., long one of the most eminent educators in India, was from 1863 to 1907 Principal of the Madras Christian College, the largest Christian college in India. Retiring in the latter year because of impairment of sight, he is now residing in Scotland, honored by all who know him. Rev. J. C. R. Ewing, D.D., president of the Forman Christian College, maintained at Lahore in northern India by the Presbyterians of the United States (North), has spent thirty years in India. He has recently been elected vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University, receiving in this an honor never before conferred on an American.

is too much truth in statements like these in regard to certain parts of the country, it is unfortunately impossible to deny. I unhesitatingly assert, however, that the language of the article is so strong as to be virtually misleading, if it be applied to the whole of India, particularly to that part of it with which I am best acquainted.

Again, it is a mistake to speak of the Indian universities as if they were purely government institutions, and as if the demands which they make on colleges emanated from government alone. Like universities elsewhere, they have charters from government; but, in their actual administration, an important part is taken by men entirely independent of government, and the part thus taken in their management by Christian educationists is by no means insignificant. These universities, moreover, are not purely examining institutions. The article itself contains evidence that, through their affiliated colleges, they aim at securing high ends in the way of efficiency and discipline. A fuller acquaintance with the recent history of Indian education would perhaps have shown that most of the rules of affiliation, which the article details, were in operation in one of the universities long before the sitting of the Commission of 1902, and that their adoption by that university was largely due to a professor in a Christian college. Such facts seem to show that Christian education may effect much by working through the universities, and that such a severance between it and them as some parts of the article have the appearance of advocating would be attended by calamitous results.

A matter must be noticed which is of greater moment than these comparatively secondary points. The article lays hardly any stress upon the great outstanding fact which differentiates all missionary work in India, and particularly the work of education, from similar work in any other field of Christian activity. Of course, I refer to that system of caste which binds all who are Hindus, in the proper sense of the word, into what may be called an organic whole. This system is in truth nothing less than the embodiment of Hindu pantheism in a social organization which naturally makes the totality supreme and the individual of no account. The fact is, no doubt, known, though its implications are not sufficiently recognized, that this system has in all ages made the mass of the people of India peculiarly inaccessible to influence from without, and has proved an almost insuperable hindrance to individuals detaching themselves from that mass by adopting alien customs and an alien faith. Besides the Hindus India contains from sixty to eighty millions of Mohammedans. All friends of missions are aware that these also are peculiarly inaccessible, though for causes other than those which bind Hindus into a corporate unity. Friends

of missions, however, too often fail to recognize that probably more than forty millions of the inhabitants of India are neither Mohammedans nor, in any proper sense, Hindus, and that it is from this non-caste population that missions have hitherto won practically all their converts. Setting aside the Syrian church, which has a Christian history of fourteen centuries, if not of eighteen centuries as its members themselves believe, but which hitherto has not spread beyond its narrow bounds in the southwest corner of the peninsula, the Christian community, as it stands today, is still regarded by the real people of the land as separated from them by an impassable gulf.

It is true that this Christian community includes among its members a few who belonged, or whose forefathers belonged, to one or other of the Hindu castes up to the very highest. Almost every one of these has become Christian through the influence of Christian education. It is also true, as the article before me well points out, that, through the various influences brought to bear on them, the descendants of non-caste converts often become in the third or fourth generation equal in culture and social position even to the Brahmin. Moreover, it is true that, with all their intolerance in some respects, Hindus are exceptionally ready to recognize culture, intelligence, and character in those who are outside the Hindu pale, though such recognition may fall short of inducing them to break the bonds of their hereditary system. All this implies that there is a very hopeful prospect for the Christian community becoming, at some future time, the chief means of leavening the whole of India with Christian thought, and, it may be, of establishing Christianity as the religion of the land. This hope for the future does not, however, interfere with the fact that for the present the Christian community is still, upon the whole, an alien element in the population. It is still regarded, and is likely to be regarded for a long time to come, as little more than a section of those depressed and casteless classes which Hindus look upon with abhorrence and from which inveterate prejudice makes them keep as far as possible aloof. It seems to me to follow that missions must employ some means of dealing directly with the Hindus and Mohammedans, in other words with the real people of India, unless all hope of leading them toward or into Christ's kingdom is to be relegated to a distant future.

Christian education was long the only and is still the most important means of bringing gospel truth to bear on those who have long proved inaccessible to any other instrumentality. At a comparatively recent date, medical missions have come to the help of missionary schools and colleges, while Christian literature has more than begun to take its share in mold-

ing the thoughts and tendencies of the Hindu and Mohammedan communities. Thus these communities are no longer quite so inaccessible to missionary effort as half a century ago. Christian education has thus done much to pave the way for Christianity taking full effect, not only upon the outside fringe but on the central mass of the people of India. If, however, Christian missions were no longer to employ means of dealing directly with that central mass—and of such means schools and colleges are undoubtedly most important—the result would be that it would come under the influence of a western culture entirely divorced from any element, not only of Christianity, but probably even of religion in any form. Undoubtedly, everything ought to be done that can be done to develop the culture, to raise the position, and above all to deepen the spiritual life of the existing native church. All that the article says on this subject will be re-echoed by every Indian missionary. Nevertheless, the native church as a whole, however great the influence of some few among its members, is still considered by the ordinary population as an alien body, quite as alien as American or European missionaries. At present, the regions are few indeed in which the native church can be expected to exert a deep or widespread influence in the way of leavening, or permeating, the community at large with Christian thought or feeling. Suppose for a moment that a fraction, perhaps a twentieth, of the Negro race in America were nominally Christians, while the white population adhered to some other faith, though a very minute percentage of them were to be found in the Negro church. In such a case, could the small Negro church be looked to as a very efficient means of converting the white race to Christianity? While doing all they could for the development of the Negro church, would not wise apostles of the Cross seek some means also by which to influence the real people of the land? Now, for the present, in Hindu estimation, the gulf between the real people of India and the outside non-caste fringe is distinctly wider than that which divides the white from the colored race in the United States.

If proper weight be given to such considerations as I have just adduced, much light will be thrown on the question as to the chief effect which Christian education in India may at present be expected to produce, and on the related question as to which of its various aims ought in the meantime to be particularly emphasized. The part of the article which deals with this question is that on which I am most desirous to express my views. As the article points out, many Christian educationists hold that, if the value of their work is to be estimated aright, its effect on the really Indian community as a whole is the thing that must be chiefly taken account of.

They hold that, by giving at selected centers an efficient education which includes a thorough study of Christian truth and is animated in all its parts by a Christian spirit, they are modifying the inner life and molding the character, not only of the individuals whom they train, but of the whole community to which these belong. They hold that they are doing a preparatory work, which, on any right interpretation of the divine method in the guidance of mankind, is infinitely important or even absolutely necessary. In particular they hold that the very organic unity resulting from the Hindu social system makes influences which take hold upon a few powerfully effective on the entire mass to an extent that can hardly be imagined by those who have not a sympathetic acquaintance with the inner life of India. They further hold that, at least in some cases, Christian schools and colleges have had, and are having, a positively wonderful effect in transforming the thoughts and molding the characters, not only of the students whom they send out, but of the multitude on whom these students exert a salutary influence in their after-lives. Of course, statements of this kind may be denied. Even Professor Burton seems to have come away from India with the idea that there is little difference between students who have been trained in a Christian atmosphere and students whose education has been entirely secular. This is naturally the opinion of those who look merely at the surface. Students of the one class are probably not very unlike students of the other, if nothing be taken into account except their efficiency in clerical or other more or less mechanical employment. In southern India at all events those who look into the heart of the community and judge by moral and spiritual standards will tell a very different tale. Of the valuable and deep effect of a thoroughly Christian college along this line, it would be easy to give innumerable proofs, though limits of space make it impossible for me to do so here.

The missionaries whose views I have thus endeavored to express have indeed no fundamental cause of complaint against the present article. The value of the leavening, or permeating, process, on which they set such store, is implied, even if not adequately emphasized, throughout it. Their only controversy is with those who reckon the sole use of a Christian school or college to be that of making converts at the earliest possible date, and who therefore virtually employ education as a bait—a view of the matter which the present article so justly and emphatically condemns. I know no Christian educationists, and have never heard of any, who would not welcome the acceptance by their students of “the best that we have to offer them.” All right-minded Christian teachers are glad when any of their students whole-heartedly accept the Savior and make open profession

of their faith in him, whatever temporal consequences may be thus involved. At the same time, there are sentences in the article which may be construed as implying that those who regard Christian education as chiefly valuable on account of its effect on the general life of the Indian community rather dislike the idea that their students should pass over into the Christian fold, and are even ready to put obstacles in the way of their doing so. I do not suppose that the writer believes that any missionaries have ever laid themselves open to allegations of the kind. Such allegations, however, have been made in the course of controversy, and the article contains expressions which those who make them may find it possible to turn to purposes of their own. I regret that there should be any ambiguity of this kind in the article. I regret also that it seems to hold that those who believe the most valuable outcome of Christian education is its effect on the life of the non-Christian community are prevented by such a view from laboring for the highest good of the present native church or for the addition of individuals to its ranks. I hold, on the contrary, that, when circumstances are favorable, it is perfectly possible for one and the same Christian college to keep in view the three ends referred to and to attend adequately to all. A concrete example is always more effective than any amount of abstract reasoning. I therefore add that in southern India the college which places the leavening of the community with Christian truth foremost among its aims is the college which for many years has done most in the way of bringing members of the higher Hindu castes into the Christian church and also in the way of raising that church to a higher social, moral, and spiritual level.

All that I contend for is conceded in that portion of the article in which the two ends of leavening the mass of the community and of adding to and building up the existing church are put, as it seems to me, in unnecessary opposition. "Both these ends," the writer says, "are extremely desirable in themselves. Only a very thorough study of the situation would enable one to decide which of them should at a given moment and in a given situation be emphasized," and adds that the question as to which of the two ends should be emphasized must be decided by "local and temporal conditions." I admit that there may be circumstances in which the chief emphasis may be laid on the end of building up the Christian community without interfering with a very adequate attainment of that other end, the great importance of which the article so abundantly admits. I deny, however, that such circumstances exist in the India of today except in a very few peculiar localities. Professor Burton instances two cases in which his ideal of Christian education is approximately realized. He

names two high-class Christian institutions, one of them at Rangoon and the other at Pasumalai. The case at Rangoon throws no light on the question now in hand. In Burmah the caste-system has no existence. There is therefore little more difficulty there about the transmission of moral and spiritual influences from one class of the community to another than in Europe or America. Thus all that specially characterizes the missionary and educational problem in India falls entirely out of sight in the case of Rangoon. Pasumalai is a suburb of the great southern city of Madura which has been for generations the theater of successful missionary work among what I have called the outlying fringe of the population. It is also in close proximity to the district of Tinnevely in which missions have had immensely greater success than in any other part of India. The leading element in the native church of Tinnevely is thus the product of three or even four generations of careful Christian culture. Thus the Christian schoolboys and college students at Pasumalai are very different indeed from what their forefathers were when the Christian church was founded at this extreme point of the peninsula early in the nineteenth century. They are thus regarded by their non-Christian fellow-countrymen with very different feelings from those entertained by the mass of the community toward the native church that has recently arisen among the casteless tribes in nearly every other region. Thus in the far south the existing native church has immeasurably greater opportunity than elsewhere for becoming the main instrument in paving the way for the reception of Christianity by the Hindus who surround it. What is possible in Madura today will one day become possible throughout India, if Christian education is faithful to the duty which Providence plainly calls it to discharge in the meantime. There are, however, but a very few scattered places in which anything of the kind is possible today. What, I would ask, do considerations of time and circumstance dictate in a case like the following? In one of the leading Christian colleges of India, far to the north of Madura, there are this year about a dozen Christians among its 550 students, and the number of Christians is larger this year than it ever was before. Moreover, there is no important Christian community in the district round that college out of which any large number of students is likely to be drawn for many a year to come. It seems to me that in that district (and nearly all Indian districts resemble it) it would be simply fatal to the prospects of Christianity for the college to act as if the uplifting of the Christian community were the sole or even the most important reason for its existence. It seems to me that the main result of the work of a college in such circumstances must be found in its effective impact

on the life of the community. It seems to me that this aim ought to be kept prominently in view. Undoubtedly, one way of gaining that end is that the mission to which the college belongs should show its readiness to welcome such of its students as may from time to time be led through its influence to break away from the trammels of their hereditary faith. All that is said in the article about the importance of such conversions from among the castes and classes constituting the main part of the Indian peoples is entirely true and ought never to be forgotten.

The general outcome of what I have said in the above connection is that, while the ideal depicted in the article is to a fair extent attainable in a very few places, Christian schools and colleges must be maintained in nearly every part of India on much the same footing as that on which they stand at present. They need, it is true, to be strengthened and improved in many ways so that they may exert the deepest and most far-reaching influence possible—influence, I mean, of a moral and spiritual kind. As I have said before, the two great purposes of Christian education are not only not antagonistic but may both be attained together and be helpful to one another within a single college. This is, of course, more true and more important in some districts than in others. It is true to a comparatively large extent in most parts of the Presidency of Madras and of the states around it. Obviously more can be done at once in the way of leavening the community, and of developing the life of the existing church in a college like one in Madras, which has 113 Christians among its 850 students, than by a college like the one above referred to, whose Christian students form barely 2 per cent of the whole and which has little prospect of increasing that percentage in the immediate future.

Before leaving this part of the subject I wish to put on record my entire agreement with the view expressed in the article that, on whatever portion of its great ends a Christian college may lay most emphasis according to the providential demands of time and circumstance, every such college should be open to non-Christian as well as to Christian students. In this way alone is it possible to reach either of the two great ends which I agree with the article in thinking that Christian education ought always to keep in view. The plan advocated by some of keeping Christian students entirely apart from others during their collegiate life is one that must be unsparingly opposed. Any such system of hothouse cultivation would defeat every end which present-day Christian education in India is fitted to subserve.

I wish further to put on record that I entirely agree with most of the practical suggestions at the close of the article, though there are a few



points on which I should like to enter a caveat or two, were it not that my remarks have run to so great a length already. But the conclusions arrived at contain much good advice, and advice that is sorely needed at the present time especially by home boards. It is, for example, most desirable that existing colleges should be better equipped so that their professors may be less hard worked and may have greater leisure, both for keeping abreast of the time in the subjects which they teach and for having more personal intercourse with present and former students, and thereby exerting as wide and deep a religious influence as possible on both the Christian and non-Christian communities around them. Of almost everything that the article says along this line of thought I most cordially approve.

I shall close my remarks by referring to a matter in regard to which, as in regard to so many others, a more thorough acquaintance with Indian affairs would have somewhat modified the conclusions at which the writer of the article has arrived. He is correct in saying that the British government, acting on "a policy largely paternal in character, has undertaken the responsibility for the general education of the people." He seems, however, to be unacquainted with the method in which that government has all along avowed, and still avows, that it means to discharge this responsibility. Theoretically that method is that government shall establish as few schools and colleges as possible which are directly under its own immediate management and control. Theoretically, again, government is to discharge by far the largest part of its functions in regard to education, particularly in regard to education of the most advanced kind, by aiding and inspecting schools and colleges established by private bodies. It is in its dealings with those private bodies that its "neutrality" is intended to appear. It is meant that private managers are to be perfectly free to teach any religion or no religion as they consider best, and government is to show that it is "neutral" by extending impartial favor to every school or college that does its work efficiently, without regard to any religious consideration. No institutions are bound to be entirely secular except the very few which, according to the policy repeatedly laid down, government may in exceptional circumstances find it necessary to establish. It is true that the policy thus laid down in theory is very far from being carried out in practice. To some extent in every province of India, and very markedly in some provinces, the officials acting under government have shown distinct disfavor to the schools and colleges conducted by private managers which, according to theory, are to be the almost exclusive means of supplying advanced education. They seem to aim at covering the whole

field of higher education with schools and colleges of their own, so that there is distinct danger in some provinces that institutions under private managers will cease, or nearly cease, to exist at all. It must be admitted also that if the policy theoretically laid down had been practically effective at any date up to some twenty years ago, institutions established certainly by Hindu and perhaps also by Mohammedan managers would have made no provision for religious instruction, in which case advanced education might perhaps be purely secular to nearly as large an extent as it is so today. A great change has, however, come about in this respect. In all parts of India, and very conspicuously in some parts, the demand is heard that there shall be a religious element in all ordinary education. If the plan of pushing forward government, that is purely secular, institutions were now to be laid aside in favor of the policy of trusting mainly to private effort, there would at no distant date be some religious element in the training given by the vast majority of Indian schools and colleges. It is here that the real solution may be found of most of the difficult problems of Indian education. If the state became really neutral by affording encouragement and aid to schools and colleges under private managers as freely as to those conducted by its own officials, I have no manner of doubt that institutions for Christian education would stand in the front rank in the esteem of the Indian public and largely determine the tone and the tendency of education generally. Some of them are already doing this within their own spheres in spite of difficulty and discouragement. To some it may appear that it would be hurtful rather than advantageous to the Christian cause if a large portion of each generation as it passes were deliberately instructed in the principles of Islam or in those of Hinduism, even in its highest forms. To me, however, and, I believe to many more who are well qualified to judge, it appears certain that the Christian cause would not lose but greatly gain if the youth of India were trained under religious influences, even if those influences were not in all respects of the highest kind. Such religious training would be better in its social, political, moral, and spiritual results than that practical inculcation of a selfish materialism which is the chief product of purely secular education, at all events in India. It may be that the introduction of religion into Hindu and Mohammedan colleges might result in the kindling of controversial fires. For that the Christian missionary must be prepared. And to him religious earnestness ought to be greatly preferable to that absorption in the pursuit of worldly advantages and personal interests which Professor Burton sees to be conspicuous in the educated classes in India at present. The practical conclusion which I draw from con-

siderations like these is that one of the greatest services that can at present be rendered to the cause of Christian education and of Christianity itself in India would be to urge the British government to give full effect to the educational policy which it laid down fifty-six years ago and to which it is pledged by many repeated and even recent avowals. Unfortunately, there is always a fresh necessity for this, for, notwithstanding the repeated resolutions passed by the supreme government when it has had to deal with the question directly, the tendency seems irresistible on the part of provincial governments and educational departments to act as if the declared policy of the Indian state were the direct opposite of what it really is.

WILLIAM MILLER

BURGO PARK  
BRIDGE OF ALLAN, SCOTLAND

---

That Professor Burton, in spite of the brevity of his visit, should lay vigorous hold upon many of the more salient points in the situation in India was to be expected. That he, or anyone, should in so short a visit succeed in catching such a vision as he has done of things educational, in their relation to the spread of Christianity, is matter of astonishment. To appreciate this it is necessary that the reader remind himself of the marvelous complexity of conditions in this country. The extraordinary diversity of race, religion, and speech which characterizes these three hundred millions of people has had no parallel in the world's history. Add to this the unique conditions created by the incoming of Western learning in the dissemination of which an alien government has taken an active part and in connection with which the missionaries have found a field of great promise, and you will then begin to recognize the difficulty of some of the questions to which Professor Burton undertook to find answers. Our visitor has given a presentation which for its accuracy and thoroughness commands our practically unqualified commendation.

Among the points which Professor Burton has emphasized there are a few regarding which an additional word may be of some interest.

1. *The "examining" university.*—With all its obvious disadvantages, it was clearly, in the beginning, the only machine available by means of which some degree of unity of plan and achievement could be attained by those who laid the foundations of modern education in this country. The outstanding weakness of this system is its tendency to foster "cram," and we are familiar with the spectacle of men of exceedingly meager education taking the highest places in the university examinations. On the other hand, it has its distinct advantages in the way of maintaining a high standard

of attainment as essential to the obtaining of an academic distinction. The Christian college must not allow its purpose to be thwarted by an ambition to put large numbers of men through the university mill. In this connection Professor Burton's word is both wise and timely. Classes must not be allowed to become unwieldy either through the ambition referred to, or through the need of money, for which the management, having looked elsewhere in vain, turns in desperation to the tuition fees which an enlarged enrolment brings. If Christian schools are to avoid the making of the "machine-made" graduate, they can do so only through full provision for personal touch with their students, and this can be secured only when the institution is set free from dependence upon tuition fees for its very existence.

2. *The aim of Christian education in India.*—Professor Burton's opinion that it should have primarily in view the upbuilding of the Christian church is undoubtedly the right one. The millions of people still untouched by the gospel must be reached by the Indian Christians. The new National Missionary Society is an illustration of the new spirit which is coming into the church. Those who are to carry on an enterprise such as this must depend, for years to come, upon the Christian education provided by the church of the West. The committee of the N.M.S. in this province, consisting of eight members, draws six of them from the graduates of a single college, and the first three missionaries sent forth by the society had their training in the same institution. The Christian school or college has another, and, in a sense no less important, work to do. It receives non-Christians as students, and aims definitely to bring them individually to know the Lord Jesus Christ as the Savior of sinners. The obstacles which stand in the way of the public profession of their faith on the part of such men are too well known to require description here. Nevertheless, individuals here and there are stepping forth from the schools into the Christian church, and taking their places as leaders. Few though they may be, they are worth far more than all the labor and money that they have cost.

And then there is the mighty influence going forth from every *good* school, removing prejudice, creating kindly feeling toward the Christian missionary, preparing men to consider dispassionately the claims of Christianity. Much might be said as to the extent to which this influence has opened the door to the village preacher, in every corner of the land. But this we would emphasize: Great as may be this indirect fruit of the Christian college, it can be thus great only when it has its source in a purpose, on the part of those who teach, to lead the taught, in so far as may be

possible, to the point of full acceptance of Jesus Christ and public acknowledgment of allegiance to him.

In concluding these observations I should like to lay stress upon the fact that it is only through the Christian college and school that a very large section of India's population can be brought at all into real contact with Christian truth. The air is full of anti-Christian argument and assertion, some of it imported from the West. Apart from the schoolroom, there appears to be no place where the rising generation can be found in circumstances such as are favorable to the presentation of the Christian side.

We say, with Professor Burton, Better no school than an inferior one. The church of the West surely does not seriously desire her representatives to put the message she would give into slipshod, unattractive, inefficient conditions.

It is the conviction of the writer that there is no place on earth where there is more urgent need for, or greater promise of, immense results from a deliberate determination on the part of the church to occupy the field open to her among the educated and educating classes in India.

J. C. R. EWING

LAHORE, INDIA  
May 24, 1910

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### EGYPT—HER RELIGION AND HER RELATION TO ISRAEL

This little book<sup>1</sup> is a publication of a series of six lectures delivered by the author at the Collège de France on the Michonis Foundation. Since the translation of Erman's admirable *Handbook of Egyptian Religion* and the publication of Steindorff's lectures on the same subject, besides Wiedemann's book, now accessible also in English, one wonders why it was considered advisable to translate this book into English. It contains no new researches and is a restatement of views long current. The chapters each representing a lecture do not attempt a systematic and exhaustive development of the subject. What one especially misses is a presentation of the development of Egyptian religion as it is discernible in some of the fundamental categories like the emergence of an ethical test, or judgment in the hereafter as a matter of slow development; or again, the gradual growth of solar monotheism. It is due to this lack of coherence in the development that one gains no impression of Amenhotep IV's great religious revolution as the culmination of forces long in operation. At the request of the translator the author has appended a hastily written note to his treatment of this revolution, in which he denies that the movement is monotheistic and seems to consider that the political elements in its origin and character must necessarily exclude monotheism. This opinion is especially extraordinary in view of the fact that the political elements in this movement formed one of the strongest forces leading toward a monotheistic point of view. It is clear that the author has not correlated the religious, political, social, and economic forces operative in that remarkable age. The treatment of this unique movement was evidently written upon the basis of a few random ideas upon the subject.

Naturally many differences of opinion are inevitable in treating a subject so complicated and difficult, but it is surprising to find, in a supposedly modern work, a recognition of "the work of the Poet Pentaour!" Erman showed twenty-five years ago that this alleged "Poet Pentaour" was a *scribe*, who having made a copy of the Kadesh poem on papyrus,

<sup>1</sup> *The Old Egyptian Faith*. By Edouard Naville, professor of egyptology at the University of Geneva. Translated by Colin Campbell, M.A., D.D. New York: Putnam; London: Williams & Norgate, 1909. 321 pages.

merely signed his name as copyist, but *not as author*. The survival of the old view in spite of Erman's demonstration, illustrates the general character of the material in the book.

This essay<sup>2</sup> is a serious effort to deal with the historical documents bearing on the relation between Israel and Egypt during the age of the Hebrew monarchies. It is, therefore, concerned with a period later than that treated in Doctor Daniel Völter's book,<sup>3</sup> of which a new edition has just appeared. It is in method totally different, also, from the essay of Doctor Völter. In spirit and method it is carefully historical and furnishes a valuable summary of the evidence available and of the conclusions which may be drawn from these materials. The book will stand as an exceedingly useful survey of the question treated.<sup>4</sup>

The reviewer cannot withhold a general criticism on both of these books, namely, that neither such an essay as Doctor Völter's brochure, devoted to the patriarchal stories, nor even an excellent political survey like that of Doctor Alt, really penetrates to the heart of the problem. A careful survey of Palestine from the beginning, based on Egyptian historical documents and the excavations in Palestine is, it seems to the reviewer, the only method for determining the age, the extent, the character, and the effect of Egyptian influence on Hebrew life. The fundamental fact with which none of the modern treatments of this subject has, as yet, reckoned, is that the Hebrews on entering Palestine inherited bodily the Canaanitish civilization already firmly rooted in the soil. That Canaanitish civilization was already at that time saturated through and through, with Egyptian civilization and especially with Egyptian religion and Egyptian industries as the excavations have shown. It was such a civilization as this, then, thoroughly colored by the civilization of Egypt and embodying many Egyptian elements, which the Hebrews found in Palestine and adopted there. That this fact is not at

<sup>2</sup> *Israel und Aegypten*. Die Politischen Beziehungen der Könige von Israel und Juda zu den Pharaonen nach den Quellen untersucht. Von Lic. Theol. Albrecht Alt, Privatdozent in Greifswald. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 104 pages. M. 3.40.

<sup>3</sup> *Aegypten und die Bibel*, Leiden 1909. 4th ed., which the writer has just reviewed in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, April 1910.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Alt's reference to the Greek inscription of Psamtik II at Abu Simbel (p. 89 note), as alleged to belong to Psamtik I by W. Max Müller (*Egyptol. Researches*, 22 f. may be supplemented. Müller bases his conclusion on an inscription at Karnak, stated by him to demonstrate a campaign of Psamtik I in Nubia. This Karnak inscription as published by Müller himself (*ibid.*, pl. 12) contains only the name of Psamtik II, and nowhere refers to Psamtik I. Homer certainly must have been nodding.

first evident in the Hebrew literature as inherited by us is due to the further fact that Hebrew literature is of late origin, arising at a time when Palestine was under the political domination of Assyria and Babylonia. But the civilization, which in earliest times stamped such fundamental customs as circumcision on the religions of Palestine, left other though more elusive evidences of its influence there; and there can be no question that these can be discerned in Hebrew literature in far greater measure than has hitherto been recognized.

Incidentally it might be added that, as the excavations have again shown, the fundamental mistake in modern treatments of foreign influences in Palestine is in the conclusion that Babylonian influence entered Palestine at an early date—a conclusion due solely to the presence of cuneiform writing in Palestine in the fifteenth century, B.C.; but cuneiform writing was by no means solely the possession of Babylonia in this age, a fact which has recently been properly emphasized by Doctor Luckenbill (see *Biblical World*, XXXV, 101 ff.). The writer hopes to take up this whole question more fully in a later issue of this journal.

JAMES HENRY BREASTED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### ISAIAH NEWLY TRANSLATED

The Book of Isaiah deserves the closest and most searching study. In recent years it has been the object of the careful and conscientious investigations of such recognized authorities as Cheyne, Duhm, Marti on the text and commentary, and Gunkel and Gressmann on eschatology and archaeology. These scholars have contributed a great fund of valuable material to the better understanding of this book—material that must be reckoned with by every subsequent worker in this field.

Mr. Box's work<sup>1</sup> is the fruitage of seven years' (1897-1904) teaching in Merchant Taylor's School, London. Its aim, as stated by Dr. Driver who writes for it a prefatory note, is to help English readers in the study of the great collection of the prophecies, which bears the name of Isaiah. The text is wholly in English and where Hebrew or other words are introduced they appear only in transliterated form, and usually in parentheses.

Some of the characteristic features of the book are the following:

1. The author presents the readers with a new translation, or one almost wholly new, based on a carefully renovated text, a text which, according to

<sup>1</sup> *The Book of Isaiah*; Translated from a Text Revised in accordance with the Results of Recent Criticism. By G. H. Box, M.A. New York: Macmillan, 1909. xv+365 pages. \$2.25.



the conservative results of modern criticism, has been purged of glosses and has been emended so as to bring out the full meaning of the original. All such variations from the Received Text are mentioned in the footnotes, thus allowing the scholar to pass upon the matter for himself.

2. One of the confusing things for readers of Isaiah is the jumbled-up condition of the prophecies. Before the book can be read intelligibly it must be arranged in a kind of chronological or thought-order. The author has articulated the whole book into sections with brief but comprehensive headings, which give the pith of each section and its purpose, and sometimes more than a page of introduction, both preceding the translation.

3. The footnotes are a welcome kind of apparatus even to English readers, for they give the sources of the variations of the substance of the translation as we know it, from the Authorized and Revised versions. Authorities are cited everywhere, both scholars and versions, as the bases for the new translations of the author.

4. The lack of interest so often manifested in the study of the prophets is due in large part to ignorance of the historical background of the prophecies. Mr. Box has taken special care to present quite full historical introductions to the separate sections, and thus to prepare the reader for the condensed and often broken utterances of the prophet.

5. Another feature of the book, and one which is quite largely successful, is the reproduction of the rhythmical forms of the original prophecies. Some of Isaiah's, as of other prophets' utterances, were written in metrical form, and their beauty and grace is greatly enhanced for the English reader if such form is represented in the manner of printing.

6. Types are useful in displaying on the printed page the sources of the prophecies. The author makes this plan do valuable service, especially in chaps. 40-66—by printing in type of different fonts, the translations of the various sources.

Taking these features together we discover that Mr. Box has made two notable contributions to the elucidation of Isaiah: (1) a new and fresh translation, which is both alive and modern in its spirit, and (2) he has arranged it in a literary form that brings out its beauty and its force. Not that he has not contributed other things of value. His other features are a result of a study of the prevailing views of the leading exegetes of Isaiah today, with just enough of the personal equation in them to reveal a certain kind of independence of the author. His remarks show him to be a master of the literature on the subject, as well as an expert in handling the original texts.

It would be ungracious in so limited a space to point out some of the

very few passages where his translation seems to fall a little beneath the noble dignity of the book.

In the arrangement of the material of the book the author usually adopts a position which commends itself and has for its sponsors some of the chief workers on the work. In 10:5-15, he endeavors to take a middle ground between 711 (Cheyne), the date of the siege of Ashdod, and 701, the invasion of Sennacherib. It would, doubtless, be safer to locate this event just before Sennacherib's invasion, immediately in connection with Judah's negotiations with Egypt, and as a warning to the Egyptian party that their league with Egypt will not stand in the face of a coming campaign of the Assyrian hosts. Chaps. 40-55 are designated "Deutero-Isaiah," and 56-66, "Trito-Isaiah," the latter after the views of Duhm and Marti. It is with difficulty that he, as well as his predecessors, can construct a theory that will explain at all satisfactorily the distinctively pre-exilic coloring of 56:9-57:13. Only by a violent wrenching of the text can one find in these verses a description of the religious conditions pictured in Malachi. Furthermore, this section is a disturbing element in the so-called unity of Part III, and in any arrangement of this Trito-Isaiah deserves to be placed alone either in an appendix to this part or better to Part I.

Three appendices follow the main body of the book on, (1) three messianic passages, 7:14-16; 9:1-6, and 11:1-9; (2) some geographical allusions; (3) some additional notes. It is a pity that the book does not contain an index of chapters and verses, for its unprecedented shifting and transferring and transposing of sections, subsections, and verses makes it very difficult to find readily any special passage. Such an index would greatly enhance its value as a reference book on Isaiah. Two good maps will be useful to the student.

IRA MAURICE PRICE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### PRE-CHRISTIAN JEWISH ETHICS

This volume,<sup>1</sup> published without date, but, judged by internal evidence, belonging to the year 1909, deals with three centuries of Jewish apocryphal literature, viz., from 200 B.C. to 100 A.D. The author does not discuss critical questions, but, taking the various writings from the hands of the critical student of the text, he subjects them to an examination with regard to their ethical content. His method is to interrogate the various documents one after another in regard to four subjects, viz., the moral ideal, moral evil, the will, and moral sanctions. This makes it necessary to take up

<sup>1</sup>*The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature.* By H. Maldwyn Hughes, B.A., D.D. (Lond.). London: Culley. x+340 pages. 5s.

each writing four times. If this treatment gives to the volume here and there a certain quality of fragmentariness, it also has the practical value of enabling the reader to get at the moral teaching of any particular writing, as far as that comes under any of the four chosen heads, with ease.

The author appreciates the importance of tracing the relation between the ethics of the apocryphal literature and the ethics of the Old Testament, and also the importance of noting how Jewish thought was influenced by Greek philosophy. Along both these lines his book contains evidence of thoughtful reading.

The value of the volume is somewhat impaired by what seems to us a wrong date for the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, ethically one of the most important writings of the group which the volume discusses. Following Charles, and not informing the reader that there is any other critical view worthy of consideration, the author ascribes the *Testaments* to the last years of John Hyrcanus (109-106 B.C.). Naturally, then, he is impressed by the resemblances between this writing and the words of Jesus. The injunction to brotherly love and forgiveness, the coupling together of the command to love God with the command to love the fellow-man, the idea of laying up treasure in heaven, and the striking passage from the testament of Joseph:

I was beset with hunger, and the Lord himself nourished me;  
I was alone, and God comforted me;  
I was sick, and the Lord visited me;  
I was in prison, and my God showed favor unto me—

these and other passages are said to show "a depth of moral inwardness closely akin to the spirit of the New Testament." But if this book was written, or interpolated and edited, in the latter part of the first Christian century (so Schürer, and, apparently, Fairweather), then the significance of this ethical strain is quite different. It would seem that in a case like this the author might well have informed his readers that the critical view which he followed is by no means certainly established.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

#### A NEW EDITION OF GESENIUS' DICTIONARY

The fifteenth edition<sup>1</sup> of Gesenius' Hebrew and Aramaic Dictionary comes just five years after the preceding one. In bulk it presents an increase

<sup>1</sup> *Wilhelm Gesenius' Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, in Verbindung mit Prof. Dr. H. Zimmern, Prof. Dr. W. Max Müller u. Dr. O. Weber bearbeitet von Dr. Frants Buhl. Fünfzehnte Auflage. Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1910. xvii + 1006 pages. M. 18.

of seventy-five pages, which restores it almost to the dimensions of the thirteenth edition. This new revision follows the lines laid down in the fourteenth and is an advance upon that only to the extent that it incorporates the gleanings from the discoveries and philological discussions of the last five years. The main sources of the new materials are the Aramaic papyri found at Elephantine, Brockelmann's *Vergleichende Grammatik der Semitischen Sprache*, Musil's *Arabia Petraea*, and Smend's edition of the Hebrew text of Sirach. Many new names appear also in the list of references. Is the fact that so few authorities other than German appear in the list wholly explicable upon the basis of German superiority in the realm of scholarly research, or is it due in part to a certain provincialism in German scholarship? A careful study of the pages of this lexicon would convince the skeptic that great progress in being made in the work of Hebrew lexicography and that this is largely due to the illumination that comes from the study of the related dialects. It is certainly true of the Hebraist that he who knows only Hebrew does not know Hebrew as he ought. Two new names appear upon the title-page of this edition, viz., W. Max Müller, who has revised the citations from Egyptian, and O. Weber, who has drawn upon the dialects of South Arabia for their contribution. Professor Buhl is to be heartily congratulated upon his success in keeping this standard work fully abreast of the progress of modern philology. Within the limits of space and price set by the character of such a book, it is hard to see how anything on the whole more complete and satisfactory than this work could be achieved. The explanation of proper names is a desideratum that might be supplied with relatively slight increase of space.

Attention may be directed to the following matters in the line of *addenda et corrigenda*. P. 12, under אֲדַרְכָּן, Assy. *dariku*, "a piece of money" (Strassm. *Nabonidus*, 1013, 26) should be cited.—P. 247a, l. 4, l. Mi. 7:18.—P. 78b, אֲחִי is better derived from חֵן, "he was like, or equal," as was pointed out by B. Halper in *AJSL*, XXIV, 366–69.—P. 258b, s.v. חֲרָף, Chr. Johnston (*JAOS*, XXIX, 226) suggests a connection with Assy. *ḫarāpu*, "to abound."—P. 287b, l. 18, the pronunciation "Jehovah" was current as early as the fourteenth century A.D., as has been shown by G. F. Moore in his instructive article on the subject in *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper* (1908), which might have been cited here and in many other connections throughout this dictionary.—P. 565b, s.v. שִׁלֵּם 2 a) may be listed I Macc. 14:41, "Simon should be their leader and High Priest forever, until there should arise a faithful prophet," which furnishes an instructive example of the limita-

tion of the period designated by עֵלָם.—P. 648a, s.v. פָּצַץ, add Pilp. Impf. וַיִּפְצֹץ, Job 16:12.—P. 712b, s.v. קָנָן, cf. Assy. *qanānu*, "coil, curl up," as suggested by Chr. Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 f.—P. 770b, s.v. רָחַם, cf. Assy. *ratamu*, "wrap, bind," as cited by Muss-Arnolt's *Concise Dictionary*.—P. 796a, l. 14, l. Ez. 16:53.—P. 876b, s.v. II רָחַם, l. "Pi. impf. יִרְחַם, m. d. acc. besingen Ri. 5:11; Pi. inf. לְרַחֵם Ri. 11:40, u.s.w."—P. 885b, s.v. צָרָה, l. Mi. 2:12.

JOHN MERLIN POWIS SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### THE TEACHING OF JESUS

Feine<sup>1</sup> regards New Testament theology as a historical rather than a dogmatic discipline. Its chief task is to expound the religious thoughts and presuppositions of Jesus and of the New Testament writers. But it is not merely a historical inquiry; it has important bearings on the religion of modern times. Since the Bible has been and remains the principal source of religious inspiration, the content of early Christianity is in the opinion of Feine especially significant for the present. Consequently he briefly indicates in different parts of his work the significance of the early Christian thought, and more especially that of Jesus, for modern religion. While the reader may not always agree with these suggestions—and he is not likely to do so unless he thinks in terms of the Hegelian absolute—he will be glad to have a New Testament theology which in the main makes the religious life of historical individuals its starting-point.

The New Testament books are viewed critically. Not all the letters ascribed to Paul are considered equally valuable as sources for the apostle's thought, and the synoptic gospels are assumed to be the chief source of historical information about Jesus. Even here theological interests were early at work, so one must recognize a theology of "Mark," of "Matthew," of "Luke." The two-source theory of synoptic tradition is followed, and even Mark is thought to be composite. Feine's discussion of the sources is extremely brief, and so far as the problem of determining Jesus' thought is concerned, altogether inadequate. Passages from the synoptics are cited seemingly without reference to a critical judgment regarding their place in the gospel tradition. The scientific value of this part of the work suffers considerably by this defect in the method. The author is at his best in his study of Paul to which he gives almost one half his entire space.

Only a few of the conclusions on some of the more important points

<sup>1</sup> *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*. Von P. Feine. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. xii + 714 pages. M. 12.50.

can be mentioned here. Jesus' faith in God is made the starting-point for a study of Jesus' thought. His belief in his messiahship rested on this unique relation to God; "Because Jesus is the Son he recognizes God as the Father," "Jesus' messianic consciousness has its roots solely in his unique religio-ethical relation to God" (47, 71). And yet Jesus expected to return on the clouds in the near future. He called himself the Son of Man, taking the term from Dan. 7:13, and he used it to express both the idea of his future divine lordship and his present earthly humility. His conception of the kingdom of God was not restricted to one main idea; it was both the "Gottesherrschaft" and the "Reich Gottes"; also both "gift" and "reward," both "present" and "future." But its consummation was to come about by a mighty act of God on this earth terminating the present world-age. After a brief discussion of the ethics of Jesus, Feine asks, Has Jesus any abiding significance? He has, and it is to be found in the religious experience possible to us through belief in him. In his person God draws near to us, he is the supreme expression of the will of God to men, he alone is man and at the same time God. But what he is and what he brings can be experienced only by one who yields to him in fulness of faith.

The uniqueness of Paul's place in Christianity is recognized, yet he is in no sense its real founder. Paul did not even create the universalistic element in the new faith; that appeared in the person and preaching of Jesus, though Paul recognized it much more keenly than the other apostles did. While he was the greatest thinker of ancient Christianity, enriching his theology by contributions from Judaism as well as from the Greek world, his work was a real historical development from, and expansion of, the faith that previously existed among believers. Nor was Paul chiefly a systematic theologian; he was pre-eminently a strong religious personality inspired by faith in Jesus.

The third main line of New Testament theology, that of the Fourth Gospel, is thought to be the work of a personal follower of Jesus—the critical difficulties here are quite ignored—who wrote not to relate history but to interpret Jesus to the Greek world which Christianity was beginning to conquer. In this important particular John's thinking surpassed that of Paul: Jesus was seen to be the perfect revelation of the Father, the giver of eternal life. This is the climax of early theology; and it seems to be, for Feine, the secret of Jesus' significance for all time. For the modern Christian world it is the experience of this new life that constitutes the deepest reality in religion, "and the ultimate source of this religion is the person of Jesus who has brought humanity this new life."

It follows from this that the author's inadequate discussion of Jesus' own thinking is all the more unfortunate. If we take the composite picture of the first three evangelists who are admittedly advocates of the new faith rather than unbiased historians, we can have no real assurance that this is the true picture of Jesus' personality or that it portrays the real content of his mission. Yet it seems to be the feeling of the author that the witness of the disciples' faith is sufficient; "we can no longer see Jesus save with the eye of faith of the oldest disciples" (14). And yet we are to make full surrender of faith to him on this ground. Is Christianity then only a noble type of hero worship?

In Spitta's discussion of Jesus' attitude toward heathen missions,<sup>2</sup> the entire gospel tradition on this subject is reviewed. The material is handled in a strictly critical and historical manner. Many passages which, as they now stand, approve of gentle evangelization are found to be later features of the tradition. Such, for example, appear in the apocalyptic discourse, in remarks about the final judgment, in the account of the healing of the centurion's servant, in Jesus' words to the disciples about fasting, in certain parables like the invitation to the feast, the vineyard keeper, the tares and wheat, the fish net, the mustard seed, salt and light; also in the use of certain Old Testament citations, in the story of the anointing at Bethany, and in the centurion's confession after the crucifixion that Jesus was the son of God. These conclusions are reached by a critical comparison of the synoptists, and the form of tradition preserved in Luke is often thought to be the more original. Jesus' command to evangelize the world (Matt. 26:16-20) is found to be of later origin.

On the other hand, some passages in the first three gospels, usually taken to imply the definite exclusion of heathen missions by Jesus, would not be so interpreted by Spitta. When Jesus said to the heathen woman, "let the children first be fed," he was not referring to his ministry to Israel; he meant that she should let his disciples finish their meal without disturbance. His advice against giving holy things to dogs and against casting pearls before swine has reference not to the heathen but to false teachers. "Go not into any way of the gentiles," etc., is practical advice for the immediate activity of the disciples and should not be taken as evidence of Jesus' intention to limit his entire work to this narrow sphere; and if he said that the kingdom should come before they completed this task and that they should sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel, it does

<sup>2</sup> *Jesus und die Heidenmission*. Von F. Spitta. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909. vi + 116 pages. M. 3.50.

not necessarily follow that he thought no work was to be done outside of Israel and that other than Israelites would not enter the kingdom.

Jesus' attitude is seen best in his own activity, and in his conception of the gospel. He was personally interested in the welfare of non-Jews and by his emphasis on universalism he implicitly included them in the messianic salvation. They were among the crowds that heard him preach, they were included in the prophet's conception of Israel's mission and Jesus had actually worked on gentile soil. True, his activity was confined mostly to Jewish territory and his interest was mainly in his own people but his thought of God's favor for all men and his preaching about universal human brotherhood found a perfectly natural expression in his desire to bring both Jews and non-Jews to a knowledge of salvation. We are not to think that heathen missions as a theoretical problem, or the question of the Jews' rejection in favor of gentile converts, ever entered Jesus' mind. These questions were the distinctive product of the apostolic age. But in actual practice he sought the salvation of gentiles, and the very content of his message made it a missionary gospel.

This conclusion stands in sharp contrast with some current opinions on this subject. It rejects, on the one hand, the traditional idea that missions are grounded primarily in Jesus' direct command to his disciples after his resurrection, and, on the other, the position held by Harnack for example, that Jesus distinctly excluded the gentiles from his range of vision. If Spitta's contention is right, and it will not be easy to set aside the general conclusion which his thoroughly critical presentation of the material is made to establish, the missionary idea in Christianity is not merely a feature added by way of supplement; it expresses the very spirit of Jesus' own life and work.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

## TWO NEW WORKS ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Professor Bacon's work<sup>1</sup> in New Testament criticism reminds one more and more of Professor Cheyne's in Old Testament research; there is the same combination of literary scholarship with spiritual earnestness, the same faculty of imaginative power in dealing alike with the details of the text and with the broader constructions, or rather reconstruction, of the history, the same restless examination of tradition. The present volume

<sup>1</sup> *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*. A series of essays on problems concerning the origin and value of the anonymous writings attributed to the apostle John. By Benjamin Wisner Bacon, D.D., LL.D. New York: Moffatt, Yard & Co., 1910. xii + 544 pages. \$4.



is a fresh example of his indefatigable activity. It consists, in part, of articles contributed to American and British periodicals, which have been recast in order to form, with other essays, a coherent statement of the author's attitude toward modern criticism upon the Fourth Gospel. The conclusion which his paper conveys is that the gospel is not an apostolic first-hand witness to Jesus but a reinterpretation of Jesus in the light of Paulinism as that appeared to a later generation at Ephesus. The anonymous author or theologos was some elderly Hellenistic Jew with philosophic predilections like those of the Ephesian teacher to whom Justin Martyr was indebted. He was neither John the presbyter nor John the apostle. After him came one editor who added the last chapter to the gospel and recast the letter with the double object of identifying the beloved disciple and the son of Zebedee and of adjusting the Asiatic or Pauline tradition to the Petrine tradition of Syria and Rome. This editor was a contemporary of Papias and Justin, probably a Roman, who believed that John the apostle had written the Apocalypse in Patmos and therefore attributed to him the anonymous gospel as well. Since the subsequent tradition of the church was assisted by this erroneous idea of R, the redactor, it follows that the way to regain a right view of the gospel is to discard the letter with its claim of an apostolic and historical witness, and to take the original gospel as Theologos, its author, wrote it

Theologos, as we have called him, merges his own testimony completely in that of the church. The purest and loftiest Paulinism is reacting from the unbridled fancy of gnosticism toward the historic tradition of the church, but without the surrender of Pauline liberty in the spirit. Space does not here permit the demonstration how far below this level is that of the redactor, who, by his additions and readjustments, particularly in the appendix, has sought to harness this eagle to the wingless creatures of synoptic tradition (463).

Such is the main thesis of the book. In four parts, which occasionally overlap one another, the author presents it from various points of view, controversial and constructive.

The main conclusions of Part I ("The External Evidence," 17-154) are that the tradition of Irenaeus about the Asiatic apostles and elders is incorrect, and that John the apostle suffered early martyrdom at the hands of the Jews. The latter point is persuasively argued (127 f.), except that Professor Bacon has tried ingeniously but quite unconvincingly to connect the two witnesses of Rev. 12:1-13 with James and John, whom the apocalypticist is said to view as the Christian embodiment of Moses and Elijah in the original tradition. In Luke 9:51-56, "to the evangelist at least the spirit rebuked is not so much that of the historical Elijah

which it would not have occurred to any of our gospel writers to question; but (unless we greatly err) he sees rebuked in it the vindictive spirit of Rev. 11:1-13" (140-41). The parallel, I confess, seems forced, and the whole construction rather fanciful. The red martyrdom interpretation of Mark 10:39 is strong enough to stand without a buttress of this kind. Professor Bacon pays more attention to the Apocalypse than several recent writers on the Fourth Gospel have troubled to do; he rightly recognizes the significance of its evidence, instead of discussing it briefly like Canon Sanday and Dr. James Drummond. But in the chapter devoted to this problem, which opens Part II, he minimizes unduly the indorsement of the Apocalypse by Papias and Justin. Whether the indorsement was right or wrong, it is surely hypercritical to suggest that it need not have indorsed a belief in John's residence in Asia Minor or authorship (159). Professor Bacon's interest in maintaining this seems to be his disinclination to allow that John the presbyter<sup>2</sup> had any residence in Asia Minor. Since the only other John was martyred long before the date (Domitianic) of the Apocalypse, it follows that the latter is pseudonymous, chaps. 1-3 and 22:8-21 being added for the purpose of claiming the Palestinian prophecy (cf. chaps. 4-22:7) for the apostle. This literary fiction was "the true starting-point" (183) of the legend of the apostle John's residence in Asia Minor. Apart from other objections to this theory, the impossibility of detaching chaps. 1-3 from the original nucleus of the Apocalypse seems to one final. Besides, some definite starting-point is wanted for the Johannine tradition. The latter is more reasonably approached as the partial result of confusion between the two Johns than as a series of literary errors.

The appendix to the Fourth Gospel is dated at Rome *ca.* 150 A.D.; it claims the authorship for John, who is identified with the beloved disciple, and from this point the growth of the Johannine legend proceeds apace, through Irenaeus and the Muratorian Canon. "The assertions of Irenaeus and his contemporary supporters of the fourfold gospel simply reverberate with natural enlargements those which had previously been embodied by redactors and revisors in the substance of the *instrumentum Johanneum*" (268).

Part III ("On the Indirect Internal Evidence," 273-439) outlines a positive view of the gospel as a Pauline restatement of the evangelic tradition. The estimate of Paulinism as indifferent to the historic Jesus does not strike one as adequate, however; it is not easy to understand the author's connection between the "beloved disciple" and Gal. 2:20; and

<sup>2</sup> He will only allow a bare possibility that John the presbyter was the author of the Palestinian nucleus of the Apocalypse. But II and III John, as well as the Apocalypse, may well be his.

the discoverer of Paulinism in the Fourth Gospel as in Mark is pushed to almost uncritical extremes. The discussion of the topography and chronology (385 f.) is "far from denying all relation with Judaea and Perea to the entire unknown period of thirty or forty years before the beginning of the ministry" (410), but it might safely have yielded more to the agreement of Weizsäcker and Spitta; Spitta's predilection for Luke has always to be discounted, but Weizsäcker's *Untersuchungen* are of permanent value in this regard. The general view of the gospel outlined in the present volume as in the recent English works of Dr. Abbott, Dr. Forbes, Professor Scott, and Dr. James Drummond, seems likely before long to become the prevailing conception; one is all the more anxious therefore that it should be so stated as to do justice to the element of historical tradition which Zahn and Lepin, among others, have re-emphasized in the wake of Weizsäcker. The first and last chapters of Part IV serve to show how alive Professor Bacon is to the religious interests<sup>3</sup> of the gospel; they sum up ironically the main conclusions which are defended at the point of the bayonet in the foregoing pages. Two chapters, sandwiched between them, are devoted to the literary analysis of the gospel, a province in which the author has already distinguished himself. The publication of Spitta's new volume is one of many signs which indicate that the last word is far from having been spoken on this matter.

The form of the book, which is partly composed of criticisms directed against contemporary scholars and partly occupied by independent discussions, does not make it altogether easy reading, and a brief notice like this does no manner of justice to the width of its range. If it had been compressed, it would have made a more definite impression; also, if it had been less clever, it might have been more convincing. Still, the tone of sincerity which characterizes its scholarship may win for it a hearing in circles when its views prove unacceptable. Certainly no student in any school will fail to find its pages teeming with suggestions and bristling with acute criticisms.

JAMES MOFFATT

BROUGHTY FERRY, SCOTLAND

---

Spitta's qualifications as a keen and subtle critic are well known. Few scholars have a more masterly command of the extra-canonical literature of the period and sphere of thought adjacent to the New Testament, from which to draw illuminating parallels. Few even of German scholars have

<sup>3</sup> In his preface he recognizes that "the assailant of the traditional authorship of the Fourth Gospel has no real success unless he can obtain a hearing from men profoundly interested in the cause of revealed religion."

so keen a sense for subtle distinctions and shades of difference in thought, whereby to establish differences of origin in writings traditionally handed down as units. The former quality appears (along with a certain disposition toward the erratic and paradoxical apt to accompany genius, but not reassuring to the sober-minded) in our author's earlier championship of the authenticity of Second Peter at the expense of First Peter, and of the non-Christian origin of James. It appears to better advantage in his discussion of Hermas and his comparison of "the Testament of Job and the New Testament." His capacity for keen and subtle analysis of documents has been shown in earlier attempts to distinguish sources and redactional material in Revelation, Acts, and Romans.

Several of the writings just referred to are contained in the three-volume work, issued in separate parts at intervals since 1893, entitled *Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristenthums* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht).

It was in the first issue of this publication, in 1893, that Spitta came forward as one of the first and boldest to assail the traditional unity of authorship of the Fourth Gospel, under the title *Unordnungen im Texte des Vierten Evangeliums*. He has a right, now, in his fuller treatment of the question,<sup>4</sup> to complain that Schwartz and Wellhausen, who since 1907 have given the weight of their great authority to a hypothesis of supplementation, take no notice whatever of their predecessors in the field. It is even worse when the critical world acts as if the discovery had now been made for the first time that the Fourth Gospel is far from being the "seamless coat" which Tübingen critics declared it; whereas Spitta is able to enumerate no less than eighteen New Testament scholars besides himself who during the last half-century have been protesting with all their might against this doctrine, largely in independence of one another.<sup>5</sup>

The present work opens with a definite presentation of results in a translation of the gospel so arranged that the portion regarded by Spitta as the authentically Johannine *Grundschrift* stands at the head of the page; underneath, in smaller type, appears the rest, a second source of unknown origin, interspersed with the editorial additions and comments set in italic. The argument in support of this analysis occupies the remaining 466 pages of the book. This method has the advantage of perfect clearness and definiteness. For the author it has the disadvantage of throwing into strongest light that which to most readers will seem his

<sup>4</sup> *Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*. Von Friedrich Spitta. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. xlvii + 466 pages. M. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Spitta, who includes the present writer in his list, might well have added Professors E. D. Burton of Chicago, and C. A. Briggs of New York, a total, himself included, of twenty-one.

weakest side, a preoccupation with his own working hypothesis so intense as scarcely to admit the possibility of any other interpretation of the phenomena. This is all the less likely to prove convincing because the form which Spitta's working hypotheses seem almost fatally foreordained to assume is of the A B C type. His analyses usually result as follows: (1) an earlier, presumably authentic, *Grundschrift*, A; (2) an inferior second source, B; (3) an "undistributed middle," C, assignable to the editor or redactor. Too many results of this kind tend to make the reader suspect that the success of Pentateuch analysis has turned the heads of the New Testament critics. A travesty is easily framed stating the matter about as follows: The problem consists in attaching the largest possible proportion of the unobjectionable material to A, and the objectionable to B, while A at least is allowed to show no acquaintance with B, and both appear to advance by fairly complete and logical sequence toward distinctive ideals. Nothing must go to C that can be made to fit in at any point of A or B; brief clauses found wholly intractable may be assigned to the editor. So stated the process bears a strong resemblance to ingenious self-delusion.

Anyone who attempts the process, like the ingenious caricaturist Carl Hesedamm, will find however (if his material be really a literary unit) that plausible results are not easy to obtain on these conditions. And Spitta's results are always plausible—so plausible that even the reader who rejects the reconstruction, yes, even the compilation theory as a whole, if truly unbiased and scientifically patient, will acknowledge that "there is something in it." In fact there is so much in it that the student of this most vital, and at the same time most intricate and complex problem of New Testament criticism, will be apt to advance at least to the theory of supplementation. He will be inexcusable if he fails to examine and carefully weigh the arguments of Spitta, one of the subtlest, most brilliant, most erratic of New Testament scholars. He will be amply repaid, even if unconvinced.

B. W. BACON

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

---

### THE WORLD OF SPIRITS IN THE FAITH OF PAUL

The thought of primitive Christianity regarding angels, demons, and Satan was long for science if not an unexplored country, at least an unobserved one. The first great scientific investigation into Paul's thought concerning spirits was Everling's *Paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie*, which appeared in 1888. He showed on the basis of apocryphal and

pseudepigraphic literature that the spirit-world of primitive Christianity was not to be divided primarily by ethical qualities—by the distinction of good and bad. The present work<sup>1</sup> carries the investigation farther. In addition to many specific instances in which the author comes to conclusions differing from Everling's the following are respects in which this work claims to mark an advance:

1. Everling used rabbinic material only now and then. Our author emphasizes the influence of Paul's rabbinic training and digs into the mine of Talmudic and Midrash literature. Being of later literary origin this material must be used cautiously, but the author thinks that its exclusion is unjustifiable.

2. It is not sufficient that the historian relate the ideas of Paul to those of his time and environment—that he find parallels and analogies. Our author attempts always to trace the thought of Paul to its origin, to determine its source in the Old Testament, in the thought-world of late Judaism, or in the ideas of Hellenism.

3. The ultimate aim of the author is to set forth the significance of Paul's ideas about spirits for his religious faith—to relate his beliefs regarding the spirit-world to his whole religious and theological thought. There is an especial significance for eschatology and Christology. The third section of the book is entitled "Origin and Significance of Paul's Conceptions of Spirits," and is naturally the most interesting part. We may add that the author notes in his preface that the *religionsgeschichtlichen* publications of the last two decades have made possible his work.

The sources are the four *Hauptbriefe*, the Epistle to the Philippians, and also First Thessalonians. Second Thessalonians is accepted with reserve, the question of its genuineness not being regarded by the author as settled. A study of these letters forms the first section of the book. The letter to Philemon has nothing touching the problem. With Colossians and Ephesians the question of genuineness is so closely bound up with the problem of angelology that to these epistles and the problems peculiar to them a special investigation is devoted, which forms the second section of the book: "Christ and the Spirits." Dibelius is disposed to admit the Pauline authorship of Colossians and to deny that of Ephesians, and he thinks that his investigations point toward the solution of this question. That the Pastoral Epistles in their present form are not genuine is presupposed, but for the sake of completeness they are not omitted.

The grouping of the spirits in classes in the third section is especially

<sup>1</sup> *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus*. Von Martin Dibelius. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909. v + 250 pages. M. 7.

valuable. Linguistic and other material is given in supplements, so as not to burden the main text. Many of the footnotes are illuminating. The author has a genuine enthusiasm for his subject and has produced a highly satisfactory book.

JOHN C. GRANBERY

PHILIPPI, W. VA.

### THE ORIGIN OF NEW TESTAMENT BOOKS

In this discussion<sup>1</sup> the author has two problems in mind: the relation of Mark to the First and Third Gospels, and the question of Mark's sources. By an examination of the Second Gospel section by section Goguel concludes that Mark in practically its present form was used in the composition of Matthew and Luke. The more difficult question of Mark's source materials is decided in favor of the composite theory. To give an illustration in detail, it is held that in the account of the Passion the evangelist drew upon five sources of information: (1) The story of Peter's denial, and the substance of the Gethsemane incident, were from reminiscences of Peter. (2) Some anonymous account of the trial and death of Jesus supplied 14:1 f., 10 f., 43-50; 15:1-15, 21-32, 37a, 40-16:8. This was a very old element of tradition and Mark may not have known it as a source distinct from that of Peter's reminiscences. (3) Slightly later traditions furnished other details. (4) The Logia contributed the prediction of Judas' treachery, and perhaps the story of the institution of the Last Supper. (5) Lastly, there were items contributed by the evangelist himself or by tradition which arose near to his time, such as the preparation for the Passover, the flight of the young man, and details added to the other four sources.

In contending for Mark's acquaintance with the Logia, some interesting observations are presented. This is a point that seems to be gaining favor with critical scholars. With Mark 1:7 f. the use of this source begins. As compared with the other synoptists, the priority of Mark 1:1-6 is thought to be evident, but in the two following verses Matthew and Luke prove to be the earlier. Mark took this messianic prophecy from the Logia, and his purpose was to fix the relation between Jesus and John. Thus he shows his interest in the early polemic against John's disciples.

Goguel is no rigid adherent of the two-document theory; he thinks there were important sources other than the Logia available for Mark. From

<sup>1</sup> *L'évangile de Marc et ses rapports avec ceux de Mathieu et de Luc: Essai d'une introduction critique à l'étude du second évangile.* (Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études. Sciences religieuses, Vol. XXII.) Par Maurice Goguel. Paris: Leroux, 1909. 348 pages.

one of these the apocalyptic discourse of Jesus as it now stands in chap. 13 was derived. This part of Mark was worked over, perhaps by the evangelist himself, from five to ten years after its first appearance. Allowance also is to be made for other redactions. It is held that the gospel appeared about 65 A.D., between 70 and 75 the synoptic apocalypse was added, between 75 and 85 further modifications and additions were made. Thus the Second Gospel owes its present form to reminiscences of Peter, fragments from the Logia source, miscellaneous items of tradition, and editorial and redactional touches.

The main outlines of this discussion remind us of Loisy's views, but the author tells us that his conclusions were formulated before Loisy's work appeared. Footnotes have been used freely in referring to other workers in this field; but Goguel has exercised an independent judgment throughout, and his remarks are stimulating if not always convincing. In the nature of the case arguments for the recovery of source elements in Mark are liable to be somewhat subjective, yet it is significant that so much attention has been given to the problem in the last few years. The theory of its composite character seems to be growing in favor.

---

These three bulky volumes<sup>2</sup> from one who is a recognized champion of traditional views cannot fail to arouse interest. Of all the author's works in the New Testament field, this is the best one to use in introducing him to English readers. It reflects, on the one hand, his interpretation of early Christian tradition, and, on the other, his exegetical method as applied to the New Testament books themselves. The task of translation, which must have been exceedingly onerous, has been well done. Except for a few infelicitous renderings, and several typographical errors, the work is quite as readable in its English dress as in the German.

The plan is in most respects that usually followed in such works. An exceptionally large amount of space is given to footnotes. These display a wide range of information, but it is not so evident that they always prove the point in question or even that they are always pertinent to it. The conclusions of contemporary scholarship are not given the attention one would expect in so extended a treatise. In fact there is an unpleasant tendency to dismiss opposing views with an epithet or with a derogatory

<sup>2</sup> *Introduction to the New Testament*. By Theodor Zahn. Translated from the third German edition by J. M. Trout, W. A. Mather, L. Hodous, E. S. Worcester, W. H. Worrell, and R. B. Dodge, under the direction and supervision of M. W. Jacobus, assisted by C. S. Thayer. In three volumes. New York: Scribner, 1909. Vol. I, xviii + 564 pages; Vol. II, viii + 617 pages; Vol. III, viii + 539 pages.



comment; they are "pure inventions," "dogmatic prejudices," "arbitrary assumptions," due to the perverted "taste" of "critics" who are "not open to conviction" but are lacking in "historical sense," and who would "convict of ignorance" the New Testament writer, or accuse him of "forgery" and "deceitful intentions," or charge him with "thoughtless indolence" and impugn his "intellectual and moral character." Zahn seems to hold it as a major premise that those who criticize traditional opinions do so primarily for apriori reasons and altogether without the support of any facts.

In the whole construction the author is guided by two general principles, one showing itself in his treatment of the external evidence and the other appearing in his interpretation of the New Testament writers. The first is his conception of the origin and growth of the canon idea. As would be expected from his earlier works, he assumes, in contrast with Harnack for instance, that the idea of authoritative Christian writings took shape at a very early date. So he can argue that the prestige of James the brother of Jesus not only makes it altogether probable that he wrote the so-called Epistle of James but also makes it improbable that any later writer would be successful in impersonating him. Similarly the abrupt ending of Mark 16:8 must be due to a sudden interruption of the evangelist. Had he written more it would have been too highly prized to be lost either by accident or by deliberate substitution. Proceeding upon this line of argument it is easy to deny the very possibility of pseudonymity for any New Testament book. If, on the other hand, the canon idea did not come to full consciousness until the second century, and then largely through the influence of the Roman church in controversy with heresy, such reasoning as the above falls to the ground. One who finds Zahn's views on the canon untenable will not be able to follow him here.

The second noticeable feature of his work is a forced exegetical method. He pronounces finally upon problems of exegesis without sufficient evidence. He is willing to say that the superlative (*πρῶτον*) in Acts 1:1 makes it certain that Luke had definitely in mind the writing of a third book. But such nicety in the usage of comparative and superlative in the vernacular Greek of the New Testament period is not supported by the facts thus far known. It is likewise unsafe to affirm emphatically, as Zahn does, that the singular and plural in the third person are always to be sharply distinguished in Paul's thought, or that the genitive is always subjective in Paul's phrase "gospel of Christ." Examples of this labored exegetical method on a larger scale, are seen in the argument for genuineness drawn from the internal evidence of II Peter and of Jude.

Zahn's contribution to the principal problems of New Testament introduction is not so large as one could wish. Many critical difficulties receive scant attention. For example, doubts about the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles are scarcely taken seriously. In fact the genuineness of all New Testament writings ascribed by tradition to Paul is virtually decided upon by a series of general considerations quite apart from the examination of the individual letters (I, 156-62). But the author does not spare words when the subject seems to him worth while, nor does he withhold the expression of his opinion on even the most disputed points. He believes Galatians was written to the southern group of churches, and was sent from Corinth soon after Paul's first arrival there. This would be early in the year 53, according to Zahn's chronology. Ephesians, written from Rome, was not addressed to any particular church but was a circular letter intended for various congregations in Asia. Other problems of the Pauline writings are answered in the usual traditional way. First Peter is thought to have been written from Rome in the year 64. Silvanus was immediately responsible for the composition, but he wrote under Peter's instructions though not at his dictation. The Pauline ideas in the letter, "when considered without prejudice," are proof of the letter's authenticity. Appollos is the probable author of Hebrews. The letter was written shortly before the year 90 and was intended for a Jewish congregation attached to some household in Rome.

The discussion of the gospels is perhaps the most unsatisfactory part of this whole work. Of course the author wrote before the numerous recent discussions bearing on the synoptic problem came out, but it is regrettable that he did not prepare for the translators a fresh revision of this part of his book. To be sure, the discussion of this topic was not up to date when it first appeared in the German work. We are told that the earliest written gospel document was the Gospel of Matthew composed at first in Aramaic but in content identical with the present Greek gospel. In its Aramaic form it circulated somewhat widely and was used in the gentile church where it was orally rendered into Greek. Later the Gospel of Mark appeared, written in Greek but considerably influenced by the author's knowledge of Matthew. Still later Matthew was put into Greek, the translator using Mark as an aid in his task. Matthew appeared in 61-66, Mark in 66 or 67, Luke and Acts between 70 and 80. The third evangelist was Luke, the companion of Paul. He used Mark as a source, but did not use Matthew or any other document prepared by an eyewitness. In writing the apostolic history he did not consult Paul's letters for information; yet alleged discrepancies between Acts and the writings of Paul are

held to be largely imaginary. The originality of the  $\beta$  text is accepted, so Luke appears personally on the scene as early as Acts 11:25. Zahn almost entirely fails to relate himself to the investigation which has been going on steadily in this field for the last half-century. To say that "Matthew's dependence on older written sources cannot be demonstrated," and that "evidence convincing to one who does not already believe the point proved has not been produced," is not an adequate reason for setting aside some of the best attested results of synoptic study today.

The books traditionally connected with the name of John are all treated as genuine works of the apostle, and are assigned to the years 80-95. The distinct style of Revelation is explained by the unique circumstances of the writer: here he wrote as a Christian prophet under the special inspiration of the spirit, while he composed the gospel and epistles in a more normal state of mind. In this connection we recall a comment of one of Zahn's German contemporaries to the effect that if this be true John did a better piece of work than the spirit did. No real contradictions between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics is admitted, not even is it conceded that they differ in their representations of the day of the week on which Jesus was crucified. Though reproducing the discourses of Jesus with freedom, for essential historical truth John is thought to be more reliable than any other gospel.

To say the least, it is unfortunate that Zahn's treatment does not better represent the results of modern scholarship in this field of New Testament study. This is all the more regrettable in a work now prepared distinctly for English readers, inasmuch as comprehensive discussions of the subject are scarce in this language. Moreover the defensive attitude of the writer tends to divert attention from some more important matters. We venture to suggest that the kind of introduction most needed today is a work that will aim primarily to give the reader an insight into the religious life and spirit of the age which produced the New Testament literature. This is the only type of *introduction* that is likely to issue in an appreciative *acquaintanceship*.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

More than half a century ago Holtzmann was a pupil of Rothe and Vatke and learned then the principles which he has ever since used in his assiduous study of the New Testament. His publications on New Testament literature and theology have long been among the most stimulating and useful of the helps accessible to students. All must share with him

the gratification which he himself expresses at the appearance of this new edition of his commentary on the Johannean literature.<sup>1</sup> As Holtzmann suggests in the preface, this revision would hardly have been undertaken if Bauer had not been persuaded that the general viewpoint and positions of the earlier editions were in accord with present-day New Testament science. Few radical modifications have been found necessary.

The present edition contains the New Testament text in a translation which strives to be as nearly literal as will be compatible with clearness. The text is printed at the top of the page with notes beneath, and a neat pleasing page is the result. The translation was added at the request of the publisher and contributes much to the value of the work.

Into both the chapters of the introductory material and the notes on the text fuller and more satisfactory references to ancient writers have been inserted. But the chief task which the collaborator has essayed has been to bring the volume up abreast of present discussion of Johannean literature. Some of the most significant work on the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse has been done since the second edition of the commentary appeared in 1893. Bauer has carefully studied these discussions of the last fifteen years and introduced copious references to them throughout the volume. In the chapters on introduction new sentences, new paragraphs, and in two instances new sections, one on the authorship and the other on the purpose of the gospel, have been added. The notes have been frequently revised in phraseology and in some places have been entirely rewritten. By these additions and changes we have not only a digest of the present position and trend of scientific study of Johannean literature, but also abundant references for the study of the conditions under which it grew.

The section on the authorship of the gospel has been thoroughly revised and considerably enlarged. It is now held that the gospel neither is nor pretends to be the work of the apostle John. The writer of it clearly distinguishes himself from the one "who bears witness of these things." In the opinion of Bauer, the evidence is very early that the apostle John died in Palestine, and that a John the elder lived in Ephesus. The question of the relation of this John the Presbyter to the Fourth Gospel has never received a satisfactory answer. But it can be asserted with confidence that the apostle is neither the John of Asia nor the Evangelist.

In the new section on the purpose of the gospel it is declared to be no

<sup>1</sup> *Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament*. Vierter Band. Evangelium, Briefe und Offenbarung des Johannes. Bearbeitet von H. J. Holtzmann. Dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage, besorgt von Walter Bauer. Tübingen: Mohr, 1908. xiii + 504 pages. M. 9.75.

polemic against Gnosticism for that atmosphere and spirit is all but entirely wanting. Nor is it directed against a John-the-Baptist cult for no reference that can be so interpreted is to be found after the third chapter. It is the Judaism of his own time against which the Evangelist directs his argument. The questions discussed in the gospel are not those with which Jesus had to deal in his conflict with Judaism, but they belong to the Judaism which was contemporary with the Evangelist. The differences between the gospel and the First Epistle are such as to indicate a period of time intervening if not a difference of authorship. The balance of evidence is against the priority of the epistle. The first (as well as the second and third epistles which belong together in purpose and time), is an antidocetic polemic.

In reference to the Apocalypse the work of Gunkel is recognized as of great value. He has given strong emphasis to the fact that for a proper study of the Apocalypse the history of religion must be supplemented by a careful study of political and literary history. The partition hypothesis has been successfully opposed. The Apocalypse is a work of art from beginning to end and not at all a loose compilation. Its relation to the other apocalyptic writings is still an open question. But it is at any rate folly to exempt it from the principles which control the interpretation of apocalypses in general. It is not an understanding of modern history, but rather acquaintance with the history of thought and life antecedent to and contemporary with the Apocalypse that gives us the key to its interpretation. The effort to find in it a description of modern situations and movements is rightly and sufficiently characterized as "wild exegesis." The section on the history of the interpretation of the Apocalypse is informing and useful.

The revision has been intrusted to capable hands. The volume has been improved in many ways. The mechanical features have been made more acceptable to English eyes. Even in so minor a matter as the arrangement of bibliography this is apparent. Bauer has brought the book up to date and greatly enhanced the value of an already useful work.

J. W. BAILEY

OSHKOSH, WIS.

#### RELATION OF THE APOSTLE PETER TO ROME

The aim of Professor Guignebert's book,<sup>1</sup> which is to test the solidity of the Roman claims regarding Peter, may well have an interest in his French environment that it hardly has in ours. In our Protestant world

<sup>1</sup> *La primauté de Pierre et la venue de Pierre à Rome. Etude critique* par Ch. Guignebert, Chargé de Cours d'histoire ancienne du Christianisme à l'Université de Paris. Paris: Nourry, 1909. xvi + 379 pages. Fr. 6.

of thought the primacy of Peter and his relation to Rome are questions which are regarded as settled. We do not deny that more may be said, that certain details are still open to discussion; but there is perhaps a feeling that no more *need* be said on the fundamental issues. It is doubtless true, as the author says, that the literature of the subject has been very largely dominated by theological and polemical interests, and hence, as far as scientific results are concerned, may be ignored. This criticism is sure to be made on his own work, however unjustly, by those who see that it destroys what they have always believed to be fundamental, and on which their entire ecclesiastical system rests. The more fair-minded, however, of the Roman confession will admit that the author has at least avoided extremes of partisanship and that he has made an honest attempt to follow a strictly historical method. It is difficult indeed to see how any intelligent Catholic could read the argument without assenting to the author's conclusions so far at least as to concede that the foundations of the papacy, so far as Scripture and tradition are concerned, are not beyond question.

The results of Professor Guignebert's investigations are in the main those which have been widely held by recent Protestant scholars. To say this is of course by no means to dismiss the book as without a value of its own. It has at least the value of an independent and weighty confirmation of many of those results. But it has more than this. There are points at which it is likely to modify the prevailing views. Thus, e.g., the author is not content with a demonstration of the incorrectness of the Catholic interpretation of Matt. 16:18, 19. His point of attack is the genuineness and authenticity of the passage. He holds with some recent text-critics that it is a late addition to the gospel. He discusses the significance of its absence from Mark and Luke, and makes a forcible argument against its being from Jesus on the basis of seven New Testament texts (Matt. 18:18; 20:20; John 20:23; Gal., chap. 2; I Cor. 3:10, 11; Eph. 2:20; Apoc. 21:14). While confident that the words are not from Jesus, he admits the difficulty of accounting for their introduction into the gospel. He inclines to regard the passage as having originated at a time when Paul was exalted as the one faithful apostle (so by Marcion), and to be in spirit anti-Pauline though formally using Pauline terminology ("building" and "church"). The view that a genuine word of Jesus, expressive of confidence in Peter, underlies the passage is not looked on with favor.

Again, Professor Guignebert departs from the current view of Peter's connection with Rome. For he holds that not even Peter's death, not to mention his recognized headship of the Roman church or a twenty-five years' sojourn in Rome, has the support of a single trustworthy text. The patris-

tic testimony is vague, the reasons advanced are unsettled. The Roman view is only a hypothesis.

But these illustrations of the more personal element in Professor Guignebert's book must suffice.

In concluding this brief review I quote from the author's *Avant-propos* a sentence whose truth needs frequent recognition: "Je crois fermement, et de plus en plus, que suivant, sans y prendre assez garde, la tendance naturelle, indispensable même, aux confessionnels et surtout aux catholiques, nous majorons beaucoup trop nos connaissances sur nombre de questions chrétiennes; nous ne savons pas assez nous résoudre à ignorer ce que pourtant les textes ne nous disent pas."

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

### SOME MATTERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CENTURIES

Every student of mediaeval history or literature should feel himself a debtor to the editors of this work.<sup>1</sup> The *De contemptu mundi* of Bernard of Cluny is one of the most valuable sources we possess for the ascetic interpretation of feudal society in the twelfth century. Written in dactylic rhymed hexameter, the poem has a certain moral kinship with Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*—the pithy, sententious, moral observation of the former; the detachedness and lofty scorn of the latter, though of course shot through and through with the morbidly ascetic ideas of the Middle Ages and tinted with that cloistered radiance that never shone on sea or land.

To the scholar whose mind is steeped in the lore of things long ago, these pages are luminous. There is something romantic yet Spartan in the vision of the Elysian brightness of the adorned earth in the Golden Age of the race (Book II, 129-32). There are vivid pictures of mediaeval society—the feudal strife that recalls the Truce of God; the fighting cleric; the warrior abbot; the sleek, well-fed bishop, "a fatted fowl filling the useless sepulchre of his belly," going forth to hunt of a morning, mounted upon a Spanish barb, with a pack of hunting dogs better fed than the peasants (160-61). The corruption of Rome and the papal curia is visited with scathing censure (164-67). But though the clergy comes in for bitterest scorn no class of mediaeval society escapes. The bailiff "who judges

<sup>1</sup> *The Source of "Jerusalem the Golden."* Together with Other Pieces Attributed to Bernard of Cluny. In English Translation by Henry Preble. Introduction, Notes, and Annotated Bibliography by Samuel Macauley Jackson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. vi + 207 pages. \$1.38.

without judgment"; the fraudulent tax-gatherer; the cheating merchant; even the peasant who filches grain are all pilloried. Characteristically mediaeval is the ferocious invective against woman (139-43). Certain portions paint the society of France in the twelfth century like that of Israel in the pages of Hosea. Bernard's passion is excessive no doubt, and his vision warped, yet the careful student of the history of morals, reading between the lines, will find much of value here. Certain allusions have concrete interest for culture history, e.g., the reference to linen undergarments on p. 131; to the *Lex Theodosiana*, (137), showing that revived interest in Roman law with which every scholar is familiar; to the plowman who swears his neighbor's planted fields are his own, a most interesting reference to the confusion which characterized the complex manorial system (137).

There are terse, moral sentiments that remind of Sir Thomas Browne's wonderful essay on "Urn Burial," such as "Purple passes away and eating comes to an end, but vengeance endures" (120).

The felicity of Mr. Preble's translation will strike every reader; no less the learning displayed by Dr. Jackson in the long historical introduction and the copious bibliography. As to the much disputed identity of Bernard of Cluny, in spite of Dr. Jackson being unconvinced of it, I see no reason to change the opinion I expressed in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1907. Dr. Jackson does not commit himself, although he seems to incline toward an English origin for Bernard. But his historical methods leave something to be desired. What value, for instance, can be attached to this judgment: "There is no direct proof that our Bernard had any English blood in his veins, as he might be expected to have had were he born in Brittany" (4)? In arguing for the possibility of Bernard's English origin he makes the point that Bernard's sermon on the Unjust Steward is dedicated to Matthew, *bishop* of St. Alban's. But St. Alban's was not raised to the dignity of a bishopric until modern times, in 1877 to be exact. The church was an abbey not a cathedral; moreover it was Benedictine from its foundation in 795, and is not enumerated in the list of Cluniac abbeys and priories of the "province" of England and Scotland. The Cluniacs had no foundation there (see Duckett, *Charters and Records of Cluny*, I, 36-37). The Matthew whom Bernard honored with his sermon, was Matthew, bishop of Albano in Italy and papal legate in France in 1129 (cf. Suger, *Vita Ludovici VI*, Grossi, ed. Molinier, 100-1; Suger, *Liber de administratione*, ed. Lecoy de la Marche, chap. 3; Mansi, XXI, 397-84; LeBœuf, *Histoire de Paris*, IV. 2-4; Imbart de la Tour, *Les élections épiscopales*, 121-22).



More colorable claim for Bernard's English lineage is afforded by his lines to Simeon, Abbot of York. Yet when one remembers the intimate connection between Cluny and England, the number of its houses there, and the large number of English students who crossed the channel to study at Cluny, among whom the most famous were Harding and Stephen Langton, the argument from Simeon seems a frail one. Cluny was international in its influence and drew many Italians and Germans, as well as English, to its cloisters. The count Wolnuth to whom Bernard dedicated the lines on p. 188 was certainly a German, for the name is German and the allusion to St. Hermes, the patron saint of the Tyrol, almost conclusive.

There are some less important errors to be noted. John Casimir (mentioned on p. 55) was the elector palatine and not the duke of Bavaria. Who ever heard of a Protestant duke of Bavaria? It is odd that a scholar so acquainted as is Dr. Jackson with the history of the Reformation, should fail to recognize Warsaw under its Latin form (locative case) *Starovesiae* (63). There is a missing word in l. 5, p. 20; a proof error in the word "catalogue," three lines from bottom of p. 20; and another in the footnote on p. 187. Finally may I express regret that the Latin original has not accompanied the translation.

---

When the Great Schism came to an end, the authority of the papacy found itself compromised by numerous decrees of the Council of Constance. The policy of the new pope, Martin V, at first was to avoid pronouncing upon the rights of the council or upon the validity of the decrees in question. But in 1418 he denied the superiority of the council over papacy in matters of faith. The conflict was thus joined between the two powers, and there were not a few keen observers of the ecclesiastical struggle who looked for some sort of popular government for the church as a result of the issue. No pages of the work<sup>2</sup> before us are of greater interest than those which elaborate this thesis.

As so often had happened before in the history of the church, the result was largely conditioned by the influence of secular politics. Martin V looked with suspicion upon the choice of Pavia as the next place for the council to meet, having good reason to doubt the duke of Milan. When the council of Pavia met on April 23, 1423, it was unable to sit there on account of the plague, and the pope, to the discomfiture of the council, took the initiative by fixing upon Siena, to the elation of the latter. But though farther removed from Milan, the situation was yet tense. The active inter-

<sup>2</sup>*Le pape et le concile* (1418-50). Par Noël Valois. Tome premier. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils. 1909. xxix + 407 pages. Fr. 20.

vention in its affairs by the king of Aragon, the arrival at Siena of the archbishop of Rouen and the delegation of the University of Paris, precipitated a crisis, and in spite of the fact that the Sienese closed the gates of the city, the council adjourned to Basel. The pope was the actual author of the dissolution, and M. Valois goes most interestingly into the clever duplicity of Martin V (76-80) in this particular.

It was his plan to prevent any conciliar action by forcing the council continually to move from one point to another; and in the interim to strengthen his own hand. This he did by overtures to the emperor and other German princes, to the English government, the duke of Milan and the University of Paris, with the hope of safeguarding the prerogatives of the Holy See.

At this juncture, the pope died and was succeeded by Eugene IV, March 3, 1431. New political developments came to the rescue of the new pope. The Austro-Burgundian war was centered around Basel, and moreover there was intense Catholic interest in the revolt of Bohemia. Before it had a chance to do anything the pope dissolved the Council of Basel, to the chagrin of the conciliar party, which protested to the powers against the pontifical action, and finally in its second session denied the papal right to dissolve or prorogue the council and continued to sit. In vain did Eugene IV turn toward France, whose clergy was assembled at Bourges (March-April, 1432). The French clergy leaned toward the council, and the attitude of Castile and England was unequivocal. The arrogance of the council increased to such an extent that the pope even hoped for international intervention in the interest of conciliation. His isolation was great. The cardinals continued to desert the court of Rome, and apparently Eugene IV was on the verge of being stripped of all his authority, when a sudden change of wind on the part of Charles VII came to save him from utter humiliation.

In temporal affairs the position of the papacy was quite as reduced. The loss of the March, the revolt of Forli, the conquests of Sforza in Umbria and Tuscany, the devastations committed by Fortebraccio around Rome, left the pope no rest. In despair, he thought of compromising with Sforza in order to turn him against his other foes. To crown all, the Romans rebelled on May 29, 1434 and established a republic. The question of the union with the Greek church was another source of friction. Nevertheless, Eugene IV refused to yield to the council.

This first volume concludes at this juncture. As a historical work it is amazingly documented and is written with that clarity so characteristic of modern French scholarship. One cannot help comparing it with its

two great competitors in the field, the works of Pastor and Creighton. M. Valois is not a papal partisan like Pastor, and endeavors to hold the balance even in the conflict between the council and the pope. Unlike Creighton's work, which abounds in skilful portraiture and much culture history, the book before us is a solid but somewhat dry narrative of church politics and diplomacy in the fifteenth century. The intricate negotiations here set forth are the prototype of those tedious negotiations that preceded the grand treaties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On pp. 27-29 of the introduction, there is a brief yet valuable résumé of the sources used, almost all of which are in manuscript.

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In this romantic history<sup>3</sup>—the counterpart of the historical romance—Mrs. Cust has produced a work evincing equal scholarship and literary skill. Her subjects are found not on the highway but in the byways of history; her heroes wander through Europe as private gentlemen, though they come into contact with many of the important personages and public events of their time. But it is not so much their impressions of these men and actions as it is their record of the everyday life, the manners and morals of the many peoples they visited, that is illuminating. The author illustrates her work with a profusion of notes drawn from almost all the memoirs and books of travel from the time of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini to that of Swinburne, though she has missed one of the most valuable of these in overlooking the diaries and letters of Albert Dürer, full of brilliant pictures of Venice and the Netherlands. Again, the Bohemian knight's description of London and its fair dames furnishes an excellent but unused chance to quote from Dunbar's contemporary poem. As the author freely uses the epistles of Erasmus, it strikes one as a little odd that those of the reformers are entirely neglected.

But on the whole her reading has been wide and her illustrations are happy. It is rather in a certain carelessness of political history that her limitations are felt. Especially in the third story, that of the adventures of Count Frederick II of the Palatinate, it is astonishing to see with what lightness all the important actions of that critical period are passed over. The reader would like to know whether, when Frederick returned to Heidelberg in 1518, he saw Martin Luther, who was there during the last

<sup>3</sup> *Gentlemen Errant: Being the Journeys and Adventures of Four Noblemen in Europe during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.* By Mrs. Henry Cust. London: John Murray, 1909. xix + 551 pages.

days of April. The important part played by the count at the diet of Augsburg in 1530 is scarcely hinted at. In describing the visit to Henry VIII in 1533 Mrs. Cust has added very little to her principal source (Ed. von Bülow's *Fürstenspiegel*, 1849), although materials which would have added color and body to the narrative lay ready to her hand in Brewer's *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII* (mentioned once or twice but not thoroughly used) and other accessible books. For example, Count Stanislaus Lasco, a member of a famous family, is mentioned simply as a "Polish pan"—by the way is it not objectionable to use the foreign word "pan" without any hint that it means "lord" (358)? The young Englishman who associated so much with Frederick's secretary had just returned from a mission from Henry to Luther on the question of the monarch's divorce, but this and other interesting matters are entirely ignored.

But the excellences of this fascinating book far outweigh its defects. The first three tales are thrilling melodramas; the last an excellent comedy. Not since the inimitable wit of Carlyle played upon the career of Frederick the Great has the British Clio worn a broader smile than in this story of poor Hans Schweinichen and his debt-driven duke.

---

The editing of this famous satire<sup>4</sup> is good; the English version, in a slightly archaic and sufficiently vulgar diction, gives as accurate an idea as possible of the humorous barbarism of the original. The notes, for the most part drawn from Böcking's fine edition of the *Epistolae*, are generally excellent, though the editor is too ready to assume that an unusual word is an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. "Parasel," for example (a corruption of the Italian *bargello*), which he says (168) is not to be met with elsewhere, actually occurs in Luther's table talk (Förstemann & Bindseil, *Luthers Tischreden* [1848], IV, 689).

The historical introduction adds nothing to the work of previous investigators, and indeed is not always familiar with their labors. Mr. Stokes still hesitates (xlvi) as to the date of the publication of the first series of letters. We supposed that it had been settled for the autumn of 1515 by the articles of Bauch (*Buchdruck in Tübingen*, 217 f., and an article in *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, XV [1898], 301) which are unknown to Mr. Stokes. He follows Brecht in making Hutten the author of the later letters and Crotus Rubianus of the first series, but he cites very poor support for the authorship of the latter, entirely overlooking the most convincing

<sup>4</sup> *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum: The Latin Text with an English Rendering, Notes, and an Historical Introduction.* By Francis Griffin Stokes. London: Chatto & Windus, 1909. lxxiii + 560 pages.

proof, that, namely, given in a letter from Crotus to Luther, December 5, 1520 (printed by Böcking I, 433, and Enders, *Luthers Briefwechsel*, III, 8).

I suspect that Mr. Stokes overrates the importance of the book. Among the opinions in its favor quoted by him, he passes very lightly over the censures of Erasmus, and fails to mention the opinion of Luther, who thought the letters "inept" and "containing no truth" (Enders, I, 60, 62).

PRESERVED SMITH

PARIS, FRANCE

To Krehbiel's essay on *The Interdict* and to that by William S. Robertson on *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America* was awarded in equal division the Herbert Baxter Adams Prize in European History for 1907, a prize awarded every two years by the American Historical Association. Half of Krehbiel's book<sup>5</sup> is given up to the treatment of the subject under the four heads: "Origin and Theory of the Local Interdict"; "The Laying of an Interdict"; "The Interdict in Force"; "Moderation and Relaxation of the Interdict"; the other half is devoted to an appendix containing Interdicts 1198-1216, a critical bibliography and an index.

In the volume under discussion, Dr. Krehbiel has given us a careful study and systematic presentation of the subject within the limits which he set for himself. His work has been referred to as an "epoch-making volume," and while one might dissent somewhat from so strong a phrase, there can be no hesitation in saying that the essay unquestionably constitutes a valuable contribution. A noticeable feature, also, is the conservatism of statement displayed throughout. All through the essay one seems to be conscious of a determination on the part of the author not to overstate his case; to be conservative, not to claim for the interdict a greater frequency of use or a greater power as a political weapon than the evidence will warrant. In this aim, if aim it was, the author is eminently successful. No one can accuse him of straining his evidence. On the contrary, if any claim can be made in this connection, it would be that the author has not made as much out of his evidence as he might—but of this later.

In another respect, indeed, the author seems to have been less fortunate than in this maintenance of a scientific restraint; he has suffered from his method of relegating source-material to the footnotes and the Appendix. This exclusion of source-material from the text helps to leave the impression,

<sup>5</sup> *The Interdict, Its History and Its Operation*. With special attention to the time of Pope Innocent III, 1198-1216. By Edward B. Krehbiel. Washington: American Historical Association, 1909. viii + 184 pages. \$1.50.

which one undoubtedly gets from a reading of the essay, that the author is presenting us with the theoretical aspects rather than the practical workings of the institution. Yet the author has kept the distinction in mind, nor has he omitted to present us with statements of the practical working of the interdict. But these fail somewhat of their effect because the source-passages are not placed immediately under the eye. They are concealed by an unexpanded or only slightly expanded reference in a footnote or by a reference to the Appendix. (Compare for example the references on p. 65 or the passages dealing with the effects of the interdict.) One gets an impression of being held away from the concrete instances, an impression not wholly removed by a study of the materials in the Appendix.

In one respect the volume is somewhat of a disappointment though perhaps necessarily so, and that is in its treatment of the question of the actual value to the pope of the interdict as a weapon. The treatment of this subject seems ineffective; an ineffectiveness due perhaps in no way to lack of research, but on the contrary to dearth of documents. In this connection, however, the absence of any reference to the manuscript materials of the Vatican Archives is significant. However this may be it is certainly due in part to a scattering of material. If Dr. Krehbiel had collected the various passages showing the effects of the interdicts, the joy of the people at their removal, the difficulties experienced by the popes in getting ecclesiastics to obey them in opposition to their municipal or kingly rulers, the popes' frequent employment in their own territories of armed force to enforce an interdict, the results would have been appreciably more satisfactory. We cannot help regretting that the author did not attempt to deal more at length with this question of in how far the interdict was a reliable weapon as employed by the bishops and especially by the pope.

CURTIS H. WALKER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

The compendium of theology<sup>1</sup> by President Schultze of the Moravian college at Bethlehem, Pa., professes to be "the first work of this kind written in the English language by a member of the oldest Protestant church founded by the followers of John Huss in 1459." This fact alone is sufficient to create an interest in it. Without making special claims to

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Doctrine and Systematic Theology.* By Auguste Schultze. Bethlehem, Pa.: Times Publishing Co., 1909. x+279 pages.

originality the author represents the spirit and the prevailing doctrinal views of the Moravian Brethren—their missionary ardor and their non-speculative view of truth.

The usual order of topics is followed and the positions taken correspond freely with a moderate Lutheranism. The interests of the personal religious life and Christian evangelism are made paramount. Religion is defined as "the spiritual life of man, . . . a consciousness of the existence of a higher power, a feeling of dependence and a sense of veneration and duty toward that power." Revelation is somewhat externally conceived: the Bible "records certain facts which could not have been known, except by a supernatural revelation and *which we could not accept as true*, if it were not vouched for by special divine authority." But over against a somewhat formal view of truth there stands a deep and earnest spirit of piety which animates the whole book. Thus, the church grows out of spiritual fellowship but "is established with earthly forms," which become "a real means by which redemption is applied." Free churches are preferable to national churches, but the latter are not without advantages. Similarly, the millennium idea is rejected but the visible bodily return of Christ is maintained.

It is to be regretted that too little attention is paid to the products of modern scholarship, but on the other hand, many people who desire a handbook of Christian doctrine free from dependence on scholastic terms or the controversial temper and permeated with the rich Moravian spirituality will find great comfort and help in this book.

Among the numerous contributions to an understanding of the theology of Schleiermacher,<sup>2</sup> Heinrich Scholz has offered the one that for all purposes is of the most value to the foreign student. Scholz, as an admirer of Schleiermacher, feels that the great theologian, like Kant, came a hundred years before his time and not until now has the significance of his theological innovations been appreciated. He feels that the central problem of Schleiermacher was not, as Bender represents it, the cosmological, nor, as the common emphasis on the *Reden* and the *Monologues* makes it appear, the ultimate nature of religion and morality; but it was, as Strauss clearly saw, the relation between Christianity and science. In this contention Scholz is assuredly right, for Schleiermacher was no mere advocate of a vague religious life but a firm believer in Christianity as a historical religion of eternal value; but at the same time his conviction of the ultimate unity

<sup>2</sup> *Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre*. By Heinrich Scholz. Berlin: Arthur Glaue, 1909. ix + 208 pages. M. 3.25.

of all things forced on him the attempt by a scientific method to reconcile faith and knowledge, which appeared as independent and opposed spiritual realities. As far as Christianity is concerned, Scholz points out, his aim was distinctly apologetical. Religion for him stood or fell with Christianity.

Rejecting both the illuminant and the speculative views of Christianity he pointed out once for all that religion is primarily a psychological reality and not an inference from theology. Naturally, therefore, he rejected the foundations of Christian faith which were supposed to be found in the Bible or in philosophical proofs of the existence of the God and the immortality it proclaimed, for to demonstrate Christianity is to annul it. "The renunciation, on principle, of the speculative method is the fundamental fact of Schleiermacher's theology." In place of it he posited the broad fact of the impression made on the consciousness of men by the personality of Jesus. Though devoted to the study of philosophy Schleiermacher was not distinctly original as a philosopher. To him the pure impulse to world-knowledge and the elevation to God in pious feeling were the highest forms of the development of the human spirit—the one its highest objective function and the other the highest subjective function. Both are anchored in the transcendental. The unity of these two sides of our spiritual life is found in God—not a God who is gained as the postulate of a philosophy but a God who is known to the mystical experience. As Schleiermacher said on his death-bed, the deepest speculative thoughts were to him entirely one with the most inward religious experience. The whole aim of his theology may be said to be, therefore, the exhibition of this unity to intelligence.

To understand Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* it is necessary to apprehend, first, his conception of science, second, the positive trend of his dogmatics. Science was to him that construction of like actions which has the ground of its forces in the idea of the unity of all knowledge. That is, there must be a highest knowledge which embraces all branches of the knowing-process and experiences, just as there must be a Supreme Being who is above all antitheses. But neither the highest knowledge nor the Supreme Being are directly demonstrable. The world is the unity of nature and reason and this gives us two realms of science—natural and spiritual.

Theology must also presuppose the reality of its object. Its work is to mediate to religion and thereby to the church their spiritual place in the whole of human life. Dogmatics aims to remove any uncertainty as to their place and any ambiguity as to their meaning. It becomes an expression of the doctrines valid at any time as representative of common piety



and, of course, in current language. With the present religious consciousness as its immediate source, it unites the creeds and finally the scriptures as secondary sources. Dogmatical formulae are the organized expression of what is identical in the original Christian experience with our own.

It is impossible here for want of space to follow the details of Scholz's exposition of Schleiermacher's application of these ideas to the specific doctrinal questions. The *Glaubenslehre* is examined from three standpoints: its systematic movement, its critical style and its evolutionary method. The last is especially fruitful in showing that the antitheses of reason and the supernatural, truth and error, good and evil, freedom and necessity, natural and supernatural, are not absolute. Hereby, especially, is found the reconciliation of the course of nature with the work of redemption.

One-third of the book is devoted to an examination of the apologetical attitude of the *Glaubenslehre*. One result is seen in the reduction of the range of doctrines, for example, by the exclusion of all cosmological material; another is, the pantheistic appearance of his system (Scholz holds that Schleiermacher had the Spinozist temper but did not hold the Spinozist views); and another, the absolute claims of Christianity on our faith.

Scholz points out that the only criticism that can do justice to Schleiermacher is not that which concerns itself with details, for his work was confessedly open to objection and incomplete, but that which applies to his fundamental view of the whole dogmatical problem. His own summary criticism is very pertinent: "The Christianity of the *Glaubenslehre* is . . . the lofty evangel of the spirituality, not the religion of the poor in spirit."

---

The aim of Walther's work<sup>3</sup> on Luther's views of Christian morality is confessedly to defend the traditional Lutheran views against the attacks of the Ritschlian school. It represents one of the many phases in the conflict between old and new in Lutheranism. The author's careful study of Luther brings out the fact that morality had no independent basis for Luther but grows out of faith. Faith issues in love, which includes all morality. As love is a Christian virtue produced by God's spiritual word in the heart, there is no true morality but the Christian.

Christian morality is true morality, for it is free, unconstrained, active obedience to the will of God, which will is expressed in the command to

<sup>3</sup> *Die Christliche Sittlichkeit nach Luther; Das Erbe der Reformation im Kampfe der Gegenwart*. Drittes Heft. By D. Wilh. Walther. Leipzig: Deichert, 1909. vi + 137 pages. M. 2.80.

love him. This love to God includes love of one's neighbor. All empirical commands are only specific applications of this one command and the obligation to perform any commanded action grows out of its necessary connection with the spirit of love. Thus such apparent contradictions of the principle of ethical action as, for example, war, may be right. The ethics of Luther run counter to the Roman view by his interpretation of the ideal moral state as action, as well as disposition, in the common things of life. The truly good man does good not for salvation but for love and does not think of his action as good. Luther considered that the promises of rewards and punishments in the Scriptures were not intended as appeals to self-interest but as exhibiting the worthiness or unworthiness of the conditions referred to. Self-love is no command to men.

Luther sought to elevate the common vocations of life by pointing out that each man's calling indicated for him the manner in which the command to love may be fulfilled. Everyday work became in this way a divine service. Here Luther stood in opposition to monastic ideals. Our author thinks that modern theologians in their statement of Luther's theology have inverted the relative prominence, in his writings, of the moral content of the Christian life and the doctrine of justification by faith. Yet it is admitted that Luther regarded baptism and the sacrament of the altar as external acts conveying the spirit to men and constituting the presupposition and the beginning of his inner activity. Evidently, then, Walther still leaves Luther pretty much of a Catholic.

GEORGE CROSS

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION  
NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

This volume<sup>4</sup> of admirable studies in the history of thought bears witness both to the great erudition of the author and his fine sense of historic perspective. The book should be particularly useful to students of philosophy as supplementary to the standard histories. The author differs widely from the recognized authorities in his estimate of the comparative importance of different movements and systems and this difference leads him to treat more adequately certain schools and epochs which are usually dismissed with scant mention. In this respect the first essay on the "Place and Worth of Oriental Philosophy" is characteristic of the book. Here the author disagrees with Zeller and other authorities who believe Greek philosophy to have been of home origin, and finds the source of European thought in the philosophies of India and Persia which he briefly reviews.

<sup>4</sup> *Studies in European Philosophy*. By James Lindsay, D.D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1909. 391 pages. 10s. 6d.

Again, he opposes the accepted view that the thought of the early Christian fathers is lacking in insight and originality and this leads him to devote chapters to "Origen as a Christian Philosopher" and "Augustine's Philosophy of History." Mediaeval thought is made the subject of several studies since the author thinks that the "modern contempt for scholasticism has been an affectation inherited from the Renaissance." An interesting chapter introduces us to a name unfamiliar to many students of philosophy—that of Wyclif than whom no English thinker previous "brought forth a philosophy more bold or broad." Chapters on the philosophies of France, Italy and Spain in the nineteenth century furnish valuable information in fields of thought often neglected by English students.

Dr. Lindsay develops his own philosophy in "A Constructive Essay on Idealism" and applies it in the three concluding chapters where he considers critically the metaphysical, psychological, and ethical tendencies of our time. He asserts that "of no one thing does the thought of our time stand more in need than of a revived interest in metaphysics." Metaphysics seeks the Absolute Reality, the Unconditioned Unity, which is the ground and source of all existence. This Absolute Reality can be conceived only as Spirit, and further—although grave difficulties are recognized at this point—as moral personality. As our author thus adopts the standpoint of Absolute Idealism it is hard to understand his disparaging criticism of the late Edward Caird. Certainly no English thinker of the past century has expounded this type of philosophy in so masterly and convincing a manner as the author of the "Evolution of Religion" and that gem of philosophic exposition, the little volume on *Hegel*. Perhaps the most serious defect of the present work is that, owing to limitations of space which render the treatment of certain subjects too compressed to be clear and of style of exposition which is somewhat formal and abstract, the book will be scarcely intelligible to students of theology and religion—who would naturally find its subject-matter most interesting—unless they have had a preliminary training in philosophy.

HENRY W. WRIGHT

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE  
LAKE FOREST, ILL.

In his two previous writings Grützmacher has dealt with "The Source and Principle of Theological Ethic" and "A Demand for a Modern Positive Theology." In this volume<sup>5</sup> our author sets before himself the

<sup>5</sup> *Studien zur systematischen Theologie*. Von D. Richard H. Grützmacher, Professor der Theologie in Rostock. Drittes Heft: "Eigenart und Probleme der positiven Theologie." Leipzig: Deichert, 1909. 132 pages. M. 2.60.

task of ascertaining what is the peculiar nature of the "Positive" theology as distinct from the "Liberal" theology in its two chief schools, the "Ritschlian" and the "Historical," and the consideration of problems involved.

To this task he is enticed, not merely by the pleasure felt in ascertaining the real nature of anything, but for the sake of the "Positive" theology itself. This theology is not now clearly presented as it was in the seventeenth century. Indeed, during the last ten years especially, in addition to former minor differences within the "Positive" school, there have appeared "new ways" and it has become uncertain whether these belong within the region of the "Positive" or the "Liberal" school. Besides this, there is need to win "clearness concerning the fundamental differences of the positive and the liberal theology." What is the best way to proceed? There is the historical method, to show that the origin and history of the "Positive" theology has been other than that of the "Liberal" and is therefore a different theology. But this requires a "concept" as to what the "Positive" theology is. This concept is not, indeed, ascertainable apart from history, yet one must go beyond the merely historical to win it. The "nature" of anything (religion, Christianity, philosophy) cannot be ascertained in a purely empirical way, there must be an antecedent concept. Thus the author really assumes the concept which he is seeking. Theology is "the science of the Christian religion." In theology there are therefore two elements, science and an objective element, religion.

The author deals first with the concept, science. In considering "science" the author really arrives at the crucial point of his thesis.

What is the relation between "science" and "reality"? Are they fully different, or, does one create the other, either science creating reality or vice versa? That science creates its object, few would maintain today. Few occupy this pre-Kantian or Hegelian position. Reality furnishes science with its "stuff." Yet, in theology and philosophy, there is a tendency to give place to the "speculative-productive science-concept." The author quotes even Nietzsche as calling philosophers "commanders and law-givers." This "productive" power of speculation is found in the "Historical" school. "This is in harmony with German idealism, especially Hegelianism." So men like Biedermann and Pflleiderer "dissolve the positive theology of scripture into nothing, in order to recreate a philosophically acceptable notion." "Naturally, no theologian will dream of actually calling that a Christian religion which never existed before, yet theology can so transform this religion that it is virtually another." This the "Historical" school does. Their "Jesusbild" is not taken from the sources. Troeltsch represents this tendency. The Historical school cuts and erases at

pleasure. The "Ritschlian" school differs from the "Historical." While the latter allows "science" to shape "reality," the Ritschlian lets reality and science grow up independently. The Ritschlian theology is a combination view. For natural sciences, the science is born of the facts; but for theological science, science and reality are distinct. So that theology cannot be worked in strict scientific form, and science and religion occupy two distinct territories. Thus Hermann says, "our faith forms thoughts without which it cannot live, which however contradict the fundamental thought of science" (p. 11). So Kaftan: "Knowledge in religion follows other laws than the scientific."

Over against these two schools is the Positive theology. Reality determines science. That is, theology is to represent the Scripture. The conclusion reached is, that the "Positive" theology has a right to this name from the correctness of its concept of science. This theology simply seizes and presents what is positively given in the Christian religion. The *method* in the Positive theology is scientific. The separate sciences have no right to impose their peculiar methods on other sciences. Therefore our author objects to the scientific presupposition of the "Historical" and the Ritschlian schools, which come with a pack of dogmas: "there is no absolute, nothing supernatural, nothing miraculous." To some degree theology must depend on other sciences for its material (text-criticism, etc.) but its method is formal and logical, the method common to all sciences.

Thus, the author holds, the Positive theology has further right to regard itself as genuine theology because of its method.

The author proceeds to define the Christian Religion. He affirms in apparent antagonism to Ritschlianism, "the transcendental and the mystical are essential to religion." For Ritschl, man is center and end, God is means. He regards the Jesus of the *Historical* school as a mere hero.

The "Positive" theology makes Christianity through and through a *religion*; still more, it is the true, absolute religion. For the "Historical" school the Christian religion is but "the best yet."

For the Positive theology, in Jesus Christ there is a specific, supernatural revelation which is not to be explained *imminenter*. For the Positive theology, the Trinity—Father, Son, and Spirit—is *fact*. Jesus is placed "at the side of God" and as occupying an equally divine relation to man as the Father. The pre-existence is more than mere speculation. The work of Jesus is both Godward and manward. His life and death enable God to be gracious and fatherly to the sinner. The Holy Spirit becomes "revealed," "an absolute divine personality who has free and

in sovereign control of the works of the Father and the Son, and by uniting these works what is new." The Holy Spirit becomes "an historical reality."

Under the head of "Problems" the author sets forth the "Positive" view of the scriptures. Grützmacher differs from Schmidt and Dunkman as to the relation of revelation to Jesus and the Scriptures. For Schmidt, the revelation closes with Jesus, while Dunkman says, Jesus did not reveal anything new except himself. Grützmacher seems to regard revelation as truths and this revelation is not closed with Jesus but continued till the "Scriptures" end. He regards the forty days after the resurrection "as productive of revelation." While "revelation" progresses, yet it also ends. He does not accept an indefinite perfectibility. It ends with the closing of inspired writings. The historical situation explains this termination. Inspired men "who possess the necessary presuppositions are moved to give final form to the content of revelation which they have known and comprehended" ( p. 94).

The last section of the volume deals with the "Problems of the Modern-Positive Theology." There is here much which is instructive. The author expects that differences will be removed and that a middle way through difficulties will be found.

His dealing with the subject, "the relation of theological and religious knowledge," is especially satisfactory. Genuine practical religiousness will show itself in theoretical forms. One closes this book with a feeling that its author is an unusually clear and conscientious thinker and writer. As a treatise introductory to theology it is valuable. As a statement of "Positive" theology it is transparent and forcible. Whether the schools he criticizes will admit his strictures is doubtful. That he will succeed in uniting all the "Positive" theologians is hardly to be expected, though he certainly greatly aids their opinions. His theology is almost, if not altogether, tritheistic, his view of revelation seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the relation of inspiration to revelation. Revelation should be regarded as the result of inspiration, which enables the inspired to see the meaning in what is objective. It seems an inconsistency to define the Christian religion in a purely theological way, and yet to call the Christian religion the object of science which is theology. But the volume amply repays most careful reading and is stimulating and instructive.

---

The distinguished author<sup>6</sup> states his purpose to be, to reshape the traditional doctrine of Creation and Providence under the light cast upon

<sup>6</sup> *The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence*. Twenty-first series of Cunningham Lectures. By J. Oswald Dykes, M.A., D.D. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. xvi + 336 pages. \$2.25.

nature and history since the last century opened (p. vii). Though he speaks of his work as a "humble contribution," it must be regarded as an admirable exposition of the doctrines which he discusses. The themes considered are the most difficult, yet he handles them in a clear and cogent fashion. The conclusions reached are, in the main, those accepted in the more orthodox schools of theology, yet they are not reached in dogmatic fashion, but through a fair consideration of the results presented by scientific authorities of the past century.

He first deals with the relation of theology to science and philosophy. He is anti-pragmatic, since value judgments (as he understands them) are inferior to the testing of religious belief by "its congruence with evidence." "We are driven as thinkers to seek the certainty, so far as it can be reached, of scientific knowledge" (p. 15). Religion is not of subjective origin, but is as "a permanent phenomenon, a response to a manifestation of himself, God." God is for our author distinctly Creator. He favors creation *ex nihilo*. "The existence of whatever is and is not God, has its sole cause or ground of being in God." Yet the writer in Genesis "was not thinking of creation out of nothing." He rejects the mediating idea of a *nihil privativum*. There is "no standing ground between something and nothing." His handling of this difficult question is cautious but positive. Hard as it may be to conceive of actual origination, yet "the things impossible with men are possible with God" (p. 62). What matter is, in its original form, is for physicists to determine. The "Genesis" account is "that of an untrained observer." God is dynamically imminent in creation, as Calvin also taught (p. 93 note). He finds at least three breaks in the creative(?) process, and supports his opinion from scientific sources. Natural evolution cannot explain man, as a spiritual moral being (chap. vii). Man's creation is "not continuous with what went before" (p. 147). Our author does not hesitate to speak of the "childlike and bizarre details" of the Genesis story (p. 170). The "Fall" is "inexplicable because irrational." "We are at that mysterious point in the moral history of each fallen soul where the tempted will makes an unaccountable, an arbitrary and a criminal departure" (p. 175). The "pangs of Nature" are explained because: "the existing creation is only a temporary and imperfect stage in the divine plan" (p. 218). There is "ground for hope," though "the creation is subject to vanity" (p. 224). We "must wait till we see the end" (p. 247). The divine providence is minute as well as vast. "Nothing is too insignificant to enter into the reckoning of the divine Mind."

An appendix of notes (42 pages) discusses some matters not dealt with fully in the lectures. An excellent Index adds value to the whole work,

which must be regarded as a substantial contribution to the support of the more orthodox faith.

This volume<sup>7</sup> contains the six lectures which were delivered in the Luther-Kirche in Leipzig by Pastor Hilbert. They are in defense of the Christian religion and of the more positive, orthodox, faith. They serve admirably for this purpose and well deserve the demand for their repetition three times in one winter, and a second published edition. The author weakens his position in his introduction by the assertion that "religion is independent of science," "the truth of Christianity does not admit of scientific determination." "Faith in God is never a matter of reflection." "If science cannot establish faith, it cannot destroy it"—a sentence most illogical. And, at the close of his lectures, the author admits the same uncertainty of faith. We must make a leap across the abyss, "We have all to win, nothing to lose."

Despite the weakening of his position, Pastor Hilbert leads his readers through a field of scientific argument by means of which he seeks to establish the scientific basis for belief in God as creator of the world. He shows the biological necessity for affirming the creation of man. He gives an excellent argument for the assertion that the spirit of man is not dependent on the material body, nor "parallel" to it in its working. Jesus is not only a historical person, as against those who cast doubts on his reality; he is the Son of God, he is King and Lord. He rejects with some scorn Frenssen's "modern Christ." Jesus is sinless. The reason Hilbert assigns for this sinlessness—that Jesus was essentially different from other men—is hardly satisfactory. It is easier to affirm the fact than to explain it. "The especial work of Jesus is not his life but his death." "In his death Jesus reconciled the world to God." This death is of value not merely as "example," it has its influence in effecting the forgiveness of sins. The older orthodox theory is clearly stated and ably defended.

The last lecture is on the resurrection and maintains the theory of the empty grave. The subject of miracles is not directly treated. The author however expresses his faith, in general, and his reason therefor in quoting Wundt (p. 78): "If there is mutual relationship between spirit and body, the door to miracles stands wide open"; and Paulsen: "If a sentence can move a molecule in the brain, it can just as well move mountains, or send the moon into a new course; one is as intelligible or as unintelligible as the other."

<sup>7</sup> *Christentum und Wissenschaft*. Von Gerhard Hilbert. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 176 pages. M. 3.



The work as a whole is impressive, the style is simple, the language clear, the reasoning in the main logical. Hilbert quotes freely and buttresses his position with many great names. The volume may rank as among the best defenses of orthodox religion.

ALLEN MACY DULLES

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
AUBURN, N.Y.

---

### PROBLEMS IN PRESENT-DAY FAITH

This book<sup>1</sup> is in line with Doctor Orr's other defenses of the idea of supernatural religion. He contends that evolution alone cannot account for the existence of the Christian religion, for it is inconceivable that higher forms of religion can be developed out of lower. The improvement must come from a supernatural factor, not from immanent forces or from changing environment. Christianity rests upon a unique revelation made through the redemption history recorded in the Old and in the New Testament. Except where the enlightening influence of this special revelation is felt, "impartial study shows the history of religion to have been rather that of the obscuration of what purer light may originally have been possessed." The task of the book is to explain the nature of the unique revelation which is contained in the Bible. By emphasizing three factors, viz., (1) the redemption history, which constitutes the revelation proper, (2) the inspiration of divinely endowed men who guided that revelation history by word and deed, and (3) the record of this revelation and inspiration in the Bible, Dr. Orr believes that partial and indefensible conceptions may be corrected.

What is the outcome of his investigation? The inspiration of the biblical authors did not exempt them from dependence on the ordinary sources of historical information, and consequently does not render their statements immune from historical criticism; it did not release them from belief in the current scientific ideas of their times, and thus does not exempt them from scientific criticism; it did not dictate the literary form of their messages, and hence allows place for literary criticism. But after having made these statements, Dr. Orr introduces several cautionary remarks. We may admit that Ecclesiastes is pseudepigraphic without destroying our belief in its inspiration; but to ascribe Deuteronomy to any author except Moses would be disastrous. We may recognize the large use of parable; but it would be a serious matter to regard the story of Jonah as fiction. We may recognize the use of legend in the book of Jude, but we must beware of

<sup>1</sup> *Revelation and Inspiration*. By James Orr. New York: Scribner, 1910, vii + 224 pages. \$0.75.

considering the book of Genesis as largely legendary. Just how and why these and similar distinctions are to be made is not very clearly indicated. Moreover, when it is stated that revelation is always limited by the stage of religious culture to which an age has reached, so that revelation in Old Testament times was compelled to admit into itself practices which later were discovered to be morally indefensible, it becomes difficult to feel that Dr. Orr ascribes to supernatural powers as much influence as is demanded by his thesis. Of course, one who knows the Bible has no question as to its exceptional character as a record of religious achievement. But after so many concessions as Dr. Orr is compelled to make, is it not a stronger apologetic position to seek for the causes of the superiority of the biblical religion by a thorough-going use of critical methods, than to attempt to withdraw those causes from the reach of criticism by locating them in a supernatural realm admittedly beyond the reach of our understanding?

GERALD B. SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

---

The attempt<sup>2</sup> of John Wilson to present the full sweep of the idea of Revelation seems at first sight to be merely an improved statement of the ordinary Christian apology as against naturalism, but in reality it is much more. It is rather a devotional work of a very high order, a meditation on the religious meaning of the universe of our perception and on the message of the biblical writings. It cannot be said that there is anything exactly new in either the method or the ideas of the book but the author is the master of a style which for dignity, force, clearness, and warmth is rarely equaled today.

The question, How far is the character of the God depicted in the Christian revelation commensurate with the grandeur of the material cosmos as exhibited in the most recent discoveries of science, the author tries to answer by viewing first of all the vastness of the universe and the infinitely complicated organization of its minute constituent elements as a grand system of reality related to our mental and physical activity and as a base out of which our physical life arose. The "cloud of innumerable whirling atoms" becomes "a complex harmony as if its component particles had been dancing in responsive accord with some celestial music." The manner in which Mr. Wilson in this part of his work has compressed the results of his most extensive reading on scientific subjects into small dimensions without sacrificing its wealth of suggestion is admirable.

<sup>2</sup> *How God Has Spoken, or Divine Revelation in Nature, in Man, in Hebrew History, and in Jesus Christ.* By John Wilson. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. xvi + 344 pages. \$2 net.

Next follows a discussion of revelation as seen in human nature everywhere, in the Hebrew religion, in the Incarnation, and the Atonement. The scope of the work prepares the reader for such an interpretation of nature as shows its meaning and worth, in the climactic unfolding of life from the lowest animate being to the highest spiritual being, in perfect personality. But those high expectations which the early part of the work arouses are realized only in part in the later portions. While the literary form and the profound moral tone of the work are sustained throughout, the author's discussion of the Christian revelation is hampered by an effort to uphold views of history and faith and a conception of the divine communion with man which makes revelation an ordered, successive, external communication of doctrinal truth. For example, the philosophic conception of a metaphysical incarnation of Deity in Christ is assumed to be a truth conveyed by revelation, and then in defense of it we are told (183) that "some form of kenosis must be and is actually held by all who are faithful to New Testament teaching," and there is a Logos that had a conscious existence from eternity. The "subconscious origin of the soul" and some sort of metempsychosis become a means of meeting the difficulties of the doctrine. The body is even called (315) a prison-house for Christ.

The more strictly doctrinal portion of this valuable book needs reconstruction.

---

Something of the effect of the modernist movement on the Catholic church in France may be gathered from a volume from the pen of the Archbishop of Albi<sup>3</sup> containing four essays on current theological topics, to which are joined two funeral orations. The subjects are, "Evolutionism in Relation to Religion," "Criticism and Tradition," "The Church and Science," "The Bible and the Religions." The author's aim, as indicated in the preface, is to defend the church against the charge that it is opposed to science: "The act by which the religious authority guards the deposit of revelation and fixes the faith is at the same time a rein and a stimulant to critical activity, theological and apologetical."

The first and most important of the essays is intended to refute A. Sabatier's *Philosophy of Religion*. Religion is objectively given to meet human need and can not arise from within man. Without such positive religion all we have is an individual illuminism that leads to absolute scepticism. Sabatier's theory—contrary to Protestantism with its authoritative Bible, and Catholicism with its Bible-interpreting church, makes

<sup>3</sup> *L'Église et la critique*. By Mgr. Mignot. Paris: Gabalda, 1910. xi+314 pages. \$3.50.

religion a matter of the temperament and every man's true. In this connection he asks the characteristic and tell-tale question: "Which of the prophecies, for example, would have been applied to the Savior if the church had not determined the sense?" He will have nothing short of oracles, authentic responses from God. Notwithstanding some concessions, he must belittle the work of science and his final reply to Sabatier is dogmatical—Sabatier's views are un-Christian even when the terms used are Christian.

In the three other essays the position is not different and the discussions overlap. It does not seem probable that any priest who has been infected with the modern spirit is likely to be influenced in his opinion by this work. The writer appears as a cultivated and pious official, possessed of a matter-of-fact view of things and a worthy desire to preserve the church intact, who when he philosophizes is guided by a practical end rather than by an interest in the discovery of truth, for the truth, for him, as given in dogmas, is fixed for ever.

GEORGE CROSS

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION  
NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

---

## THE HASTINGS ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS

To the editors and publishers of this work<sup>1</sup> recognition is due for a magnificent courage in projecting so large a work in a comparatively new field. For, in spite of the conjunction of "ethics" with "religion," the latter is the principal interest. That the trait was courage and not rashness is happily proved by the reception which the first two volumes have met. Yet an inevitable element in the data on which judgment is to be formed is the size of the work. For this is not a series of disconnected volumes from which a selection may be made, but one work which subscribers are obligated to take at a cost of eighty dollars. The size and scope are such that a rival or supplementary work is out of the range of immediate commercial probability; in other words, the editors have pre-empted the field. Having done this, they have assumed no ordinary responsibility. While they have clearly seen and wisely seized a great opportunity, they have the larger task of living up to it. And this task is much greater than that so well performed by the senior editor in the more limited field of biblical

<sup>1</sup>*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D. with the Assistance of John A. Selbie, M.A., D.D., and Other Scholars. Vol. II, "Arthur-Bunyan," New York: Scribner; Edinburgh: Clark, 1910, xxii+901 pages. \$8.00.

study. The worker in comparative religion requires a catholicity of spirit, a range of knowledge, a nicety of judgment, an awe before facts which he may not gloss or explain away but must endeavor to understand, a depth of information such as few departments of knowledge demand. Moreover, the making of cyclopedias has become almost a science; it does not mean merely securing and printing articles, nor merely "covering the field." It involves co-ordination of materials, securing effective supplements, and making the whole detail orderly and relatively complete without waste of space by repetition.

The second volume follows the lines of the first. It contains about 190 articles by about 170 authors of at least nine nationalities; three-fourths, however, are from the British empire. The articles thus average rather less than five pages. But subtracting forty-four articles of one page or less, the rest average over six pages. There are also a number of title cross-references, and a full page of others is prefixed. Some of the articles are composite having the inherent excellences and defects of this type, notable examples of which are: "Asceticism" (12 authors—48 pages), "Atheism" (9-18), "Atomic Theory" (4-14), "Baptism" (9-44), "Birth" (13-29), "Blest, Abode of the" (7-30), "Blood-Feud" (8-15), "Body" (7-20). Prominent articles by single authors are: "Aryan Religion" (O. Schrader, 46 pages), "Austerities" (MacCulloch, 10), "Baal" (Paton, 10), "Bantu and South Africa" (Hartland, 16), "Bengal" (Crooke, 22), "Berbers" (Basset, 13), "Bible" (Sanday, 17), "Bible in the Church" (Dobschütz, 36), "Biology" (Simpson, 13), "Boddhisattva" (De la Vallée Poussin, 14), "Brahmanism" (Jacobi, 13), "Brahma Samaj" (Farquhar, 10), "Bridge" (Knight, 8), and "Brotherhood, Artificial" (Hamilton-Grierson, 14). The range of the articles is wider than the title of the book, and the insertion of some of these is in itself reprehensible, since they have no relation to the main topics, while others by their method of treatment do not justify their admission. Of the former class are "Association," part of "Atomic Theory," "Atrophy," "Attention," "Attraction and Repulsion," "Biology," "Blindness," and "Brain and Mind"; of the latter class are "Biogenesis," "Boldness," "Boys' Brigades." The space taken by these might have been more pertinently used.

The roll of contributors is, in the main, one of distinction. It includes folk-lorists like Clodd, Crawley, and Hartland; Sanscritists like Deussen, Hopkins, Jolly, Crooke, and Rhys Davids; such Semitic scholars as Barton, Paton, and Zimmern; Arabists like Arnold, Browne, Goldziher, and Margoliouth; and historians of the church like Barnes, Dobschütz, Lake, and Sanday. Of course some articles even by eminent scholars are a

disappointment. Zimmern's "Babylonians and Assyrians" does not rise above the commonplace; Schrader's "Aryan Religion" is in part vitiated by his brief for ancestor worship to the exclusion of a very evident fetishism and animism; Jeremias' "Book of Life" suffers from the obtrusion of his astral theory; Sanday's "Bible" is practically a condensation of his Bampton's Lectures with some notice of later literature, and the conservative position is maintained, for instance, with regard to the Fourth Gospel with but few concessions to advance in critical views. On the other hand, such an article as that by Dr. Dobschütz on "The Bible in the Church" lends distinction to the volume as a model of orderly development, succinct discussion, and sound statement.

Worthy of special mention are "Brahma Samaj" by Farquhar, "Arya Samaj" by Griswold (the two exhibiting two of the three notable modern Hindoo theistic movements), and Browne's "Bab, Babism." The composite articles are in general good; the lack here is co-ordination. It happens for instance that the introduction at times traverses and repeats material given by the other writers (cf. 370 with 410). But the average of the articles is very high. Even the utility writers have done well, showing diligence in the collection of facts.

The chief defects are in the finer points of editing. The principal marks of editorial supervision are in the reduction of references to a standard form (in which there are slips; cf. the cryptic entry "*Lib. pont. ad Usener*," 343). While topics not legitimately within the scope of the work are included (see above), serious omissions occur. Among geographical articles one wonders why Brazil but not Bolivia is present. Unpardonable is the omission of Asia Minor, a region most important ethnologically and also for the history of religion, serving, as it did, as the melting-pot in which religions passing from the East westward were fused and received new form. Are there to be denominational articles? "Plymouth Brethren" is found, but not "Baptists." The system of cross-references is defective; e.g., "Bereans" has much to say of John Barclay, but the necessary entry "Barclay, John.—See Bereans" is missing. Of twenty-one longer articles by individual authors only five have what all should have, a conspectus of the contents. In the list of contributors there appears sometimes the full name, sometimes the initials, now one given name and initials; there seems to be no regular order in which academic degrees are given.

But lack of editorial care is most evident in the bibliographies. Here the editor-in-chief has given hostages by admitting to his journal finical criticism of a current work, labeling "incorrect" bibliographical entries which are letter perfect, and neglecting to make correction though informed

of his error. The editors do not seem to know that an adequate bibliographical entry includes six particulars: (1-2) author's name with initials (or full name), (3) title of work, (4-5) place and date of publication, and (6) number of volumes; given these, the reader may be expected to find the book. Omission of any of these is serious error.

In the various lists of references given here sometimes the full name, sometimes initials, sometimes only the surname, appears, while place or date may or may not be present. The reviewer is not disposed to press minor inaccuracies, which are found but do not very seriously affect the value of the bibliographies. It is, however, gravely misleading to insert an entry (266): "J. Müller, *Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, Munich, 1859 (Germ. tr. 1875)," which should read "Averroes, *Die Philosophie und Theologie (arabisch)*, in *Monumenta saecularia*, Munich, 1859 (Germ. tr. from the Arabic, 1875)." Especially necessary is mention of the place of publication when the book appeared outside the ordinary channels (e.g., p. 245, Furness' *Folklore in Borneo* was printed at Wallingford, Pa.; p. 328, Risley's *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* was issued at Calcutta). Not one reader out of ten, if he wished to obtain them, would know how to go to work to find where these two books were issued.

Furthermore, many of the bibliographies, though rich and full and in the vast majority of cases correct, are chaotic in form, showing no principle of arrangement. Ideal arrangement of a list of works is that in order of importance, but it is difficult. Attainable is mention of leading works first and after that chronological order. But in some of the fullest and otherwise most valuable lists in this work the titles are apparently "dumped" together. This is not twentieth-century bibliography, and it is a serious blemish on the work.

Eight volumes are still to appear. The editors may yet make great contributions to the usefulness of their very worthy publication.

GEO. W. GILMORE

NEW YORK, N.Y.

## BRIEF MENTION

## OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

MARGOLIS, MAX L. *A Manual of the Aramaic Language of the Babylonian Talmud*. Grammar, Chrestomathy, and Glossaries. [Clavis linguarum Semiticarum. Edidit Hermann L. Strack.] München: Beck; New York: Stechert, 1910. xvi+284 pages. \$3.

This is the third volume to appear in Dr. Strack's new series. Its predecessors have been a Hebrew Grammar by Dr. Strack himself, and a Babylonian Grammar, by Dr. Ungnad. The present volume is well worthy of a place alongside of these two. A modern grammar of the Aramaic of the Talmud in concise and usable form has long been a desideratum. Indeed, so far as the syntax of the Talmudic speech is concerned, this is the first presentation of the subject. More than half of the present book is given to the chrestomathy and the vocabulary. These are both deserving of unstinted praise for the care and accuracy that characterize their presentation. The grammatical treatment is marked by clearness and insight throughout. No better book could be asked for as an introduction to the language of the Babylonian Talmud.

DRIVER, S. R. *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. New ed. New York: Scribner, 1910. xxxii+577 pages. \$2.50.

This is in fact the eighth edition of this famous work. It is unfortunate that the title-page should describe it as "printed from new plates" when as a matter of fact the author himself says, "It has not been found necessary this time to have the book reset; the needful alterations and additions have been all introduced on the stereotyped plates" (p. xiv). A well-known and standard work like this does not need misleading advertising. The scope of the revision may be seen from the following statement: "The principal and most numerous changes are those that have been involved in bringing the bibliography up to date and in incorporating notices either of new facts that have been discovered, or of new views that have been propounded, since 1897" (p. xiv). Dr. Driver does valuable service in exposing some misrepresentations of critical positions made by Professor Sayce and taken up in turn by one defender of traditional views after another (pp. xviii ff.). Dr. Driver records no changes of opinion on his own part of any significance. In the new materials of interest, one of the most important is his judgment that the Aramaic of the Assuan papyri may not be used as legitimate argument for the exilic origin of Daniel; for the differences between the Egyptian Aramaic and the biblical are far more numerous and significant than the resemblances. The book increases in value to students with each new edition.

HAUTSCH, E. *Der Lukiantext des Oclateuch*. [Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Heft 1.] Berlin: Weidmann, 1910. 28 pages. M. 1.

The Royal Society of Göttingen has set itself the task of determining the Septuagint text in its original form. This involves a tremendous amount of preliminary investigation. Before the Alexandrian version can be recovered as it first came into being it is necessary among other things to identify the existing representatives of the Hesychian and Lucianic texts, a task of no small magnitude and one involving the finest delicacy of perception and keenness of discrimination. The present pamphlet constitutes one



of these preliminary studies. It attempts to show, chiefly by a comparison of the citations of Diodorus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Chrysostom from the Octateuch with the readings of a certain group of MSS, whether or not the latter may rightly be regarded as representing the Lucian recension. Such work as this is of the greatest value and importance for textual students.

GINSBURG, C. D. *Isaias: Diligenter revisus juxta Massorah atque editiones principes cum variis lectionibus e MSS atque antiquis versionibus collectis.* Londinii: Sumptibus Societatis Bibliophilorum Britannicae et externae, MCMIX. 93 pages.

Dr. Ginsburg has spent the most of his active life in the study of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament. *Isaias* is a specimen of the new and latest text upon which he has put years of toil. This when completed is to commemorate the centenary of the British and Foreign Bible Society. The author has had at his command the manuscript and printed biblical treasures of the British Museum, within whose walls he has done the greater part of his work. The basis of this new version is the text "of the first edition of Jacob ben Chayim's *Massoretic Recension* (printed by Bomberg in Venice in 1524-25) with the correction of obvious errors." Dr. Ginsburg has collated this edition with a large number of authorities never before consulted, and has examined more than seventy MSS in the British Museum, and in the libraries of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. He has also included therein the ancient versions and the Targums. As a result of this examination he brought together every important variation in orthography, vowel-pointing, accent, and reading, and the variant massoretic sectional divisions. These variations appear at the foot of the page, often occupying from one-third to one-half of a printed page  $11 \times 7\frac{1}{2}$  inches. The Hebrew type is the most beautiful that we have ever seen.

BRANDT, W. *Die jüdischen Baptismen oder das religiöse Waschen und Baden im Judentum mit Einschluss des Judenchristentums.* [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft XVIII.] Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. vi + 148 pages. M. 6.

The author traces the development of Jewish baptismal rites from the days of Israel's wanderings in the desert down to the early days of the Christian church. The original significance of the act of ritualistic washing is found in the belief of the primitive Hebrews that contact with other deities than Yahweh rendered one taboo and that this taboo could be removed by washing and must be so disposed of before one could venture into Yahweh's presence. Growing out of the same fundamental conception was the requirement, which persisted to the very end, that priests and others who had come into close contact in any way with the holiness of Yahweh must wash away this holiness before returning to the discharge of the ordinary duties of profane life. The sacred and profane were two separate spheres; to pass from the one to the other in either direction called for ablutions to remove the effect of the sphere in which the individual was at the time in question. Baptisms of various kinds thus came to occupy a very large place in Jewish ritual. Naturally when foreigners wished to forsake the worship of idols and join themselves to the people of Yahweh, the initial rite for the proselyte was that of baptism whereby the defilement of the old religion was removed. In like manner the

baptism of John was a washing-away of sin. This conception of baptism prevailed also among the Ebionites and the Elkesites and closely related heretical groups. The study is useful for its collection into one easily accessible place of all the more important data for the history and meaning of Jewish baptism; it is rich in citations from the sources.

SULZBERGER, MAYER. *The Am Ha-arets: The Ancient Hebrew Parliament*. Philadelphia: Greenstone, 1909. 96 pages.

The author prepared, and read before the professors and students of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, the present paper as one of a series of popular lectures. It is an attempt to show that the roots of the Sanhedrin are to be found in a national assembly of Israel which had its beginning as far back as in the time of Moses. The lecture comprises three parts: (1) the political power of *am ha-arets*; (2) its judicial power; (3) the witness of literature. The treatment for a brief space is scholarly and able, and certainly has some strong points in its favor, e. g., in the history and conduct of the trial which brought about the stoning of the house of Naboth (I Kings, chap. 21), and also the arrest and trial of Jeremiah (Jer., chap. 26). We think, however, that a more detailed textual study must be made of all the passages used before the author's chief thesis can be indisputably maintained.

PROCKSCH, O. *Studien zur Geschichte der Septuaginta: Die Propheten*. [Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von R. Kittel. Heft 7.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 134 pages. M. 4.

The purpose of this work is threefold: (1) to classify the many minuscule MSS of the prophets on the basis of the various uncials from which they must have arisen and so to point out certain types of uncials which must once have existed alongside of Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, Alexandrinus, etc.; (2) to consider the relation of these unknown uncials to the known uncials and to one another, and to determine which represents the purest and which the most corrupt form of the Septuagint text; and (3) to throw some light upon the history of the Septuagint text. Dr. Procksch classifies his MSS into three groups, viz., the hexaplar group (I), the pre-hexaplar (II), and the Lucian (III). From among all the codices of the prophetic books, Alexandrinus is selected as the most valuable witness to the original Septuagint; next to it in value comes Sinaiticus representing another textual tradition. Marchalianus (Q) is to be classified with Alexandrinus (A), while Vaticanus (B) belongs to the Sinaiticus (Σ) group. ΣB represents the type of text to which Origen's Septuagint belongs. Midway between the groups ΣB and AQ, showing traces of the influence of both, stands the hexaplar group of minuscules, but more closely related to ΣB; while the pre-hexaplar group belongs to AQ. Thus two main types of text, viz., ΣBI and AQII, were independent of and preceded the recensions of Origen and Lucian, at the hands of which they suffered many things after coming in touch with them. The study closes with a history of the Greek text of the prophets and a summary of the results obtained. The general conclusion reached is that the history of the Septuagint is the story of its removal from the maximum to the minimum of distance from the Massoretic text. The author deserves the hearty thanks of all students of the complicated problem of the rise of the Septuagint for his valuable contribution.

## NEW TESTAMENT

GEFFCKEN, J. *Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums: Studien und Charakteristiken*. Zweite Auflage. [Aus Natur und Geisteswelt.] Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. 126 pages. M. 1.25.

Professor Geffcken's sketch, which now appears in a second edition, seeks to acquaint the general reader with the character of the Graeco-Roman world into which Christianity entered, and the early struggles which resulted. The primitive enthusiastic movements, the persecutions, the literary conflicts with Greek and Roman thought are treated with skill and breadth of view. The book is in short a concise popular introduction to early Christian history. It deserves an index.

*The Codex Alexandrinus in Reduced Photographic Facsimile: New Testament and Clementine Epistles*. London: British Museum, 1909. 11 pages. 286 plates. 30s.

An important service has been rendered textual students in the publication of this beautiful facsimile of Alexandrinus in quarto form. The great folio facsimile of the New Testament volume of Alexandrinus appeared just thirty years ago, Alexandrinus being the first New Testament uncial to be published in photographic facsimile. The new edition is much more elegant and attractive, and its reduced form (it is about half the actual size of the manuscript) and the references at the foot of each page indicating the text each covers, make it an exceedingly convenient and satisfactory medium for consulting the text of the manuscript. Mr. Kenyon contributes a brief introduction, dealing with the history and characteristics of the whole manuscript. He concludes that five scribes worked upon it, four of them being represented in the New Testament part. The codex is generally assigned to the fifth century, probably only Vaticanus and Sinaiticus, among Greek biblical manuscripts, being older. The Trustees of the British Museum propose to follow this New Testament volume with a similar facsimile of the Old Testament parts of the codex. Textual students are to be congratulated upon such accessions to their materials as this excellent facsimile, and those of Sinaiticus and the Freer manuscripts which are now being prepared.

PEAKE, ARTHUR S. *A Critical Introduction to the New Testament*. ["Studies in Theology."] New York: Scribner, 1910. xii+242 pages. \$0.75 net.

Students of the New Testament will welcome this concise Introduction, from the pen of Professor Peake, of Manchester. It is probably impossible to compress an adequate introduction to the New Testament into 240 pages of moderate size, yet within these narrow limits Professor Peake has given us an extremely useful and informing book. His attitude is historical and critical; tradition is recognized, but not mistaken as final. Much attention is paid to recent critical opinion, which is briefly, fairly, and intelligently set forth. Useful bibliographies for each chapter are supplied at the close of the volume. The book opens with the Pauline epistles and closes with the Gospel of John. Professor Peake inclines to the acceptance of II Thessalonians, Colossians, and, with some reserve, Ephesians, as Paul's; he favors the South Galatian view of the destination of Galatians; and holds the closing chapters of II Corinthians to belong to the supposedly lost "severe letter"; The synoptic problem is discussed at some length, and the Synoptic Gospels are then somewhat scantily treated. Two-fifths of the book relate to the Johannine literature. Pro-

fessor Peake sees no reason to doubt that the seven letters of the Apocalypse were written by a John, but does not identify this John with the Apostle; the Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, he is disposed to ascribe to John the Apostle.

Some books which might have been expected to appear in the bibliographies are not included in them; they are nevertheless tolerably full, and decidedly helpful. The defect in the whole work is its failure to introduce us, by analysis, summary, or short paraphrase, to the course of thought in each of the works discussed. Professor Peake has evidently conceived his *Critical Introduction* as not including this, and perhaps his space would not permit it.

*Handbuch zum Neuen Testament.* In Verbindung mit H. Gressmann *et al.*, herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann. 7.-14. Lieferungen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907-9.

The fourteenth *Lieferung*, completing the fifth volume of this series, finishes the practical exposition of the whole New Testament. The aim has been to bring out the religious content of these books for readers who wish to take the modern critical standpoint and the attempt is certainly timely. The work is prepared for the benefit of preachers and religious teachers. The other volumes, more technical in character, are progressing slowly. The eleventh and thirteenth *Lieferungen* contain, respectively, the exegesis of II Cor. and the first half of Matthew.

STEINMANN, ALPHONS. *Aretas IV. König der Nabatäer. Eine historisch-exegetische Studie zu II Cor. 11:32 f.* Freiburg: Herder, 1909. 44 pages.

This is a compilation of the available information regarding the Arabian king, Aretas IV, whose representative in Damascus was persuaded by the Jews to attempt Paul's arrest. Steinmann restates the view of Schürer (and of others), claiming that Aretas held Damascus in the years 37-40 by grant of Emperor Gaius. Accordingly Paul's conversion is placed in 35-37. It is doubtful whether the restatement of this opinion without any substantially new evidence will be convincing to those who have formerly found it unsatisfactory.

---

#### PATRISTICS

REICHARDT, WALTHER. *Die Briefe des Sextus Julius Africanus an Aristides und Origines.* [Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXIV 3.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 84 pages. M. 3.

The fragmentary letter of the third-century critic, Africanus, to Aristides, seeks to harmonize the genealogies in Matthew and Luke by appeal to the Jewish custom of levirate marriage. Africanus contended that the list in Matthew gives Joseph's ancestors "according to nature"; while that in Luke gives his ancestors "according to law." The letter of Africanus to Origen written *ca.* 240 A.D., deals with the authenticity of Susanna. Africanus points out the several particulars of style and matter in Susanna which are unfavorable to or inconsistent with its character, and his letter has long been regarded as a model of ancient criticism. From all the textual materials accessible Reichardt re-edits the Greek text of these letters with some account of the manuscripts which preserve them. He holds that the form in which the best manuscripts present the letter to Aristides is the original, rather than the somewhat arbitrary reconstruction of the letter which Spitta has thought necessary.

HEMMER, HIPPOLYTE. *Les Pères apostoliques*. II: "Clément de Rome; Epître aux Corinthiens; Homélie du II<sup>e</sup> siècle." Text grec, Traduction française, Introduction et Index. ["Textes et Documents."] Paris: Picard, 1909. 204 pages. Fr. 3.

Hemmer presents substantially the Greek text of Funk with translations and brief introductions. His views are in general in accord with the best critical opinion as to I and II Clement. The idea of Harnack and Hilgenfeld that II Clement is Soter's letter to Corinth is rejected, and that document is ascribed to some Corinthian preacher of the first half of the second century. The notes are brief but helpful. Polycarp to the Philippians 2:3 should certainly have been referred to in connection with I Clem. 13:2, where almost the same strange words are quoted as sayings of the Lord.

LE LONG, AUGUSTE. *Les pères apostoliques*. III, Ignace d'Antioche et Polycarpe de Smyrne: Epîtres; Martyre de Polycarpe. Texte Grec, traduction française, introduction et index. ["Textes et Documents."] Paris: Picard, 1910. lxxx+187 pages. Fr. 3.

This twelfth volume of Hemmer and Le Jay's convenient series of patristic texts with introduction, translations, and notes, indicates the lively interest of French Catholic scholars in patristic literature. Le Long adopts the Greek text of Funk, and follows the main positions of the leading patristic scholars in matters of introduction. His notes are less full and technical than those of Lightfoot, and are well adapted to the needs of students, as the general editors intend. Le Long holds to the substantial authenticity of the martyrdom, the Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians, and the seven Eusebian Letters of Ignatius, as preserved in the shorter Greek form.

ARCHAMBAULT, GEORGES. *Justin: Dialogue avec Tryphon*. Text grec, Traduction française, Introduction, Notes et Index. Tome II. ["Textes et Documents."] Paris: Picard, 1909. 396 pages. Fr. 3.50.

The first part of Archambault's edition of Justin's *Dialogue* appeared less than a year ago, and contained the introduction and the text and translation of chaps. 1-xxvii. The second part continues these through chaps. lxxiv-cxlii, and supplies a useful index of the more important Greek words. This seems to be the first edition of the *Dialogue* in which the chapters, some of which are very long, are divided into verses or sections; a most useful innovation, in which it is to be hoped subsequent editors will follow it. The two parts constitute an intelligent and convenient edition of one of the most important pieces of early Christian literature.

#### CHURCH HISTORY

CONNOLLY, R. H. *The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*. With an appendix by Edward Bishop. [Texts and Studies, VIII, 1.] Cambridge: University Press, 1909. lxxvi+176 pages. 6s. net.

Narsai of Nisibis was a Nestorian leader of the fifth century, teaching at Edessa for twenty years prior to 457, and then founding the Nestorian School at Nisibis, where he labored until his death in 502. An eastern scholar has recently published his homilies in Syriac (Mosul, 1905) and the important bearing of four of these upon liturgical history, especially in the matters of the mass and baptism, has led to this

publication of them in an English translation, with notes and introduction. Students of liturgics will find these homilies important material, and Mr. Connolly has interpreted them with sympathy and skill.

DOUMERGUE, E. *Iconographie Calvinienne*. Suivie de deux appendices: Catalogue des portraits gravés de Calvin, par H. Maillart-Gosse; Inventaire des Médailles concernant Calvin, par E. de Mole. Lausanne: Bridel, 1909. viii + 280 pages. Fr. 30.

This remarkable book has been called forth by the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Calvin, which has been recently celebrated at Geneva. Doumergue, the dean of the Protestant theological faculty at Montauban, has already published extensively upon the life and works of Calvin, and this new work shows wide and intimate acquaintance with both the literature and the documents relating to the biography of the French reformer. Portraits of Calvin, painted or engraved, are numerous, but few of these are demonstrably authentic. The most familiar one is the Rotterdam picture, probably a copy of an original portrait now lost, which was painted from life. The Basle portrait bears a very close resemblance to the Rotterdam. These show Calvin in his early manhood. Of still greater interest is the Tronchin portrait, now at Bessinges, which shows the Reformer as he appeared rather late in life. This remarkable picture possesses added interest for having once belonged to Calvin's successor, Theodore de Bèze, and was probably painted from life. In it we may believe we come nearest to Calvin as he actually appeared. These and a host of less important portraits are reproduced and discussed by Doumergue, with great liveliness and appreciation. The caricaturists did not neglect Calvin. Opponents, both Protestant and Catholic, employed cartoons and grotesques of varying degrees of scurrility against him, and the reproductions and discussions of these instructively illuminate the history of the times. The work is finely illustrated by more than one hundred plates and illustrations, and includes an inventory of the medals relating to Calvin and a catalogue of engraved portraits of him.

TIXERONT, J. *Historie des Dogmes*. II, "De Saint Athanase à Saint Augustine" (348-430). Paris: Gabalda, 1909. 534 pages.

The present work belongs to a series entitled *Bibliothèque de l'enseignement de l'histoire ecclésiastique*, inaugurated in 1897 and intrusted by Pope Leo XIII to Cardinals Luca, Pitra, and Hergenröther. The aim was to secure the publication of a universal church history fully abreast of modern critical research. As the volume is published with the approval of the archbishop of Lyon and Vienne its ultramontane quality may be assumed. Nearly half of the volume is devoted to the Arian, Apollinarian, Nestorian, and Eutychian controversies, and more than half to the theology of Augustine and to the Donatist, Pelagian, and Manichaean controversies, minor Greek and Latin thinkers and parties being in each case duly considered. Every doctrinal issue is discussed with ample knowledge of the sources and abundant quotations in the original languages. So far as the reviewer has observed, the exposition is fair-minded and free from effort to distort the facts. The style is simple and lucid, so that one need not be at a loss to understand the writer's meaning. The work may safely be commended to students of theology who possess a good knowledge of French. A third volume will complete the work and will cover the period from the death of Augustine to the age of Charlemagne.

LANG, A. *Die Reformation und das Naturrecht*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909. 51 pages. M. o. 60.

This brochure appears in the series "Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie," edited by Professors Schlatter of Tübingen and Lütgert of Halle. It had already been published in English in the *Princeton Review* for April, 1909. The essay was occasioned, as were similar polemical publications by Böhmer, Loofs, Kattenbusch, and Hunzinger, by a somewhat unguarded remark in E. Tröltsch' *Kultur der Gegenwart* to the effect that Luther and the reformers in general belong, so far as their views of nature (natural ethics, natural theology, natural science) are concerned, to the Middle Ages. The reason for the extreme sensitiveness of Lutheran scholars that has resulted in such a polemical output seems to be the disparagement of Luther that seemed to be involved in Tröltsch' remark rather than their belief that in the attitude of Luther and the other reformers toward nature there was any very marked divergence from mediaeval conceptions. It does not appear to the reviewer that Tröltsch is in error in maintaining that as compared with modern scientific conceptions the reformers were upon essentially mediaeval ground; but if he wishes to imply that they were to blame for not entering fully into modern conceptions the polemics are perhaps justifiable. Tröltsch might have gone even farther without overstepping the mark and have said that in his conceptions of nature Luther was more naively primitive than such mediaeval philosophers as Raymund of Sabiende or such humanists as Marsilio Ficino, Albano, Telesius, and Erasmus.

---

#### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

LOUIS, M. *Doctrines religieuses des philosophes grecs*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1909. vii + 374 pages. Fr. 4.

This book is an excellent popular presentation of the subject-matter named in its title. It can hardly be regarded—and, in fact, is not intended—as an original contribution to the subject nor as adding anything of importance to human knowledge: it simply puts together in excellent form what is known concerning the development of religious ideas among the Greek philosophers. To some extent it, therefore, parallels Caird's *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, and yet differs from it considerably, both in being more popular and less profound and in dealing with religion rather than with theology. Caird's book belongs to the history of philosophy; this belongs to the history of religion.

M. Louis seeks to show not only that there was a large amount of unity in the developments of Greek thought, but also that the attitude of the leading philosophers of Greece toward religion was essentially one. The idea that Greek philosophy was a veiled attack upon religion and that it sought to substitute for it mere science and ethics is, M. Louis insists, an essentially modern view; religion was so intimate a part of Greek life that the thought of doing without it is essentially non-Hellenic. The Greek philosophers, including even Epicurus, sought not to overthrow religion but to purify it.

In conclusion, M. Louis takes up a question of present-day interest—the relative importance, namely, of Hellenism and Christianity in our modern life and for the future of the race. He states clearly the position of those who, like the Croisets, maintain that the victory of Christianity, or revealed religion, over Hellenism was a tremendous misfortune to humanity, and who prophesy that Hellenism, which they

identify with naturalism, is destined soon to regain its rights and, driving out its rival, rule supreme. This view M. Louis attacks at two points. In the first place, the real Hellenism was essentially religious and is no more to be identified with naturalism than is Christianity itself. And, secondly, naturalism never satisfied the Greek philosophers and certainly cannot satisfy us nor the humanity of the future. The Greeks needed religion as well as science, and so do we. Hence our author comes (in good orthodox fashion) to his conclusion that Hellenism had its place in the divine plan, and that Christianity is shown thereby to have originated exactly "in the fulness of time."

On the whole the book deserves warm commendation. It accomplishes what it sets out to perform. It is both scholarly and simple, and it will prove as helpful as anything which has yet appeared to those who wish to inform themselves upon the religious doctrines of the Greek philosophers, and yet have not the time to study them in the original writings.

---

#### DOCTRINAL

BURTON, MARION LE ROY. *The Problem of Evil: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. 234 pages. \$1.25.

This monograph will do a real service. The interpretation of Augustine in his treatment of evil, despite reiterations, is clearly presented. If God created only that which is good, then what is evil and whence is it? Augustine denies that evil is a substance; he regards it as a flaw, something contrary to nature, a negation of the good, a defect. In itself, it is non-existent; it exists only in relation to some good. God is not responsible for it. It arises from creation out of nothing, and from man's freedom of will. Adam lost his freedom through sin. We were in Adam; therefore we are guilty of his sin. We are only free to sin; original freedom can be restored solely through God's grace. Original sin is transmitted by propagation; actual sin proceeds from the will. Volition, therefore, is the common element in sin, and is sinful when the lower is preferred to a higher form of nature. The tendency of sin is toward non-existence yet it is not clear that a time will ever be when no evil wills will exist, though ultimately evil will be separated from the good. In his critique of this doctrine, the author notes Augustine's failure to distinguish metaphysical and moral evil. The realistic treatment of Adam he regards as the prolific source of error and inconsistencies. It robs us of individuality, destroys responsibility, and involves traducianism which Augustine rejects. The doctrine of freedom is really determinism. "The validity of the Augustinian doctrine of sin cannot be maintained." For it the author would substitute a theory based on evolution, though he does not attempt its elaboration.

LECKIE, J. H. *Authority in Religion*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. x+238 pages. \$2.

Mr. Leckie has given a very suggestive study of the place of authority in religious life. Recognizing, in the first place, that there can be no authority of real significance which is not willingly accepted by the soul, he attempts to discover just what sort of authority actually compels such moral consent. In answering this question, he takes a distinctly mystical view of religion. The ultimate authority for any soul is the immediate message of God in communion. "The ideal organ of authority in religion must be found in the soul of man, in that secret place of its life where the voice of God is heard." But the imperfection of experience makes it impossible for men generally to



be certain that they have correctly heard and interpreted the voice of God. Hence in the sphere of religion unusually gifted individuals, the prophets, stand as leaders and guides of our religious thinking. But this authority of the prophet—the aristocrat in the realm of the spirit—is constantly tested and judged by the common religious sense—the democracy in religion. Perfect freedom both of prophecy and of democratic judgment are both essential. This, of course, means that such idealistic conceptions as infallibility and finality are not tenable. But it means also the undeniable fact of expert guidance in religion. The practical outcome of such a view as is advocated in this book will be a genuine respect on the part of the individual for the inheritance which comes to him from the prophets, and a recognition on the part of the church that the authority which it possesses can be retained only as the voluntary loyal consent of the individual is secured.

Thus the book, while preserving the vocabulary and even the conservative spirit of authority religion, yet completely frees the idea of authority from that element of irrational compulsion which has so often been a source of revolt. By recognizing the social implications of life, it avoids that false dilemma—either external authority or irresponsible individualism—which prevents any fruitful discussion of the matter. The book is an admirable means of leading men of religious spirit to the inductive point of view. But it leaves unanswered some important questions concerning the psychology of mysticism and of prophetic inspiration; and by exalting the importance of unique personality on the part of the religious "aristocrat," it tends to depreciate the primary importance of the empirical tests of belief. It thus creates an apparent distinction between *religious* thinking and other thinking which preserves in a way the isolation of theology from other sciences.

---

#### APOLOGETICS

GARDNER, PERCY. *Modernity and the Churches*. New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1909. xviii+313 pages. \$1.50.

In this volume are collected nine articles and addresses prepared by the author on various occasions from 1902 to 1909. They all deal more or less directly with the problems which modernism—or as Professor Gardner prefers to call it, modernity—has brought into the foreground of theological discussion. The titles of the papers are, "Modernity and the Churches," "The Essential Nature of Christian Faith," "The Divine Will," "The Function of Prayer," "The Translation of Christian Doctrine," "The Basis of Christology," "The Christian Church," and "Liberal Anglicanism." The first paper emphasizes and discusses the essentially negative religious consequences of historical investigation and the essentially positive contributions of pragmatism. All of the essays represent this point of view. The historical survey culminates in uncertainty and a certain timidity. But a practical philosophy shows that faith has excellent reasons for its assertions. The volume abounds in suggestive bits of insight, but, like the author's previous works, leaves the reader more conscious of the magnitude of the task of theological reconstruction than confident of the outcome.

SMYTH, NEWMAN. *Modern Belief in Immortality*. New York: Scribner, 1910. 95 pages. 75 cents.

This little booklet undertakes to analyze the fundamental conception of personal life which underlies any doctrine of immortality. He observes that the traditional

conception, resting as it did upon the concepts of a substance-soul in problematical relation to a substance-body, has completely broken down. Bodily resurrection and bodiless spiritual life are both equally inconceivable to the modern mind. Both the reason for this prevailing skepticism and the conditions of a tenable belief in immortality must be found by asking what personal life means in terms of biology and psychology. From this point of view, life is essentially dynamic, capable of taking environment and transforming it to suit its needs. The question, then, is not whether a finished "soul" can persist after the dissolution of the body, but whether the centralized life which has built up the present body can be conceived as continuing the work of creating an instrument by which it deals with environment when the environment changes as it does at death. Since in biological evolution death is the means of bringing into existence richer and more highly specialized forms of life, we may reasonably believe that this mission is also fulfilled in the case of human personalities.

D'ALLONES, G. REVAULT. *Psychologie d'une religion*. Paris: Alcan, 1908. 289 pages. Fr. 5.

This volume consists of an impartial, yet sympathetic, account of the founder, doctrines, and followers of a contemporaneous religious movement in France. The first part deals with the life of William Monod (1800-96), a venerable pastor of Paris, who proclaimed himself a reincarnation of Jesus Christ, come to announce a new dispensation, commencing especially with that part of his life involving an attack of mental trouble in his thirty-second year, which led to his detention in private sanitariums for a period of four years. It contains also a sketch of the lives of the most important *inspirés*, ancient and modern, among the Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians. The second part treats of the Monodist doctrine in its theological and logical aspects, and also of certain men and women of his followers, who have themselves received revelations from God. It closes with a sketch of the prophetic movements of Israel and of the Cevenols, as compared with that of the Monodists.

The volume is not primarily "psychological," as we should use the term, but rather a rich and valuable field for psychological interpretation. The author's usage, however, is entirely justifiable, since he means to give us a "subjective" view of the phenomena, as opposed to the "objective" way of classing them under the heads of "miracle or trickery or pathology." Underlying all this classification there are certain real facts, and it is the purpose of the book to present these in an unprejudiced way.

His most important contribution is his emphasis upon the social criterion of such religious movements, and to this he is led by the fact that during the course of Monod's life those convictions which came to him in the first place under the influence of a delirium were gradually worked out into a consistent doctrine, which appeals and has appealed to normal persons of high intelligence. The burden of the book goes to show that neither life (even with its "insanity") nor doctrine can furnish any substantial difference between Monod and the prophets of the Bible, even Jesus himself. Nor, subjectively considered, can either be differentiated from the number of other claimants of divine inspiration. The same states of ecstasy, the same personal conviction, even similar "marvels" are to be found time and again in the religions of many races. Subjectively, then, no adequate criterion of the truth of "inspiration" can be had; what criterion shall we find? The author answers by turning to history and asks what *has* decided; and in his answer we see an implicit approach to the modern identification of the questions of "trueness" and "worth."

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Adams, John. *Israel's Ideal, or Studies in Old Testament Theology*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. 232 pages. \$1.50.
- Bauer, Leonhard. *Das palästinische Arabisch. Die Dialekte des Städters und des Fellachen*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 256 pages. M. 6.
- Berry, George R. *The Old Testament among the Semitic Religions*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press 1910. 215 pages. \$1.
- Cohn, Leopold. *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria. Erster Teil*. Breslau: Marcus. 1909. 409 pages. M. 6.
- Driver, S. R. *The Literature of the Old Testament*. Revised ed. New York: Scribner, 1910. xxxv+577 pages. \$2.50.
- Eerdmans, B. D. *Alttestamentliche Studien. III. Das Buch Exodus*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 147 pages. M. 4.
- Ginsburg, C. D. (editor). *The Book of Isaiah in Hebrew*. London: British and Foreign Bible Society, 1909. 93 pages.
- Kent, Charles Foster. *The Sermons, Epistles and Apocalypses of Israel's Prophets. From the Beginning of the Assyrian Period to the End of the Maccabean Struggle*. (The Student's Old Testament.) With Maps and Chronological Charts. New York: Scribner, 1910. 516 pages. \$2.75.
- Margolis, Max L. *A Manual of the Aramaic Language of the Babylonian Talmud, Grammar, Chrestomathy and Glossaries*. Munich: Beck, 1910. xvi+293 pages. \$3.
- Peckham, George A. *An Introduction to the Study of Obadiah. A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Graduate Divinity School of the University of Chicago in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Old Testament Literature and Interpretation)*. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 29 pages. \$0.27.

Puukko, A. Filemon. *Das Deuteronomium. Eine literarkritische Untersuchung*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 303 pages. M. 6.

Torrey, Charles C. *Notes on the Aramaic Part of Daniel*. Reprinted from the transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, July, 1909. 42 pages.

### NEW TESTAMENT

Goguel, Maurice. *Les sources du récit Johannique de la passion*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1910. 109 pages.

Gowen, Herbert H. *An Analytical Transcription of the Revelation of St. John the Divine, with Introduction and a Dictionary of Apocalypse*. London: Skeffington & Son, 1910. 267 pages.

Lutgers, W. *Die Vollkommenen im Philipperbrief und die Enthusiasten in Thessalonich*. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 102 pages. M. 1.60.

Mangenot, E. *La résurrection de Jesus. Suivie de deux appendices sur la Crucifixion et l'Ascension*. Paris: Beauchesne & Cie, 1910. 404 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Monod, Victor. *De titulo Epistolae vulgo ad Hebraeos inscriptae*. Montalvani: Ex typis imprimerie cooperative, 1910. 48 pages. Fr. 1.50.

Spitta, Friedrich. *Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. xlvii+466 pages. M. 15.

### CHURCH HISTORY

Bardy, Gustave. *Didyme l'aveugle*. Paris: Beauchesne & Cie, 1910. xi+279 pages.

Goguel, Maurice. *L'eucharistie des origines à Justin Martyr*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1910. ix+336 pages.

Harnack, Adolf. *Entstehung und Entwicklung der Kirchenverfassung und des Kirchenrechts in den zwei ersten Jahrhunderten. Nebst einer Kritik der*

- Abhandlung R. Sohm's: "Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizismus" und Untersuchungen über "Evangelium," "Wort Gottes" und das Trinitarische Bekenntnis. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 252 pages. M. 6.60.
- Koch, Hugo. Cyprian und der römische Primat. Eine kirchen- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 173 pages. M. 5.50.
- Koeniger, Albert Mich. Voraussetzungen und Voraussetzungslosigkeit in Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte. München: Lentner 1910. 50 pages. M. 1.
- Lahitton, Joseph. La vocation sacerdotale: traité théorique et pratique. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 439 pages. Fr. 4.
- Rauschen, G. L'eucharistie et la pénitence. Durant les six premiers siècles de l'église. Paris: Gabalda, 1910. 245 pages. Fr. 3.
- Schaß, David S. History of the Christian Church. Vol. V. Part II. The Middle Ages from Boniface VIII, 1294, to the Protestant Reformation, 1517. New York: Scribner, 1910. 795 pages. \$3.
- Sell, Karl. Christentum und Weltgeschichte bis zur Reformation. Die Entstehung des Christentums und seine Entwicklung als Kirche. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 118 pages. M. 1.25.
- Sell, Karl. Christentum und Weltgeschichte seit der Reformation. Das Christentum in seiner Entwicklung über die Kirche hinaus. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 123 pages. M. 1.25.
- Steinmann, Alphons. Die Sklavenfrage in der alten Kirche. Eine historisch-exegetische Betrachtung über die soziale Frage um Urchristentum. Berlin: Druck der Germania, 1910. 55 pages.
- Tschackert, Paul. Die Entstehung der Lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre samt ihren in erprotestantischen Gegensätzen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. x+645 pages. M. 16.
- SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY**
- Downer, Arthur C. The Mission and Ministration of the Holy Spirit. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. 347 pages. \$3.
- Giss, August J. Die menschliche Geistestätigkeit in der Weltentwicklung. Eine kritisch-philosophische Betrachtung des menschlichen Geistes; mit Anwendung der Prinzipien auf die Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Leipzig: Deichert, 1910. xvii+278 pages.
- Haase, Felix. Zur Bardesanischen Gnosis. Literarkritische und dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchungen. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 98 pages. M. 3.
- Joyce, G. C. The Inspiration of Prophecy. An Essay in the Psychology of Revelation. London: Oxford University Press; New York: Frowde, 1910. 195 pages. \$1.40.
- Lebreton, Jules. Les origines du dogme de la trinité. Paris: Beauchesne & Cie, 1910. xxvi+569 pages. Fr. 8.
- Monod, Victor. Le problème de Dieu et la théologie chrétienne depuis la réforme. Neuchâtel: Foyer Solidariste, 1910. 169 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Pfleiderer, Otto. The Development of Christianity. Translated from the German by Daniel A. Heubusch. New York: B. W. Heubusch, 1910. 319 pages.
- PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS**
- Bawden, H. Heath. The Principles of Pragmatism. A Philosophical Interpretation of Experience. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 364 pages. \$1.50.
- Boutroux, Emile. Wissenschaft und Religion in der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 368 pages. M. 6.
- Davison, W. T. The Christian Conscience. A Contribution to Christian Ethics. Being the 19th Fernley Lecture. Popular ed. London: Culley, 1910. 249 pages. 1s.
- Dewey, John. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. And Other Essays in Contemporary Thought. New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1910. 309 pages. \$1.40.
- Gauthier, Léon. La théorie d'Ibn Rochid (Averroes) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie. Paris: Leroux, 1909. 195 pages.
- Ladd, George Trumbull. Knowledge, Life and Reality. An Essay in Systematic Philosophy. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co, 1909. 549 pages. \$3.50.
- McConnell, R. M. The Duty of Altruism. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 251 pages. \$1.50.

Rashdall, Hastings. *Philosophy and Religion. (Studies in Theology.)* Six lectures delivered at Cambridge. New York: Scribner, 1910. 189 pages. 75 cents.

Sharp, J. Alfred. *Social Aspects of the Drink Problem.* London: Culley, 1910. 128 pages. 6d.

Smyth, Newman. *Modern Belief in Immortality.* New York: Scribner, 1910. 95 pages. \$0.75.

Tissier, Joseph. *La vieille morale à l'école.* Paris: Tequi, 1910. 416 pages. Fr. 3.50.

### APOLOGETICS

Cauderlier, Em. *L'église infaillible devant la science et l'histoire.* Paris: Nourry, 1910. 83 pages. Fr. 1.25.

Letters to His Holiness Pope Pius X. By a Modernist. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1910. xx+280 pages. \$1.25.

Lofthouse, W. F. *The Bible: Its Origin and Authority.* New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 151 pages.

Womer, Parley P. *A Valid Religion for the Times. A Study of the Central Truths of Spiritual Religion.* New York: Broadway Publishing Co., 1910. 180 pages.

Young, Jesse Bowman. *Charms of the Bible. A Fresh Appraisal.* New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 255 pages. \$1.00.

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Main, Arthur E. *Bible Studies on the Sabbath Question. For the Use of Pastors, Sabbath Schools, Young People's Classes, Home Study, etc.* Plainfield, N.J.: Printed for the Sabbath School Board of the Seventh Day Baptist General Conference by the American Sabbath Tract Society, 1909. 80 pages. \$0.25.

Schubert, Ernst. *Unsere Predigt vom auferstandenen Heiland.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 85 pages. M. 2.40.

### MISCELLANEOUS

Billot, Gabriel. *La bienheureuse Mère Barat. La fondatrice, l'éducatrice, la sainte.* Paris: Tequi, 1910. 85 pages. Fr. 0.75.

Cherrington, Ernest H. *Anti-Saloon League Year-Book 1910.* Westerville, Ohio: The Anti-Saloon League of America, 1910. 256 pages. \$0.35.

Cowley, A. E. (editor). *The Samaritan Liturgy. The Common Prayers, Based on a Copy of the Vatican MS. Made by P. Bollig. In two volumes.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909. 442; 879 pages. £3 3s.

Feige, P. *La sainte vierge.* Paris: Tequi, 1910. 244 pages. Fr. 1.

Finck, F. N. *Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus. (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt.)* Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 156 pages. M. 1.25.

Finck, F. N. *Die Sprachstämme des Erdkreises. (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt.)* Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 143 pages. M. 1.25.

Gauthier, Léon. *Ibn Thofail, sa vie, ses œuvres.* Paris: Leroux, 1909. 123 pages.

Grimes, Abbé. *Traité des scrupules.* Paris: Tequi, 1910. 266 pages. Fr. 1.

Jackson, Samuel Macauley. *The Source of "Jerusalem the Golden." Together with Other Pieces Attributed to Bernard of Cluny. In English Translation by Henry Preble.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 207 pages. \$1.38.

John the Unafraid. Chicago: McClurg, 1910. 128 pages. \$1.

The Fundamentals. *A Testimony.* Vol. I. Chicago: Testimony Pub. Co., 1910. 126 pages.

The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson, D.D., LL.D. (editor-in-chief), and George William Gilmore, M.A. (associate editor). Vol. VII, *Liutprand-Moralities.* New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1910. xvii + 502 pages. \$5.

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XIV

OCTOBER, 1910

Number 4

## THE PLAY IMPULSE AND ATTITUDE IN RELIGION

---

PROFESSOR CARL E. SEASHORE  
State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

---

We are accustomed to regard play as the escape of surplus energy, as a life of semblance and shamming in comparison with serious work and reverent worship, as something to be avoided when we engage in religious exercises. But current psychology is undermining these views and is giving us wonderful revelations of the function of play in religious mental economy.

In discussing this subject, I shall take up in a preliminary way the scope of play, its purpose, and the relation of this purpose to the purpose of religion, and then briefly review the salient characteristics of play, showing their relation to the religious life.

The introduction of the natural-history method in psychology has completely changed our conception of play—its nature, its function, its evolution and development, and its meaning; and, with the new significance discovered in play, comes a new interpretation of human functions, such as education, morality, art, and religion. To understand the nature of religion, therefore, we must know something of the biological rôle of play.

Play is self-expression for the pleasure of expression. This definition is very general and is subject to criticism, but it designates adequately that conception of play which I wish to present.

Play enters into the life of all normal individuals, young and old; into all the capacities, from the simplest sensory motor activities up to the highest exhibition of reason, sentiment, and will.

The senses develop largely through play with them. Watch the infant discover his ears; investigate his nose; pat-a-cake with his hands; splash in the water; grope, reach, grasp, and fumble, in all sorts of ways with touch and muscle sense. These semi-random touch plays refine the sense of touch, develop the ability to locate touch, and give meaning and pleasure to these experiences by founding and enriching associations. Basking in the sun is a temperature play. Many of our sweetmeats are eaten, not for the food value, but for the tickling of the sense of taste. We even play with the bitter and sour. To enjoy the scent and fragrance of flowers is to play upon the sense of smell.

But as we live essentially to enjoy the higher senses of sight and hearing, the delights of play center in these. All sorts of racket—ringing, rapping, cracking, and shouting—appeal to us at some stage of development. These gradually refine themselves as in the appreciation of rhythm, accent, pitch, melody, and harmony. The child plays with the cruder sounds first, because he must master them before he can appreciate the refinements of perception. At first, all sounds are alike to him. He learns their differences by play. The play in producing sounds runs parallel to the play in appreciating sounds. To be able to make sounds is a continual source of pleasure and profit. There is a close connection and a gradual transition from the youngster's racket and howl to the set and labored music lesson of the adult. Music often becomes a drudgery to the adult, because in his artificial culture the student is not allowed the freedom of play, but is forced to make sounds according to command and rule. The artist who is a genius reaches his highest mastery through play. We gain mastery of the voice, for example, far more by play than by work. The development of music and poetry is, in a marked way, the direct result of play. When genuine, they are play.

Colored nature, colored pictures, colored faces, colored dress and ornaments, are a large part of the source of enjoyment in life. Life is equally a play with form, as in the playful imitation of nature in drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, etc., not to mention the forerunners of all these in child play.

The scope of play in motor development is coextensive with

motor life. Children are very active. The child first makes random movements, then he co-ordinates these with movements into sitting, then creeping, then walking, then jumping, then balancing and difficult tricks, then dancing, skating, gymnastics, physical sports, etc. The capacity for using tools develops through a hierarchy of plays. Handling is notorious in children. Watch the picking, tearing, lifting, shaking, and throwing movements of the boy. See him lead the dog, the bird, the kite, and even his own playmates, thereby enjoying the pleasure of being a cause and feeling an extension of personality. Curiosity may lead to destruction or construction. The same analytic instinct of curiosity which leads the child to destroy his toy for the purpose of analyzing it, makes the botanist and the theologian. Curiosity is back of plays of imitation, invention, collection, and building. The sand-pile forms itself into mountains, houses, rivers, lakes, living folk, and beasts in the constructive curiosity-play of the child. Take, for example, the collecting instinct; the boy's pocket is paralleled only by the girl's trunk. The little urchin who stuffs his pocket with pebbles, bugs, nuts, papers, doughnuts, and pennies is moved by the collecting instinct—the same instinct which fills our museums, our art galleries, and our churches. "Follow me and I shall make you fishers of men."

The projection of personality may be traced from infancy to old age. The child begins by dropping its play things and throwing everything helter-skelter. Later he enters into competition for distance, as with the sling-shot or discus. He learns to project himself by a blow as in handball, football, baseball, tennis, golf, etc., or by imparting skillful motions as in the spinning of bodies in pool, billiards, croquet, shuffle-board, and pebbles on water, and by projection toward an object as in shooting. Then there are reciprocal movements as in catching, dodging, parrying, and decoying. There is a progressive series of extensions of personality.

Just as we play with our senses and our muscles, we play with our higher mental powers. Memory plays are favorite pastimes for young and old, primitive and civilized man. The power of reminiscence is one of the charms of life. Primitive man was a



story-teller. There is a pleasure in memorizing things that we need to remember, but we memorize a great deal merely for the pleasure of memorizing. Recognition gives a feeling of warmth and possession, as in the critical appreciation of a drama or in the interpretation of historical events. Still memory play is work in comparison with play in imagination. The effective novelist lives with his characters. It is the play illusion which makes the writing artistic. The same is equally true of the reading of fiction. The theater is a play-house; and from cradle to play-house, from story-telling to the building of a home, life is full of imagination-play. There is a pleasure in taking liberties with imagination. Novelty, shock, grotesqueness, etc., are obtained by allowing the unbridled imagination to express itself. This is the charm of reverie, mind wanderings, musings, and idlings.

Much play is hard reasoning, for example, the game of chess, solution of riddles, flash of wit, and the art of conversation, as in the clash of nothing against nothing. The feelings are perpetual objects of play. Even the cynic and grouchy Mr. Blue plays with his morbid love of bad news, tragedy, and misfortune. Indeed, we enjoy that tragedy most which is the truest picture of great misery. It is, of course, unnecessary to cite instances of play with agreeable feelings. There is much more exhibition of the will power in play than in work; as in plays which involve courage, discriminative action, self-control, etc.

In short, a very large part, and that the most essential part, of the life of both child and adult is self-expression for the pleasure of expression. That is, to the player the immediate object of the play is pleasure in expression; but when we stand off to the side and take a biological view of this process, we see here as in the exhibition of other instinctive activities that nature makes the individual serve a part of more ultimate purposes.

What, then, is the purpose of play? There seem to be two fundamental purposes traceable. The first is that which Karl Groos formulated so well fifteen years ago when he said that *play is a preparation for life*. There is a second purpose which I venture to distinguish from the first for the sake of clearness; this is that *play is one of the chief realizations of life*. We learn to live by

play; and much of the best part of life is play. Let us examine each of these in turn for a moment.

Play is a preparation for life. Children, youth, and adults all play—not with the intention of preparing for life, for such a direct aim would defeat itself, but for some immediate satisfaction. It is when we take a large view of the situation, looking back, that we see how nature has worked out marvels of development through the operation of the instinct of play, and how man is essentially a playful being.

With the conception of play, just outlined, in mind, we can see how both the mind and body have developed more through the exercise of play than through work. Sensory experience has gradually differentiated itself, acquired associations and responses, come under control of voluntary attention, and become discriminative and serviceable through play; memory, imagination, conception, judgment, and reasoning have been whetted, strengthened, and enriched through their exercise in play; affective life has become sensitive, differentiated, adapted, balanced, serviceable, and responsive through play; habits have been formed, instincts have been developed, impulses have been trained and brought under control, streams of subconscious activities have been stratified, and the power of attention has been acquired through play. In short, play has been the principal instrument of growth. We may conservatively say, without play, no normal adult cognitive life; without play, no healthful development of affective life; without play, no full development of will power.

This is not denying the place of work and tasks deliberately undertaken for immediate ends other than pleasure; it is not denying the drudgery, the dull thuds, the wearing and tearing, obligatory exercise of mind and body; but it is laying emphasis upon the fact that when we view mental development as a biological process we find that development takes place far more through play than through work. Of course we recognize that work and play are seldom clearly separated. Most of our life is a combination of the two, but the relative dominance of each may well be observed.

In the same way, both introspection and objective observation

reveal to us that the moments of supreme satisfaction, the moments of highest realization and appreciation of life come from those activities which are most conspicuously characterized by play attitudes; either from play, pure and simple, or from work in which play motives dominate. What is it that the child is all interested in, all satisfied with—most effective and at home in? It is play or playful work. Witness the lives of developed men and women who have felt the thrill of satisfaction from life. These are the persons whose minds have been full of play; whose attitudes have been a spontaneous and natural expression.

We have our work, our set tasks and duties; but those who get the most out of life are they who earn their daily bread in such work as they would be engaged in irresistibly even if they were not earning their bread and butter by it. And they are the most fortunate who get their relaxation, rest, recreation, stimulations, self-expression, etc., without making tasks of them. The things we do for the pleasure of doing are the rewards of life; they are the expression of the larger and more natural self; they are the means which take us out of the ruts of necessity and give us inspiration, power, and satisfaction.

The purpose of play, then, viewed as a biological process, is to prepare for life and to furnish a medium for the realization of life. Both the preparation and the immediate realization are most conspicuous in early years, but both continue throughout the period of normal adult life. Pity the man or woman who has lost the power to play. The pleasure of self-expression is largely immediate in the early periods, but in the more mature life it is for more and more distant ends.

The purpose of religion, we may say with Hoefding, is to supply an ultra-rational basis for conduct. This means life on a large scale—not for immediate pleasure or happiness only, not for self-control or wisdom only, not for law or duty only; but “to be in tune with the Infinite,” “to be under the influence of divine Will,” “to live in the Kingdom of God”—in short, to do those things which we enjoy because we are a part of a larger whole—because they are a part of our higher nature. This I maintain is analogous to the purpose of play and, in large part, identical with it.

Religious life is the crown of life. It is the richest and most varied of our natures; yet it involves no faculty which is peculiarly or specifically religious. It is through our senses, our memory, our reasoning, our feelings, and our actions that we are religious. Then if play is the means of growth and a large source of enjoyment, as has just been maintained, it is this for religious life just as it is for social, ethical, or business life. And this is my thesis: *Play is a preparation for religious life, and one of the chief means of its realization.* We become religious through play and to be religious is often to play.

To illustrate these propositions, let us pass in rapid review a few of the dominant traits of play and see how they singly, as well as in a group characterization, reveal the play attitude in religion.

Religion is a growth; it is a preparation for greater life. Take out the element of growth from religion and you take out religion. And how does this growth come about? It comes through exercise. The labored, set, necessary exercise produces a servile, negative, and stale religion; the religion of love, happiness, and faith, on the other hand, grows through spontaneous self-expression for the love of expression. There is nothing more mysterious about this growth than about any other mental growth. Religious sensibility, religious discernment, religious ideas, religious emotions, religious habits, the religious self-surrender, all grow through the progressive exercise of these various capacities, in religion as well as out of religion. The sentiment of gratitude to God, for example, grows better and to a higher stature, through the spontaneous reaction to the vision of divine goodness by which the soul is set aglow, than through a set expression of gratitude as a matter of duty. So repentance is not so much an obligatory affair as the free and irresistible expression resulting from a progressive change in apperception. Our ceremonies, services, and observances, whatever purpose they serve, have much in common with games, play attitudes, sacrifices, and fictions which characterize play. We have been brought up to think that it is in the lower forms of religion that we find the play elements. True they are there, but religion has invariably been linked with ceremonials. Dancing,

for example, is not an uncommon element. Indians have their savage orgie dances in their religious feasts. The Book of Psalms, which is one of the most sturdy and virile expressions of religious consciousness, teems with exhortations to sing, shout, make a loud noise, play, and dance to the glory of the Lord. And we shall find that instead of play being a mark of inferior religious attitude, it may be regarded as a criterion of development as seen in the progressively evolving higher forms of religion. So far as we know, the highest type of religion is that type which grows through play. We learn to be "joyful in the Lord" by giving expression to this joy of freedom and power. From the singing of the gospel hymns to the rendition of the sacred oratorios, there is celebration. Many have an unformulated feeling that singing is for the purpose of pleasing God; but, of course, psychologically, the essential value lies in the ennobling influence upon the singer himself. Singing about love, he becomes more loving; singing about Christ, he becomes more Christlike. And singing is a play. Dwelling upon the divine with spontaneous emotion is the surest way to cultivate the character of the divine.

Man has an instinct to do everything he can do. Work and the necessities of life develop only a relatively small part of our instinctive resources. Masses of instinctive capacities would be lost were it not for play, which is the liberal educator. Play develops those racial capacities which have not been called forth by necessity. It is creative. It develops the possible man rather than the man of choice, or necessity. Woods Hutchinson says that we are all of about the same age, at least 12,000,000 years old. We have been millions of years in the making. Instinct is the conservator of the product of these millions of years, and play is the agent of this conservator. Religious life is instinctive. We are religious because we are religious organisms. We are born with the craving for self-realization along all lines; and this craving satisfies itself through the channels of play.

The sense of freedom is an essential and distinguishing trait in all play. Witness skating, coasting, sailing, golf, and the chase; plays of constructive imagination, and idealizing. And this we find prominent in religious life, the self-expression of the freed

soul. We play when we have opportunity for rest. Religion has always been associated with rest, which, by the way, usually means change of occupation; the Sabbath was given man as a religious institution. We play when we are free. Play has always been a breaking away from the bonds and cares of this world. "Behold the lilies of the field, they toil not neither do they spin." We play when we are in need of recreation. Religion has been not only a haven of rest, but a fountain for the renewal of life's energies. The freedom which comes from a sense of independence in movement and capacity for action in our ordinary play is very limited in comparison with that freedom which comes from taking hold of some aspect of Infinite Spirit.

The most effective play is characterized by the experience of fascination. The dance, for example, when it is real play and not mere social labor, carries because the dancer falls into a state of diffuse and dreamy consciousness, intoxicated by the idea of pleasure, lulled by the automatic rhythmic movements, and soothed by the monotonous flow of the music. This element of fascination or elation with mental intoxication may be seen in some degree in all play, be it the romping of the infant, the adolescent mating plays, the sport of youth, or the successful pastime of the adult. And this element of fascination and elation is one of the characteristics of religious life. We speak of religious life as serene. Religious devotion, religious faith, religious fervor, from that of the ignorant believer to that of the dominating seer and prophet, reveal this trait. The history of conversion, revivals, and great religious movements need not be reviewed to substantiate this claim. Religious heroism, as well as religious fanaticism, picture it. The transcendent joy of the sane and cultured devout man reveals it in its noblest form. Religion in all ages and forms has had devices for cultivating this fascination and elation.

The feeling of extension of personality is a common cause and trait of play. This is clear in games of competition. The boy who flies his kite the highest is the towering boy of the bunch. The person who parries in wit and caps the climax is the master for the moment. Like freedom and fascination, this feeling of extension of personality finds its fullest expression in the religious attitude.

That communion with the Infinite which comes over one who worships in nature is a reaching out into the larger spiritual self. That new person which comes through regeneration measures its relation to the world in entirely new terms. Paul's enumeration of the wonders that faith can do is true. Faith is power. In a very real sense we are what we believe ourselves to be.

A sense of fellowship is one of the traits as well as one of the results of play. Laying aside petty differences, interests, and points of vantage, the playing group fuses into a common consciousness on the plane of equality with common means, common interests, and common enjoyment. Play is the making of social man. It is the bond of solidarity in the social group. We become like those with whom we play. Many of our religious conceptions are based on this idea of a fellowship attitude; such as the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of mankind, the sacrifice of love, abounding grace, and the joy and comfort in spiritual inheritance. Christian fellowship is the supreme test of religion. Social life in the church is a fellowship. Church dinners are not given for the sole purpose of raising money. The institutional church operates its various branches not only for the economic results, but primarily for the development of the religious life. The kindergarten in our Sunday schools is the most serviceable form of religious instruction we have for that age of children. Boys' military societies, students' receptions, and pastors' calls, have their function in building up fellowship. The psychology of childhood and adolescence is putting new life into religion among the young by seeking out and fostering natural religious impulses. I am, however, inclined to think that in many ways the high ideal of fellowship is being dragged down into the mere idea of being a good fellow and that the church needs to re-examine its social conception of fellowship. To force entertainment upon the youth does not develop the play attitude for which I am making a plea. Some of us have worshiped in the churches in which our Puritan forefathers forbade the use of the organ on the ground that it was an instrument of frivolity, and today these churches have pipe-organs, orchestras, and paid singers. Are we right, and were our forefathers wrong? Is not the fullest worship that which leads to a hearty self-expression?

Would we not often profit by substituting a good congregational hymn for some of the operatic music in our churches? It is a good thing for the child to see good games going on around him, but it would be a mistake to hire acrobats to do all the playing for him. It is not the entertainment, but the genuine self-expression that develops fellowship. It is not amusement and having things done for you, but the feeling of responsibility and opportunity for doing your share with a free hand and a warm heart that develops fellowship.

Play is positive as opposed to the negative aspects of life. It stands for acquisition, satisfaction, seriousness, and optimism. Compare the child who is full of play with the child who is deprived of the privilege of play, or who has a preverted nature. Compare the adult who has a young heart which finds self-expression in playing, and the youth who has lost his plasticity. We may divide religion into negative and positive, or into the religion of self-denial and the religion of self-expression and joy. Many of the destitute heathen to whom we send missionaries are very much more serious and self-sacrificing in their worship than we are. We send them our missionaries because their religion is negative while ours is positive. They labor to pacify their gods; we rejoice to live in God. The gospel is good news and leads to celebration. As we progress toward higher and higher forms of religion, the more we find of this positive element which is the sign of natural self-expression, as in play.

Play is an expression of the joy in life. Indeed, to the happy man and to the happy child, everything in life plays before his eyes. He eats for the pleasure of eating, drinks for the pleasure of drinking, works for the pleasure of working, rests for the pleasure of resting, listens and sees for the pleasure of listening and seeing, serves for the pleasure of serving, gives for the gratitude he feels, obeys for the joy he finds in obeying, and serves because he loves to serve. He is a free man, a man with inspiring conviction, a man who grows when he is grandfather; and the whole series of acts in his life are one sweet song. The life of the saints has always been a mystery to the non-religious. The joy, equanimity, and triumph which they have shown in the face of apparent suffering,



discouragement, obstacles, and grief is one of the wonders of the human spirit. It makes work play; it makes torture pleasure; and it makes faith the beginning of life. One side of religion is humiliation, confession, and petition; another is praise, thanksgiving, and adoration. Both have their places; but if I have my choice, give me the latter. One child is ever engaged in covering up mischief and begging for favors, whereas another only glows with joy in life and gratitude for past favors and gets more than he would think of asking. The same is true of adult religion; and it is true of the man who has been saved from a life of infamy just as really as it is true of the man who has always led a sweet-tempered life. Where grace aboundeth, there aboundeth joy. This is one of the beauties of the biography of the stricken and long-suffering who have found an abiding comfort in religion.

It is strange that play should have been regarded as the opposite of exertion. Play requires the most serious exertion. When we work, we walk; but when we play, we run. When we perform a duty, we do as much as is required; but when we play, we do all we can. Work seldom leads to overdoing, but play offers great temptation. If the football heroes were to work as hard at their lessons as they play on the gridiron, there would be fewer conditions in the classrooms. If every child grew up to work as hard as he plays, it would be necessary to form more unions to limit the time of work. The fact, then, that religion requires most serious exertion leads us to expect to find in it the most efficient type of activity, that which operates through a spontaneous interest. Only the instinctive, spontaneous, and natural impulse could bring about such self-exertion as we find in religion.

And with exertion comes seriousness. If we join in a game and are not serious about it, we are not playing. To play means to be in the game, whether it be a game of loafing or a game of war. This idea of a whole-souled self-expression fits in with the sacred nature of religious exercise. There is nothing greater in social man than love; but by the very fact of its greatness and worth, it is one of the commonest objects of play. The same principle applies to our reactions to divine love. Therefore the fact that there is a serious and solemn attitude does not deprive the exercise

of the character of play. All sport is serious; tragedy is one of the best forms of entertainment. The passion play at Oberammergau is one of the most serious as well as one of the most fascinating stage spectacles. If it were not printed on every program that the crucifixion scene is a trick, many in the audience would faint at the sight of that scene.

The play object is often the most real and serviceable. One morning my little boy said, "Jack Frost has made pretty figures on the windows." Jack Frost is avowedly a play conception and we grown-ups tend to treat it with an air of superiority; but I challenge any student of meteorology and the metaphysics of matter and force to tell me in final terms what puts the frost figures upon the window. As we advance in knowledge, we go farther and farther back, merely to fit the level of our intellectual grasp, but to this day we have only gone a few steps in the infinite regression of retreats. I am safe in saying to the wise, "Tell me what the frost is and I will tell you what God is." All we have is merely more or less serviceable symbols for the reality of matter as well as for the conception of God. In a recent sermon, the minister preached on the question "What is God?" and showed that God had at sundry times been identified with graven images, the forces of nature, a big physical man on a throne, etc. "All these," he said, "are low and unworthy conceptions. I will tell you what God is. God is love." The congregation felt warmed up and satisfied with the final solution. But the conception of God as a big man was anthropomorphic; the conception of God as love is also an anthropomorphism. Man and love are mere symbols upon which our minds rest in the ever on-going struggle toward the conception of the Infinite. "God is my loving father" is a sweet and serviceable conception only because the mind is willing to rest itself in the play attitude.

Now the fact that fellowship is present in both play and religion does not prove that play is present in religion, nor that religion is present in play. But when we take a dozen of the most salient features of play, as I have done, and find that these are among the most salient features of religious life, then there is some reason for saying that there is a relationship. I have aimed to present

the picture from the point of view that play represents a characteristic attitude of mind which we find in religion. But now I wish to represent the obverse view and assert also that religion is present in play. Religion enters into all our play for the very same reason that we cannot boast of keeping our religion and our politics apart. We feel more religious when we play golf, sail, climb mountains, or bask in the sun, than when held down to our fixed tasks of work. Religion is in play because play is the launching of one's self upon those forces in life which carry and elevate us. It represents an attitude of well-being and surrender to the beneficent forces of life.

What I have endeavored to show, then, is that those attitudes and experiences which we call play characterize a very large part of our religious experience, and the religion of daily life shows itself most naturally in the moments of free self-expression.

Let me address myself briefly to some of the most plausible objections to the argument. Foremost of these is undoubtedly the charge of eudemonism. If play is the better part of life and play is self-expression for the pleasure of expression, and the dominant factor in religion is play, then we are thrown back upon a primitive type of ethics. To this I reply first, religion is not all play, or play pure and simple; but from the natural-history point of view, the play attitude is a dominant trait. Second, the pleasure which leads to play is not at war with either duty ethics or perfection ethics in so far as these are conducive to religious life which is religious growth. Pleasure, like play, is here used in a very comprehensive sense. As we must rid ourselves of the popular idea that play is a farce, is making fun of things, is the cause of those evils which often gather around amusements, is childish, is frivolous, and is useless; so we must rid ourselves of an old psychology of pleasure and pain. Pleasure, as I have used it, may perhaps be described as that sort of personal satisfaction which comes from the exercise of an instinctive capacity.

Another charge which I must face is that of naturalism. There was a time when natural meant material, and mental supernatural, or was relegated to the realm of airy nothing. This fallacy still lurks in certain quarters of material science and the pulpit; but

modern biology finds two aspects of nature, the material and the mental. Psychology deals with the mental phenomena as phenomena in nature. Not only our sensations, associations, reasonings, and conscious reactions, but also our feelings, our impulses, and the whole stream of subconscious life behave according to laws, the laws of mental nature. The religious phenomena are, therefore, from this point of view, phenomena in nature. The psychologist is not concerned with their transcendental aspects, but compares the religious emotion with other types of emotions, the religious sentiment with other sentiments, the religious self with other selves, as phenomena in nature. This method leads to the discovery of continuity of function. We describe the religious impulse; trace its development through infancy, childhood, adolescence, adult life, and senile decline; we observe the evolutions and involutions which it goes through. There is an unbroken chain of religious evolutionary events from the cradle to the grave. We recognize in manhood the things that were present in the child, because we can trace the stages of its growth. Things which have under the old view seemed to us unholy, become holy when we discover their mission in life. There is danger, as LeConte says, that when we discover all about how the machinery works, we shall ascribe its origin and maintenance to ourselves. There is danger that when I say that the sweetest communion with God is play, some will say, with an air of finality, "That is what I suspected."

The working-man is probably looking for a change in the course of events, if my argument about play has impressed him. But there is still some work. In distinguishing between work and play, we must not be misled by terms. Much that goes by the name of work is done in all fortunate occupations in the play attitude; and, on the other hand, much that goes by the name of play is downright hard work. Many games, sports, and so-called amusements and diversions are not play at all. Witness many of the social "duties" which are done in painful compliance with duty. The greater part of life is neither play nor work pure and simple, but a blending of the two. What we have said should, therefore, be taken with reference to the play *attitude* or play impulse whether it occurs in the performance of a duty, the pursuit of an ideal, or

the pursuit of immediate pleasure. In many situations, such as in our happy and contented work, play merely gives a sort of color and vim to the occupation. Religious manifestations are always complex. Much of religion is done through awful necessity with groans and tears as preparatory to the higher type of self-expression. Much of religion is downright work, but the goal of our best efforts is to make religion the expression of the freed self, just as the goal of the beneficent employer should be to make his work cheerful and natural.

Again I may be charged with an impulsive and infantile type of religion. To this I reply that as life develops, that is, becomes more intellectualized, spiritualized, and refined in its sentiments, the play attitude runs into the more serious types of self-expression such as quiet worship, contemplation, teaching, ministration, etc., which are the equivalent, in the developed soul, of games in the undeveloped. The attitude is the same; the same purpose is served; the same instincts operate; there is simply an adaptation of the self-expression to the stage of development.

At first impression, the point of view which I have presented seems to lower the dignity of religion, to commit us to a questionable sanction of morality, and to imply despair about the possibility of knowledge; but such fears are ill-founded. If the rôle of play in religion is carefully worked out, it reveals one of the elements in religion in most vital terms, namely, natural self-development; it leads to a serene appreciation of the spiritual self; it lays a cornerstone in the foundation of our religious pedagogy; it helps to put a true value upon our symbols of knowledge; it throws some light upon the nature of the faith that is within us; it reveals in religion those moving impulses and distinguishing attitudes which characterize art for arts' sake and zeal for research and science.

## THE GREEK ELEMENT IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS

---

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, PH.D., D.D.  
Northampton, Mass.

---

The Epistle to the Hebrews, the stateliest piece of composition in the New Testament, may be compared to a temple whose structure is Greek and whose atmosphere is Christian. One who passes immediately from a careful perusal of the first three gospels to a perusal of Hebrews has at first a feeling as though he had entered a new and strange world of thought. The fatherhood of God which glorifies the words and works of the Master as the sun glorifies an earthly landscape recedes here into the remote background. The Old Testament is given a prominence which quite overshadows the teaching of Jesus, and that too in regard to Jesus himself. The heavens are opened, and we catch a glimpse of the true sanctuary, of which that of Moses was only a shadow, and we see there in the heavenly world the climax of Christ's redeeming activity, which the gospels put on the earth.

When we analyze the difference of conception that marks off the Epistle to the Hebrews from the teaching of Jesus we soon find that its characteristic features are strongly tinged with Greek thought. No other New Testament writing, unless it be the Gospel of John, reveals a Greek influence at once so deep and so pervasive, and no other New Testament writing whatever shows such a blending of Greek thought with the old Hebrew ritual.

If we look through the epistle into the mind of its author to ascertain the starting-point or living center of his views on their Greek side, we are led to his thought of Christ. It was at this point not only that his readers were in danger of falling away from the living God and of surrendering their "confession," that is, their Christian faith, but at this point also that his own deepest personal interest centered. The Greek element in his thought of Christ is the dominant element in all the Greek thought of the epistle. With this element, therefore, it is necessary that our study should begin.

Of the earthly life of Jesus this writing, though it deals with Jesus more or less in each of its thirteen chapters, says little. It makes a passing reference to the fact that the Christian "salvation" was spoken at the first through him (2:3), but never makes a specific reference to the content of his teaching nor alludes to his works of mercy and power. In respect to character it is said that Jesus was "holy" and "guileless" (7:26), but his unselfish love is nowhere mentioned, that is, in the allusions to his earthly life. With the exception of these two passages all the score and more of references to Christ's life on earth touch only its suffering, most of them that last supreme hour of suffering on the cross. His temptation is mentioned, but that was part of his suffering (2:18; 4:15).

Of special interest in view of the author's lofty claims for Christ is the stress which he lays on his human weakness. Thus, with Gethsemane in mind, he says that Jesus offered up prayers and supplications *with strong crying and tears* unto him that was able to deliver him from death, a statement which goes beyond the gospel narrative in its suggestion of infirmity (5:7). Altogether peculiar to this letter is the thought that the sufferings of Jesus were a means of his *perfecting* (2:10; 5:9). This somewhat startling declaration is rendered still more startling by the words that Christ learned *obedience* (5:8), i.e., the perfecting that was achieved through bitter suffering was a perfecting of his own spirit in relation to the will of God and not simply a discipline fitting him to be the leader of other sons of God (5:10).

Such is the background of the life of Jesus against which the epistle sets the glorious picture of the great High Priest. In the creation of this picture Greek thought blends with Jewish, and furnishes the more conspicuous element. Both elements appear in the opening sentence, and each has there about the relative emphasis which is given it elsewhere.

First is the Jewish designation, that one through whom God has spoken at the end of the ages is his "Son" (1:2), and the writer appeals to the Old Testament in support of his use of this title (1:5). This designation is followed by a wealth of interpretative statements such as has not a parallel in the New Testament. First, this Son was appointed "heir of all things," i.e., the possession of the universe with all its riches was to fall to him. From the goal of history the writer

turns back, in the following clause, to its beginning, and asserts that through him whom he has called "Son" God made the ages or the worlds (1:2). Later in the chapter he appears to define this agency of the Son in the creation as the veritable production of the universe, for he applies to him the lofty words which the psalmist addressed to Jehovah,

Thou, Lord, in the beginning didst lay the foundation of the earth,  
And the heavens are the work of thy hands (1:10).

He does not regard the Son as the creator in the ultimate sense, that is God (1:2); but God accomplished it, not by his own personal word, as the author of Genesis supposed and as the Old Testament everywhere conceived of the matter, but he accomplished it indirectly through his Son. This thought is shared by Paul and the author of the Fourth Gospel.

The writer continues his description of the Son in three clauses, two of which at least concern an eternal relationship. The Son is the refulgence of God's glory, the very image of his substance, and he upholds all things by his powerful word (1:3). Such is the opening affirmation regarding that being through whom God has spoken at the end of the ages. The details of it are not formally repeated elsewhere in the letter, but its glory gives color to a word here and there (1:6, 9), and its thought helps to explain various passages (e.g., 2:9; 7:26; 13:8).

Whence came these exalted claims? Not from the Old Testament anticipations of the Messiah, for these never transcend the limits of a righteous King or a suffering servant who is filled with the Spirit of Jehovah; nor from the Synoptic Gospels, for Jesus said nothing of a relation which he sustained to the universe or the divine nature. It is now widely recognized that this conception of Christ is essentially Greek. To understand it we must go back to Philo and from Philo to the Greek philosophers. What they said of the Logos furnished the writer of Hebrews the materials which, under the influence of the historical Christ, he wrought into his conception. Let us consider its details briefly. The idea that God made the ages or worlds *through* the Son we find in Philo, who says that the cosmos has God as its cause and the Logos as the instrument through whom it was prepared.<sup>1</sup> The Son's heirship to all things follows from this close relation to creation.

<sup>1</sup> *Cherubim* 35.



We may notice here the word of 11:3 about the framing of the worlds. "By faith," says the writer, "we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which appear." Two points are of interest for the present study. The statement that the worlds have been "framed," or set in order, suggests that the writer, if he did not wholly adopt the Platonic view of the eternity of matter, at least did not think of a creation out of nothing. His language leaves the question of the origin of matter untouched. But then, in a subordinate clause, he adds what may at first sight appear to contradict the natural inference from his main statement, that "what is seen hath not been made out of things which appear." But if not out of things "which appear," then, presumably, the writer thought that what is seen had been made out of things which do *not* appear. This inference would at least accord with his use of the word "framed" instead of created. It is favored also by the fact that, in the Greek version of the Old Testament, Gen. 1:2 is rendered, "the earth was unseen and formless," a rendering which seems to show the influence of Greek philosophy; and furthermore, if the thought of the text is that the visible universe was framed out of an unseen and formless mass, it is in line with Philo who, though with some apparent hesitation, regarded the material of the universe as eternal.

Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews, both in its conception of the formation of the universe *through* the Son and in its conception, somewhat vague and questionable, that the origin of the visible universe was not at the same time the creation of the material of which the universe consists, is essentially Greek.

Again, the Son is called the "effulgence" of God's glory, or, if we prefer the less intensive translation of the Greek word, the "refulgence"; that is, we may suppose that the author likened the Son either to the light itself, or, in analogy with Paul's word about the knowledge of God's glory in the face of Jesus Christ (II Cor. 4:6), he likened him to a mirror which gives back the light. Now, while this phrase by itself might be regarded as a figurative mode of saying that the *character* of the Son was like the character of God, glorious in holiness and love and patience, yet in view of the obvious sense of the passage as a whole we are doubtless to take it as referring to the essen-

tial being of the Son. In this significant sense it is used by Philo when he calls the human spirit the effulgence of the blessed and thrice blessed nature,<sup>2</sup> and by the author of Wisdom, who calls it an effulgence of the everlasting light (7:26). We are in the same sphere of thought when, in the next clause, the Son is called the "very image" of God's "substance," for Philo calls the Logos the "image of God," the "nearest model of the only Being that truly is."<sup>3</sup> When, finally, the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the Son as "upholding all things by the word of his power" (1:3), he is simply stating in a more clearly personal form what the philosopher of Alexandria said of the Logos, that he is the "firmest and most secure support of the universe."<sup>4</sup> The next sentences of the same passage illustrate how much more abstractly Philo sometimes spoke of the Logos than the writer of Hebrews ever spoke of the Son. He says: "This (Logos) being stretched from the center to the ends and from the extremities to the center, runs the long unconquerable race of nature, collecting and binding all the parts. For the Father who begat it made it a bond of the universe that cannot be broken." Thus while the source of our passage is unmistakable, it is equally clear that the Christian writer's conception of the Son was not a little different from the Jewish philosopher's conception of the Logos. And this was of course natural, for while the Greek conception was a philosophical interpretation of the world, the Christian conception was a religious interpretation of Christ. Had Philo come under the personal influence of Jesus, we can easily believe that he would have written of the Logos much as the author of Hebrews did of the Son.

There remains one important christological feature of the Epistle to the Hebrews which we set apart by itself because in its form at least it is altogether Jewish. This is the high-priesthood of Jesus. The author may have been the first Christian, and he may not have been, who thought of Christ as a high priest. The Old Testament gave him a high-priestly ritual and Jesus had shed his blood. But while it was possible to deal symbolically with the blood of Jesus, and while the Old Testament had much to say of an earthly high-priesthood, there was nothing in the one field or the other to suggest a *heavenly*

<sup>2</sup> *De mundi opif.* 33.

<sup>3</sup> *De conj. ling.* 28; *De prof.* 19.

<sup>4</sup> *De plant.* No 2.

high-priesthood and its exercise in a heavenly tabernacle. What the author found in the Scriptures as a basis of his view will be considered later. It will then appear that the Old Testament did not originally suggest to him the conception of Christ as a high priest, but that, the conception having been derived from another source, the Old Testament was made to yield for it a shadowy support. The original suggestion probably came from Alexandria and the Logos doctrine. For Philo thought of the Logos as a high priest, and as exercising his priestly function both in the cosmos and also in the invisible world where he intercedes for mankind before God.<sup>5</sup> When the writer had once fallen in with this conception and had transferred it from the Logos to Christ, he searched his Scriptures for justification, and, as he thought, the search was not in vain. Of his special proof we speak in another connection. It remains to notice the magnitude of the contribution that was made to the thought of Hebrews when Philo's conception of the Logos as a high priest was adopted by the Christian writer. It may not be too much to say that he regarded this thought as the special burden of his message. It is suggested in the opening sentence, clearly stated in the second chapter (2:17), assumed as the basis of exhortation in the third and fourth chapters (3:1; 4:14), and its detailed elaboration fills the central portion of the epistle from chapter five to chapter ten. It colors the author's entire presentation of the work of Christ. Thus he summarized the historical work of Jesus as "making purification of sins" (1:3); he taught that the aim in his being made like unto his brethren was that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest (2:17); that his sufferings were designed to qualify him for the exercise of the priestly function (2:10; 5:29); that this function was prophesied in the Old Testament (e.g., 5:5-6, 10); that Jesus was set apart to the office by God with an oath (7:21); that the true tabernacle in heaven is cleansed by his blood (9:23); and that in this heavenly tabernacle he makes intercession forever (7:25). The high priest is the central figure in the epistle, and his priestly service dominates the thought. Thus, as has been pointed out, the chief references to the earthly career of Jesus are the references to his death, and furthermore the conception of God himself appears to be molded in some degree by

<sup>5</sup> *De somn.* 1. 37 ff.

that of the priestly character of Jesus. Thus his sterner attributes are emphasized. He is represented as one who is to be propitiated (2:17), one who visited Israel with judgment (3:17), whose word pierces to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow (4:12); as one into whose hands it is a fearful thing to fall (10:31), and as a consuming fire (12:29).

This representation of the character of God and of his relation to men, laying stress as it does on his severity, may be regarded as an evidence that, for the author of Hebrews, the high-priesthood of Jesus was the central Christian doctrine, for his high-priesthood requires just this conception of God as its background.

We pass now to a brief consideration of the debt which the epistle owes to the Platonic doctrine of ideas. It is most probable that the author, before his acceptance of the gospel, had been influenced by this doctrine, but he may well have been reassured of its truth as he applied it in the defense of his favorite tenet. For it is scarcely to be doubted that this tenet, in the form which it assumes in Hebrews, would not have been evolved independently of the Platonic doctrine.

The Scripture ground for the existence of a heavenly tabernacle, as far as any ground is claimed by the author of Hebrews, consists of a single text. When the Lord directed Moses to make a sanctuary, he said: "According to all that I show thee, the pattern of the tabernacle, and the pattern of all the furniture thereof, even so shall ye make it," and again, referring to the same sacred articles, it is said: "See that thou make them after their pattern, which hath been showed thee in the mount" (Exod. 25:9, 40). This simple statement, which was obviously intended to dignify the tabernacle, was the basis on which the author erected his theory of a greater and more perfect tabernacle in heaven. All that the text directly affirms is that Moses was divinely taught how to make the tabernacle and its furniture. This thought is expressed by the use of the word "pattern." Here it is that Greek speculation enters into our author's view. The "pattern" does not remain a simple pattern which Moses as an architect and builder was to follow in constructing the tabernacle and its furniture, but it becomes a great eternal reality of which the earthly tabernacle could be nothing more than a passing shadow-copy. The "holy place" in the earthly tabernacle is made after the true holy place,

that is, heaven (9:24). This conception plainly has no valid basis in the passage of Exodus which is cited. That merely affords a happy opening by which the Platonic speculation enters our epistle.

But while Exod. 25:40 is the only passage of Scripture which the author brings forward in proof of the doctrine of a heavenly tabernacle and so by implication the doctrine of a heavenly high priest, he evidently saw a further support in the fact that only the high priest might enter the holy place of the tabernacle, and he but once a year, always with an offering of blood. This was for him a divine symbol, teaching that the way into the holy place, that is, the heavenly tabernacle, had not yet been made manifest (9:8). But this ritual of the day of atonement, historically understood, had no such transcendent meaning. Only when considered in the light of Greek philosophy could it be made to yield the immense significance which the author of Hebrews saw in it.

There is another strong feature of the Epistle to the Hebrews which brings us into contact with Greek conceptions, and this is its use of Scripture. In no other writing of the New Testament do we have Greek conceptions of inspiration and interpretation so strikingly illustrated.

There is, first of all, in the author's use of Scripture a wide and deep influence of the doctrine of the Son. When he came to think of Jesus in terms of the Logos-speculation of Philo and the Stoics as the eternal medium between God and the universe, it was natural to think of him as speaking in the prophets. He could not make Christ the actual speaker everywhere. Indeed, there are comparatively few passages in which this was possible. That however is not significant. The momentous fact is that he unhesitatingly ascribes a single passage to Christ.<sup>6</sup> This far-reaching step which was taken by the author of Hebrews we call Greek because it was for him necessarily bound up with the identification of Christ with the Logos.

In thus representing certain passages in the Old Testament as spoken by Christ the author of Hebrews was the first of a long series of interpreters, perhaps not yet ended, who have created unspeakable

<sup>6</sup> Three passages are ascribed to Christ, one in Ps. 22, one in Ps. 40, and one in Isa. 8:1, 8. But Christ is represented as *addressed* in various other passages. See Heb. 1:5, 8, 10-12, 13; 5:5, 6; 7:17, 21.

confusion in regard to the historical sense of the Scriptures. In the case of his successors, as in his own, this error of interpretation has been inseparably bound up with a view of Christ which came not from Christ himself but from Greek philosophy.

Another Greek feature in the author's conception of Scripture—implied rather than expressed—is the passivity of the human agents through whom the teaching is given. The psalmists and prophets whose words are quoted are simply ignored. In the great majority of cases God himself is said to have been the speaker, in two places words of Scripture are cited anonymously, and of three passages Christ is represented as the speaker. When the eighth psalm is cited, which the author doubtless knew was attributed to David, it is cited simply as the testimony of a "certain one." Thus the human authorship of the Old Testament practically drops out of sight. The only real author is God. But this idea of the complete passivity of the human agent through whom God speaks is Greek.

Again, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was an allegorist, and this style of interpretation goes back to the Greeks. Jews of the Dispersion made use of it in the second century before our era, and the writer of Hebrews may have had no knowledge of the fact that it *was* Greek in its origin. That, however, is immaterial. He was an allegorist, and how profoundly this fact has modified his conception of Christian truth we shall now see. We notice first his explanation of a passage in Ps. 95. The author of that psalm called upon his contemporaries to hearken to God's voice, and warned them against unbelief by reminding them of its sorrowful consequences in the case of the generation who came out of Egypt (3:7—4:13). They did not enter into God's "rest," but their bodies fell in the wilderness. Moreover, the succeeding generation whom Joshua led into Canaan were nevertheless not partakers of God's rest, for in that case the Psalmist would not have been inspired to speak of "another day." The thought is that if he, centuries after the time of Joshua, was instructed to say,

To-day if ye shall hear his voice,  
Harden not your hearts,

it follows that the "rest" of God was not entered upon by those who passed over Jordan with Joshua. There are here two points to be

noticed. The writer sees in the simple "to-day" of the Psalmist a designation of the present age, the entire period from the day when he wrote down to the second coming of Christ (9:28). But this is to take the word allegorically. There the word "rest" is also allegorized. In the thought of the psalmist it was the inheritance in Canaan (Deut. 12:9). This land that flowed with milk and honey was regarded as God's rest to the people after the long hard experiences in the wilderness and in Egypt. But the word has a new meaning in our epistle. It is no longer Canaan and an earthly rest, but it is the "Sabbath rest" beyond the grave (4:9-10). This is indeed the crown of God's gifts of rest to his people, but it did not come within the Psalmist's horizon in the passage which we are considering.

The next instance of allegory is the author's treatment of Melchizedek (5:6, 10; 6:20; 7:1-3). This is by far the most notable New Testament illustration of allegorical interpretation. It is true, the author seemed to have a starting-point for his thought in the mysterious language of Ps. 110, where we read:

Thou art a priest forever  
After the order of Melchizedek.

This statement invited an imaginative reader to seek to discover what that "order of Melchizedek" was. But recent Old Testament scholars regard the word "Melchizedek" as a gloss, as perhaps a marginal illustration of what the text was supposed to mean, and they translate: "Thou art a priest forever for my sake." The simple thought of the passage then is that the person who was addressed, perhaps Simon who was high priest in 141 B.C., was established in his office for life, and that this was in a peculiar sense *God's appointment*, for Simon was not of the priestly order. We may suppose that the case of Melchizedek was set in the margin as an illustration, for he is called in Scripture a priest of God (Gen. 14:18-20), though he lived long before the establishment of the Aaronic priesthood and was not a Hebrew. Then this gloss, as was often the case, crept into the received text of the psalm. Accordingly, this mysterious "order of Melchizedek" disappears from the psalm, as not in the original text. But the author of Hebrews took the gloss as authentic, and the verse furnished a convenient support for an allegorical interpretation of the reverend and mysterious figure of the king of Salem

who met Abraham returning from the slaughter of the kings and blessed him.

Turning now to the author's use of the passage in Genesis, we notice two significant points. First, he found a deep meaning in the etymology of the name Melchizedek, and also in that of the name of the town over which Melchizedek was king. The first name justified him in thinking of this ancient priest as king of righteousness, and the second justified him in the thought that he was also a king of peace.

The story in Genesis, as might be expected, gives no very good warrant for this picture of Melchizedek, for it simply represents him as approving of Abraham's exploit against Chedorlaomer and the allied Kings. It does not suggest that he was pre-eminent in righteousness and worthy to stand as a model for far distant ages. Of course there is no occasion at all in the nature of things why Melchizedek should be put down as a king of peace because he ruled over "Salem," which word means peace, or why he should be held to have been a king of righteousness because his parents gave him the name "Melchizedek," which word has that meaning. But such treatment of proper names was very common in Philo, and it is properly reckoned as belonging to allegorical interpretation. The extreme felicity of the application of these names to Christ does not lend any support whatever to the author's treatment of the passage.

The last instance to be considered under this head of allegorical interpretation is that of the word "pilgrim" or "sojourner." It is said that Abraham became a sojourner in the land of promise, as in a land not his own, and from the word "sojourner" it is inferred that he looked for "the city which hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God" (11:9-10). Again, the author says, with apparent reference to Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Jacob, that they were self-confessed "pilgrims and strangers on the earth," and he concludes that they were "seeking a country of their own," that is, a heavenly one (11:13-16).

Now, according to the Old Testament, Abraham was indeed a sojourner in Canaan, as in a land not his own, though he did at length acquire the field of Machpelah as a burial-place; but he was a sojourner and stranger simply in contrast to being in possession of



the promised land of Canaan (Gen. 23:4). The Lord said to Moses regarding the descendants of Abraham, "I have established my covenant with them, to give them the land of Canaan, the land of their sojournings, wherein they sojourned (Exod. 6:4). This was the land of promise, and, as far as the ancient story goes, the *only* land which the patriarchs or their descendants contemplated. When the psalmist said unto the Lord,

I am a stranger with thee,  
A sojourner, as all my fathers were (39:12),

he expressed his sense of the transitoriness of his earthly life. It is a going hither and yon, a coming forth as a shadow that tarries not. His words are a plaint on the sad limitations of earthly life.

The author of Hebrews, having himself a Christian hope of the consummation of life in the city of God and in a heavenly country, quietly ascribed the same hope to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He ignored the historical sense of the passages which speak of Abraham and others as pilgrims and sojourners, and gave to them instead an allegorical significance. This was solely an error of judgment as related to the problem of interpreting the Scriptures.

These then, as it seems to me, are the Greek elements in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Its conception of Christ is wholly interpenetrated with the widely current views of the Logos, its conception of a heavenly tabernacle of which the Mosaic was only a copy and shadow is based on the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, and its conception of Scripture is Greek in the underlying view of inspiration, Greek in that Christ is sometimes represented as speaking in the Old Testament—for this view probably sprang out of the Logos influence—and Greek in its profoundly allegorical character.

## THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PSYCHO-THERAPEUTIC MOVEMENT<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR IRVING KING  
State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

The great wave of enthusiasm for mental healing through the agency of the church has in some measure subsided and it is now possible to look at both sides of the questions involved in it with a somewhat juster valuation of the factors concerned. In spite of exaggerations, the movement had an undoubted educational value for the church, opening its eyes to certain lines of religious effectiveness which it had scarcely realized before, lines indeed which are quite distinct from direct participation in the healing vocation. I refer especially to the facts, now widely known, which emphasize the intimate relation that subsists between mental conditions and the well-being of body and spirit. There can be no denying the vast array of evidence which has accumulated under the auspices of psychology in the last few years. Neither the average minister nor the average physician, for that matter, had suspected the scope and significance of these facts.

The minister, it is true, has had more or less theoretical and unsystematic notions regarding the possibility of effecting the cure of disease by faith and prayer. The physician has had equally vague notions of being able to supplement the action of his drugs by working upon the "imagination" of his patients. Then came the wave of popular enthusiasm for religious leaders to become active psychotherapists. This wave culminated with the so-called Emmanuel Movement, although it had certainly been slowly gathering in strength for the past twenty-five years under the stimulus of Christian Science and kindred sects. The point, however, to

<sup>1</sup> The author of this paper, while quoting extensively from certain authors, does not wish to be understood as thereby approving of all the positions taken in the books referred to. In many cases he differs widely. His approval extends no farther than the actual quotations. He has attempted to avoid making this a controversial paper.

which I would call attention is that this popular movement with all its fallacies has had considerable educational value. The religious leaders, at least, appreciate the fact that they stand as yet only on the outskirts of a great field and that there is need of straight, clear thinking if they are really to profit in exploring it.

Of the bare facts of mental healing there is, on the whole, no question. They are there before us, whatever we may choose to say about them in an interpretative way, and it is as legitimate and worth while to try to determine their significance for the Christian church and for the Christian minister as from any point of view. There seem, indeed, to be excellent historical precedents for a definite alliance between religion and the healing art, and this is possibly one of the reasons that the interest in psychotherapeutics has just now been so easily aroused and has spread so rapidly within religious circles. Religion has always been more or less definitely associated in the minds of the masses with the healing of diseases.<sup>2</sup> "The broad undercurrent of religious cures, especially in the Catholic church and in the Greek church, but with fewer symbols also outside of them, has up to the present time never ceased to flow."<sup>3</sup> This is true not merely of the Christian but of all religions from the most primitive to the most highly developed types. In earlier times the priest, frequently, if not always, combined the functions of the religious ministrant with those of the physician. In all ages and among all peoples the sick have been inclined to turn to their priests for help in shaking off the bonds of their bodily afflictions.

However, as society has become more complex and as its functions have differentiated, the labors of the priest have become more highly specialized and he has had less and less to do with the healing of diseases. In other words, the sphere of religion has gradually been more and more definitely delimited and the functions of the priest have been correspondingly narrowed. Into the history of the matter it is not necessary now to go farther. We may, however, consider for a moment the probable basis of this primitive connection of healing with religion.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the writer's *Development of Religion*, 194.

<sup>3</sup> H. Münsterberg, *Psychotherapy*, 325.

In general this connection seems to have been due to the peculiar theory of disease and death which has prevailed among all the natural races even to this day, that is that they are the results of evil magic exercised against the victim by some enemy or by some viciously disposed person.<sup>4</sup> Being produced by a mysterious power, it was easy to suppose that disease would have to be combated by the same agency. Hence the primitive man often turned to his priest because he was a public functionary, the conservator of tribal welfare, and because he also possessed power, or was *en rapport* with superior and mysterious forces of various kinds. It was, then, through his supposed access to a higher power that the religious leader was considered able to minister to those in sickness. In fact, whenever man has been baffled, whenever the vital concerns of life have seemed totally beyond his foresight and control, he has turned to religion to find help.

This theory of the method of healing through religion has prevailed in large measure to the present day. The accounts of the miracles of the New Testament show clearly that it was the accepted view of that period. The disciples, as well as Jesus himself, worked their wonders because, as they certainly believed, they had a power from above which was superior to the power of the evil spirits.

It is easy to pass from this belief over to the notion that the ability to work wonders is an important proof of the genuineness of the religion. If the adherents of a certain religion can cure disease their religion gives them power and it is therefore true. If they cannot work such miracles the power of their religion is either inferior or *nil*. It is a matter of history that every religion has, at times, tended to put forth its miraculous healings as the most important evidence of its genuineness. The broad and open-minded study of the various ethnic religions has, however, revealed the fallacy of depending upon such arguments, for it is found that all faiths, the lowest as well as the highest, actually are able to effect striking cures. It can hardly be maintained, then, that the miracle of healing is capable of throwing any special credit upon any religion. Evidently, that which is common to all religions cannot be used to prove the peculiar validity of any one of them.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Development of Religion*, 194.

If we would consider the religious significance of the current psychotherapeutic movement we find there are, then, two problems which require some consideration. First, is there any legitimate ground on which the minister, as over against the physician, may still participate in the healing of the sick? That is, has the therapeutic function passed completely and properly over to the physician, as the healing vocation has been gradually differentiated from the priestly, or is there some aspect of the healing art to which the minister as such may still lay claim? Secondly, if there *is* still a healing function for the church and its ministers, on what basis does it rest, inasmuch as the higher religion can no longer hold that such healing is due to the exercise of, or *rappor*t with, supernatural power?

While it seems most logical to state these questions in this order, it will be more satisfactory to reverse them for discussion as the solution of the first problem will to some extent depend upon the answer we give to the second. In other words, the question as to whether the religious leader may still be a therapist for the body will be significant only if there is admitted to be still a ground on which the healing *can* take place, the exercise of supernatural powers being ruled out by both historical and scientific evidence. If the minister *can* heal, has he a right to do so in view of the existence of the physician class? Is there something that the minister as a minister can do that the physician cannot?

We seek, then, first of all the explanation of the cures that have occurred under the ministration of religious faith. This explanation, as is well known, modern science has offered in terms of the psychology of suggestion. Students of mental life have long recognized the tendency of ideas to find motor or bodily expression of some sort. This is true not merely of ideas which are associated with some voluntary activity, as when a man eats an apple or sharpens his pencil, not because he really wishes to do so but because in some way the idea of doing so is suggested to him, for example, by the act of someone else. Almost any act can be thus initiated by suggesting the idea of that act in some appropriate way. But the power of suggestion extends much farther than this. Not merely ordinary voluntary activities can be thus produced;

changes also may be wrought in the physical organism, apparently entirely beyond the control of the will.

Medical experts also recognize that disease is to some extent the outcome of a disintegration within the personality. Certain ideas may acquire an undue prominence in the field of attention. The psychophysical organism loses its normal condition of balance and thus lays itself open to various functional derangements. If the normal balance can be restored the prospects of regaining health are more favorable. All curing of disease, in so far as it depends upon psychical factors, acts to a large extent along this line, namely, that of establishing a strong idea of recovery and of turning the attention away from the affliction as an absorbing object of interest.

The methods by which suggestion acts vary widely whether within or without the pale of religion. As Professor Münsterberg says: "The forms were frequently changing through the history of the church but the essence remains the same. Sometimes more emphasis is laid on the personal factor of the priest, sometimes more on the sacred origin of the symbol as in the case of the relics, sometimes more on prayer and godly works, but it is always the religious belief which cures."<sup>5</sup> That is to say, the means by which one's attention is turned from the malady and fixed upon the idea of recovery may vary; now it may be a person, now a relic, now a prayer, but in every case there must be a turning of the attention away from the disease and a fixing of it upon the idea of attaining health, or at least there must be an absorption of attention in other things than in the sickness. The principle here involved is fundamental to the practice of the primitive witch doctor. It is one of the elements of Christian Science practice with its affirmation that disease is non-existent, for here also attention is transferred from the disease and the disease-producing conditions by denying that they exist and is fixed upon ideas of health and well-being.

It would seem from these things that the conditions appropriate for health might be furnished by *any* agency or institution and that there should be no special reason for religions being

<sup>5</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 324.

concerned in mental therapy unless it be from a desire to maintain its traditional connection with the healing art.

As has been said, a functional disease is to some extent the outcome of a disintegration of the psychical organism, and suggestion is effective because it is possible by such means to reconstitute that organism.<sup>6</sup> If religion is to play any part in the matter at all it must be through its capacity to exert just such an influence. Some students of psychotherapy hold, and not without reason, that the tendency of religion in this direction is negative rather than positive. For example:

It is really doubtful whether the moral and religious appeals are always helpful and not sometimes or often even dangerous for the health of the individual; and it is not doubtful that morally and religiously indifferent mental influences are often of the highest curative value. The more we abstract from everything which suggests either the mysticism of the subconscious or the moral issues of the mind which is independent of the body, the more we shall be able to answer the question as to the means by which health can be restored.<sup>7</sup> . . . By touching one of the deepest emotional layers of the mind, the layer of religious ideas, the minister gives to the soul an intense shock and expects that in the resulting perturbation everything will be shaken and may then settle itself by its own energies in a healthful way. It is a fact that can sometimes happen, and under favorable conditions the chances for it are even favorable. Under other conditions the chances are unfavorable and the result does not happen at all.<sup>8</sup> . . . Religious fervor has at all times helped to create hysteria and to develop psychasthenias.<sup>9</sup>

There is, however, another side to the matter and our author recognizes it, as we shall see later.

To determine adequately the exact nature of the influence of the religious attitude upon bodily health would require a careful

<sup>6</sup> "It is the skeleton in the closet, the tug of an evil spirit residing in the mysterious depths of our subconscious life, the misunderstood twists and tendencies derived from unfortunate experiences in childhood, experiences which at the time may have seemed innocent and trivial enough, that contribute many of the specters which terrify us and seem to block our paths. It is among the best contributions of modern psychiatry and psychotherapy that it has been shown to be possible, in a remarkable degree, to reverse these hidden influences, which are due to old environments, to misinterpreted emotions, in brief to ignorance."—Dr. Putnam in *Psychotherapeutics*.

<sup>7</sup> Münsterberg, *op. cit.*, 164, 165.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 336.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 338.

inductive study of the psychology and social psychology of religion. In lieu of such an empirical study we can here offer only a few theoretical generalizations. Religion is not, strictly speaking, the expression of a simple instinct, but rather a developed and complicated attitude, a complex of ideas, emotions, and impulses about certain ends, ideals, or objects. Thus, a system of mental states may be organized about the end of conforming to the will of some deity, or to the ideal of life supposed to be set forth by Jesus or Buddha. Then again there may be systems of ideas, motives, and acts clustering about the adoration of some god. We can thus see that a religious attitude represents an integration of the psychophysical life of the individual about certain nodes or foci.

These nodes are important features of our mental life in general. Our ideas, our feelings, our emotions are not jumbled together without plan or organization. There is always a grouping of some sort among the mental elements. A part of these elements are systematized about our vocations. Our capacity to act efficiently and promptly seems to depend upon the thoroughness with which our mental systems are integrated. It is these definite organizations of the person's mental self that constitute character. One with no definite centers of interest is without definite character. The psychophysical make-up is at loose ends.

Now, it is important to recognize that, even in its lowest forms, the religious life of a person is more or less such an organization of himself and that it serves to give to him a certain character. He has literally had his ideas, his emotions, his habits, his desires put together after a particular pattern, a pattern which resists disintegration and is capable of exerting a definite influence upon the person in all the other aspects of his life, both conscious and unconscious. It is a means of integrating a broader self; at least there *are* persons who find in religion an enlargement of being, who find in it a means of making the actual working personality more than ordinarily inclusive.

The question is whether such a mental complex as this which may develop under the influence of religion is in itself favorable to health, and whether the continuous cultivation and development of the religious attitude may be an important influence in



fortifying the body against disease as well as in healing those diseases that already exist.

I have already pointed out that medical specialists tend to regard functional diseases as due, to some extent, to the disintegration of the normal mental and physiological complexes and to the development of unhealthy ones. Thus:

Common experience has shown that certain unhealthy habitual states of mind are apt to be accompanied by various derangements of the functions of the body. By "unhealthy" I would designate those which tend to misadapt a person to his environment, and among those habits or states of mind I would classify disruptive emotions and feelings; apprehensions and fear of disease or of the consequences of business or social acts; fixed beliefs in fictitious disease, illogical doubts, scruples, and anxieties; habits of thought such as constant introspection, self-consciousness, the concentration of attention on the physiological functions of the body, the expectation of ill consequences following any sort of conduct, and so on. I need not go into details, for that such conditions of mind are accompanied by derangements of the bodily functions is a fact of common knowledge. . . . Furthermore, in certain persons, the modes of mental activity I have described, if frequently repeated, tend to become habits or habitual reactions to the environment that are not easily discarded. . . . It is not to be affirmed that these unhealthy mental states, even when they become habitual, are accompanied in every individual by disturbance of bodily functions, but the tendency is such in persons of a certain temperament and so-called nervous organization.<sup>10</sup>

We may take it, then, as an established fact that the healthful functioning of the body is dependent, in part, upon a well-organized mental life.

"The aim of psychotherapy, therefore, must be to reassociate the split-up personality and to form such healthy complexes of ideas as will not stimulate the undesired complexes, but by their automatic activity will contribute to the well-being of the individual and adapt him to his environment."<sup>11</sup> I believe it may be plausibly held that religion is capable of becoming such a healthful integrating force in one's life. There are certainly some aspects of religious belief that seem to be very definitely productive of a healthful condition of mind. Such would surely be the result of the perfect love that casteth out all fear.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Morton Prince in the symposium published under the title *Psychotherapeutics*, 13, 14.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

The idea of the man Jesus of the theological concept of Christ, as a noble and impelling personality, easily becomes a great organizing force, rich in suggestions, a means of effecting real character development.<sup>12</sup>

Religion, as we have seen, is in its essence an outcome or expression of a psychical complex. It depends of course upon what the religious environment of the individual is whether these complexes are healthful or not. They should be healthful, however, and, in the main, their tendency is in that direction, notwithstanding the fact there is much to substantiate the assertions of Münsterberg quoted above. Many aspects of current as well as historic religion have indeed tended to produce just the effects which he mentions. But the *ultimate* aim of religion is to reconstitute the person after a certain fashion, and even though this reconstituted person may be quite abnormal from the viewpoint of present-day standards, such as the anchorite, the extreme ascetic, or mystic of the Middle Ages, it is nevertheless true that even such types of character represent a remarkable definiteness and unity of organization. It is chiefly in the *steps* by which such unity of character is attained that the danger of shipwreck exists, the danger of starting complexes or setting up powerful ideas which shall, through mismanagement, never get properly organized with the rest of the self. For instance, certain ideas of sin and punishment, of self-denial and self-condemnation, or even of love and duty, may be presented with such strong emotional tones that they acquire the power of fixed ideas in some persons and remain independent centers of activity interfering with, rather than contributing to, the building-up of a strong central character.

The religious ideal may be said to be the attainment of some sort of unity or harmony with a superior order of existence. The present world is felt to represent inadequately the real values of life. The religious character strives for a higher organization of the elements of psychophysical existence than would come from a narrow conformity to present physical and social standards. By its powerful appeal to the emotions, by its emphasis upon its valuations as absolutely ultimate, by its ideal of helpful service

<sup>12</sup>Cf. Brown, *Faith and Health* 122 ff., for an excellent discussion of this phase.

and its obligation to stand for and promulgate the teachings imposed upon its adherents, a religion may furnish an almost unparalleled agency for the integration of character and a type of character at that which should be quite healthful. Surely, healthfulness would tend to be the result of the vivid appreciation of the dictum that all things work together for good with the godly, or of the faith that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, all is ultimately well with the world. The firm conviction that sin and disease are twin delusions of mortal mind and that only the good exists, whatever its crudity as a system of metaphysics, is undoubtedly a psychological condition favorable to a buoyant, healthful frame of mind.

In fine, we can say that the development of a religious attitude *may* tend toward a state of mental organization and mental poise which makes for health in one already diseased and which tends to maintain a condition of health in the well, and all this entirely aside from the action of any supposed supernatural and extraneous powers. In this broad general way it is certainly true that the modern religious leader does retain a part of his ancient healing prerogative. It is true also that religion, as a character-building force, may be made favorable to health and inimical to disease.

I started out by explaining mental therapy through suggestion. Afterward I emphasized character development as the special avenue of healing open to the church. Let us now try to see if there is any relation between these ways of looking at the matter. Professor Münsterberg defines a suggestion as "an idea which has a power in our mind to suppress the opposite idea," not different from other ideas except in "the way in which it takes possession of the mind" and "reduces the chances of any opposite ideas" in the determination of conduct.<sup>13</sup> Character development, on the other hand, may be said to be in part the resultant of the many suggestions to which the individual in all his formative years has been subjected. And yet character development involves more than suggestion and it is most important for all discussions of mental therapy to recognize this fact. This "more," to which I refer, is the factor of conscious will, or purpose. It is well known

<sup>13</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 86.

that the condition of mind most open to suggestion is that of relative passivity. Now, it is fairly evident that a character built up altogether through *mere* psychologic suggestion would be a very poor sort. It would be a disjointed mechanical product devoid of a certain uniqueness which we associate with individuality. We are far from being merely the product of countless suggestions from our environments. There is always the inner impulse or self-activity of the organism to be taken into account and it is quite as fundamental in our make-up as any and all external influences. This inner impulse may be *modified* by suggestion, but to grant this does not affect the point at issue, namely: that in normal character development there is always present the factor of active choice, the impulse to overcome all obstacles in working out a life of one's own.

In terms, then, of this impulse, of this conscious striving, psychologic suggestion is merely so much raw material, important as raw material, but never capable of making a genuine character without much elaboration and transformation from within. What is the bearing of this upon the religious significance of psychotherapy? It is evident that suggestion, while it may help to re-establish the functions of the organism upon a more healthful basis, does not in itself furnish a fully adequate basis for a continuation in a state of bodily health. Unless there has been real character development, real and profound integration of the scattered elements which before contributed to the diseased condition, the return to health, mediated merely by suggestion, may be only temporary.

It is interesting to note that physicians and psychologists recognize the more or less partial and even temporary influence of bare suggestion. For instance one authority says:

There is a striking difference between the impulses to action formed through suggestion and those gained through experience and struggle, even though the apparent result and form of the action might seem now and then to be the same in the two cases. This difference resides in the fact that, although an impulse to action secured through suggestion may fit us to carry out a certain result, and thus adapt us to a certain environment, the position of character—assuming of course that it is character of a desirable sort—adapts us to environments of many sorts.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Dr. Putnam in *Psychotherapeutics*, 201.

There is the case of a cocaine and morphine patient<sup>15</sup> who was dismissed from a New York hospital apparently cured, but who soon relapsed into his old habits. He was really cured (true, in this case not entirely by mental therapy), but he had not developed the strong character necessary for resisting the manifold temptations which came to him in most subtle ways when he entered the environment and took up the vocation of his old life.

There is a growing recognition on the part of physicians and psychiatrists of the deep-rooted causes of many diseases and with this recognition a further appreciation of the fact that we have here emphasized, that suggestion is, in many instances, able to offer only a superficial or partial relief. Thus, to quote again:

In proportion as our knowledge of the mental life has become deeper and more accurate, there has been a growing tendency to seek further and further for the causes of distressing mental symptoms; whether these causes lie in the environment of the patients or in habits and instincts and experiences dating back to the years of childhood or expressed in inherited physical traits. Hand in hand with these tendencies towards a more searching analysis of symptoms with reference to this origin there has come a willingness to undertake a modification of the mental mechanism such as was not characteristic of the therapeutic efforts of earlier days.<sup>16</sup>

Psychotherapeutics in its best sense thus resolves itself into a broad system of mental regeneration, or re-education, not dependent upon isolated doses of suggestion in which the factors of personal initiative and purposive endeavor are apt to be overlooked, but rather upon real inner growth. It is common now-a-days to say that Jesus effected his miraculous cures through suggestion. It is significant, however, that he apparently recognized the necessity of re-education, or of character development, as the only sure guarantee of continued health. Is not this the psychological significance of his forgiving the sins of many as a step preparatory and essential to the healing process? And what is forgiveness, viewed psychologically? Whatever may be its metaphysical meaning, it is at least for the individual a regenerated personality. Sin is the outcome of the activity of some narrow or restricted portion of the self, the result of the functioning of a detached

<sup>15</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 288, 289.

<sup>16</sup> *Psychotherapeutics*, 187.

psychical complex. A bad man has either a loosely organized character, or a character organized on a low and narrow plane. What such a man needs, first of all, is to get a broader outlook, to feel himself a part of a higher order and appealed to by a new type of motives. If this wholesome attitude can be secured by forgiveness, if the sinner can feel that he is no longer at variance with higher things by being assured that his sins are remembered no more against him, it is certainly a concession on the part of the divine mind worth the while. That is, if a person of disintegrated personality can be put on the road of mental regeneration by God's forgiving and forgetting, the latter can well afford to make such a concession. What is even the worst sin in view of the possibility of a new man's being built up by that sin's forgiveness? When, therefore, Jesus first forgave the sins of the paralytic and then suggested to him that he arise and walk, he did something which is quite in accord with modern theories of the healing of disease. He provided by that fiat of forgiveness for a unification of character which would serve as a basis for the new health that the suggestion of rising up and walking had called into being.

I believe it can be shown that successful mental healing in all ages has been associated with some form of character-building. The main element of success in the Emmanuel Movement as well as in Christian Science lies just here. The Christian Scientist has always been loud in his denial that the cures wrought under his influence have had any connection with hypnotism or suggestion, and in a sense he is right. It is suggestion, only much more than that, upon which he depends. Christian Science really provides for an elaborate system of education in a peculiar philosophy of the world and of life. This education, as I understand it, is recognized as fundamental in the practice of the art.<sup>17</sup> As was pointed out above, the view of matter and disease as non-existent furnishes a basis upon which psychical complexes of character can be organized and a spirit of healthy-mindedness developed which is apparently independent of the question of whether the philosophy is true or false.

We have probably given a sufficient answer to the second of

<sup>17</sup> *Science and Health* (1910), chap. xii.

the questions proposed in the beginning of this paper. The answer is this: Religion in general may have a genuine therapeutic value because it affords definite centers of interest and compelling objects of attention. It is capable of exerting an influence favorable to the organization and unification of personality and all of this we have seen is favorable to physical health.

The next question is whether the minister, in view of the above facts, should undertake specifically the work of therapy. Can the therapeutic values of religion be best realized by the minister's consciously and actively attempting to help the sick when their maladies are supposedly altogether or largely of mental origin? At first glance it seems that such a course would be perfectly feasible, provided the minister has the time for it in the midst of his other and admittedly heavy duties. It would seem, indeed, to be but the logical outcome of the fact that religion is capable of exerting a positive integrating influence upon the life of the individual.

The question is not, however, to be disposed of so easily. When one recognizes how intricate the processes involved in even functional diseases are, one may see that even when psychical treatment is desirable it is questionable whether any but the skilled physician should attempt to administer it. The well-known proposal of the leaders of the Emmanuel Movement has been that the physician diagnose the case, and, if he decide that psychical treatment is required, he turn the case over to the clergyman, the assumption apparently being that the clergyman is better able to administer it than the doctor. True, the minister has the advantage of being able to utilize religious forces, and yet religion, while of probable therapeutic value, is only one of the forces that are capable of playing a part in mental healing and there are unquestionably some persons in need of mental treatment who cannot be approached on the religious side. There are other difficulties attending the minister who attempts in any definite way to be a therapist.

The diagnostician who treats the patient himself has ever new chances to remodel his diagnosis and to correct it under the influence of therapeutic effects. The danger is great that under the proposed conditions the activity

of the physician will be superficial, because he is deprived of his chief means, constant observation.<sup>18</sup>

But even if it should be shown that these possibilities of error are not serious, there is still a further difficulty.

The usefulness of psychical treatment does not at all exclude the strong desirability of physical treatment at the same time. The emphasis which is laid on religious persuasion and inspiration, on prayer and spiritual uplift, practically excludes the use of baths and douches, of massage and electricity, of tonics and sedatives. . . . The minister applies and can apply only one of many possible methods for cure and yet, if we really want to make use of the resources of modern knowledge, we have to adapt most carefully all possible means to the individual case.<sup>19</sup>

In other words, few if any diseases are clear-cut and simple as to mode of treatment. Those of an organic character do not require physical treatment alone nor are the functional diseases capable of being clearly separated from the organic. Even if they could be, it is doubtful whether mental therapy would suffice in all cases.

Even on the purely mental side there are difficulties. The average minister, and the average physician too, for that matter, are scarcely able to make the detailed analysis on the mental side which a case usually requires. The factors which require attention and specific adaptation are extremely complex, so that it is questionable whether anyone who does not devote his entire thought to the study of psychotherapy can adequately deal with all the exigencies of a particular case.

It is true that the minister as a confidential and trusted friend, through quiet conversation, suggestion, or prayer, may calm the troubled nerves of a patient and induce in him a more hopeful and hence more healthful frame of mind. But it is questionable whether he can do more than treat in this very general way the cases that may come to him. He can give general suggestions which may relieve insomnia, he may do many things that will help the nervous patient and set him on the road to living a better balanced life. But most diseases require *specific* treatment as well, and the minister can hardly differentiate his therapeutic methods. The science of suggestive therapeutics is full of the subtlest details

<sup>18</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 333.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 333-34.



and, while the general suggestion of health that one may get from the bones of a saint, from the waters of Lourdes, from the philosophy of Christian Science, or from the encouraging words and prayers of a trusted clergyman may be productive of excellent results, there will be many cases that will require very much more detailed attention both on the mental and on the physical side. Even when mental treatment is desirable it cannot

ignore the hundred physical elements which enter daily into the disease. There are the most complex digestive problems involved which demand a thorough understanding of chemical metabolism, there are still more complex problems of the sexual organs which the minister certainly ought not to discuss with his female parishioners, there are bacteriological questions, there are questions of the peripheral nervous system and sense organs; in short, questions which belong to a world into which the minister as minister has never looked.<sup>20</sup>

It thus appears doubtful whether the minister should enter actively into the therapeutic field in other than the most general way. The clergyman who seeks to be a therapist will be apt either to give undue stress to the religious factor or to depart from it in some degree by depending now and then and in part upon the aid of various physical means.

If the woman who cannot sleep is cured from her insomnia by being made to listen to the beats of a metronome, it may sometimes be effective, however crude, but it is certainly no longer religion, even though the metronome stands in a minister's room.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, little by little, the minister may come to supplement his religious suggestions by physical aids and as he does so, "he simply enters into competition with the physician, only with the difference that he has never studied medicine."<sup>22</sup>

This, then is the upshot of our inquiry: There is little doubt that the minister, able as he is to arouse the religious emotions and to awaken the strongest of human impulses under the stimulus of religious ideas, may give specific suggestions that will lead to the healing of the sick, in just the same way that the priest of a primitive cult, or the relic of a saint may cure a believer who belongs to a lower stage of culture. To be sure, the one may be more enlightened than the other as to the actual method of his cure.

<sup>20</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 334-35.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 340.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

The one may think that it is effected through the action of some supernatural power. The other *may* know that the help comes through suggestion and through the building-up of a better balanced self. It is more than likely, however, that the large majority of those presumably enlightened people who have their attention turned to Christ and are encouraged to "believe" that he will heal as in days gone by, or who seek healing through prayer, it is more than likely, I say, that they also expect the desired results to be accomplished through the exercise of some supernatural power which becomes available through the fervency of their prayer or the quantity of their faith. It is evident that they do not stand on a different ground from that occupied by those primitive minds who are healed by some relic, by holy water, or by an incantation.

Even though the belief in magic powers should continue, though in modified form, to be efficacious with modern peoples, it is a serious question whether the church can afford to build up its healing functions on the basis of any such idea. It seems to me, if it came to a choice between the two, that the fantastic metaphysics of Christian Science along with its thoroughly practical healthy-mindedness would be far more desirable and certainly safer. Moreover, even though many people may be able to be helped through a belief in miraculous powers, it is a belief which will fail to appeal to an increasingly large number in this age of enlightenment.

What, then, is the way out of these various difficulties? If the minister attempts, on the one hand, to use suggestive therapeutics in any thorough way he encroaches upon the sphere of the physician and if, on the other hand, he confines himself strictly to the religious sphere he almost inevitably overworks the religious motives and in the minds of many of his patients becomes a purveyor of supernatural powers. As far as I can see he must first of all recognize more clearly his real function as a religious leader, and secondly he must see, without intellectual wavering, the real nature of the relation of religion to health. This function and this relation have already been clearly stated in the earlier portions of this paper in terms of religion as a developer or integrater of character.

There is a real need, on the other hand, that the medical psychotherapist should appreciate more keenly the fact that it is not mere suggestion, in the long run, but rather actual reconstruction of character (a process often slow as well as difficult), that is most needed in combating disease and that religion can, as we have seen, exercise an important influence in such a reconstruction. I am willing to go so far as to say that the efforts of the *average* physician might well be supplemented in many cases by the intelligent minister. Possibly some basis of co-operation might be worked out not open to the objections brought against the Emmanuel Movement. The busy physician is apt to treat disease as if it were an isolated process and he is apt to overlook the

thousandfold connections in which the nervous system stands with the patient's whole life experience in past and future. The physician is thus too easily inclined to underestimate the good which may come in the fight against disease, from the ideas and emotions which form the background of the mind of the patient. Even if the disease cannot be vanquished, the mental disturbances which result from it, the pains and discomforts, may be inhibited, as soon as hopes and joyful purposes gain a dominating control of the mind. The nervous patient often needs a larger hold upon life, while routine prescriptions may too easily reduce that hold by fixing attention on the symptoms. Here then is the right place for the moral appeal and the religious stimulation. . . . We should not underestimate the manifold good which can come from the causal effect of religious and ethical ideas. Those faith curists who bring mutual help by impressing each other with the beauty and goodness of the world really bring new strength to the wavering mind [as the personal self is submerged into a larger, all-embracing existence, and] thus inhibits the small cares and troubles of merely personal origin. The consciousness sinks into God. . . . The haphazard pains of the personality disappear [or] are suppressed by the joy and glory of the whole. . . . Neglected functions of the brain are released and give to the mind an energy and discipline and self-control and mastery of difficulties which restitutes the whole equilibrium and with the equilibrium a new calmness and serenity which may react almost miraculously on the entire nervous system and through it on the whole organism and its metabolism.<sup>23</sup>

It seems to me, in conclusion, that great good for the minister and his people might come from the current psychotherapeutic movement, even though the minister should not enter the field as a mental therapist. As he goes about his ordinary duties as a reli-

<sup>23</sup> *Psychotherapy*, 206-8.

gious ministrant and counselor he may exercise important and safer therapeutic influences. He is pre-eminently a character-builder, and he may now appreciate as never before the subtle difficulties which attend the process through the possibility of emphasizing aspects of religion which, if taken by themselves, disintegrate rather than build up the self. Religious leaders, in view of the facts which this movement has brought to light, may well consider whether the content of their religious messages might not be reconstructed to some extent, reconstructed so as to place more emphasis upon hopefulness, cheerfulness, and the joy of being of service to others rather than upon intellectual problems of doctrine, or upon the distressing aspects of the problem of evil, or even insisting too much upon an uncompromising ideal of duty. I have no thought or desire to soften religion or to render it any less worthy of the respect of the strongest minds. The things which have just been mentioned must often enter into the message of the minister to his people. But we have learned enough about the working of the human psychophysical machine to know today that these are edged tools, not to be used indiscriminately nor to be hurled at all times upon the receptive minds of a congregation. By cultivating a different type of general religious appeal, the clergyman of today will actually minister more effectively to the needs of his people. The content of religion is vast, and a selection from its great storehouse must be made from generation to generation to meet the varying human needs. I believe this age has a peculiar need and that it will in no wise compromise religion if the ministers of the people try to offer them that for which they are hungering. I shall not try here to formulate that need more definitely. It is easier felt than stated, and, moreover, each one will have to state it for himself. It seems to me, however, that it lies along the lines suggested in this paper.

## WAS NEWMAN A MODERNIST?

PROFESSOR WILLIAM HENRY ALLISON  
Colgate Theological Seminary, Hamilton, N.Y.

The attempt to assign a man of a past age, even of the previous generation, to one of the groups into which men are now classified in regard to their opinions—political, philosophical, theological, ecclesiastical—may be nothing more than an idle act of the imagination, guided perchance more or less by the reason, but after all of little scientific value.

Such an attempt at classification as is suggested by the question before us may do violence to distinctions which existed in the past but which now have practically or completely disappeared; or, on the other hand, it may imply the existence in the past of conditions in the realm of thought or in social groupings before they have come into actual being.

Moreover, to catalogue a man of the past according to the system of classification now in vogue may imply that his thinking would have continued in its habitual trend, that nothing could have arisen to deflect it into a new channel; yet history is full of instances of men who have been working as colleagues, in fullest and deepest sympathy one with another, with common purpose and complete accord as to methods, until the rise of some new issue has given to some of them a new point of view, after which time radical differences have separated them. No one, however, looking at only such evidence as was available before the new and disruptive issue had arisen, could have foretold with certainty how individual members of the group would be affected by the entrance of a completely new factor, be it political, economic, social, philosophical, or perhaps personal. If Hurrell Froude had lived ten years longer, would he have remained Anglican or would he have gone over to Rome? Probably both sides of this question could be argued with about equal weight of evidence; but we realize how impossible it is to reach an incontestable conclusion as we

recall that if we were to limit ourselves to evidence previous to the death of Froude, we could use much the same arguments and with equal force for Pusey or for Newman, for Faber or for Keble.

It is with caution, then, that we must raise the question concerning John Henry Newman which forms the subject of the present paper. There is the more need of this because of certain difficulties which inhere in Newman's mental attitude toward fundamental religious questions. The question before us has been raised because the defenders of Modernism have claimed Newman as belonging to them in spirit, while certain of the opponents of the Modernists have resented this as an assault upon the genuineness of the late English cardinal's Catholicism and the aspersion of heresy within the unsullied precincts of the Sacred College itself. Although Newman was called by Whately "the clearest headed man he knew," and is considered a master of the most lucid English style, in regard to some matters he never succeeded in making himself understood. The historic pamphlet of Charles Kingsley, *What, Then, Does Dr. Newman Mean?* was doubtless for many reasons an unfortunate episode in its author's career, and yet there are several reasons why it is well that it appeared. Of these the most obvious one is that it resulted in the production of that almost matchless spiritual autobiography, the *Apologia pro vita sua*, but to mention this only is to imply that the pamphlet was merely an evil out of which, forsooth, good came. The brochure was not, however, as the Roman Catholic clergy of the diocese of Hobart Town asserted in the heat of polemic passion, "the production of a bold, unscrupulous man, with a coarse mind, and regardless of inflicting pain on the feelings of another," for no characterization of Charles Kingsley could be farther from the truth. Kingsley but voiced suspicions that were rife throughout Protestant England, partly springing from the inherited prejudices and animosities toward Roman Catholics, but directed toward Newman, because his own words, interpreted in the light of his religious career as that was popularly understood, opened the way to those suspicions. Newman accused his assailant of "poisoning the wells," but the question may be raised whether the wells were not poisoned before Kingsley wrote. The curse of Chocorua was supposed to account

for the death of cattle which drank from a certain stream in New Hampshire running down from the rugged mountain which bears that Indian chieftain's name; but chemical analysis showed that certain alkalis in the native soil had been for centuries polluting the water, making it unfit for drinking purposes. One needs only to recall such historic facts as the Marian persecutions, the political intrigues of the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, and the well-known opposition of Newman and his confrères to the liberal progress in England during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, to understand how there had been precipitated in the mind of English Protestantism the corrosive of suspicion. Newman's *Apologia* probably has done more than any other one literary work to expel certain unfounded suspicions that were held against all Roman Catholics, merely by making clear his own integrity. As his fellow-religionists received his work as representative and credit him with the results produced, common fairness, based upon the actual conditions which produced Kingsley's polemic, should interpret the pamphlet, not as a personal assault, but as the expression of a widespread suspicion. It may be questioned whether the method used was the wisest—it surely opened Kingsley's own motives to suspicion and attack<sup>1</sup>—but after all, what but a public statement of the suspicions would have opened the way for Newman to clear himself as in his *Apologia* he actually did? Nevertheless, in spite of the clarity of Newman's style and the general simplicity of his reasoning, the old question arises again and again, and in its latest form it is raised among Roman Catholics themselves—but now the question is freed entirely from any shadow of suspicion as to Newman's sincerity—"What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?" Now while Newman himself disclaimed any interest in polemics and disliked his rôle of controversialist, his most significant writings, at least those most important for an understanding of Newman's theological position, using that term in its broadest significance, were addressed primarily to those who were not standing on the same ground as Newman himself;

<sup>1</sup> Professor Saintsbury says (*Short History of English Literature*, p. 74): "He experienced a discomfiture which was rather due to the blundering of his tactics than to the weakness of his case."

until he should make known just what his position was, they could hardly themselves make the intellectual transition to his point of view. In other words, the burden of the responsibility of making himself understood rests upon Newman; that the question still must be asked is probably owing to the extreme length of some of his elucidations which are "leisurely and insinuating" rather than crisp and articulate presentations of his logical position. The rise of the question immediately before us shows that Newman is capable of a double interpretation; its answer is to be sought, then, not merely by bringing forward proof-texts, as it were, from Newman's writings, for another selection of quotations might point in a different direction, but by determining what was most fundamental for Newman's religious thinking, and then seeing how this would correlate itself with Modernism. Practical considerations will lead us to reverse this procedure, as indicated a little later, but the essential method will be unchanged.

These preliminary words have seemed necessary both for an understanding of certain difficulties confronting any attempt to solve our question and also to make it clear that we are carrying along with us no suggestion whatsoever of insincerity on the part of Newman. We may not always agree with him and we may see some inconsistency in his views; but this does not involve any insinuation against the sincerity of Newman as a man and as a Christian. If it seems to the present writer that any ethical judgment adverse to Newman is implied in any criticism he may make, he will endeavor in the same context to express it explicitly as well.

The term "Modernist," as used in our question, doubtless calls for definition. In its most natural meaning, brought over from the ordinary use of the corresponding adjective, the Modernist is merely the modern man, as distinguished from the ancient or the mediaeval man; the distinction is almost completely chronological in significance. Since the time of Dean Swift a more definitely qualitative idea has been associated with the word; but while a dictionary by no means out of date gives the definition, "one who advocates or adheres to modernism," the definition of the latter as "modern character, methods, or mental atti-



tude" is marked "rare." Our question bears witness to the rise into currency of this more qualitative meaning and its still more specific application to a number of individuals within the Roman Catholic communion, whereby the term has gained a sharpness of outline (heightened by capitalization) that commends it for historical purposes in the service both of theology and ecclesiology. Already, however, by that process of analogy which has corroded so many words in the English language, the term has begun to be applied to movements or tendencies within Protestantism, while the curial definition of "Modernism" as "the synthesis of all heresies" will not tend to make clear to the Catholic or Protestant mind just what the encyclical of 1907 has condemned under that name. Already the word "Modernist" is being used as the synonym of that most overworked and abused word, "liberal," to the mental confusion of hearers and readers and to the impoverishment of a scientific historical vocabulary. Thus the term readily passes current among some as the antonym of "conservative" and carries along with itself the connotation of disruption if not destruction. The Modernist himself claims that his work is reconstruction.

The need of definition, then, would seem to be essential; the relative demand for a formal definition, however, will depend somewhat upon our method. We shall not use the term as an equivalent of "liberal," for that would be to start with ambiguity. It is enough to say that in spirit Newman was not a bigot, however the rigidity of his logic may have controlled his own thoughts and his actions; on the other hand, one does not need to read very far in Newman's writings to find how strongly he was opposed to what were ordinarily called the liberal movements of his day, whether in politics or in the church, whether in theology or in philosophy. We turn rather to the most concrete meaning of the term in its historical environment of that church of which Newman was a priest and high ecclesiastic at the time of his death in 1890; for any consciousness of "Modernism" as a distinguishable movement, however, we must await the decade in the midst of which the nineteenth passed into the twentieth century.

While there is no complete statement of Modernist principles

to which everyone willing to assume for himself that designation would be willing to subscribe, no more comprehensive and at the same time concise presentation of its most salient features has appeared than the reply to the papal encyclical condemnatory of Modernism, drawn up by some Italian Modernists and translated into English by the late Father George Tyrrell, published under the title, the *Programme of Modernism*. With this was combined, in the familiar volume, a translation of the encyclical, which, the *Programme* complains, is an entirely wrong interpretation of that which it condemns. Some Modernists have taken refuge in the thought that the encyclical does not involve them, for the described errors are not their opinions, but will the actual ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Catholic church look upon this attitude as more than an evasion? Let the cases of Loisy and Tyrrell reply. Other Modernists have taken refuge in the idea that the encyclical is not an infallible utterance of the church and so it may be modified and even its attitude reversed. To be sure, the encyclical does not declare explicitly that "it is a dogma divinely revealed" as is the case with the decree of infallibility; but notice the language of that decree:

The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme, Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer wills that his Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals. . . .

Note that definition of the *ex-cathedra* utterance: "*When in discharge of the office of the pastor and doctor [teacher] of all Christians.*" The encyclical is explicitly an act of the pope in his *pastoral* function and is officially known as the *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*. Can there be any real doubt as to this being an *ex-cathedra* utterance when we read the opening sentence of the encyclical?

One of the primary obligations assigned by Christ to the office divinely committed to Us of feeding the Lord's flock is that of guarding with the greatest vigilance the deposit of the faith delivered to the saints, rejecting the profane novelties of words and the gainsaying of knowledge falsely so called.

As to infallibility, there may be a narrow loophole in the claim that the encyclical is not technically a definition of doctrine; but here is a case where the *depositum fidei* is concerned; the purpose of the encyclical is to protect that; moreover, has not the dogmatic position of the Roman church, especially in recent years, been determined objectively by its opposition to such false doctrines as it has anathematized?<sup>2</sup> The present writer knows of no reason for making any distinction, as regards their authoritativeness for the Roman Catholic church, between the *Pascendi Gregis* and the *Syllabus errorum nostrae aetatis*, which fell well within Newman's day.

Our method of further procedure will be as follows: We shall notice certain principles for which the Modernists have taken their stand as evidenced in the *Programme of Modernism*, although we may note some elucidations of their fundamental position by other Modernists. We shall notice certain differences between their own interpretation of the movement, if we so call it, and the interpretation placed upon it by the encyclical, partly as an aid in our endeavor to determine Newman's position in regard to the same fundamental principles; for the differences may bring forth some discriminations which otherwise might be overlooked. It is not our purpose to follow closely the order of the *Programme*, as we shall be controlled more by the practical interest of obtaining an answer to the specific question before us. We shall notice first the conception of the relation of God and humanity which is most characteristic of Modernism. Then we shall take up the question of the theory of knowledge, but we shall look at this from a practical rather than from a purely metaphysical point of view. We shall then look at the most distinctive objective task of Modernism, the application of science to questions directly or indirectly religious, especially in biblical criticism, in scientific research into the history of the church, and in the historical examination of the development of doctrine. Next we shall notice the views as to the scope of the authority of the church and its location. Finally, we shall observe the attitude of the Modernists toward the relation of

<sup>2</sup> "The disavowal of error is far more fruitful in additions than the enforcement of truth."—*Grammar of Assent*, 148.

the church and society. These will not exhaust all the phases of Modernism, but they will afford us grounds for attempting an answer to our main question.

We take up first the Modernist conception of the relation of God and humanity, although it would not be possible to make any formula which would cover and at the same time distinguish the slightly varying views of those who might be considered representative Modernists. The Modernists, in spite of occasional language which by suggesting *esprit de corps* might seem to involve the existence of a compact body of associates, are in no sense an organized group; they have never dreamed of forming an "ecclesiola in ecclesia," and in presenting anything as their views, we can at the most only claim that it is the general consensus of opinion among their number. It is in this sense that the authors of the *Programme* accept for themselves and their fellow-Modernists the appellation "Immanentists" which the encyclical confers upon them. It may be asked why we should consider this phase of Modernism at all or at least before taking up what the Modernists themselves consider their most characteristic principle. Immanentism may be considered fundamentally a philosophical concept, and the Modernists deny that philosophy is at the basis of their system, but rather, criticism.

So far from our philosophy dictating our critical method, it is the critical method that has, of its own accord, forced us to a very tentative and uncertain formulation of various philosophical conclusions, or better still, to a clearer exposition of certain ways of thinking to which Catholic apologetic has never been wholly a stranger. This independence of our criticism in respect to our purely tentative philosophy is evident in many ways [*Programme*, 13].

In so far as Immanentism is philosophical, the Modernist may be said to hold it only tentatively; he has no completely satisfactory formula by which he can express his ideas concerning it; he sees that philosophically its trend is toward pantheism. Against this *dénouement*, however, his religious sense revolts and at the same time Immanentism, as a religious conception, reinforces him against the materialism on the one side and a form of idealism on the other which would lead logically to agnosticism if not to atheism. The

bearing of the so-called "agnosticism" of the Modernists belongs to the next phase of our study; we are concerned here with the religious bearing of the Immanentism of the Modernists. Mgr. J. Moyes,<sup>3</sup> in an interpretation of Modernism which strangely overlooks certain phases of the accusation of the encyclical (although the latter appears inconsistent in some of its charges), ascribes to the Modernists the principle of the "non-intervention of the divine in history," whereas the Modernists themselves see in all history, and especially in Christian history, a development "dependent on the assistance of that Divine Spirit which has fostered the life of Christianity from the beginning."<sup>4</sup> This religious value for the Modernists it is important to emphasize at this point, lest we take into our consideration of Newman's attitude toward such a conception the insinuation that the Modernists' doctrine of divine immanence is in reality an exclusion of God from the world and especially from the actual experience of humanity. If so, Newman, whose chief interest was religious, would have nothing in common with them.

In his *Idea of a University* Newman gives a concise exposition of what he considers Catholic monotheism which in some of its phraseology might seem to involve immanence. God, though he is "one who is sovereign over, operative amidst, independent of, the appointments which he has made," is also one "who has with an adorable, never-ceasing energy implicated himself in all the history of creation, the constitution of nature, the course of the world, the origin of society, the fortune of nations, the action of the human mind; and who thereby necessarily becomes the subject-matter of a science, far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular education."<sup>5</sup> Some pages farther along,<sup>6</sup> he repeats that God has *implicated* himself in the history of the universe, including mankind; but this implication nowhere seems to be carried to a recognition of a divine immanence. Newman seems satisfied with a refutation of the deistic conception of an absentee God. He makes frequent quotation from Butler's *Analogy*, of which he says, that although it "has had

<sup>3</sup> *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1907.

<sup>5</sup> *Idea of a University*, 36.

<sup>4</sup> *Programme*, 113.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

so much to do with the conversion to the Catholic faith of members of the University of Oxford, [it] appeared to Pitt and others, who had received a different training, to operate only in the direction of infidelity." This is not at all strange, for the *Analogy* conforms itself to some of the preconceptions of deism, as its objective was to convince deists of the truth of revelation. The Roman Catholic conception of the church as the medium between God and man could be admirably served by Butler's argument and Newman was quick to use the opportunity. There is in Newman's conception, however, no sense of God as being in any way self-involved in his creation. For him, revelation must be an intrusion upon the order of Nature. God's implication in Nature and in humanity is after all hardly more than the establishment of a use-relationship. "When Providence would make a revelation it does not make a new commencement but uses the existing system; it does not send an angel visibly, but commissions and inspires one of our fellows." In short, Newman's mind was so thoroughly dualistic that it is extremely unlikely that he could ever have made the transition into any form of monism. Not only so, but the conscience, in which the Modernists recognize the divine voice, is for Newman a human faculty quite impervious to the influence of the Holy Spirit, unless indeed the latter be brought to act upon it through the sacraments. It is certain that Newman's characteristic mode of thought concerning the relation of God to humanity was not that prevailing among the Modernists; but so long as the Modernists do not press their conception as a philosophic necessity and so demand for it a permanent place in a dogmatic system, Newman's probable inability to accept Immanentism would not necessarily exclude him from the Modernists; but he would live among them with that same disquietude which marked his abode among the Anglicans.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Essays, Critical and Historical*, II, 230

<sup>8</sup> The present writer must confess his inability to discern how the Roman Catholic dogmatic system can receive the Modernist doctrine of immanence, even as a religious conception, without involving a reconstruction of almost every part of that system, for relationships within it would be so completely changed that it would be virtually a revolution. Has Roman Catholic *authority* shown any favor for any trend toward any form of monistic philosophy? Has it not assumed that this must be identical with pantheism? Cf. the *Syllabus errorum* and the encyclical *Pascendi Gregis*.

The factor, revelation, is the connecting bond between the phase of the subject which we have just been examining and the next to which we turn our attention. "Has God spoken to men?" is rightly considered one of the most important questions for theology to answer. In the dualistic system of Roman Catholicism, the native mode of thought conceives of the instrument of revelation as virtually a third element introduced into the dualism; to be sure, some existing medium is employed, a physical phenomenon or some individual person, but these are (so to speak) temporarily taken out of the class to which they belong; in proportion as they are thus removed and separated from the natural and the ordinary, is the revelation itself purified and elevated in esteem. Man's knowledge is limited, but in such directions as are illumined by revelation, man may, by making use of his logical powers, attain to the scientific and philosophical knowledge of those things which are involved in the revelation. This view presupposes definitions "inherited by scholasticism from certain classical sources, by which science was conceived as 'the knowledge of an object according to its causes—efficient, final, material, and formal,' and philosophy as 'the knowledge of things—human and divine in their ultimate causes.'"<sup>9</sup> Now, these definitions involve distinctions which the modern philosophy of science finds no need of recognizing, while they ignore other distinctions which Modernism, accepting the newer philosophy, considers necessary unless one would step deliberately into confusion. We have already noted the denial of the Modernists that their system was based upon a particular philosophy, but they cannot conform themselves to any system of philosophy which does not find room for such criteria as the modern critical methods demand.

First of all, we distinguish different orders of knowledge—phenomenal, scientific, philosophic, religious. Phenomenal knowledge embraces all sense-objects in their particularity; scientific knowledge applies its calculations to the various groupings of perceived phenomena, and gives expression to the constant laws of their changes; philosophical knowledge is the interpretation of the universe according to certain inborn categories of the human mind, and having regard to the deep-seated, unchanging demands of life and action; religious knowledge, in fine, is our actual experience of the divine which works in ourselves and in the whole world.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Programme*, 97.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

Now, if such distinctions had arisen only with Modernism (and by this we mean here a movement originating as such since the death of Newman, although as a critical movement its sources can be traced much farther back), we should have no reason to look for any trace of them in Newman; but modern science and philosophy have long been making these distinctions, and as Newman's polemic and apologetic works were addressed to the highest intellect of England, it is significant that he gives no recognition to such a fundamental matter. In fact, Benthamism is about the latest phase of modern philosophy which Newman thought it necessary to notice, while the very few allusions to later philosophical movements reflect no adequate consideration of them.<sup>11</sup> Nowhere does Newman appear more strikingly as a survival of a past age rather than as a representative of his own times, nowhere does he play less the rôle of a prophet of the future, than in his naïve and uncritical acceptance of the traditional and essentially scholastic theory of knowledge. Although he does finally present a logical analysis which in its form seems to be dealing with the foundations of belief, it has in reality to do with the superstructure only. But does the *Grammar of Assent* make any appeal to the minds of the twentieth century which have perceived at all the significance of the questions and the distinctions which cluster about the term "the theory of knowledge"?

For Newman, revelation was a particular process of supernatural origin, producing a knowledge of which science could make use, especially in theology, but behind which scientific knowledge could not go. To use an illustration that is not Newman's but which could be paralleled from Newman's handling of ecclesiastical miracles, the Shekinah of the mercy-seat is for science just as much a fact as the light from the tail of Halley's comet, but the former could not be subjected to the analysis of the spectroscope. Notice these words from one of the *Lectures on the Idea of a University*:<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The present writer has examined a large part of Newman's writings, especially his published journals and correspondence, with the distinct purpose of ascertaining what Newman read, especially during his Anglican days. There is very little trace of his contact with the contemporary writers who have molded the thought of the modern philosophic and scientific world.

<sup>12</sup> P. 73.



Revealed Religion furnishes facts to the other sciences, which those sciences, left to themselves, would never reach; and it invalidates apparent facts, which, left to themselves, they would imagine. Thus, in the science of history, the preservation of our race in Noah's ark is an historical fact, which history never would arrive at without Revelation; and in the province of physiology and moral philosophy, our race's progress and perfectibility is a dream, because Revelation contradicts it, whatever may be plausibly argued in its behalf by scientific inquirers.

The real bearing of this theory of knowledge upon our main question is perhaps most clearly seen when we compare the limitations of scientific knowledge as these are stated by Newman and by the Modernists. From the last quotation we perceive that Newman recognizes two kinds of knowledge, one human, the other divine; as regards their content, these are conceived as in a measure complementary, but antithetical when regarded as cognitive processes. The same analysis of knowledge underlies the *Grammar of Assent*. But Newman never makes clear to one reader at least how the subject-matter of this "divine knowledge" can be admitted into any ratiocinative process which can be considered in any true sense scientific. As a matter of fact, Newman is by no means consistent in his use of the terms science and scientific; he has two distinct meanings and he passes from one to the other without warning. This is seen particularly in his treatment of theology, which ordinarily is presented as an objective science, the data for which are submitted to the reasoning powers of the reader. Yet scattered through his argument, in such works as the *Development of Christian Doctrine* and *Grammar of Assent*, are numerous passages implying the necessity for "a transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral, and a special self-protection, beyond the operation of those ordinary laws of thought,"<sup>13</sup> though he admits that the latter alone have any place in the discussion; while in the midst of the argument to which this admission particularly refers, we are emphatically reminded "that theological reasoning professes to be sustained by a more than human power, and to be guaranteed by a more than human authority."<sup>14</sup>

The Modernists, both in their explanation of their methods in the *Programme* and in their actual scientific work, assume very

<sup>13</sup> *Grammar of Assent*, 187.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.

definitely the boundaries of each particular science. If they themselves transgress these limitations, they expect to be called to account. Any positive conclusions they reach are to be considered conditional and viewed under the restrictions within which the particular science professes to speak. Criticism itself is a two-edged sword and if it cuts into many of the long-unquestioned traditions of the Christian church, it also swings back, often with a slashing stroke, upon many of the theories which have been advanced to supplant the older views.<sup>15</sup>

It is the work of the Modernists in biblical criticism which has most directly attracted the attention of the authorities of the Roman Catholic church to them and which has led most directly to the disciplinary measures which have been taken against them. The *Programme* lays chief emphasis upon this aspect of the movement, and, as we have seen, it declares criticism to be the fundamental "presupposition" of Modernism and it traces the beginning of the movement back to the early critical work of Richard Simon, published between 1670 and 1690. It points out the service which criticism has done in correcting the traditions of the church, as in the universal acceptance of the *Comma Johanneum* (I John 5:7). It may be objected that this was a tradition *in* the church rather than one *of* the church, but the dogmatic use of the clause makes such a distinction pure sophistry. If our question necessarily involved a complete exposition of Modernism, it would be necessary for us to linger on this most distinctive factor, criticism, and its intrinsic relation to the Modernist system, but we are required only to ask how far does this presupposition of Modernism enter into the philosophy and theology and religious experience of Newman. It will be unnecessary to quote from Newman's works in detail; it will suffice to mention the three works to which we have most frequently referred, as they afford most explicitly the opportunities for contact and so for comparison with Modernism. The *Grammar of Assent* presents most definitely the working philosophy of Newman; its whole argument is to support not

<sup>15</sup> The opponents of Modernism, in common with Protestant opponents of biblical criticism, have sought, often through shafts of ridicule, to discredit the scientific method itself because of the diversity of the results obtained.

criticism but assent as the justifiable postulate of all right thinking. The *Development of Christian Doctrine* gives us its author's theory of dogma; but while he presents a wide range of historical material which is to be offered freely to criticism—much more, in fact, than the ultramontane is willing to submit—there is nevertheless a reservation, the *depositum fidei*, which is not *materia* for criticism, although it is presented as an objective element to be apprehended by the intellect and as a perceptual reality admitted into the dogmatic system.<sup>16</sup> The *Apologia pro vita sua* gives us the story of the spiritual experience of a man who, by the advance of liberalism and the rise of criticism, has been thrown into a state of mind which in a less balanced intellect would very easily have passed over into a mental terrorism. In his mental processes recorded there, there is no trace of any consideration of those questions which are occupying the Modernists; his problems were not the same as theirs before the appearance of the recent encyclical, nor do theirs seem to have arisen above the most distant horizon of his mental vision. The encyclical has very definitely thrust upon the Modernists a new problem, but one which for Newman ceased to exist as soon as he had submitted to Rome.

This is the problem of the scope of ecclesiastical authority and its location within the church. Here where the Protestant mind has rightly demanded the greatest clearness on the part both

<sup>16</sup> Such discussion of the specific question before us as the present writer has noticed in recent periodical literature has turned largely upon the interpretation to be given to Newman's theory of the development of dogma as presented especially in the work just named. The controversy over this point may easily become a mere logomachy; the writings of the Modernists are sometimes as capable of double interpretation as are the words of Newman. For example, these words of Loisy, if taken entirely apart from the light which Loisy's critical work throws upon their meaning, might be given an interpretation in harmony with either of the interpretations which have been made of Newman's theory: "The conceptions that the church presents as revealed dogmas are not truths fallen from heaven, and preserved by religious traditions in the precise form in which they first appeared. The historian sees in them the interpretation of religious facts, acquired by a laborious effort of theological thought. Though the dogmas may be divine in origin and substance, they are human in structure and composition."—*The Gospel and the Church*, 210. This is not a denial of a *depositum fidei*, as some of the opponents of Modernism assert, but does it forbid criticism to investigate that *depositum*? Because of the fulness of recent discussion upon, or more correctly around, this point, it has seemed more profitable to turn our attention in other directions.

of Rome and of Newman, it has never received an unambiguous answer from either. We need not now raise the question of infallibility but rather examine (and this can be done summarily) the attitude of the Modernists and of Newman toward *ex-cathedra* utterances of the pope. We have already indicated our reasons for considering the encyclical *ex cathedra*. The *Programme* is avowedly a reply to the papal document; it is not a petition to the pope, and so can hardly be called an "appeal from the pope ill informed to the pope better informed"; it is from one point of view a protest; from another, it is an appeal, not to the curia, but to the entire Roman communion, which is asked to sit in judgment upon two questions: (1) Has the encyclical rightly interpreted and represented the Modernist position? (2) Does not Modernism justify its own right to exist and to develop within Roman Catholicism? Most significant is the bold assumption of the *Programme* that the pope is not really the author of the encyclical, that the compilers are an ultramontane group temporarily in control of the curia, that they have deceived the pope in their representation of the Modernist movement and by intrigue have secured for a partisan attack upon the Modernists the sanction of the papal authority. In short, the Modernists go behind the *ex-cathedra* utterance and raise the question as to the factors which produced it; they apply to the present policy of the papacy the very method which they use in the investigation of the history of the church as an institution and of its dogmatic development. "History is past politics and politics is present history," just as truly in the church as in the state. The Modernist does not say, "It is the word of the pope; behind that we cannot go." To be sure, ecclesiastical discipline still holds individual Modernists in outward submission—Loisy and Tyrrell harkened to a higher authority—but the individual Modernist is still doing his own thinking, although some of us are waiting to see what measures the Ultramontanes will take to crush absolutely all truly scientific work within Roman Catholic seminaries and colleges.

When we turn to Newman to determine his probable attitude in the present situation, in one important matter he eludes us. He never so definitely locates the authority of the church that that

authority can be tested by the criteria which he himself incessantly puts forward as the proof of the existence of the objective authority of the church; and yet on the basis of the assumed ability of the church to bear this proof he rears his whole argument of ecclesiastical authority.<sup>17</sup> While Newman apparently would be willing to reduce the number of actual infallible utterances to a minimum—a tendency especially noticeable after the Vatican Council—we find that he is willing to submit his own intellectual operations (and in a much wider field than that covered by infallibility) absolutely to the authority of the papacy. While we might show this by numerous quotations, perhaps none is more explicit than this extract from the *Apologia*.<sup>18</sup>

I submit, moreover, to the universally received traditions of the Church, in which lies the matter of those new dogmatic definitions which are from time to time made, and which in all times are the clothing and the illustration of the Catholic dogma as already defined. And I submit myself to those other decisions of the Holy See, theological or not, through the organs which it has itself appointed, which, waiving the question of their infallibility, on the lowest ground come to me with a claim to be accepted and obeyed.

We would make only one comment on this mental attitude of Newman and this comes not from the moral revulsion which a Protestant feels toward such an abdication of life's sacred trust; it comes rather from the bearing of such a mental attitude upon the work which the Modernists have been trying to do. To frame it in the form of a question: If the Modernists occupy Newman's

<sup>17</sup> While many of the charges of inconsistencies in the dogmatic utterances of the papacy are ill founded, it is only by a refinement of the definition of infallibility or by an evasion of the question as to the precise location of the authority of the church, either of which deprives the whole theory of infallibility of all practical value, either in reason or in morals, that certain inconsistencies in Roman Catholic dogma, pressed by the most careful Protestant writers, can be denied. It would seem as if the objective teachings of the Roman church could be scientifically studied, but a-priori defense is inevitably introduced. Is there to be found a clearer case of anticlimax in the substance of its reasoning than in the closing sentence of the third chapter of the *Development of Christian Doctrine*? "... the one essential question is whether the recognized organ of teaching, the Church herself, acting through Pope or Council as the oracle of heaven, has ever contradicted her own enunciations. If so, the hypothesis which I am advocating is at once shattered; but, till I have positive and distinct evidence of the fact, I am slow to give credence to the existence of so great an improbability."

<sup>18</sup> P. 251.

position, what is the profit of their laborious toil in the field of scientific scholarship, biblical, historical, doctrinal? They are raising a mere castle in the air, their apparent scientific results are after all nothing but a mirage. Their cause is surely not worth suffering for, and Loisy and Tyrrell were the most deluded of men.

The last point we shall consider, and that very briefly, is the attitude of Newman and the Modernists toward the relation of church and state. The *Programme* very plainly admits the latter's acceptance of the principle of separation of these two social institutions, that each may be free from present complications and acquire greater efficiency each for its own tasks. In particular, they wish to see the church freed from the temptations leading to political corruption, being strongly convinced that for the church to assume a purely spiritual leadership would mean the enhancing of its moral power over men. Underlying this desire for separation is a strong demand for an emancipated democracy in both civil and ecclesiastical institutions. How little there is in Newman to stir the heart of the common man! Already we have referred to his well-known hostility to political liberalism; the Tractarian Movement took its rise in no small degree as a reaction against the progress of political liberalism; the Revolution of 1830, which drove out of power in France as bigoted a clerical régime as could well be imagined, Newman referred to as "the triumph of irreligion."<sup>19</sup> The attempt has been made by recent defenders of the encyclical to interpret the "liberalism" which the encyclical and the papacy in general condemn, as being not in any sense the liberalism of the political world, but, using the phrase of Newman, "the anti-dogmatic principle." Newman himself, however, used the phrase, "the anti-dogmatic principle *and its developments*." It may be taking an advantage of Newman to argue from the *Syllabus errorum* of 1864, for Newman never could enthuse over that, but the only group of articles definitely condemning liberalism by that name (*Errorum, qui ad liberalismum hodiernum referuntur*) are specifically concerned with the civil establishment of religion. In the civil-ecclesiastical struggles going on in France and Italy and Spain, not to mention other countries, no Modernist could

<sup>19</sup> *Letters and Correspondence*, I, 233.

adhere to his principles and at the same time conform to Newman's conception of the Catholic's duties; and it must be remembered that in the conflict in those lands the call of citizenship is for something more than the mere holding of an academic theory.

We have thus noted several reasons why we find ourselves unable to place Newman among the Modernists. The attitude of the Roman Catholic church would not be modified an iota if it could be proved that Newman was a Modernist, and, as all his works in their final form are submitted to the authority of the church, he himself would be free from anathema even were his writings or any part of them to be placed upon the *Index*. But John Henry Newman played such a part in the religious history of England in the nineteenth century and his interpretation of Roman Catholicism has been so influential upon the thinking of so many in his own country and in America; moreover, he is such an interesting subject from the standpoint of religious psychology, and has attained so representative a position, that such a question as we have been considering acquires something more than a merely biographical significance. Was the Catholicism of Newman after all one that the Roman Catholic church today repudiates? Listen to what Father Tyrrell, the translator of the *Programme*, has said elsewhere:<sup>20</sup>

The solidarity of Newmanism with Modernism cannot be denied. Newman might have shuddered at his progeny, but it is none the less his. He is the founder of a method which has led to results which he could not have foreseen or desired. The growth of his system has made its divergence from scholasticism clearer every day. If scholasticism is essential to Catholicism, Newman must go overboard and the defiance hurled in the face of history at the Vatican Council and reiterated with emphasis by Pius X is superabundantly justified.

Tyrrell does not here call Newman a Modernist; he rather implies that Newman would at least have shrunk from becoming one; but he argues that if Newman had carried through his interpretation of Catholicism consistently, the breach with scholasticism would have been inevitable and Newman would have been forced to break with his logic or place himself among the Modernists. We have seen, however, how Newman shifts

<sup>20</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1908.

his position at the crisis and is inconsistent in his logic. Moreover, this quotation represents the views of one who became a Modernist largely through English influences, where Newman's influence is strong but doubtless overemphasized; Modernists in other lands have felt it very little if at all. The real forbears of Modernism are not Newman or any of his contemporaries in Roman Catholicism, but rather the founders of modern scientific methods. Modernists should trace their descent through a line strong in moral and intellectual freedom, from Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton; in their special interest in historical research they are the descendants of Laurentius Valla, who broke down the "catholic" tradition of the Donation of Constantine; of Freudenberger and Kopp, who dissolved the Tell legends (but Swiss patriotism still survives); and of Ranke, who gave new impetus to critical investigation of the sources of historical knowledge; while their contemporary intellectual kinsfolk are that large number of Christian scholars who believe that the Christian religion must meet the tests of scientific investigation at every point, at least where it makes any use of science either in polemics or in apologetics and wherever the church makes any direct claim upon the reason of man.



## A MISTAKE IN STRATEGY<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR JAMES BISSETT PRATT  
Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

So much has been said and written first and last about the present religious crisis that the subject has become certainly trite if not positively tedious. Yet in spite of all that has been told us, there still remain many things to say; and I hope I shall be pardoned if I try to say one of these. The present situation has often been likened to a military campaign between the forces of Christianity and its opponents; and from that point of view I should like to draw attention to what seems to me a very considerable strategical mistake on the part of the leaders—and of the rank and file—of the Christian hosts. To put the matter as briefly as may be, it seems to me that we are laying Christianity open unnecessarily to attack by holding to positions which have ceased to be of real importance merely for the sake of sentiment and conservatism. In short, to drop the metaphor, we are allowing our opponents to identify Christianity—and we ourselves are officially identifying it—with doctrines which have ceased to be vital to us or to the world of modern thought.

A current opinion, often voiced, insists that most of the danger to Christianity today is due to the fact that some of the leaders of thought have been saying too openly and plainly what they believe. Possibly there may be some truth in this; but I am convinced that the greater source of peril lies in the fact that most of us Christians have failed to say what we believe plainly enough. As I look back upon the story of dead faiths and consider the causes of their mortality, I do not recall one that was destroyed by the arguments of its enemies. Religions do not die because they are refuted; they die because they become unim-

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read before the Pastors' Institute of Berkshire County at Pittsfield, Mass., on October 27, 1909, and a little later before the Philosophical Union of Williams College, under the title, "Sincerity in Religion."

portant. They drop out silently and unnoticed in the night; not because they are proved untrue, but because no one thinks it worth his while to prove them untrue. They perish because their former adherents have ceased any longer to take them seriously.

Now unless we would be guilty of an almost unpardonably blind optimism, we must, as it seems to me, recognize that the present situation in Christianity shows at least some of the symptoms which in other and older faiths have proved to be the heralds of decline. What are the causes of this state of things? Doubtless there are several, but one cause I am sure is this: the people are ceasing to take Christianity seriously. And if we ask ourselves sincerely why this is so, I think that we shall find one reason to be that we Christians have allowed Christianity to become identified, in the mind of the world, with its less important as well as with its essential elements. The truth is, there is a great deal in traditional Christianity which we do not ourselves take seriously, and the world, judging by our actions rather than by our professions, sees that we do not.

Ever since the days of Professor Bain it has been a commonplace of psychology that the ultimate test of belief is action. If you want to know what a man really believes, see how he acts. A man's conduct is a better expression of his belief than are his words. Judged by this standard, the weekly repetition of many of the articles of our creeds is a rather astonishing spectacle. For the truth is we do not really believe what we verbally profess. Down in the bottom of our hearts we know that many of the things we allow others to suppose we believe about religion rest on foundations so insecure that in any other field we should give them up at once and either deny them or confess our ignorance. We should be ashamed to hold and proclaim views on science or government half so outgrown as are many of the doctrines we feel bound to cling to because they are called "Christian." And as a result we cannot put our hearts into what we say about these things, and the critics of Christianity see that we cannot. If we could believe these things with the fervor our fathers felt for them we could still make them living for the world. But, for better or worse, that power is gone from us.

I hope that in writing thus I shall not be understood as denying any place to a sincere but undemonstrable faith. So the faith be sincere and genuinely alive I care little how undemonstrable it be. Concerning most vital questions we cannot absolutely know. It is not only the just who live by faith. And our attitude toward the deeper things of life with which religion has to do must always be one of faith rather than of certain knowledge. It is not only right but inevitable that we should trust where we cannot prove. The "will to believe" is almost a necessity to every sane and happy life. But on the other hand, we must remember that it is impossible for most of us to have any real faith in anything that is obviously inconsistent with the established results of modern science and criticism and with the modern way of looking at things. It is therefore not faith that I am opposing, but the shadow and semblance of it which are still hanging about long after the real substance is departed.

It would be very far from my purpose in this paper to make out an *index expurgatorius*, as it were, of Christian teaching and to dictate to the reader what he should and what he should not profess. Each one knows best what doctrines to him are real and what are not. But if we examine our hearts sincerely in the matter I think that most of us will find that we have been passively or actively professing belief in dogmas which to us are really dead, and we have taken no definite stand to show that these are not an essential part of our Christian faith. As an indication and illustration, merely, of the sort of thing I have in mind, let me refer to certain particular doctrines of our fathers, which for at least a large part of Christendom are no longer vital, yet which still form part of our official creeds. Many others may suggest themselves to the reader. And again let me say that in singling these out I do not mean to imply that they must be given up by anyone who honestly and earnestly holds them. I wish merely to make the question concrete: Do we believe what we profess? The doctrines will speak for themselves.

I have recently been reading over the latest declarations of belief of some of our leading Protestant denominations—the doctrines they wish to stand for before the world and with which

they would identify the Christian faith. Among these doctrines I find the following: the infallibility of the Scriptures, the creation of the world out of nothing in six days, the election of certain individuals to eternal life by the free act of God without reference to their conduct or deserts, the literal acceptance of the Garden of Eden story, the fall of man as there described, and the consequent inheritance of "original sin" by Adam's descendants, the loss of free will, the inability of the natural man to do right, the doctrine that God blinds sinners and hardens their hearts, the death of Christ as necessary to satisfy divine justice, the resurrection of the body, the eternal punishment of the wicked in a place of torment called hell.

This list of doctrines, if I am not mistaken, arouses in many of our minds a sense of curiosity and wonder. We are so far from believing them ourselves that our chief reaction upon them is a feeling of surprise that anyone can ever have believed them. If we do not assert our refusal of them it is because it is simply not worth our while to do so. And yet these doctrines are seriously put forward by the official boards of some of our churches among the things for which Christianity stands. If you want to know what Christianity is, they say, that's it!

As most of these doctrines, however, are safely buried in creeds read by none but the curious and are seldom preached or taught, I shall say no more about them. But I do wish to consider more seriously a few much more important points of our theology which are not confined to our creeds and upon which the world rightly demands to know our position.

The first of these is the question of authority. Where do we stand upon it? What view of the nature of the Scriptures do we mean to put forth as the Christian view? It will not do to blind ourselves and seek to blind others with rhetoric. We must take a definite position about which there shall be no possibility of misunderstanding. Do we really accept the Bible as our infallible rule of faith and practice? Do we really believe that its authority is superior to that of human reason and that in the last resort reason must bow to it? Do we honestly consider it different in kind from other books? Are we convinced that it has an external,

supernatural authority over our belief and conduct which we are bound to obey even in contravention of the generally accepted results of science and criticism? If so, if we do really believe this with all our hearts, then by all means let us teach it. But let us face the fact that we have the whole heavy drift of advancing human thought against us. And if, on the other hand, we really recognize the essentially human element in our Scriptures, if we feel down in our hearts that in the last resort reason must judge the Bible rather than vice versa, then why not frankly say so, and use our influence to identify the Christian view with the progressive thought of our age?

Perhaps most important of all for our purposes is the question of the "plan of salvation," so carefully worked out by our fathers. It is doubtless familiar to all readers of this *Journal*: the fall of man, the separation between him and God, the offended justice and love of the Creator, the council of the Trinity, the plan carefully laid to save man—or rather some men—and yet satisfy divine justice, the incarnation and sacrifice of the Second Person of the Trinity, the imputation of his righteousness to us, the acceptance of it by an act of head as well as heart on our part, the remission of our sins only through this shedding of Christ's blood and our faith, and our consequent final justification, adoption, and sanctification. How clear, how simple, how neat—and also how remote, how unreal, how distant from all the ideas of the nature of the universe and of the divine that have been growing up in our minds for the past fifty years. I know of course this is not true of all. I know that there are still thousands of good Christians who sincerely believe that we have here an unmistakable insight into the inmost councils of the Trinity. But I also know that there are thousands—and increasing thousands—of equally good and equally sincere Christians who find it as impossible to take this plan of salvation seriously as it would be to believe in the gods of Olympus. Let us ask our own hearts to which of these two classes we ourselves belong. Do we honestly believe that the many good men and women about us who do not—and seemingly cannot—accept the death of Christ by the act of faith made essential by the "plan of salvation" are going to eternal torment? I venture to affirm

that we do not believe any such thing. A man who really believed that would tear his hair and rush madly about the streets. He could not sleep nor rest till he had gone to every friend, to every mere acquaintance of his who stood in this peril and labored with him night and day to flee from the wrath to come. If our friends were asleep in a burning building how would we run and risk our lives to fetch them forth! But if the "plan of salvation" be true, many of our dearest ones are in a sadder plight and more dire peril than any earthly conflagration could bring. Yet even those who profess with most reiteration their belief in the "plan" are able to sleep at night and enjoy their meals, and talk with their friends who are in this fearful danger about politics and church suppers, and not one of them goes mad from worry or dies of a broken heart. The truth is, whatever else of the theology of our fathers we may believe, we do not believe in the plan of salvation they outlined. We may possibly believe that "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins," or that, as is so often said "Christ's death is our only ground for hope" (God's love apparently being insufficient); but we do not believe that faith in the mediation of Christ is the only thing that can save our friends from eternal damnation.

Finally, a very practical question presents itself in the matter of prayer. Do we really believe that by praying we can induce God to interfere with the laws of Nature or persuade him to do things which otherwise he would not do? If we do not so believe why do we retain a kind of public prayer which implies such a belief? Of the tremendous power of prayer over our own souls, of its efficacy in healing the spirit and through it the body, no one, be he Christian or atheist, can for a moment doubt. Nor will the reality of prayer as communion with the Divine be questioned by any Christian. But when all this is said, the unreality of much that is called prayer is sadly apparent. Especially is this true of the conventional long prayer of our church services. The public prayer that arouses in the audience the prayerful attitude of mind is something we could ill afford to do without. It is the most important part of the service. But my experience has been that the long prayer of our evangelical services seldom does this. In the first place it is as a rule so long as to weary the listener and of

such a nature as to discourage the attention. I venture to say not one out of ten in the audience follows what is said. And while my experience may have been exceptionally unfortunate, the average long prayer as I have known it consists largely in a collection of statements which presumably God knows quite as well as we, and a succession of requests many of which imply the belief that by prayer we can induce God to some particular interference which he would not perform or think of but for our suggestion. We ask for all sorts of things which we do not really believe prayer can effect. And we go on with it all very solemnly because we always have and because it wouldn't look well to give it up. I ask, does it look well to continue it? In keeping up this kind of prayer are we not laying our Christainity open to attack or even holding it up to ridicule? Real prayer is, I suppose, the most important thing in religion. It is, as Sabatier says, "religion in act." But by identifying it in the eyes of the world with this sad counterfeit and saying, This is prayer, we are advertising that it is a burdensome form and a mere relic of an outgrown past. The reason why prayer is today of less importance in the eyes of the world than it used to be, the reason why so many of us are really unable to pray, is because we have seldom really tried; and one reason why we do not try is that we have not been made to take prayer very seriously. When we see the motorman turn on the electric current, we feel sure that something is happening. When we hear the long prayer in church few of us, now-a-days, have any such feeling. Somehow or other, the things men see about them in our times are leading many of them to feel that religion is very much less real than electricity.

And the pitiful thing about it all is that it is all so unnecessary. Genuine religion is as forceful today as it ever was. It is still the most efficient power in human life. But we who in some sense stand for it are making the world think it half dead by identifying it with a theology which was made for another century. And while religion has the gift of perennial youth, theology grows old like the rest of us. As Professor James says in his *Pluralistic Universe*:

Those of us who are sexagenarians have witnessed in our persons one of those gradual mutations of intellectual climate, due to innumerable influences, that

make the thought of a past generation seem as foreign to its successor as if it were the expression of a different race of men. The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of nothing, its juridical morality and eschatology, its relish for rewards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external contriver, an intelligent and moral governor—sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion. The vaster vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened, and the rising tide of social democratic ideals have changed the type of our imagination, and the older monarchical theism is obsolete or obsolescent. The place of the divine in the world must be more organic and intimate. An external creator and his institutions may still be verbally confessed at church in formulas that linger by their mere inertia, but the life is out of them, we avoid dwelling on them, *the sincere heart of us is elsewhere*.

And yet, though “the sincere heart of us is elsewhere,” we allow the materialists and the growing army of atheists to identify Christianity with just these dead things, without a word of protest on our parts.

Why [asks Mr. Lewis Dickinson] do many free thinkers find that Christianity, in any of the forms it assumes, is an inadequate vehicle of their faith? [And his answer is] that Christian teaching, in many important respects, no longer helps but hinders us in expressing our view of the world and of society. Let us try to see how [he continues]. Christianity tells us that the world was created by an omnipotent and all-good God. I will not press the difficulty so often urged and never answered, which arises from the admitted fact of evil. But apart from this, the idea of creation has ceased to be credible; and what is worse, has ceased to be interesting. It is the idea of *process* with which *we* are preoccupied. Is this process also a progress? If so, what are its laws? Whither does it tend? What is the relation of human life and human ideals to the universe? Is man a temporary accident? Or is he, or something that is coming out of him, the goal and meaning of the whole? These are the kind of questions we are asking. And Christianity has either no answer to give, or answers that are felt to be absurd. But if that be so, Christianity cannot serve as an expression of our emotional reaction to the world. For such expression we have to turn elsewhere, and construct for ourselves, if we can, new myths.

These words of Dickinson's express very mildly the opinion which many good and earnest men are forming of Christianity today. And by our public creeds, and still more by our silence, we are allowing them and their followers thus to identify Christianity with its outgrown shell. The result of this lack of courage to speak out, of this “whipping of dead horses” as our opponents put it, is a loss of interest in religious matters even among nominal



Christians, a deadening of the spirit, an atmosphere of artificiality in much of our so-called worship. Religion with many of us church-goers is becoming—or has always been—largely a matter of convention. We are at times like children playing at a game of “make-believe.” We meet at church and seem to say to each other, “Let’s pretend!—Let’s pretend we believe in the plan of salvation so neatly outlined for us; let’s pretend we believe in the creed we so glibly repeat; let’s pretend we believe in the efficacy of the prayers to which we listen—or fail to listen—and the prayers we say while thinking of something else.” I know a woman, a friend of mine, whose religion seems to consist in going to church on Sunday mornings, calling on her mother-in-law Sunday evenings, visiting the cemetery once a month, and making hot-cross buns on Good Friday. Religion as a vital living thing, a force within her, a genuine reality like other realities to be reckoned with outside of convention, is something of which she seems never to have dreamed.

And there is nothing that suffers more from being made conventional and second-hand than does religion. There is nothing that more needs to be thoroughly empirical—a first-hand immediate experience of the individual, a living force abreast of and in advance of the times. If it is to be all this, we who speak for it, we who in some sense represent it and to a considerable extent determine what it shall stand for in the eyes of the community, must see to it that it be identified with no dead beliefs, no matter how dear and sacred these beliefs may have been. We must let the dead bury their dead, remembering that our God is not the God of the dead but of the living. In the name of the Christianity we love we must send forth a spiritual Declaration of Independence from all that would bind it to the dead part of a glorious past. We must be dreadfully in earnest; and in order to be so we must cling to nothing which we do not with all our might believe.

Some one may object: “Would not this be to preach mere morality? If we cast aside the doctrines criticized, what is left?”—What is left? Look into your Bibles, look up at the starry heavens, look into your own hearts, and see! Is not an infinity still ours too great for naming? Jesus is ours still; the human soul with

all its depths and mysteries is ours; ours is the eternal struggle upward toward the light; God is ours. Nor has faith in any way lost its value. Faith is a necessity without which we cannot live. I would by no means limit our teaching and our profession to the demonstrable. It is not the substitution of knowledge for faith that I would urge; it is the substitution of a living faith for a dead one. And it is only the living faith which never "makes believe," which never pretends for the sake of appearance or of sentiment—it is this faith only that is able to subdue kingdoms, work righteousness, quench the violence of fire, and put to flight armies of aliens.

Nor do I wish to be understood as urging the formation of a "new religion" based upon reason and individual experience. That we should cut ourselves off from our splendid Christian past is one of the last things I could wish. A continuous growth out of the past seems to me the ideal—so it be really a growth. Both elements are needed in a great religion, conservatism and progress, independent thought and reverence for the authority of the past. This of course is a commonplace; but just how the two should be combined is not so easy a question.

The eighteenth century laid its emphasis upon rationality and the free thought of the individual, with but little historical sense for the relevancy and importance of origins and development. It prided itself on being the "Age of Reason," and upon its production of "natural religion." The nineteenth century swung to the other extreme. It sought out origins and traced developments, and joined the present with the past in unbroken continuity. In doing this it, of course, never denied the importance of reason, but it was often so busy with its historical problem that it rather neglected the questions of truth which had chiefly interested the eighteenth century. The twentieth century is the heir of its predecessors and it is its task to work out, by trial and error, the best possible combination of what is most valuable in its inheritance.

We certainly cannot go back to the natural religion of the eighteenth century and invent a new religion of our own. And if we look at the various "new religions" about us, I think we shall see the reason why. To put it as mildly and conservatively and as

kindly as possible, these attempts to found a perfectly non-historical and purely rational religion fill most of us with the feeling of something at least like "bad form." There is something in such a "religion" not in good taste, and to go over to it, we feel, would show rather a lack of breeding. The people who go into that sort of thing are doubtless perfectly good people, but we should not like to have it known that any of our immediate family were of the number. We feel sure that most of the male members have long hair—or that the female members have short hair—that there must be something a little queer about them. I am inclined to think that this feeling, prejudiced and somewhat intolerant as it probably is, expresses after all a very sound and trustworthy instinct. It is a fundamentally right feeling that the normal human being will not want to cut himself off altogether from the past and trust to his own reason alone, that he cannot with impunity neglect the real and great authority of the experience of the race, and that he who does so may indeed be worthy and sincere, but presents, in spite of his sincerity, a somewhat ludicrous spectacle. He reminds one, somewhat, of the small boy in long trousers, who wants to be a big man too soon. Or he might be compared to a very rationalistic person who should in summer most sensibly go naked—clothes at such a time being a burdensome convention. This, at any rate, is the way I feel when I meet those really admirable people who in their love of abstract truth have quite forgotten that by their very birth they are Christian, and who hence seek to ignore both the Christian tradition and the Christian Scriptures. For the Bible is *our historical sacred book*. It is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. For historical and psychological reasons we cannot get from the Upanishads or the Dhammapada or the Koran or the other "sacred books of the East" the spiritual nourishment which we can and do get from the Bible. And in like manner for most of us a God out of all relation to the history of our race could hardly be our God at all, in any very vital sense. We may accept an "Absolute" from Royce—much as we accept argon from Ramsay—as a philosophical object; but the Absolute does not become a religious object—a genuine part of our inner lives—until we have somehow persuaded ourselves that He

is just Jehovah under a new name—that the philosophers have really been describing to us the God in whom we have always believed, we and our fathers.

And in much the same way, the Christian tradition handed down to us through these nineteen glorious centuries is an integral part of our religion. The sense of continuity with the Christian Fathers, the strength that comes from feeling behind one the noble army of martyrs, the holy church throughout all the world, the sense of clasping hands across the centuries with the great Christian dead, united with them in an organic whole through one Lord, one faith, one baptism—these and other things like these are the priceless heritage of our Christianity, and we cannot and we will not give them up.

And yet the other side of the argument must not be neglected. If one must err on one side or the other he had best trust too much rather than too little to the light of what reason he has. To accept the authority of tradition in despite of reason, to love the dear warm past better than the austere truth, is the greater danger of the two. For though religion gets much of its emotional strength from its associations with the past, it has, after all, more in common with science than with history. And not even science itself needs more than it to be abreast of the times—and leading the times. Our God must be our God first of all, whether he be the God of the Fathers or not. We must taste and see for ourselves that he is good; we cannot take his goodness on the word of anyone else, be it King David or St. Paul.

The reconciliation of the new with the old must be sought in the continuity of a common life. The old creeds and the old doctrines which have no longer any real vitality and can make no genuine appeal to us and our generation must be treated reverently, indeed, but must not be allowed to choke the life of the Christianity which is dearer than they. All that was best and truest in them will grow on into the Christianity of tomorrow. And if the spirit of Christ permeates our thinking and our living, and if we be loyal to the truth we see as he was loyal to the truth he saw, we may be sure that the product of our thought will be essentially Christian. For Christianity is not like an old bottle into which new wine

may not be poured. It is like a tree, rather, which can get its nourishment from all sorts of things, and transforms earth, water, and air alike into its own self. The continuity of a common life will continue to unify it in the future as it has in the past. For the self identity of a religion is not of the sort possessed by a stone, but the sort you find in the tree or the flower. It is not an identity of content, but an identity of life.

The subject has, I confess, carried us rather far afield. But let me once more emphasize a fact which the last comparison has suggested. Christianity is not like a stone or a clod; it is a living thing. And if it is to live it must be allowed to grow. To check its growth is to choke its life. I believe it will live and grow, but I also believe its life and its growth depend on the attitude its defenders take in this hour of its trial. And while I am on the whole optimistic, I cannot shut my eyes to the real dangers that surround it. It is being attacked today on many sides and with great skill and vigor. The many anti-Christians are tremendously in earnest and genuinely devoted to the cause of humanity as they see it. Many of them are sincere and admirable as well as able men. They feel that Christianity has had its innings and has failed. They are convinced that it points backward rather than forward, that it binds rather than makes free, that its teachings are the relics of an outgrown past, and its leaders, blind leaders of the blind. They are organizing a very determined opposition. In Catholic lands they are identifying Christianity in the minds of the people with a decadent church. In Protestant Germany the followers of Nietzsche, the followers of Haeckel, and the "League of Monists" are using every effort to discredit Christianity. In England the Rationalist Press Association is carrying on a successful anti-Christian and anti-religious propaganda. And in our own country able men like Mangasarian in Chicago are calling upon the people to cut loose from all Christian ties and form a new religion which shall be more in accord with natural science than is the Christianity which the churches teach. It is not a time, then, when we can afford to be influenced against our better judgment by the pardonable sentiment of religious conservatism. We cannot afford in the presence of the enemy to continue to expose ourselves

to ruinous loss in a fatuous endeavor to hold positions which are really no longer either tenable or desirable, simply because our fathers held them. In the race that is set before us, against so swift an opponent, we must lay aside every weight. It will be fatal to cling to useless incumbrances merely because they bear the name "Christian" and because we fear that our religion, if we give them up, will no longer bear that name. After all, the important question is not what name the religion of the future shall bear, but how far that religion shall be molded by those who love the name of Christ and who shall be able to bring into it the spirit of the Master and the essential part of his teachings.

For there can be no manner of doubt about the part which science and philosophy and criticism are destined to play in fashioning the faith of the coming centuries. Science and philosophy and criticism are here and are here to stay. Their details may and will be modified, but their fundamental point of view is not going to be given up. Every year they extend their sway over thousands of minds. No one can prevent them from having their share—and a large share it will be—in determining the nature of the religion of the future. Are we Christians going to have our share in it? That is the important question for us to face. Are we going to co-operate gladly and helpfully as Christians, in the building of the faith of the future and so keep it essentially Christian? Or are we going to put ourselves on record, and our Master on record, as forces of obstruction and decay, of obscurantism and superstition? Are we going to make men feel that faith is believing what you know isn't so, that Christianity and truth are alternatives and opposites, and that the influence of Jesus is working to keep men from knowing the truth, lest the truth should make them free? Let us beware lest in this matter we be found fighting against God.

I am advocating, I confess, a somewhat radical change in our attitude. Such a change will require courage. There will be an outcry against it on the part of some. We shall be told that our message is less comforting than the older view. It is possible that this is the case. But if it be so we must remember that our foremost duty is not to preach pleasant things, but to be loyal to the

truth as we see the truth. The consequences of the truth are in the hands of God. There have always been those who have said to their prophets, "Prophecy unto us smooth things"; and the false prophet has ever been he who was willing to cry "Peace! Peace!" when there was no peace.

And there can be no real peace for religion so long as there remains in it a vestige of the trivial or the unreal. There can be no peace for it till we who in some sense represent it shall have freed it from the bad name that it is, more or less justly, beginning to earn, and until we have made it as serious in the eyes of the world as are the scientific hypotheses about electricity and gravitation. It is only by the strictest honesty and frankness that we can do this. But when we shall have done it the opponents of religion will have been deprived of half their weapons, numbers of able young men will once more be attracted into the ministry, the serious-minded public may be brought back to the churches, and we who seek to teach and to defend the religion of our fathers will be able to put into it not only all our hearts but all our minds as well. The certain result of this would be not only increased respect for religion, but an increased practical efficiency in our efforts and a growing influence of the Christian spirit in the lives of men.

Of course religion is not theology, and a mere reform of the latter will not give life to the former. But though it will not give it life, it may well allow the life that is already there, abounding and full, to grow on unchecked. It is, in fact, just because religion is not theology that I would set it free from so much of its theological expression as is no longer a help but a hindrance to its life. It is out of the heart that religion arises. It is more akin to poetry than to prose, it is more a matter of immediate intuition and of mystic feeling than of exact statement. It gets itself expressed in the glowing symbolism of the Old Testament and in the music and liturgy of our Christian service. And it is no more to be identified with a theological theory than the life of a man is to be identified with a definition of protoplasm.

And yet, because religion has also a rational element and a definite view as to the nature of the world, and because it means to be not only useful and beautiful but true as well, it must have some

sort of theology. And this theology must not be poetry. Religion must have a message for men's minds as well as for their hearts, and if it is to do so it must strive to express exactly what it means. Hence it will not do to say: "Let all the old doctrines of our creeds stand, and let him who cannot accept them literally take them symbolically." There is, indeed, nothing insincere in a symbolic interpretation as such provided it be frank and open. But the world has a right to know, and ought to know, exactly what the churches and what we individual Christians believe. And for us to state our belief in the old words, in order to satisfy orthodoxy, while giving to the words a private interpretation, to satisfy our consciences, can hardly be called ingenuous. Simple sincerity demands that if we retain the historical formulations of the Christian faith as the expression of our own, we should let it be known publicly that we mean by these formulas something very different from that which our fathers meant by them. And to stick to a pious form of words while denying, in our hearts but not publicly, their obvious and historical meaning is the essence of intellectual dishonesty. And not only so; it also gives and keeps up the impression in the mind of the world that we Christians are only half in earnest with our theology, and that what we say about God and about man, about sin and about destiny, need not be regarded very seriously, since what we say is always capable of symbolic interpretation. The world knows perfectly well that no scientist, no historian—no one, in short, who has a message to give and is in earnest about it—puts what he has to say in a form that requires to be taken symbolically. Nor were the dogmas of our creeds meant to be taken so. They were not the product of the poetic but of the philosophic mind. They were intended as exact statements of belief, and to take them in any other way is essentially unhistorical. And the splendid, clear-headed, straight-forward men who framed them would be the first to cry out against any merely symbolical or private interpretation. "Say what you mean, in God's name!" they would protest, "Speak out like men what you honestly think. But do not use our words as a vehicle for conveying the very opposite of our meaning!"

The present situation is not unlike that which presented itself



in the time of Jeremiah and again in the time of Paul. While we think of these men as essentially constructive, the fact is that their construction was based upon and made possible by a message that was first of all destructive. The great service of Jeremiah to his religion was his bold attack upon the sacred dogma of the Inviolability of the Temple, and his denial of the existence of any such God as the one in whom his fellow-countrymen believed. He made no attempt by smooth words to reinterpret the old dogma symbolically, so as to hurt nobody's feelings. He had too much respect for his religion to do anything of that sort; and fortunate it is for his religion that it was so. And in like manner, the greatest service which the Apostle Paul performed for the Christian faith was in cutting it loose, once for all, from the outgrown forms of Judaism. As Harnack puts it: "Someone had to stand up and say, 'The old is done away with': he had to brand any further pursuit of it as a sin: he had to show that all things were become new. The man who did that was the apostle Paul, and it is in having done it that his greatness in the history of the world consists."

We need today a new Jeremiah and a new Paul. We need men brave enough to say out, in manly fashion, what they believe about religious matters as frankly and as clearly as they speak their views in matters of science. These, indeed, we already have in considerable numbers. But most of all we need to be authorized by the leaders and by the rank and file of the Christian church to call out to the opponents of our faith, "Knock down your man of straw as you like. Amuse yourselves with it as you please. But know that the real Christianity is no more like the image with which you are playing than the great sun is like the child's drawing of it. For the real Christianity is not to be found in the outgrown dogmas of mediaeval theologians, but in the words of the Master and in the lives and hearts of his followers. Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here. He is risen as he said unto you."

## FOUR PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

---

CLYDE WEBER VOTAW  
The University of Chicago

---

There are latent possibilities of humanity that call for fuller development, as there are latent possibilities of the soil that call for more thorough cultivation. We are wasteful of both our natural and our human resources. More intelligence, better method, keener purpose will enable us to improve our common agriculture; more intelligence, better method, keener purpose will enable us to improve our common humanity.

One has but to look around to see that men and women, boys and girls, have unrealized capacities—many remain stunted physically, mentally, and morally because they have not room to grow, or because blighting conditions surround them, or because other persons overshadow them, or because their resources as fast as they develop them are gathered in by other hands to promote other welfare than their own. It is intensely pathetic that many people whose lives would have been larger, stronger, and happier through higher education must remain small, weak, and hungry, because higher education is inaccessible to them. Again, human welfare suffers a constant loss in that many persons who have the ability and impulse to promote the common good are restricted in their social service by limited opportunities and meager resources. It is one of the gross defects of our current civilization that it makes so much of material achievement and relatively so little of moral and spiritual achievement.

Religious education seeks to make good these and other deficiencies in our present living.

1. The first principle underlying religious education is, that *religion is the primary element in life*. It makes for the vital aspects of human well-being. There is no other element in life so important, because no other element equally conditions human welfare.

Religion stands for an ideal attainment of the whole personality, in itself and in its relations to others; or, in historic phrase, religion stands for the sanctification of body, mind, and spirit.

At its latest and best, religion includes all that morality includes, all that social righteousness, social justice, and social service include, all that "loving one's neighbor" can be reasonably interpreted to mean, all that self-sacrifice and altruism require, all that forgiveness signifies, all that helpfulness can effect. In some sense and measure religion has for long meant these things. If such a list of qualities and actions seems like an extension of the term "religion"—making it more inclusive, more concerned with the common life, more directed to the present good, then let it be said that our conception and application of religion must progress with the progress of the race, must develop as our understanding of life develops, must be fitted to the modern conditions and needs. Religion exists as an aid to living; it is truest when it is most helpful. The evidence of this is in the history of all religions during their vital stage, and especially in the history of the Christian religion. The moral content, purpose, and effect of religion are essential to it, gaining in importance as religion ascends. And those may prove to be right who hold that in time morality will dominate and determine religion, so that religions will be strong as their moral element is strong, weak and transient as their moral element proves its inadequacy to solve the practical problems of everyday life.

The recession of the creedal, ritual, and ecclesiastical features of religion, which is so notable a feature of the present time, is a natural and proper shifting of the point of view. The change of major interest in religion from future destiny to present welfare makes decidedly for the common good. One still hopes, trusts, and, so far as may be, labors for ultimate well-being—his own and others—in the world that is to come; but the remoteness of this end is recognized, while it is felt that the best guarantee of an eschatological salvation is the achievement here and now of a moral (i.e., spiritual) salvation which is both individual and social. It becomes increasingly clear that the best preparation for the eternal time is being and doing right in the present time. Being

and doing right *now* because it is right is an imperative obligation and has in itself adequate worth. We do not wish to lose—we must not, shall not lose—the values that the creedal, ritual, and ecclesiastical features of religion have had, and still largely have, for men. What we do wish is to transmute former values into present ones, and to find new values in religion. New light upon life is breaking forth from our modern experience and thought, in which we may be discoverers, or of which we may at the least be beneficiaries.

Can we not anew strengthen, adapt, and apply religion to the social conditions that oppress humanity? As things are now, success comes only to the fortunate few; the many are held down to ignorance, toil, poverty, and misery. Can we not in some way raise ourselves out of the moral blindness, weakness, and perversity that still afflict us? Can we not shake off the selfishness, materialism, dishonesty, unfairness, luxury, and waste that stifle our principles and defeat our ideals? How are we to improve the current habits, make men thoughtful and serious, establish high ideals in the nation and in the commonwealth? We answer: *by making religion vital and dominant*; namely, by bringing it about that all living—of all persons, all the time—shall be religious in purpose, character, and action. By preaching, teaching, and exemplifying a twentieth-century Christianity that has a clear vision of the way and goal of humanity, that knows the conditions of modern life, that supplies the needed inspiration, restraint, and guidance which a man needs and society needs to keep it straight and enable it to achieve. Particularly, by promoting the moral-religious development of boys and girls during the formative period of their education.

Two generations are upon the stage—the older and the younger, the passing generation and the oncoming generation. With which chiefly lies the future? Upon which will educational effort tell the more? For which should we mainly work? The older generation is retiring through the wings, its act in the drama of life approaching the end; but the younger generation is moving compactly, sturdily to the front, its act about to begin. Whether one counts himself with the oncoming or the passing generation,

the future—with its possibilities and promise—belongs to the young.

Education, therefore, is the main chance. To make our sons and daughters, our boys and girls, the kind of men and women that we should like to have been, to help them to achieve the ideals of living which we reach out for but cannot grasp, to equip them to establish righteousness, prosperity, peace, and happiness upon still better lines—this is what we want to do, this is the task of education.

There is no group, organization, or class of men or women who cannot devote themselves to this problem and contribute to its solution. It is the common task, and the particular ambition of all free, normal, intelligent, serious, and energetic persons. Self-preservation may be the immediate law of nature, race perpetuation and advance is the ultimate law of nature; nature regards the individual as subordinate and ancillary to the race. The greatest human instinct, the greatest human obligation, the greatest human happiness is to provide a succeeding generation, characterized by those qualities and supplied with those resources which will insure physical, mental, moral, and social progress for mankind.

2. A second principle underlying religious education is, that *all education is to be primarily moral-religious in aim*. This is to hold for every educational agency which present society provides and operates. We have many educational agencies: for greater distinctness and efficiency the educational function is distributed. From primitive times there have been two great educational institutions—for the child, the home; for the adolescent, the social order. The Mediterranean civilization, in the ancient period, had four educational institutions: the home, the social order, the school, and the church. The school had been added to promote especially the intellectual training, the church (i.e., the religious institutions of the period), to promote the moral-religious training.

In this modern period we have as a heritage these four major institutions—the home, the social order, the school, and the church. Nor have we been able to create others of equal importance. Our contribution to education thus far has been some improvement

of the inherited agencies, and the launching of a few additional minor agencies, the newspaper and magazine press, the public library, the educational and religious convention, and the like. We are seeking to clarify and advance the aim of education, we are largely increasing the material of education, we are further systematizing and standardizing the educational process, we are extending the area of education among the people as a whole, we are developing an "efficiency" type of education alongside of the "cultural" type, we are acquiring in the light of biological science a better knowledge of child characteristics and child growth, we are replacing some of the scholastic materials and methods that had become classical, we are enlarging the social spirit and point of view in education, we are establishing the ethical interest and aim as primary and dominant. This is the way ahead educationally, and real progress is being made. The professional educators are keen, wise, and active in promoting this fundamental improvement; even the general public takes part intelligently and appreciatively in modern educational advance.

*The opportunity is immediate and urgent for a reconnection of religion with education.* Today they are apart, whereas historically the relation between them has been close and strong. In the United States the public schools have been under religious influence; more than that, they have been intentionally, concretely, and to some extent formally religious. The colleges have been mostly of church foundation and under church control. The indebtedness of the American schools to the churches of America is not to be overlooked or minimized. But this older relationship is fading out. Education has become an independent science and profession. Presidents and professors are not drawn from the ministry as formerly, but from the ranks of professional educators; denominational colleges are freeing themselves from church control; state colleges and universities are multiplying in which disconnection from the church is strictly maintained; the public schools are excluding religious exercises and the Bible. The vast body of school officials and teachers far outnumber the ministers, lawyers, and doctors; and they as a body assume or declare their independence of the church, together with the kind of religion for which

they suppose the church stands. Are we to dispute the right and duty of education to think, choose, and act for itself, to make over the school according to its best judgment, to administer the school without interference? The historic influence, or even authority, of the church over the school was useful until the school as an institution should reach maturity and competence in self-administration. But this maturity and competence have now been reached. It is time, therefore, for the church not only to concede but heartily to accord and support the independence of education and the school. The two institutions ought to be on a basis of mutual understanding, appreciation, and co-operation. Each is an educational agency of the first class; neither should despise, ignore, or stand apart from the other.

Nevertheless, the school is in the self-assertive, non-relational attitude, not feeling that its independence and competency are yet sufficiently recognized by the church. One result of this antagonism is the present obscuration of the religious aim in education. When the school detached itself from the church, it tended to detach itself from religion as well, for it was assumed that religion and the church were identical. Moreover, the kind of religion which the church as a whole teaches and practices is regarded by many educators as antiquated in much of its doctrine and point of view, useless in much of its ritual, dogmatic in many of its claims, arrogant in some of its prerogatives. In order that religion may recover its true place and influence in education, we must discriminate between religion as an organization and religion as a life-factor, between religion that is traditional and religion that is dynamic, between the religion of the past and the religion of the present, between religion as a particular form of experience, doctrine, and practice and religion as a vital force finding new expression, creating new ideas, giving rise to new practices. Like any fundamental reality, religion is more than any of the descriptions, formulations, codifications, institutions, or uses of it. If the particular formulae, customs, and administrative features of religion prove at any time to be incorrect, inadequate, or unuseful, religion may be adjusted to the new facts and the new requirements. Whether this adjustment will take place, how rapidly,

and how successfully, depends upon that group of men—chiefly ministers—who preside over religion.

School trustees, superintendents, principals, and teachers are many of them members of Christian churches, and friends of religion—if we use the term “religion” in an elemental and progressive sense. If we religionists can make it appear that religion means essentially right character and conduct, that they are religious who aspire, love, and serve, that education is religious when it promotes righteousness, nobility, intelligence, reverence, kindness, justice, and helpfulness, we shall have cleared the way for a new recognition of religion in the schools. Educators will come to feel that the school and the church have a common work, are kindred agencies.

Some of the present advocates of religious education are reactionary in their point of view and purpose. They would like to see the public schools turned back into church schools, promulgating the traditional church ideas of organization, doctrine, and duty, employing the methods that have become threadbare, mechanical, inappropriate, and ineffective. They would educate our boys and girls in that ecclesiastical-theological fashion which the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopal churches have used and generally still use. The point of view of such education is static and dualistic, its conception is creedal and churchly, its basis is the catechism and the prayer-book, its method is formal, inculcatory, and dogmatic. To memorize and profess certain doctrinal formulae; to believe in and perform certain religious rites; to adhere to, defend, and extend with sectarian zeal some particular branch of the Christian church; to assent and conform to certain conventional moral standards; to acquire and use those terms and phrases commonly known as religious and which differentiate the minister and the churchman from the common speech; to look upon life in that detached, mystical, and other-worldly way which shuts the church off from modern thought, feeling, and action—these seem to be the things which some would restore as religious education.

But the movement for religious education in America does not stand for this ancient and outlived conception of religious education. The leaders of the movement are modern-minded men,



in full accord with scientific thought, in full appreciation of the newer educational ideals and methods, in full sympathy with the effort to ethicize and socialize religion, in full co-operation with those who are striving by thought, teaching, and action to make Christianity into a twentieth-century religion expressive of present religious experience, world-view, and moral-social ideal, promotive of all that is truest and most helpful in our American life.

These leaders in religious education do not advocate the use of the catechism and the prayer-book in the public school, nor even in the Sunday school. They do not wish the boys and girls to be dogmatically taught the creeds of the church—partly because creeds are for adults and not for the young, partly because a fixed set of ideas forced upon one in early life interferes with spontaneity, individuality, and progress. They do not wish the American youth to be trained in a sectarian viewpoint and habit, to maintain and perpetuate the divisive organizations, tenets, and practices which separate the forces of good, whereas Christianity calls for unity, co-operation, brotherliness, and service. They do not wish the Bible to be taught or used in a sectarian way, in either home, school, or church, for it is a book of moral religious experience, inspiration, illumination, and guidance that belongs to the race, and is not by right the property or the textbook of any exclusive organization, institution, or sect.

3. Our third principle is, that *the materials of religious education are discriminatingly inclusive*. The great peoples of the ancient world had their several religions, and in connection with these religions they had their sacred books. These sacred books constituted the chief literature for the instruction of the people—particularly the young—in the standard moral-religious ideas and practices. The books arose at various times, by various persons, in various circumstances, under the impulse of religious expression and inculcation; they were used, appreciated, approved, and “canonized” as the people gradually discovered their practical and ideal worth. From generation to generation and century to century these sacred books, or Scriptures, were handed on for the enlightenment and inspiration of the people in the religion to which they were born. There are still extant the sacred books

of a number of the ancient religions, including Buddhism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. Christianity, since it arose among the Jews, took over from Judaism its sacred books—the Old Testament, and supplemented them with its own series of books—the New Testament, the two groups together making up the Christian Bible. This literature remained the Bible of the Christian movement even when Christianity passed over to the non-Jewish peoples of the Mediterranean world. These subsequent non-Jewish Christians of the second and succeeding centuries produced religious writings, but their writings did not become canonized as a part of the Christian Bible—we know them as the “patristic literature.”

Christianity has continued until the present time to be the religion of the European nations, and thus the religion of the most advanced civilization. For this reason the Hebrew-Jewish and primitive-Christian sacred books constitute the Bible of these European peoples and their offshoots on other continents, including ourselves—Americans. We concur in the judgment of our predecessors that the Christian religion is the highest, truest, and most helpful of all the religions, and that the Bible is the best of all the sacred books.

We therefore continue, and will continue, to use the Bible as the chief literature of moral and religious education. Rightly interpreted and treated, it contains much of our best material for this purpose. It is a heritage from the past, the best gift of the Hebrew-Jewish people to humanity, the treasure-house of many of the world's choicest experiences, ideas, and aspirations, a classical literature of supreme worth, the best comfort to the earnest soul, the best guide to moral and religious living. When the Bible is understood according to the well-established principles of historical, literary, comparative, and psychological interpretation, and when its teaching is applied according to the well-established principles of pedagogy, ethics, and sociology, the difficulties of using the Bible, even in the public schools, will be largely removed.

The Bible comes to us out of the ancient world; it brings to us the religious experiences, visions, ideas, standards, and customs of that ancient time. We live in the modern world, approxi-

mately two thousand years after. Why set up an ancient age as normative for a modern one? Our world-view, our religious experience, our ways of doing things, cannot and should not be a repetition of theirs. We may learn from the Bible, we may be inspired by it, we may find principles and precepts of highest value in the Bible, it may be "a lamp to our feet and a light to our path"—as it has been through centuries past and will be through centuries to come. But we are not enslaved to the Bible. The Bible exists for man, not man for the Bible. We are not tied down to a mere repetition of Hebrew-Jewish and primitive-Christian religious experience, thought, and practice. To be sure, no people of the past had so deep an insight into the moral-religious realities as the Hebrew-Jewish people, no people had so strong and lofty a moral-religious purpose, no people produced so helpful a moral-religious literature. Yet absoluteness, finality, sufficiency, did not attach to their experience, ideas, or practices, or to the description of these things which they have given us in the Bible. Men must go forward to a fuller knowledge, a further experience, a more applicable interpretation of life. I am not thinking now of the fundamental principles and realities for which the Bible stands, and to which it gives classic expression; but of those many features of the biblical thought, standards, and customs which reflect the limitations and peculiarities of the time from which they come. We do not wish to reproduce in the twentieth century these transient elements of the first and preceding centuries. *We must find a way to employ the Bible for moral and religious education that does not, either in intent or in effect, re-enact the ancient world.*

Hence the present serious effort on the part of many persons—ministers, Sunday-school teachers, and laymen generally—to acquire a *historical* understanding of the Bible. The long, firmly established *normative* interpretation and use of the Bible is passing. We now know that the Bible is not a mechanically revealed, final, perfect, universally applicable, and all-sufficient textbook of religion and morality. We know that the Bible contains within its own pages lower and higher types of religious experience, theological belief, moral standards, precepts, and practices. We

know that the static, dualistic, small world-view which underlay and determined the thought-forms of the ancient period out of which the Bible came is being superseded by the modern developmental, unitary, and large world-view which is the splendid gift to us of the nineteenth century. We know also that the biblical writings are *literature*, to be understood as literature according to the principles of literary criticism and interpretation. We know that these books were written primarily for moral and religious instruction, rather than for the exact narration of historical events; historical events are employed abundantly, but pragmatically; and the ascertainment of the precise facts concerning them is possible, if at all, only by means of a thoroughgoing historical-critical investigation. We know that the religious experience and ideas, the moral ideals and precepts, great and useful as they were for the Bible times, cannot be transferred *en bloc* to other times and peoples, but must undergo adaptation, modification, and supplementation when experience and knowledge advance, when conditions of life change, when human needs develop. We know that the moral standards and practices of the past progressed, as even a comparison of the Old Testament with the New Testament shows; that Christian morality since New Testament days has taken up into itself much from Graeco-Roman and Anglo-Saxon ideas and customs; that we have much to learn by a historical comparative study of morality in the race as a whole; and that our present life requires not a mere re-enactment of Hebrew-Jewish and primitive-Christian principles, precepts, and practices, but a fundamental, critical, and constructive analysis and determination of the ideals and means of human welfare.

It is therefore not enough for us to read how the Bible people felt, thought, and acted, and then to feel, think, and act so. To be sure, we might do worse; but it is also possible and obligatory to do better. The Bible principles of reverence, righteousness, love, and service are true and binding principles, and the first-century application of them is illumining and inspiring; but it was impossible in the first century to forecast their interpretation and application for the twentieth century. One cannot completely expound the Bible for today who knows the twentieth century but

not the centuries out of which the Bible came; neither can one competently expound the Bible for today who knows the ancient centuries but not our own. Every person therefore who undertakes to interpret the Bible—in the pulpit, the classroom, the home, or the press—is confronted with a twofold obligation: (1) to make himself acquainted with the finest moral and religious experience, the best thought, the highest ideals, the actual conditions and needs, and the choicest educational materials and methods of the present time; (2) to make himself acquainted historically with the events, persons, ideas, standards, customs, and literature contained in the Bible. We are in great need of teachers and ministers who will thus become competent to select discriminatingly the now useful portions of the Bible, to disclose its moral-religious meaning, and to point correctly its message for present-day living.

But the Bible, great and useful as it is, should limit neither the method nor the material of religious education. We are at present working out our modern educational theory and method upon the basis of the biological, psychological, sociological, ethical, and historical sciences. Scientific education will gather together from all literatures and all periods of history, from all moralities and all social endeavors, those materials which it counts of value, to use them in all ways which it counts helpful. Ancient literatures, and particularly the Bible, will contribute much. But educators are not proposing simply to take the Bible as it stands and make it the one all-sufficient textbook of moral and religious education. Even in the Sunday school this is not the best way to employ the Bible. A literature of education is arising. Its aim is to train boys and girls, young men and women, to know and to deal with the modern conditions, problems, needs, and opportunities; to put them into right relations with life as it is; to lead the way to a better social order; to inspire them to brotherliness; to stir their aspirations and their zeal. The moral and religious principles which underlie this education are many of them those which the Bible proclaims and enforces—reverence, honesty, uprightness, truthfulness, brotherliness, sympathy, forgiveness, helpfulness. To these are added others which have been more emphasized elsewhere than in the Bible, as self-respect, self-reliance, self-

realization, knowledge, courage, foresight, chivalry, thrift, industry, efficiency, achievement, citizenship, human rights, social relationships, and justice.

This new educational literature, whose material is widely gathered but chiefly from modern sources, is capable of making—indeed, is certain to make—a new epoch in moral and religious education. The volumes, from many authors and presses, come so fast that one can scarcely keep track of them. The regular publishers of school books issue dozens of them every year. Even some Sunday-school publishers are now getting out textbooks along this line. In fact there are now enough of these modern Sunday-school lesson courses to permit of an educational curriculum. The aim of these textbooks is to teach the child what life is and how to live it. The stories, parables, sermons, exhortations, truths, principles, and precepts of the Bible are woven into the scheme of instruction and training, along with much else that is educationally useful, to awaken the moral and religious sense, to inform the mind, to develop the judgment, to strengthen right impulse, to direct the purpose, to arouse and enlighten the social consciousness, to stimulate the altruistic feelings and actions, and in other ways to prepare the boy and girl for young manhood and womanhood in this wonderful age of the world.

4. The fourth principle underlying religious education, and the last here to be mentioned, is, that *the need of the child determines what is educationally to be done for him*. Man is biologically a developmental being. He grows, and his growth extends over some twenty to twenty-five years from infancy to maturity. His needs are determined in every instance by the stage of growth in which he is engaged. This is obvious enough for the visible self—the body. It is equally true for the invisible self—the soul, or personality. The moral-religious nature of the child is quite as much subject to the laws of growth as his physical nature. From infancy to childhood, and on through adolescence with its early, middle, and late periods, the boy and girl pass through a succession of various and vital stages toward the achievement of manhood and womanhood. The psychology of this development is becoming known to us, so that we can understand something of

the attainments, capacities, and needs of the boy and girl at three, six, ten, thirteen, sixteen, and twenty years of age. We no longer expect the child to feel, think, act, or speak as an adult. He hasn't it in him to do so, and we will not try to make him.

The moral impulse, the moral wisdom, the moral judgment, the moral purpose of the adult are not the child's, and cannot be. The child and youth are morally immature. We cannot expect them to recognize, feel, or conform to the moral standards and requirements of grown people. Self-control, industry, truthfulness, altruism have to be acquired by the long and strenuous process of experience. The normal child, reared under favorable conditions, will develop in due time the character and efficiency which civilization now demands. But patience and faith are necessary while the process is going on. We parents and teachers learn wisdom in this matter. It is not our part to produce the moral growth of the child—that is the Creator's work; but it is our part to assist this growth, by giving the child the best possible environment, by living before him a helpful example, by helping him to his feet again when he stumbles, by comforting and reassuring him in the hard places of his experience, by giving him knowledge of things he needs to know, by showing him the better road to travel, by bringing him into association with schoolmates, playfellows, and friends whose companionship will develop the most and the best that is in him. If it seems a long time to wait for the maturity of a boy or girl, two things may be considered: first, that maturity is worth waiting for, since manhood and womanhood are supreme, ultimate achievements in our universe—worth all they cost, and that is saying much; second, that youth is full of strength, beauty, possibility, and promise—he who does not enjoy youth, in himself and in others, is missing one of the greatest human joys.

The child's religious impulse, experience, and ideas are also of a simple and elemental sort. Grown people are apt to assume or expect too much of the child in the matter of religion; especially is this the case with parents and teachers who have a supernormal amount of religious sentiment and zeal. Prayer, Bible-reading, church-going, Sunday observance are virtues into which the well-bred child will gradually grow; but the value of these things is

not self-evident to the child, nor can this at once be made plain to him by explanation. The earlier stages of their acquisition are to be effected by examples and habit rather than by inculcation; the child will begin by doing these things because others around him do them—he will accept them as his social heritage and obligation. Moreover, if parents or teachers force the development of the habit too rapidly or strenuously, reaction and animadversion on the part of the child are likely to result. Similarly, reverence, adoration, consciousness of sin, penitence, conversion, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, and other vital features of religion will in due time appear in the spiritual life of the normal boy and girl. But these belong to the adolescent periods of growth; they need not be looked for, and they should not be cultivated, in the childhood years. As for theology and ecclesiology, these belong to the adult stage of religion. Some young people may incline to them, because of particular mental bent or environing interest; but adolescents generally are not far enough along mentally, socially, or ethically to have a taste for or comprehension of doctrines and institutions.

Further, moral and religious education is to be conducted, not so much by formal instruction, inculcation, and exhortation as by environment, example, the arranging of opportunity and circumstance. There is some danger at the present time, when so much emphasis and energy are directed to religious education, that this good thing will in some instances be overdone, and particularly that very earnest parents and teachers will make too much of formal instruction and exhortation. Boys and girls grow essentially like plants, which sometimes need bending or pruning but ordinarily do best when they are little handled and given their natural freedom, to work out their own inner natures with the aid of the soil, rain, and sunshine. It is easier to teach than to train, easier to instruct than to nurture, easier to force one's personality upon another than to develop that other's personality. We can increase the quantity of moral and religious education more readily than we can improve the quality. Yet it is the quality that counts. There are indeed many children in the less-favored social groups who need more help than they now get toward the growth of



their moral-religious nature; they are poverty-stricken spiritually as well as physically. But the children of intelligent, educated parents, who are supplied with the modern educational resources, need better rather than more training. And better training may in some instances mean even a less amount. The child does not need and cannot well stand a persistent besieging with moral-religious instruction, advice, warning, and exhortation. All this may be given with the best of intentions, but in disregard of the psychology and pedagogy of child-life.

If the home conditions are right, the child will quite surely come to have right impulses, right habits, and right ideas. An anxious and strenuous surveillance and prodding are not required from parents, teachers, neighbors, or friends. Much may be said for the training of parents as well as for the training of children. Imitation is a primary law of growth. Example is more fundamental and certain in its effect than precept. The best help that parents can give their children toward their moral-religious development is to live before them every day the kind of life that is ideal. The children will learn to be kind, thoughtful, considerate, honest, reverent, helpful, obedient, industrious, and altruistic, less because these qualities are inculcated by word of mouth, more because those closest about them possess and exhibit these qualities.

It seems to be sometimes assumed that people are bad because they want to be bad, that children do wrong for the love of it, that human nature is "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." The facts of experience indicate, on the contrary, that human nature is aspiring; it has high ideals and it strives to realize them. The normal person, even the normal child, aspires, purposes, and strives to be good and to do good. Individuals who do not manifest this upward tendency in thought and conduct are to be classified as subnormal or abnormal, are to be looked upon as lacking in some essential element of human personality. There are, of course, in any given generation many subnormal or abnormal individuals, whose misfortune it may have been to be born with perverse or flabby wills, with degraded tastes and impulses, with moral blindness and incompetency. These individuals are the imperfect offshoots of

the race. But human nature is not to be judged or characterized from them.

Is it not in accordance with the facts of experience to say that normal human nature chooses perfection as its goal and looks forward to perfection as its destiny? The present inability to attain perfection is due to conditions over which the present generation has but limited control. We are members of a race and the race characteristics inhere in us. Although this human race aspires to and strives for perfection, it has so far been imperfect. Each individual is involved in this race-imperfection. We are a complex product of the generations that have preceded us. Our impulses, motives, abilities, peculiarities are inherited from our ancestors. We are not *de novo* creations, having ideal characteristics to start with; nor can we at one leap break away from our hereditary entanglements to reach the goal and destiny of perfection. The individual may ascend, but only with the race. We are inextricably bound together with those who have gone before and those who are to follow after. Why then expect that our boys and girls, of whom we imperfect people are the parents, will be perfect? It is not only wisdom but justice to the children when patience and appreciation are shown them rather than criticism and denunciation. Are we too ready to attribute to the child a bad will, bad impulses, bad nature? Do we take too little account of all the child has to contend with, of how difficult it is for him to achieve goodness? We understand and sympathize with him as he gradually acquires control over his physical self. Do we show equal understanding and sympathy with him as he gradually acquires control over his moral self? It is generally safe to assume that the child means well, even if he fails to act so. His fundamental desire and tendency will be toward love, right, and helpfulness. Even grown people wish to be judged and estimated by their inner choice and purpose rather than by their words and deeds. How much more will this be true of the young, who have not yet gone through long years of educative experience and struggle for self-mastery.

The needs of the child during the period of his immaturity are to indicate the way in which others can help him. Along with the

patience and appreciation to which he is entitled from all, there are many things that can be done for him by parents, teachers, and friends. Within limits there is value in teaching the boy and girl the general truths and principles of life, in storing his mind with poetry and proverbs that furnish a kind of general aid to right thinking and right living, and in enjoining him "to be good," "to do right," "to tell the truth," "to act justly," and the like. The choice, purpose, and impulse of the normal child will be in this direction, but it is helpful to confirm him in this attitude.

More helpful still will it be if we can show him how to interpret goodness, right, truth, and justice for the specific life-situations which he must negotiate. A clear and adequate idea of what it means to be good, right, true, and just is not easily or quickly attained. Life is so various, so complex, so difficult. Experience is the teacher of the meaning of these fundamental ethical terms, these fundamental virtues. Abstract definitions are not the chief way of instructing children regarding them, abstract exhortations are not the chief way of bringing them to realization in children. Really, ideals cannot be handed over to children; they must grow up by a biological process in the will and mind of the child. Through the long years of childhood and adolescence the boy's or girl's individual ideal takes shape, under the influences around him and in accordance with the impulses inside him.

The best that can be done for him, toward the development of his ideal, is to live before him and with him an ideal life in one's own character, conduct, and relationships.

The next best thing is to bring before him, in a multitude of concrete and attractive ways, the ideal living of other persons past and present. For this purpose story-telling is the main method. The Bible stories of Hebrew-Jewish and primitive-Christian heroes have for centuries been eminently helpful in giving clearness and power to these concrete instances of the higher virtues exemplified in actual lives. Jesus becomes the supreme hero of moral and religious living when presented in a way that appeals to the adolescent mind. Other nations and peoples had also their collections of stories, which are also highly useful. Provided, of course, that these stories deal in an ethically satisfactory

way with conditions, problems, and principles that find real parallel in the lives of present-day children and youth. Much use is also to be made of modern persons as exemplifying the fundamental virtues, for modern instances will be more likely to meet the child's need because he belongs to the modern time and must live in a modern environment. Specifically how he ought to feel, think, speak, and act in the life-situations which he daily meets is the precise problem which the boy or girl is all the time at work upon. Religious education seeks to understand and to assist him in this daily endeavor, for in it are the issues of manhood and womanhood.

The four principles of religious education here presented seem to me to be cardinal: (1) that religion is the primary element in life; (2) that all education is to be primarily moral-religious in aim; (3) that the materials of religious education are discriminat-ingly inclusive; (4) that the need of the child determines what is educationally to be done for him. Along these lines we are at present moving, in the home, in the school, and in the church.

## CRITICAL NOTE

### MANUSCRIPTS OF THE VULGATE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM

The papal commission to revise the text of Jerome's Vulgate has reawakened interest in the Latin translations of the Bible. An organized search for and systematic examination of manuscripts have been undertaken throughout the libraries of western Europe such as could not have been possible before. The labors of scholars have indeed marked out the lines of classification, and indicated the direction in which the purest text is to be found. The article by Dr. Westcott on the Vulgate in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* (1863) was for a long time the best authority for the Latin translation, and is still very valuable. M. Berger's works are a mine of information, especially on French and Spanish manuscripts. Indeed we know very little about the latter except what he has told us. The Oxford edition of the Vulgate by the Bishop of Salisbury and Rev. H. J. White gives a full collation of the most important manuscripts ranging from the sixth to the thirteenth centuries, besides the materials for a comparison of the Vulgate with previous translations, and the quotations from the Latin Fathers.

It may be of interest to our readers to have the means at hand of estimating the value of the manuscripts in the British Museum. We have, therefore, collated one chapter (Luke, chap. 11) in all the Latin manuscripts of the gospels in that library up to the close of the twelfth century. We have thought that a continuous collation of some fifty verses is a better test of the character of a manuscript than the tabulation of readings in select passages.

The following is a list and short description of the manuscripts:

1. **Hari. 1775.** Gospels *cir.* 670. Italian. 'Harleian Gospels' (*hari*) Wordsworth's Z. small 4to one col. uncials stichoi Eus. can., S. Luke xi, foll. 295b-302b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 387.
2. **Reg. I E VI.** Gospels (*imperf.*) *cir.* 700. S. Augustine's Canterbury. Part of a Bible ('Biblia Gregoriana') broad folio two coll. semiuncials, pictures, and initials on purple vellum, foll. 55b-56b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 35.
3. **Add. 5463.** Gospels *cir.* 700. S. Peter's Benevento, Wordsworth, large 4to, two coll. uncials, stichoi, Eus. can., rubricated headings to chapters, foll. 151b-155a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, pp. 91, 92.

4. **Cott. Nero D IV.** Gospels *cir.* 720. Lindisfarne 'Lindisfarne Gospels' Wordsworth's Y. large 4to, two coll. semiuncials, stichoi, full-page pictures and initials. Eus. can., interlinear Saxon paraphrase, foll. 167b-171a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, pp. 39, 40.
5. **Reg. 1 B VII.** Gospels *cir.* 750-800. Northumbria large 4to, two coll., semiuncials, stichoi, Eus. can., rubricated headings to chapters, foll. 105a-107a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 39.
6. **Harl. 2788.** Gospels *cir.* 800. Fol. two coll., gold uncials, stichoi divided by semicolons, Eus. can., paintings and illuminated letters, rubricated headings, foll. 132b-135a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 267.
7. **Add. 11848.** Gospels *cir.* 800-850. West Germany, large 4to, one col. Eus. can., musical notes, cover silver and silver gilt with precious stones, containing relics, foll. 135b-137b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 250.
8. **Harl. 2795.** Gospels *cir.* 840-850. Large 4to, one col. red letters, stichoi divided by dots. Eus. can., gold headings of chapters, foll. 148b-151b.
9. **Add. 11849.** Gospels *cir.* 840. Small 4to, one col. Eus. can., rubricated headings, foll. 124b-127b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 253.
10. **Harl. 2790.** Gospels *cir.* 840-860. Nevers given by Bishop Herman, large 4to, one col. Eus. can., foll. 168a-171b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 254.
11. **Add. 10546.** Bible *cir.* 850. French Alcuinian Recension. 'Charlemagne's Bible' or Bible of Grandval, Wordsworth's K, large folio, two coll., Eus. can., full-page pictures, foll. 375b-376a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, pp. 209-12.
12. **Harl. 2826.** Gospels *cir.* 850, monastery of S. Hilary, small 4to, one col., Eus. can., foll. 89a-90b.
13. **Egerton 768.** SS. Luke and John, ix cent. Germany, small folio, one col., Eus. can., Irish illumination, red initials, much rubbed, foll. 28b-31b.
14. **Harl. 2823.** Gospels *cir.* 850-880, Chartres, small 4to, one col., Eus. can., foll. 89b-91b.
15. **Harl. 2797.** Gospels *cir.* 880, S. Genevieve, Paris, 4to, one col. gold minuscules, corrections also made in gold, Eus. can., foll. 105b-108a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 276.
16. **Egerton 609.** Gospels (imperf.), *cir.* 880, S. Maurus, Tours (*mm.*), Wordsworth's E, small fol. one col., Eus. can., corrections made in blacker ink, foll. 60a-61b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 47.
17. **Egerton 873.** Gospels *cir.* 880, Zurich, small fol., one col., many erasures, original writing inked over in blacker ink, foll. 94a-96b.
18. **Add. 24142.** Bible (imperf.), *cir.* 900. S. Hubert Ardennes (*hub.*), Wordsworth's H, large 4to, three coll., Eus. can.; cf. Berger's Vulgate, pp. 179-180.
19. **Cott. Tib. A II.** Gospels *cir.* 900. Christ Church, Canterbury, 'Athelstan's Coronation Book.' German, 4to, one col., gold initials, Eus. can., foll. 135b-137b.
20. **Add. 9381.** Gospels *cir.* 900. S. Petrocs, Bodmin, 4to, one col., capital

- letters filled in with red paint, Eus. can., cover wooden boards, foll. 89a-90b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 43.
21. Reg. I A XVIII. Gospels (imperf.) *cir.* 920. Canterbury, 'Athelstan's Gospels.' German, 4to, one col., Eus. can., foll. 131b-134a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, pp. 49-50.
  22. Add. 21921. Gospels *cir.* 900-950. Germany, 4to, one col., Eus. can., red initials, foll. 143a-147a.
  23. Reg. I E VIII. Bible (two volumes) *cir.* 950. Christ Church, Canterbury. Italian, large fol., two coll., foll. 144b-145a.
  24. Stowe 3. Gospels x cent. German. small fol., one col., red initials, Eus. can., foll. 137a-139b.
  25. Harl. 2820. Gospels *cir.* 1000. German, 4to, one col., Eus. can., ivory crucifix and symbols of evangelists in cover, foll. 153b-157a.
  26. Harl. 2821. Gospels *cir.* 1000. German, 4to, one col., Eus. can., illuminated and gold initials, foll. 124a-126b.
  27. Egerton 608. Gospels *cir.* 1000. German, 4to, one col., Eus. can., small illuminated and gold initials, foll. 108b-110b.
  28. Reg. I D IX. Gospels *cir.* 1000-1020. Canterbury ('Canute's Gospels'), large 4to, one col., Eus. can., gold initials, foll. 88b-90b.
  29. Add. 34890. Gospels (imperf.), early xi cent., Hyde Abbey, Winchester, 4to, one col., Eus. can., pictures, gold initials, foll. 91b-93b.
  30. Harl. 2830. Gospels *cir.* 1050. S. Martin's, Louvain, small 4to, one col., Eus. can., red initials, foll. 119a-122a.
  31. Stowe 944. Lectionary, xi cent., Hyde Abbey, Winchester. small fol., one col., Cont. S. Lu. 11:14-28, fol. 47.
  32. Reg. I D III. Gospels *cir.* 1060, Rochester, folio, one col., Eus. can., mixture of majuscules and minuscules, various hands, foll. 122a-123b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 43.
  33. Harl. 2970. Lectionary, xi cent., German, Scribe Oudalricus, small 4to, one col., full page illum., cont. S. Lu. 11:14-28 (foll. 19b-21b) and vss. 27, 28, 33-36 (fol. 69b) in a xvii cent. hand.
  34. Add. 20692. Lectionary xi cent., German, small fol., one col., illuminated initials, marginal notes, Ivory carving of S. Bernard in cover, cont. S. Lu. 11:5-13 (fol. 124), 14-28 (foll. 43, 44), 33-36 (fol. 195b), 47-54 (fol. 165b).
  35. Harl. 76. Gospels *cir.* 1060, Bury S. Edmund's, 4to, one col., foll. 82a-84a.
  36. Add. 6156. Gospels xi cent., Christ Church, Canterbury, German (Spanish?), large 4to, two coll., rubricated headings, Eus. can., foll. 107a-108b, lectionary at beginning, cont. S. Lu. 11:27-28 (fol. 13b).
  37. Burney 41. Gospels, late xi cent., German(?), broad fol., two coll., Eus. can., foll. 97b-99a.
  38. Add. 11850. Gospels, late xi cent., Anglo-Saxon, small fol., one col., gothic letters, gold initials, Eus. can., foll. 112a-114b.
  39. Add. 15304. Gospels, late xi cent., German, 4to, one col., Eus. can., many contractions, foll. 68b-70a.

40. **Harl. 2831.** Gospels, late xi cent., French or Italian, small 8vo, one col. rubricated liturgical notes in margin, foll. 59a-60a.
41. **Add. 28107.** Bible (two vols.), 1097, S. Remacle Stavelot, large fol., two coll., Eus. can., red initials, foll. 168b-169a.
42. **Add. 17739.** Gospels, early xii cent., Flemish, 4to, two coll., frequent red and green initials, lectionary marks in margin, foll. 127a-129b.
43. **Harl. 1802.** Gospels 1139 (dated two years after the great storm), gospels of Maelbrigte Hua Maeluanaigh, Armagh, small 4to, one col., Hibernian minuscules, glosses in margin, foll. 105a-106b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 44.
44. **Harl. 1023.** Gospels (imperf.), *cir.* 1140, Irish, small 4to, one col., Hibernian minuscules, foll. 47a-48b; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 44.
45. **Harl. 2834.** Bible (two vols.) *cir.* 1150, large fol., two coll., gothic letters, colored initials, Eus. can., fol. 177.
46. **Reg. I B XI.** Gospels *cir.* 1150, S. Augustine's Canterbury, 8vo, one col., gothic letters, lectionary marks, foll. 90b-92b.
47. **Harl. 4773.** Bible (two vols., imperf.) *cir.* 1150, Montpellier, large fol., two coll., gothic letters, red initials, foll. 132b-133a; cf. Berger's Vulgate, p. 76.
48. **Add. 27926.** SS. Luke and John (imperf.), xii cent., Heiningen-Hildesheim, small fol., one col., Eus. can., red initials, Limoges cover, foll. 14a-15a.
49. **Harl. 2994.** Lectionary xii cent., S. Simeon Trèves, 4to, one col., cont. S. Lu. 11:5-13 (fol. 86), 9-13 (fol. 126b), 14-28 (fol. 31b), 27, 28 (fol. 125b), 33-36 (fol. 133b), 37-46 (fol. 104), 47-54 (fol. 138b).
50. **Add. 35167.** S. Luke (imperf.) xii cent., English, small folio, one col., glosses of Walafrid Strabo and Anselm of Laon, many contractions, foll. 54a-59b.
51. **Add. 29276.** Lectionary, xii cent., monastery of SS. Peter and Maurice near Bingen, fol., one col., cont. S. Lu. 11:5-13 (fol. 86b), 14-28 (fol. 35b), 33-38 (fol. 154), 37-46 (fol. 106).
52. **Add. 11434.** Lectionary xii cent., Germany, 4to, one col., cont. S. Lu. 11:5-13 (fol. 98b), 14-27 (fol. 35), 27, 28 (fol. 182), 27-32 (fol. 162), 33-36 (fol. 179), 37-46 (fol. 125b), 47-54 (fol. 165b).
53. **Add 17738.** Bible (two vols.), Abbey of Floresse, Liège, large fol., two coll., Eus. can., full page illuminations, red initials, double set of chapters in margin, fol. 192.
54. **Add. 15459.** Gospels *cir.* 1170-1180, small fol., one col., Eus. can., colored initials, foll. 88b-90a.
55. **Harl. 2804.** Bible (two vols., imperf.), late xii cent., Worms, large folio, Eus. can., red initials, fol. 207.
56. **Add. 14813.** Gospels late xii cent., S. Peter's, Erfurt, small fol., one col., miniatures, red initials, lections foll. 72a-73b.
57. **Burney 29.** S. Luke, late xii cent., English, small fol., red initials, one col. with gloss in margin, foll. 53a-58b.



58. **Harl. 2799.** Bible (two vols.) *cir.* 1180, large fol., two coll., Eus. can., summary of each chapter by later hand in lower margin, foll. 178b-179a.  
 59. **Arundel 208.** Lectionary late xii cent., Carthusian Monastery, Mayence, small 4to, one col., cont. S. Lu. 11:5-13 (fol. 193), 14-28 (fol. 140), 33-36 (fol. 246b).

The other signs for MSS. used are as follows:

- A. Codex Amiatinus, Laurentian Library, Florence, *cir.* 700.  
 B. Codex Bigotianus, Paris B.N. 281 and 298, *cir.* 800, def. vss. 36-48.  
 C. Codex Cavensis, Monastery of La Cava, ix cent.  
 D. Book of Armagh, Trinity Coll., Dublin, A.D. 807.  
 F. Codex Fuldensis, Gospels in form of a Diatessaron, A.D. 541.  
 G. Codex San Germanensis, Paris B.N. 11553.  
 Θ. Codex Theodulfianus, Paris B.N. 9380, ix cent.  
 J. Codex Forojuliensis Cividale in Friuli, *cir.* 600.  
 M. Codex Mediolanensis, Combroian Library, Milan C. 39 inf., vi cent.  
 O. Bodley Gospels, Bodleian Library, Oxford, vii cent.  
 P. Codex Perusinus, Cathedral Library, Perugia, vi cent.  
 Q. Book of Kells Trin. Coll., Dublin, *cir.* 700.  
 R. Rushworth or Macregol Gospels, Bodleian Library, *cir.* 800.  
 T. Codex Toletanus, Madrid National Library, x cent.  
 V. Codex Vallicellanus, Vallicellian Library, Rome B vi, ix cent.  
 W. Bible of William of Hales, Brit. Mus. Reg., I B xii, A.D. 1254.  
 X. Corpus Christi Gospels, Corpus Christi Coll., Cambridge, No. 286, vii cent.  
 ept. Epternach Gospels, Paris B.N. 9389, ix cent.  
 mt. Gospels of S. Martin of Tours, Tours, 22 viii cent.  
 r. Codex Usserianus Alter. Trin. Coll., Dublin, A 4, 6, x cent.  
 dur. Book of Durrow, Trin. Coll., Dublin, vi cent.  
 mol. Gospels of Moling, Trin. Coll., Dublin, *cir.* 800.  
 aur. Codex Aureus, Stockholm, *cir.* 700.  
 leg 1. Leon Cathedral Library, x cent.  
 aem. Codex Aemilianeus, Madrid Royal Academy, F 186, x cent.  
 corp. oxf. Corpus Christi College, Oxford, Bentley's C, x-xi cent.  
 gat. S. Gatien's, Tours, Paris, Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1587, viii cent.

1. Et factum est: cum esset in quodam loco orans, ut cessauit, dixit unus ex discipulis eius ad eum: Domine, doce nos orare, sicut docuit et Ioannes discipulos suos.

*The capitula are marked in the margin:* (1) xi., 3, 8, 9, 12; 17, 29<sup>rec</sup>, 30<sup>rec</sup>, 36, 38, 39, 40<sup>rec</sup>, 42, 43<sup>rec</sup>, 44<sup>rec</sup>, 54; xii., 6 (by mistake), 48; (2) xxxiv., 7, 10, 11, 14, 20, 26, 27, 37, 45; xxxvi., 47; (3) xliiii 41, 53, 58; xlv 4, 5, 18. *The first class appears to follow Wordsworth's MSS B Θ J O X: the second is the division in the Alcuinian MSS; the third is the division of Wordsworth's AV.* cum: quum 18, Θ; dum 54, D. cum esset in quodam loco 16, 48; >in loco quodam cum esset 2; >cum esset in loco quodam the rest (locum 58\*). oraris 19. dicit 23. ciscipulis 18. suis 43, 44,

48, 56, 57 *mol*\* >unus ex discipulis eius dixit 42. docens 36. docuit et iohannes: >et iohannes docuit 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 54 A M P Q X *epi*<sup>m</sup> *d e ff*; nearly all Gr MSS; >iohannes docuit (*om et*) 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36, 40, 41, 47, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58 B C D F G Θ J O R T V W *epi*<sup>t</sup>, *mt*, *mol*, *a b c / i l q r δ aur*. Gr *Δ*; *om* docuit et 43. (iohannis 16, 21. 43\* D O\* R ioh̄s 28 ioh̄es 32).

2. Et ait illis: cum oratis, dicite: Pater sanctificetur nomen tuum. Adueniat regnum tuum.

illis + ihs 43. cum quum 18 C Θ. oretis 21. 32. dite 18\*. pater + sanctae 16, (*mol r*<sub>2</sub>); + noster 44, 53, 58, *gat Gr L*; + noster qui in caelis es. 1\*, (*mol r*<sub>2</sub>) *d q*; + noster qui es in caelis 43, P R *Dunelm A. ii. 16. b e / l (r)*. (cf. noster qui in caelis *δ*. Gr. A C D P X *Δ* etc.) *om* adueniat regnum tuum 14X\* *add at end of verse* fiat voluntas tua. 1. 18<sup>m</sup> 47 Θ *leg 1\* aem\* Par. B. N. 93, 256\*, 262, 17726<sup>c</sup>, a*; fiat uoluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra 3, 5<sup>c</sup>, 26, 28, 35 B D O P Q R T X\* *Dunelm A. ii. 16. mol dur. aur r*<sub>2</sub>, *c d / ff i q r δ (b e l)*. Gr. *Δ* A C D P X T *Δ*, etc.

3. Panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie.

*The original writing of this verse in Reg. 1 Bvii. has been erased, and panem nostrum cotidianum da nobis hodie written by the corr.* quotidianum 20, 44; quotidianum 9<sup>c</sup>; cottidianum 6, 19<sup>c</sup>, 55, 56. O\*X.; codidianum *the rest*. hodie 1\*, 5<sup>c</sup>, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 35, 43, 44, 47, 50, 57. D J Q R T X *epi mol dur r*<sub>2</sub> (G O) *old Latin, Gr D*; cotidie 1<sup>c</sup>, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9\*, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 25, 27, 30\*, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 53, 54, 58, A B Θ M P V W *mt q.*; cotidia 21 C; cottidie 6, 8, 19, 48, 55, 56; quottidie 9<sup>c</sup>; quotidie 30<sup>c</sup>.

4. Et dimitte nobis peccata nostra, siquidem et ipsi dimittimus omni debenti nobis. Et ne nos inducas in tentationem.

dimittae 32; demitte 5, 7, 10, 11 B O R V *epi mt*. *om* nobis 43. peccata 24 R.; debita 21, 28, 32, 35, 43 P Q T *r*<sub>2</sub>, *b c d (e) Gr. D 131*. siquidem et ipsi: sicut et nos. 50, *b c d / ff l r*. Gr. D; siquidem et nos. 16, 44; siquidem ipsi 22. dimittimus 14, 47. 47\* *writes debitoribus, then puts dots underneath and continues omni debenti, etc.* cf. debitoribus R *b c d (f) ff l r Gr D*. omni over an erasure 26; omne 15; omnium 46; om omnia 36\*. debenti: dimittenti 24\*; debiti 32; debentit 39. *erasure of two letters after et 5*. ducas 50. >inducas nos 47. *c d*. temptationem 1, A B T X.; temptationem 22; temptationem *the rest*. +sed libera nos a malo 5. D O Q R *aur mol r*<sub>2</sub>, *Bodl laud lat. 102, b c d ff l q r δ*; +sed eripe nos a malo 26 B *Par B. N., 93, 256\*, 262, 14407, 17226<sup>c</sup> i cf. Gr. Δ* A C D R X T *Δ*, etc.

5. Et ait ad illos: quis uestrum habebit amicum, et ibit ad illum media nocte, et dicet illi: amice commoda mihi tres panes,

*Cap xlvii. 4, 5, 18; xlv. 41, 53, 58. In illo tempore dixit ihs discipulis suis 34, 49 51, 59; in illo tempore dixit dñs ihs discipulis suis 52; in letaniis dixit ihs discipulis suis 40<sup>m</sup> quis uestrum. habebit gold capitals 26; illuminated Q 26, 27 habens 16 Amb.; habet 43, 44 D F G Q R T X *epi*<sup>m</sup> *dur r*<sub>2</sub>, *gat b / ff i l q r Gr. 240*. >ad illum ibit 37. abiit 18\* b. dicit 2, 181, 22\* D F G M O\* Q R *dur. d / ff Gr.**

BC EFG, etc.; dicit uel dicet 44; dicite 18.\* amicae 35, 44; aamice 1.\*  
comoda 15, 21, 24, 32, 34 W; acomoda 40, 47; commoda da 18\*. michi 36,  
37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51 W.

6. quoniam amicus meus uenit de uia ad me, et non habeo quod ponam  
ante illum,

quod (= quod) 21: quia 39. *mol. d* meus uenit: meus meus 59 >ad  
me de uia 47, 56. *m* quid 16, 27<sup>c</sup>. antae 32 eum2, 16 ff.

7. et ille deintus respondens dicat: Noli mihi molestus esse, iam ostium  
clausum est, et pueri mei mecum sunt in cubili, non possum surgere, et dare tibi.

at uel et 43 (at J d r sah) ipse 43. >respondens deintus 16, 21, 32, 43  
M\* *epi* ff. om respondens 4, 5\* AF *epi*\* dicet 40, 44. *dur b e m Gr. D*  
om noli mihi molestus esse 45. michi 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 47, 51, 57; om 44  
iam + enim 54, 59 *m Gr. F* 13, 69 hostium 5,\* 17, 20, 22,\* 26, 29, 38, 39, 40,  
42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 56 C D *epi mol* ostium + meum 16, 50, 51, 58\* T W om  
mei 1, 47X *most old Latin Gr. C\*M* om sunt 2D. cubilo 5<sup>c</sup>; cubiculi  
14 O; cubiculo 18 G T *mol b j m r* nom 2; et non 44 O Gr. *h* possunt 58\*  
om et 50 Q.

8. Et si ille perseuerauerit pulsans: dico uobis, etsi non dabit illi surgens eo  
quod amicus eius sit, propter improbitatem tamen eius surget, et dabit illi quot-  
quot habet necessarios.

om et si ille perseuerauerit pulsans. 2, 4, 5, 44, B\* F G J M P *epi*; *corp. oxf, dur*  
*b d f q d Gr.* et: at 3 B<sup>c</sup> Xc; om 43. si ille 18 (*over an erasure*) 56, W: om, si 16, 22\*  
43 D; > ille si *the rest.* perseuerit 10, 38\*r\*; perseuerauit 50 D *mol<sup>c</sup> r<sub>2</sub>.*  
pulsans 28\*. dico + autem 43. dauit 2 O\*; dabat 36\*. om eius 43 *Θ\**  
*epi*\*. improbitatem: inprobitatem. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,  
23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 47, 54, 56; improbitatem uel oportunitatem  
43 (*c/ epi*\*); inoportunitatem 3 O *c ff r aur.* om tamen 9\*, 19. D R *b d l d.*  
>eius tamen 43 *dur.* surgit 17\* Q. *dur.* dauit 2 om illi 1\* 18<sup>c</sup>; Gr.  
D. ei 16 18\* R.d quotquot: quodquod 5<sup>c</sup> 17\* 56 CO\* T\* *dur:* quodquot 37;  
quod 4, 5\* G T<sup>c</sup> Gr *h* D E F L etc. necessarios: necessarium 2\* 21 Td;  
necessarius 19; necessario 32.

9. Et ego dico uobis: Petite et dabitur uobis; quaerite et inuenietis; pulsate  
et aperietur uobis.

om et 12\*? ff m >dico ego 43 dico uobis 16, 18, 44, 58. *d f ff:* om  
dico 32; om uobis 29; >uobis dico *the rest.* in illo tempore dixit ihs discipulis  
suis 49. om petite . . . inuenietis 32. *erasure of six or eight letters after*  
uobis 22 quaerite: quaeritae 35; querite 20, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 36, 37, 39, 40,  
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, R *mol* aperietur: aperitur 16\*; aparietur  
18; apereetur 22.

10. Omnis enim, qui petit, accipit: et qui quaerit inuenit: et pulsanti  
aperietur.

querit 12, 15, 17\*, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54,  
56, 57, 59, D *Θ R mol* pulsant 37; a pulsanti 43. aperietum 2\*.

11. Quis autem ex uobis patrem petit panem, numquid lapidem dabit illi? Aut piscem: numquid pro pisce serpentem dabit illi?

Quis autem ex uobis *half erased* 12 autem: enim 16, 47 R uobis + filius 16 R. patrem: patri 16; panem 17\*; + petrem 50\* petit: petet 2 B C T *gat b c f f i l Gr*: + filius eius 44 D *gat b f f q*. (*δ most Gr. MSS.*) nunquid 38, 41, 44, 45, 53, 57, 58, 59 W; nomquid 39. dabit porriget 16 b q r illi: ei 16, 44 b d f r aut piscem . . . dabit illi om 9\* (*add in lower margin*) 19\* (*add in margin*). *Walker's r* aut + si 4, 5, 7\*, 10, 11, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 27\*, 32. A D F P R V *gat mol a b c f r aur syr-cu* num 24; nunquid 41, 44, 45, 53, 58, 59. pisco: poscem 16\*; piscem 16<sup>c</sup> G M f f; pice 21.

12. Aut si petierit ouum: numquid porriget illi scorpionem?

ouem 12, nouum 21\*, 27\* nunquid 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59. porrigit 1\*, 4, 5, 18\*, 22\*, A C F G Q T X *dur a, b f f i l r* ei. 1, 16, 26, 44. F R *cor vat mg i l r*; illis 39\*, 51; om 21, 28\*, 32 c scorpionem 16, 19; scorpionem 18; scorpionim 34\*.

13. Si ergo uos cum sitis mali, nostis bona data dare filiis uestris: quanto magis Pater uester de caelo dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se.

nostris 4\*; nostis *over an erasure* 27. om data 43, 44. D Θ R. *ept r, cor p*. Oxf. de celo 22, 32, 39, 40, 47\*, 49, 54; de caelis 10; caelestis 47<sup>c</sup> l *cor. vat\**. > spiritum dabit 59 > bonum spiritum 46 bonum + datum 16. (*cf. b c d f f i l r Gr D*).

14. Et erat eiiciens daemonium, et illud erat mutum. Et cum eiecisset daemonium, locutus est mutus, et admiratae sunt turbae.

*cap* xlvii. 4, 5, 18; xlvii 41, 53, 58; xxxv 7, 10, 11, 14, 26, 27, 37, 45, 57; xxxvii 47. *cross in the margin* 21. *dōc* 111 in xl. 40<sup>mg</sup>. *Illuminated capital* E 26, 27. et erat eiiciens *in gold letters* 26. et: in illo tempore 31, 33, 34, 49, 51, 52, 59. erat: + ihs 11, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 54, 59, W. Gr. F; + dñs ihs 52. eiiciens 44; ieciens 5 D Q: eieciens 43\* V; eiciens *the rest*; + ihs 22. daemonium: doemonium 33, 34; demonium 22, 26, 28, 29, 32\*, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59 D R W *ept*. illud: illut 2, 5. G X a, i ipsud uel m uel illud 44. > erat illud 11 mutam 20\* t *for* et 29. quum 18 Θ; om 44. eicisset 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 20 G. O *ept mt mol f f i r*; eiicisset 44 P. daemonium: doemonium 34; demonium 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, R W *ept mol* loquutus 6, 8\*, 12, 39, 47, 51 Θ om locutus est mutus. 31 b admiratae: ammiratae 12, 4, 7, 11, 15\*, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, 41, 42 A B D Θ M V X *mt*; ammirate 5, 39; admirate 22, 26, 32, 36, 47, 51, 54, 57, 59; admirata 43; miratae 16, 56, (T) (q r) turbe 28, 32, 39, 47, 51, 54, 57, 59, W.

15. Quidam autem ex eis dixerunt: In Beelzebub principe daemoniorum eiicit daemonia.

om autem 20\* 42 T eis: is 28; his 44, 56 c dicebant 51c in: et 18\* beelzebub: belzebub 5\*, 18, 21\*, 32, 35, 41, 43, 44, 47<sup>c</sup>, A C D Θ O T *mt*; beelzebud 2, 16 *dūr*; belzebul 5<sup>c</sup>, R *gat b. ff. r.*; behelzebub 17: beelzeb 4\*

principem 3, 4, 5\*, 18, 20, 23 A B C O Q T *dur b f f i q r* **daemoniorum:** daemoniarum 21; doemoniorum 34; demoniorum 18, 22<sup>c</sup>, 26, 27, 29, 32, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, D R W *e p t*; demonium 22\* *mol mi*.  
 > principe demoniorum beelzebub 47\* **eiicit** 24, 44; **ecit** 17\*; **eciecit** 16, 21\*, 32, 43\* *mol*; **ecit** *the rest*. **daemonia:** doemonia 34; demonia 26, 28, 31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, D J R W *e p t mol*.

16. Et alii tentantes, signum de caelo quaerebant ab eo.

**alia** 22\* **tentantes:** temtantes. 1, 4, 18 A Q T X *q*: **teptantes** 58; **temptantes** *the rest*; **de daem** 20\* **celo** 22, 32, 39, 47, 51, 55, 57, W **querebant** 17, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 36, 39, 40, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59 D R *f f q*; **quaerebant** 35 > querebant de caelo 16 D *mol a*.

17. Ipse autem ut uidit cogitationes eorum dixit eis: Omne regnum in seipsum diuisum desolabitur, et domus supra domum cadet.

**ut uit** 38. **cogitationes** 51 *c* **dixit ait** 16. **eis:** illis 16 *d*; *om* 48, 49 *a*, *b f f i r* **ipsum:** ipso 3, 4, 5, 18, 43, 44, A Θ M O X<sup>c</sup> *e p t, mi, aur, d*; *om* 47, 56, *a*, *b c d* **diuissum** 21, 32 D; **diuidit** 13 (?). **desolabitur:** dissolabitur 16, 36<sup>c</sup>; **desolatur** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\*, 8\*, 9<sup>c</sup>, 12<sup>c</sup>, 14, 17<sup>c</sup>, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 58 A B C F M O T X<sup>c</sup> *Par. B: N.* 2, 262\*, 13171\*, Tours 23. *b f f i q r*; **dissolatur** 36\*. *Gr.* **super** 16 *a*, *c d* **cadet:** cadit 9<sup>c</sup>, 12, 13<sup>c</sup>, 14, 17, 22, 27\*, 31, 33, 34, 39, 56, *b c r Gr.*

18. Si autem et Satanas in seipsum diuisus est, quomodo stabit regnum eius? quia dicitis in Beelzebub me eicere daemonia.

**si autem et satanas in seipsum diuisum desolatur et domus supra domum cadit** 14\* (*crossed out*) **om** et 43, 44. D Q *e p t mi dur r*, *Gr* Γ **sathanas** 36\*, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58 W **in se** (*repealed*) 56\* **seipsum:** seipso 3, 18 Θ; **semetipsum** 2, *aur r*, *q*. **diuisus:** diuissus 20, 21, 24, 32 D; **diuisum** 17 *f f*. **quomoda** 24\* **stabit:** stauit 1\*; **stabat** 22, 44\* **eius** 3, 4, 5, 16, 21, 26, 28, 32, 35, 41, 48, 53, 55. R. *e p t m b c d / i q r*: **ipsius uel eius** 43; **ipsius** *the rest*. + **est** 35 **om** in beelzebub 22 **beelzebub:** belzebub 5, 18, 21\*, 32, 35, 41, 43 A D Θ O Q R T *mi f f*; beelzebub 2; beelzebub 16 B G X *a*, *d f i q*; behelzebub 17; beelzeb 4\* **me eicere** 54\*: *om* me 3, 10, 20, 21, 36\* D O *dur c Gr* F 69; >eicisse me 16; >eicere me *the rest* **eicere** 44; **ecieere** 2; **ecieere** 21\*, 32, 43; **eicere** *the rest* **daemonia:** doemonia 34; demonia 22, 26, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59 C D R W *e p t mol*.

19. Si autem ego in Beelzebub eiicio daemonia: filii uestri in quo eiiciunt? Ideo ipsi iudices uestri erunt.

**Si:** i 19. > **ego autem** 46 **om** ego 43, 47, 54 T **om** in 43 D **beelzebub:** belzebub 5, 18, 32, 35, 41, 43, 44 A D Θ T *mi f f*; beelzebub 2; beelzebub 16, 20 G *a*, *d f q*; behzebub 17; beelzeb 4\* > in beelzebub ego 16. **eiicio** 42, 44: **eciecio** 21\*, 32, 43\*; **eciecio** *the rest*. **daemonia:** doemonia 34; demonio 29\*; demonia 17, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29<sup>c</sup>, 31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, D J W *e p t f f* **om** si autem ego in beelzebub eiicio daemonia 42. R *r*, **fili** 24 *f r* > **uestri filii** 47 **eiiciunt** 44: **ecieciunt** 43\* V; **ecieciunt** *the rest* > **erunt uestri** 16, 21, 29, 44. *mi dur b f f i q r gr*; **iudi-**  
**cerunt uestri** (= iudices erunt uestri) 32.

20. Porro si in digito Dei eiicio daemonia; profecto peruenit in uos regnum Dei.

poro 28. digito 44. eiicio 44\*: eicio 43\* V; eicio *the rest*.

daemonia: daenia 14; daemonio 21, 32; doemonia 34; demonia 7, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, D W *ept mol ff*.

peruenit: praeuenit 1\*, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 18\*, A B C Q R T *ept Par*. B. N 13171<sup>c</sup> *b f q r*; preuenit 36\*; inuenit 43\*

21. Cum fortis armatus custodit atrium, suum, in pace sunt ea, quae possidet.

quum 18 C Θ; dum 56. custodiat 44 Q R *ept dur r* ea: omnia 20, 37, *f i*; omnia ea 16; + *erasure of four letters* 52. que 16, 21, 22, 47, 52, 54, 57 D R. *q*.

22. Si autem fortior eo superueniens uicerit eum, uniuersa arma eius auferet in quibus confidebat et spolia eius distribuet.

forcior 47, 54. eo: illo *all* uicerit: uincerit. 14, 21 R *mol*; uinceret 16 eum: illum 21, 32 *c* auferet 3, 4, 5\*, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15\*, 18, 24, 27\*, 30, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59\*, A G Θ M O P Q R V X<sup>c</sup> *ept mol r, b c f f i q r*: aufert 1, 2, 5\*, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15\*, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27\*, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 59\*, B C J T X<sup>c</sup> *mi dur gat aur Gr* confedebat 35 om eius 43\* *ept b* distribuit 4, 5\*, 22, 37 A C J M R T I *Gr* (*nearly all*)

23. Qui non est mecum, contra me est: et qui non colligit mecum, dispergit.

om contra me est et qui non colligit 32 contra: aduersus 5\*, 16, 21\*, 44, 50, 59; aduersum *the rest* me est *in an erasure* 5 om aduersum me est 37\* om qui 35 colligit: collegit 12, 16, 17 D G *ept mt mol*; colliget 43 O; colligi *followed by a space of two letters* 35 dispargit 5\* G R *b d r c*.

24. Cum immundus spiritus exierit de homine, ambulat per loca imaquosa, quaerens requiem: et non inueniens dicit: Revertar in domum meam unde exiui.

cum quum 18 C Θ; + autem 16, 20, 23, 28, 35. D *aur r, b d Gr* D U X *syr hcl* imundus 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56 exierit: exiret 5; exhierit 19; exerit 35\* de: dae 14; ab 9\*, 16, 21, 22, 24, 32, 33, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 59\* W (R) *ept-mg b c d q d* homne 28 ambulat 9\*, 10\*, 26, 30, 33, 36\*, 39, 40, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 59 D P W *mt b f*; ambulabat 37; perambulat 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9\*, 10\*, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22\*, 23, 24\*, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36\*, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46 47, 50, 53, 55, 58 A B C G Θ J M O Q X<sup>c</sup> *ept dur mol Gr*; perambulabat 5, 22\*, 24\*, R T V X\* *r, per*: in 2 G loca: + a 50\* om inaquosa 20 in inaquosa 36\* R *ept d* quaerens: que non habent 16; querens 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 59 om requiem 37 meam + ex 56\* exiui: exiuit 36\*; exii 44 *ept*.

25. Et cum uenerit, inuenit eam scopis mundatam, et ornatam.

quum 18 Θ uenerit: inuenit 22\* *mt* inuenit inueniet 18\* W *b i r* eam 16, 51. *b c f f i l r*: om, *the rest*: + uacantem et 5\* *syr. hcl* (uacantem *mol*)

*l r Gr*  $\aleph^c$  B C L R T) et ornatam 16, 21, 23, 27, 28<sup>c</sup>, 32, 37, 39, 40, 46<sup>c</sup>, 47<sup>c</sup>, 49, 51, 55, 59\* R W *mol a*, *b f f i q r*  $\delta$  Gr: *om*, the rest, Gr 225.

26. Tunc uadit et assumit septem alios spiritus secum nequiores se et ingressi habitant ibi. Et fiunt nouissima hominis illius peiora prioribus.

tunc 44 D *a*, *c e f q r* Gr: et 40; et iterum 2; et tunc the rest. et: *om* 40  
et assumit *over an erasure* 43 assumit: assummit 20, 47; asumit 28\*;  
adsumit 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 28<sup>c</sup>, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 51, D G  $\Theta$  J P Q  
*mt a a*, *b d e f i q* vii 16, 21, 32, 40, 44 D R T W > alios septem 34, 59<sup>c</sup>,  
*a a*, *c d e* spiritus: spiritos 4, 5; pritus 17; spsritus 27 secum 9<sup>c</sup> 51  
G *l r Gr*  $\aleph^c$  C X 33, 69: *om*, the rest. ingresi 19, 21 R *e p t* fiunt 16, 39, 59\*  
D P R *mt a a*, *d e r* Gr: sunt the rest. nouissimum 5\* > illius hominis 47  
hominis: homini 14, 37; *om* 40\* peiora: peior 17; priora 24\*; peira 37.

27. Factum est autem, cum haec diceret: extollens uocem quaedam mulier de turba dixit illi: Beatus uenter, qui te portauit, et ubera, quae suxisti.

*cap* xlviii 4, 5, 18; xlvii 41, 53, 58; xxxvi 7, 10, 11, 14, 20, 26, 27, 37, 45, 57;  
xxxviii 47. in illo tempore 52; in illo tempore loquente ihu ad turbas 33, 49  
*om* autem 28\*, 35; *f r Gr*  $\Delta$  cum: quum 18,  $\Theta$ ; dum 46, D hec 39,  
47, 57, W. dicerent 18 > q. uocem mulier 9\* (*corr* 9\*\*) 52\* Gr  $\aleph$  B L;  
> q. mulier uocem 51 *most Gr. mss* ' *om* uocem 17\* + est 36 (*lect*).  
quaedam 15, 22, 27, 32, 36 (*lect*), 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 59 D R *f q*;  
quidam 26\*; + de 36 (*lect*)\* illi: ei 27 *c*; ad ihm 48, 49, 51<sup>ms</sup>, 52; *om* 37  
uenter qui te por *illegible* 13. uenter + est 44. qui: quae 5\*  
(*corr* 5\*\*). portabit 15<sup>c</sup> que 36, 39, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 57 R. suxisti  
16, 20 qui te lactauerunt 22e.

28. At ille dixit: quinimmo beati, qui audiunt uerbum Dei, et custodiunt illud.

at: et 22 Gr C *syr-jer*. dixit + ad eos 16 D R *mol b f f i q r* *om* at ille  
dixit 37 quinimmo: quinimo 20, 33; quimimmo 28; quin himmo 47; immo 3,  
18<sup>c</sup>, 36\* B<sup>c</sup> D G  $\Theta$  <sup>ms</sup> Q R *mol r*, *c e r*; quippini 2, 4, 5 A  $\Theta$ \* M O P X *e p t*\* *corp christi*  
*Cambridge 197 Cambridge Univ k k. I. 24 (mt Par. B. N. 2)*; quippe 21, 32 (*c p*). F  
Dunelm. Aii. 16 *e p t* <sup>ms</sup>, *gat*; *om* 16 *a a*, *b f f i q syrr*. + hii 21 quia 28  
audiu 28\* audiunt uerbum dei *over an erasure* 43 illud 7, 8<sup>c</sup>, 9, 10,  
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36<sup>c</sup>, 37,  
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47<sup>c</sup>, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, B\*  $\Theta$  V W.  
Gr. X  $\Gamma$  A II etc.: *om* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8\*, 16, 21, 30, 36\*, 43, 44, 47\*, A B\* C D G J  
M O P Q R T X *e p t mt mol dur r*, *all old latin mss. Gr*  $\aleph^a$  A B C D L  $\aleph$  etc.  
*om* et custodiunt illud 32.

29. Turbis autem concurrentibus coepit dicere: generatio haec, generatio nequam est: signum quaerit, et signum non dabitur ei, nisi signum Ionae prophetae.

concurrentibus: currentibus 48 B\*; conuertentibus 35. cepit 22, 39, 40,  
43, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 57. + ihs 16 (*q*) generatio (*1st*): generatio 50;  
geratio 10; + *ma* 20\*. hec 22, 32, 39. generatio (*2nd*): *om* 54\*  $\delta$  Gr C  $\Gamma$   
A A II etc. nequam: nemquam 37; quam 14. *om* est 54\* b > nequam

est generatio 47\* querit 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57  
 D R *mol ff q* ei 5\*?, 9\*, 20, 40, 43, 44, 46, 48, 52, 54 D G R *a d f*: ei uel illi  
 39; illi *the rest.* ione 22, 32, 39, 47, 50, 54, 57 R W prophetae 46<sup>c</sup> R W  
*cor vat\* e f q r d Gr A C X F Δ A II* etc.; prophete 47<sup>c</sup> W; *om*, the rest *Gr B B D L Z*

30. Nam sicut fuit Ionas signum Niniuitis: ita erit et Filius hominis generationi  
 isti.

Sicut fuit ionas signum 12, 13, 15<sup>c</sup>, 19<sup>c</sup>, 22, 26, 28, 30, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48  
 52, 56 (D) W *mt b ff q*; > fuit sicut ionas signum 15\*, 17, 19\* 23; > sicut ionas signum  
 fuit 16, 21, 32 (R) *mol*; > sicut ionas fuit signum 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,  
 14, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58 A B C G Θ J  
 M O P Q T V X *ept dur (r.)* iona 5\* signum + in 14 niniuitis: nineuitis  
 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7\*, 8\*, 9<sup>c</sup>, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27\*, 28<sup>c</sup>, 36, A B C G M O  
 Q V *ept dur a b d f ff i q*: nineuetis 15\* *mt*; niniuetis 15<sup>c</sup>, 16<sup>c</sup>, 21, 29, 32, 44 *om*  
 erit 39\* *om* et 20\*, 43, 52, 55, 56, P *mol f* hominus 2 generationis 18; gen-  
 eratio 32. isti: huic 16 D *mt mol b d q (a r)*

31. Regina Austri surget in iudicio cum uiris generationis huius, et condem-  
 nabit illos; quia uenit a finibus terrae audire sapientiam Salomonis: et ecce plus  
 quam Salomon hic.

surget *over an erasure* 9<sup>c</sup> iuditio 14, 37, 42, 47, 57 quum 18 Θ  
 uiris: uiriis 16; *erasure of two letters in the middle* 10; *om* 21 Gr C *syrr. cu.* cum uiris  
 generationis huius: cum generatione hac 32 D (ista). condemnabit 8, 9, 15,  
 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50,  
 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 Θ V W *mol* illos: illis 17: eos 38 *a f r* terrae:  
 terre 22, 35, 39, 54: *om* 5. + ue uobis phariseis qui diligitis primas cathedras in  
 synagogis et salutationes in foro 56\* audire audire 5\* sapientia 5, 18\*  
 salomonis: salemonis 27, 44, 56; salamonis 36 D R *mol*; salimonis 43; solomonis  
 4<sup>c</sup> M *ept a b d e ff q r* *om* et 39, 44, 50 *dur* eccae 32. quam salomon  
 9\*, 12\*, 16, 23, 26, 28, 29, 35, 37<sup>c</sup>, 38, 42, 46, 54<sup>c</sup> Θ P T W (*mt*) *d r (b q)*; quam  
 solomon 2; quam salomine 1\* (*f*); quam salomone 10\*, 14, 25, 37\*; salomone (*om* quam)  
 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9<sup>c</sup>, 10<sup>c</sup>, 11, 12<sup>c</sup>, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 32, 36<sup>c</sup>, 39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 48,  
 50, 52, 53, 54\*, 55, 57, 58, A B C J O Q V X *dur i (a e ff d aur)*; salomone (*om* quam) 27<sup>c</sup>,  
 56; salomone (*om* quam) 5, 36\*, 44 D R; salimone (*om* quam) 43; salomine (*om* quam)  
 1<sup>c</sup>; salomon (*om* quam) 18; salemon (*om* quam) 27\*; hic: *in margin* 3; hiic 21.

32. Uiri Niniuitae surgent in iudicio cum generatione hac et condemnabunt  
 illam: quia poenitentiam egerunt ad praedicationem Ionae, et ecce plus quam  
 Ionas hic.

niniuitae: niniuite 9\*, 36, 37, 39, 47, 52, 54, 57, 58, W; nineuitae 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7\*,  
 8\*, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15\*, 17, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28<sup>c</sup>, A B C G M O Q V X *ept dur a b f i r*;  
 nineuite 9<sup>c</sup>, 22, *ff q*; niniuetae 15<sup>c</sup>, 32; niniuite 16, 21. iuditio 7, 14, 37, 42, 47,  
 54, 57; ditio 16 hac: haec 17 G; ista 16 (*c e r*) condemnabunt 1, 2, 3, 4,  
 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 38, 41, 45, A B C G J M O P Q T V X *mt dur*: cum-  
 demnabunt 24\*; comdemnabunt 18, 24<sup>c</sup>; condepnabunt 48; comdemnabunt *the rest*  
 Θ *mol ept* illam: eam 16, 21, 29, 32, 35, 44, 50, 53, 58 *mol a f r* quia: qui  
 48 poenitentiam: paenitentiam 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,  
 18, 24, 29 A B C G Θ J M O Q T V *mt a b e f i*; paenitentiam 30; poenetentiam 44;



penitentiam 19, 22, 28, 32, 36, 39, 41 43, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54, 57, *mol ff q* aegerunt  
 16, 17, 21, 29, 32, 37 C D ad: in 16, 20, 37, 47, 48 G *mi mol a b c e f i q r*; a 52  
 praedicationem: predicationem 26, 29, 47 D; praedicatione 16, 20, 37 *mi aur*  
*a b c f r*; predicatione 48, 52 *ff q* ione 32, 39, 47, 48, 50, 54, 55 G\* W om et  
 47 r quam 1, 2, 3, 5<sup>c</sup>, 6, 7, 8<sup>c</sup>, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,  
 27, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 46<sup>c</sup>, 47<sup>c</sup>, 50, 53, 54<sup>c</sup>, 55, 57, 58, B O P T V W X  
*mi aur mol\* a b c f q r*: om 4, 5\*, 8\*, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 30, 32, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46\*,  
 47\*, 48, 52, 54\*, 56 A C D G J M Q R *ept gat dur mol e ffi d* ionas: iona all  
 hiic 21.

33. Nemo lucernam accendit, et in abscondito ponit, neque sub modio: sed supra candelabrum, ut qui ingrediuntur, lumen uideant.

*cap* xlviii 4, 5, 18; xlviii 41, 53, 58: nemo lucernam accendit *gold letters* 26;  
 illuminated capital N 26, 27 in nat confess dixit dñs ihs discipulis suis 40<sup>mg</sup>; in  
 illo tempore dixit ihs discipulis suis 33, 34, 49, 51, 59; in illo tempore  
 dixit d. i. d. s 52. lucerna 4 accendet 3; ascendit 57 > accendit  
 lucernam 6, 28, 49, 51, 56, 57, 59 et: neque sq et in abscondito ponit *over*  
*an erasure* 5<sup>c</sup>. abscondito: absconso 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26,  
 28<sup>c</sup>, 29, 32, 34, 36\*, 37, 40, 48, 53, 56<sup>c</sup>, 58 B D J Q R T *ept-mg mol dur cor val-mg.*  
*b c e f i r d*; abscondito uel absconso 43, 44 ponet 9<sup>c</sup>, 12<sup>c</sup>, 13, 14, 15\*, 17, 29, 34  
 supra: supra 7<sup>c</sup>; super 15\*, 19, 26, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 48, 52, 54, 57, 59  
 T W *ept\* a d e f f q d*; sup 28, 30, 33. candellabrum 5, 22\* *ept mol* ut: et  
 22\* (et ut D) ingrediunt 50.

34. Lucerna corporis tui, est oculus tuus. Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit: si autem nequam fuerit, etiam corpus tuum tenebrosum erit.

occulus (1st) 47 R om si oculus tuus 20 occulus (2nd) 47 R  
 >om tuus (sec) 49\* om fuerit 48 > simplex fuerit 21, 32, 47 D a autem:  
 aut 50; + oculus tuus 16 a Gr X *syr-cu* nequaquam 50\* R actiam 16, 21,  
 32. + totum 43, 44 *cop (mol f. r syr-cu)* tenebrae 10

35. Uide ergo ne lumen, quod in te est, tenebrae sint.

uide 21, 32. ego 2\* > quod in te ne lumen 20 est + ex 27\*  
 tenebrae 22, 27, 36, 39, 47, 50, 54, 57 W *mol ff q* sit 49<sup>c</sup>

36. Si ergo corpus tuum totum lucidum fuerit, non habens aliquam partem tenebrarum, erit lucidum totum, et sicut lucerna fulgoris illuminabit te.

ergo: *over an erasure* 7; enim 2 corpus tuum totum lucidum fuerit: >  
 totum corpus tuum l. f. 43 T W *ept r a*; >c. t. fuerit lucidum totum 1\*; >c. t. totum  
 fuerit lucidum 7\*, 20, 25, 27, 45; c. t. totum lucidum totum fuerit 5\*; >c. t. fuerit  
 lucidum (om totum) 1<sup>c</sup>, 11; c t l f (om totum) 3, 16, 21, 26, 47, 49, 59 D *gat aur.*  
 tuus 50. fuerit erit 17\* C\* T\* r<sub>2</sub>; fuerit uel erit 43 om totum lucidum  
 fuerit non habens aliquam partem tenebrarum erit 32 sicut: sicuti 21, 32 C; si  
 36 fulgoris fulgeris 14; fugoris 51 illuminabit: inluminavit 1\* O; inmin-  
 abit 47; inluminabit 1<sup>c</sup>, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\*, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25,  
 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37 A C D G Θ J M P Q R T V X *ept mt dur mol r, f.*

37. Et cum loqueretur, rogauit illum quidam Phariseus, ut pranderet apud se. Et ingressus recubuit.

*cap* l. 4, 5, 18; xlviii 41, 53, 58; xxxvii 7, 10, 11, 14, 20, 26, 27, 37, 45, 57; xxxviii 47 quum 18 Θ in illo tempore rogabat ihm quidam 49, 51 (quidem), 52 loquaeretur 25 illum: eum 16, 44 *a c d f g* pharisaeus: phariseus 16, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58. *W ept ff i*; pharyseus 54; fariseus 43, 44, 50 *D mol q*; de phariseis 51. + autem 32\* ut: a ut 23\*; et 22\* panderet 22\* apud 2 *G R T e* cum illo pranderet 52 *mi ff i* ingresus 21, 32 *R ept mol* recubuit: recubit 32; discubuit 51 *f*.

38. Phariseus autem coepit intra se reputans dicere, quare non baptizatus esset ante prandium.

pharisaus: phariseus 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58 *R W ept ff i q*; pharyseus 54; pharieus 20; fariseus 43, 44 *mol om* autem 53, 58 *R* caepit 25, 35 *D*; cepit 26, 39, 40, 43, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57 + cogitare 25 *cf. d* intra se *twice* 48\* se + et 25 reputans 21; reputatis 32 baptizatus 5, 21, 40, 43, 44, 56 *D R T* esset: est 16 *T b c d f ff i q r* pradium 30.

39. Et ait Dominus ad illum: Nunc uos Pharisei quod deforis est calicis, et catini, mundatis: quod autem intus est uestrum plenum est rapina, et iniquitate.

dominus: ihs 26 *J mol e Gr U syr-pesh* at, 9 eum 27, *mi d* > ad illum dñs 16. *om* et ait dñs ad illum 48 nunc: non 20 pharisei: pharisei 22, 26, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, *R W ff i*; pharysei 54; farisei 43, 44 + prius 29 *D R r, c e ff i l* deforis: diforis 2\*; foris 24 *Q r, c* est *over an erasure* 22 catinis 5<sup>c</sup>, 36\*, 37, 51, 58\* *om* uestrum 32 plaenum 9\* rapina: rapine 36\*; capina 2\* iniquitate + spurcitiae 43.

40. Stulti, nonne qui fecit quod deforis est, etiam id, quod deintus est, fecit?

stulte 26; *om* 43 fecit *over an erasure* 12 quod: qui 50 deforis: eforis 32; foris 50, 57 *r est*: *om* 57; + calicis 2 etiam: et iam 40; aetiam 16, 21, 32 *C*; *om* 2 id *om* 22, 37, 44, 46, 47, 48, 56, *C R T dur\* i r* deintus: intus 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 12\*, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 30, 32, 41, 43, 44, 47, 50, 56, 57 *C D J Q R T mol dur aur r, Par. B. N. 262, 13171<sup>c</sup> C C C Oxford d i (c e)*.

41. Uerumtamen quod superest, date eleemosynam: et ecce omnia munda sunt uobis.

uerumtamen: uerumtamen 7; uerumptamen 29, 35, 42, 47<sup>1</sup> *W*; ueruntamen 9, 17, 24, 25, 27, 32, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 46, 51, 53, 57 super omnes est 47 eleemosynam: eleemosynam 1, 2<sup>c</sup>, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24 *A Θ J M P Q V X mi dur r, a b c / ff m r*; elemosy 2\*; elimoynam 5; elimosinam 32 *R ept*; elimoysinam 43, 44; elymosinam 10, 11 *mol*: aelemosinam 27; aelimosinam 16, 21; helemosinam 36; elemosinam *the rest* *T W*. *om* omnia 16, 20\* > uobis sunt 21, 32 *Gr (nearly all)* fiant 23.

42. Sed uae uobis Phariseis, quia decimatis mentham, et rutam et omne olus, et praeteritis iudicium, et charitatem Dei; haec autem oportuit facere, et illa non omittere.

uae uobis pharisei qui decimatis *over an erasure* 43 uae: ue 25, 27<sup>c</sup>, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58W; *om* 27\*  
 uobis + scribae et 21, *gat b*; + scribe et 32 (*cp. syr-cu aeth*) phariseis: phariseis 28, 36, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 52\* 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, W *ff*; pharyseis 54; pharisaeus 14\* (?); pharisei 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\*, 7\*, 10, 11, 16, 20, 21, 25, 27, 32 A<sup>c</sup> X\* *aur b c e r*; pharisei 26, 41, 43, 47, 52<sup>c</sup> R *i*; farisei 44 Q T *q* quia: qui 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13\*, 15, 16, 19, 23, 25<sup>c</sup>, 26, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46\*, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58 D M T V W *mol r, b c ff i q*. decimas 22 mentham: mentem 35\*; mentam *the rest* + hanetum 43; anetum 44 *r* *erasure of two letters after* omne 5 olus 39, 45, 49, 50<sup>c</sup>, 51, 53\*, J P Q T; bolus 32; holus *the rest* + non triticum solummodo et uinum 48 praeteritis 22, 23, 26, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, D *ff q* + omne 47 inditium 37, 42, 47 W *ept* charitatem: karitatem 22, 26; ueritatem uel caritatem 43; ueritatem 44, *ept-mg, corp. Oxf*; caritatem *the rest*. haec: hae 18<sup>c</sup>, hec 39, 44, 47, 54 W autem: enim 10 W *e f q r* + omnia 47, 52 oportuit: oportet 10, 18\*, 28, 35, 54, G *e p r*; oportet uel oportuit 43; oportuerat 16 *r* facere: *om* 21, 32; + primo loco 48 et illa: et illam 23; *om* 48. omittere: homittere 2 C; nomittere 4; ommittere 9\*, 20, 35, 36 G; ommitterae 21; omittre 45; obmittere 54; mittere 14 *corp. Oxf*.

43. Uae uobis Phariseis, quia diligitis primas cathedras in synagogis, et salutationes in foro.

cap xl 47; xxxviii 11, 37 *The whole verse is written in the margin* 56  
 ue 25, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 W phariseis: phariseis 22, 28, 36, 38, 39, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 52\*, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58 W *ept*; pharyseis 54; fariseis 40 (*trous phariseis A B C L X etc*); pharisei 16, 21, 26, 32, 41 *mt aur a b c d e*; pharisei 47, 52<sup>c</sup>; farisei 44 Q T *q* (*r*) (*ol pharisei 18 D*). quia 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15\*, 17, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, 32, 36\*, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, C G J M P R T *ept*\* *gat cor-val b d e f ff q Gr*: qui 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15<sup>c</sup>, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36<sup>c</sup>, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 58, A D Θ O Q V W X *ept-mg mt dur mol r, c i r d* diligitis 44 D *ept* cathedras: catedras 19\* O T *b*; chathedras 51 G synagogis: sinagogiis 16\*; sinagogis 16<sup>c</sup>, 21, 22, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 56 W *ept mol* salutationes 51 *c* foro + et primos discubitos in conuiuuiis 44 *b l q r* (*d*) *Gr C D* 13, 64, 66<sup>ms</sup>.

44. Uae uobis, quia estis ut monumenta, quae non apparent, et homines ambulantes supra, nesciunt.

ue 22, 25, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 W quia: qui 1, 7, 11, 14, 15<sup>c</sup>, 16, 17, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 36<sup>c</sup>, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, D R W *aur r, d* monumenta 16. que 22, 24, 26, 32, 39, 47, 51, 54, 57 D R apparent 1\*, 2, 3, 7<sup>c</sup>, 9<sup>c</sup>, 13, 14, 15\*, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24<sup>c</sup>, 27<sup>c</sup>, 28, 29, 30, 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52\*, 54, 57 P W X\* *aur mol cor-val-mg i q*: parent 1<sup>c</sup>, 4, 5, 6, 7\*, 8, 9\*, 10, 11, 12, 15<sup>c</sup>, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24\*, 25, 26, 27\*, 32, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 52<sup>c</sup>, 53, 55, 56, 58, A C D G Θ J M O Q R T V *ept mt dur r, Par B. N.* 13171<sup>c</sup> *b e f ff r* > supra ambulantes 21, 32, 44 *d Gr D aeth*. supra + qui 57

45. Respondens autem quidam ex Legisperitis, ait illi: Magister haec dicens etiam contumeliam nobis facis.

*cap.* li. 4, 5, 18; l 41. *om* autem 25 legis peritus 18, 20, 36 J. ait  
*over an erasure* 58 magister *over an erasure* 56 hec 22, 32, 39, 47, 54, 57 W  
 actiam 21. etiam contumeliam nobis: >nobis etiam contumeliam 48;  
 etiam uobis contumeliam 44\*; etiam nobis contumeliam *the rest* facit 36\*

46. At ille ait: Et uobis Legisperitis uae: quia oneratis homines oneribus, quae portare non possunt, et ipsi uno digito uestro non tangitis sarcinas.

ille: illae 45; ipse 27 *b i q r* >ait ille 47 ait: at 26; dixit 28, 35  
 38 *r, a d e r*; +eis 16 et +uae 29; *om* et 44 >uae uobis legis peritis 13,  
 22. legis legis peritis 9\*; legis peritiis 16\* ue 25, 26, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48<sup>c</sup>, 49,  
 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, W: *om* 48\* +uobis 29 R quia: qui 1, 2, 5, 7, 11,  
 15, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28\*, 36<sup>c</sup>, 38, 41, 44, 52<sup>c</sup>, 55, 56. V W *mt r, e\* q r* oneratis: honeratis  
 2, 5, 15, 16, 18, 23, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 47, 50, 57 D G O T X\* *epl mt a c d q r*;  
 onerastis 13 (e) hominem 22\* oneribus: honeribus 2<sup>c</sup>, 15, 16, 22\*, 28, 29,  
 32, 35, 36<sup>c</sup>, 38, 40, 42, 43, 47 C D O T *epl mt c e q r*; honoribus 1\* R; omnibus 50\*  
 que 22, 39, 47, 54, 57 D R; qui 56 portare 3, 9\*, 14, 18, 26, 54 O *aur b q*: non  
 portari 40; portari *the rest d fil.* *om* uno 22 digito 43\* *om* uestro  
 1\* *c e* tangis 21\* sarcinas: sarcinam 49\*; sarcitas 50; +ipsas 23, 28, 35,  
 51, 54<sup>c</sup> D Q *mt mol (r,) fil r*; +uestras 52; +eius 55.

47. Uae uobis, qui aedificatis monumenta Nrophetarum: patres autem uestri occiderunt illos.

in illo tempore dicebat ihs turbis iudeorum et principibus sacerdotum 49, 52; in  
 illo tempore dicebat ihs turbis pharisaeorum 34; in nat s cornelii et cipriani dixit ihs  
 ad legis peritos et fariseos 40; uae uobis qui aedificatis monumenta prophe *erased*; in  
 illo tempore dicebat ihs pharisaeis et principibus iudeorum ue uobis scribe et pharisei  
 qui edificatis monumenta prophe *written in margin* 7 ue 25, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48,  
 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 uobis +scribe et pharisei 7<sup>c</sup> (*see above*), 52  
 qui: quia 3, 4, 12, 14, 18, 20, 32, 37, 43, 45, 47, 48, 57 A C G Θ O P T X *epl mt b c e /*  
*Gr*; quae 46 edificatis 20, 27, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57 munu-  
 menta 4; monomenta 16 profetarum 5, 43, 44 D O R *epl mol d e q r*; prophae-  
 tarum 16 autem: enim 6 *mt* uestri: uestris 26\*; *om* 32 autem  
 uestri occi *over an erasure* 43

48. Profecto testificamini quod consentitis operibus patrum uestrorum: quoniam ipsi quidem eos occiderunt, uos autem aedificatis eorum sepulchra.

profecto . . . occiderunt *written in margin* 56 testamini 2; testificami 49\*  
*om* quod 16, 21, 32, 34 *dur gat* consentitis: consititis 23\*; consetititis 23<sup>c</sup>;  
 consentistis 50. operibus: hominibus 9\* >patrum operibus 48\*  
 >quidem ipsi *all* >occiderunt eos 49 *mt r, a b d f i q r c* *om* uos autem  
 aedificatis eorum sepulchra 39 autem: aut 50 edificatis 22, 32, 47, 48, 50,  
 54, 56, 57 W; aaedificatis 35 sepulchra: sepulcra 1<sup>c</sup>, 8, 28, 39, 41, 43, 47, 48,  
 52, 56 T; saepulchra 16; sepulcha 18; setpulchra 44.

49. Propterea et sapientia Dei dixit: Mittam ad illos Prophetas, et Apostolos, et ex illis occident, et persequentur:

*om* et 43<sup>c</sup>, *Gr A syr-cu aeth* dicit 54<sup>c</sup>, *a* mittat 36\* illos: eos 21<sup>c</sup>,  
32, *d*; *cas* 21\*; *uos* 46\* *c* prophetas: prophetae 19; profetas 43, 44, D O R W  
*epi mol d e q r*; *om* 22\* apostolus 4; apostulos 43. persequerentur 23\*

50. Ut inquiratur sanguis omnium Prophetarum, qui effusus est a constitutione mundi a generatione ista,

quiratur. 28\* sanguinis 28\* R; sangis 43 > omnium sanguis 54\*  
prophetarum: prophetae 19; profetarum 43, 44 D O R *epi mol d e q r*  
effusus 5, 16, 43 D R *mol q* constitutione 7, 42 *c*; constitutionem 37 T\* *e*  
*om* mundi 16 geratione 4.

51. a sanguine Abel, usque ad sanguinem Zachariae, qui perit inter altare et aedem. Ita dico vobis, requiretur ab hac generatione.

sanguine + enim 16 *om* abel usque ad sanguinem 48 abel + iusti 2, 17,  
28, 35, 37, 39, 49, 54\* Q *mol r, aur c e i r Gr K M II etc. syr-hci\** ad sanguinem:  
ad sanguine 10 M *d*; ad sanguinae 32. Zachariae: Zacchariae 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 17,  
18, 36 C J O *b f*; Zacharie 39, 40, 47, 52, 57 W quae 16 perit 5 *mol i*  
inter: intra 50; in 53, 58 inter templum et altare 20 (cp. *r, e*). aedem:  
eadem 28 R: edem 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57 W ac 10.

52. Uae vobis Legisperitis, quia tulistis clauem scientiae, ipsi non introistis, et eos, qui introibant, prohibuistis.

ue 24, 32, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 W vobis + non 32\*  
legisperitis: legis legis peritis 1\*; legisperitiis. 16\*; legis peritos 17\* quia:  
qui 1, 7\*, 10, 15<sup>c</sup>, 25, 26, 27, 38, 39, 41\*, 46<sup>c</sup>, 49, 50, 55, D Q R V W *mi aur i r d*  
clauem: clauim 26, 27<sup>c</sup>, 35, 41, 44, 50, 52, 53 D; clau 28\* scientiae: scientie  
32, 39, 40; sapientiae uel scientiae 43 + et 1, 7\*, 10, 11, 15, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27,  
32, 44, 46<sup>c</sup>, 47, 49, 55 D R W *r, a b c d i l q* ipsi: psi 26; ipsis 18\*; *one letter*  
*erased after* ipsi 5. introistis: introitis 1, *b c e*; istis 21\*, 32 introibant:  
*over an erasure* 55 introibunt 3; introiebant 4, 5, 48 A M X<sup>c</sup>, intrabant 16, 21, 32, 44  
D *epi-mg dur mol c r, aur l*; introibant uel intrabant 43; introierunt 50. proibui-  
istis 15, 19, 40\*, 54 C.

53. Cum autem haec ad illos diceret, coeperunt Pharisei et Legisperiti grauitur insistere, et os eius opprimere de multis,

*cap* xii 6, 8, 9, 12, 17, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 53; xxxviii 11, 20, 37; xli 47; l. 41, 53,  
58. *written in large letters* 15; *the first line written in gold* 19. quum 18,  
C Θ; et cum 49 J autem (*a c d e i d*): *om all.* hec 22, 28, 39, 47 W  
illos: eos 16 *r, c d e* diceret: discederet 12; dicerent 40\* > diceret  
ad illos 56 (*c e*) coeperunt: caeperunt 35 D; ceperunt 27, 30<sup>c</sup>, 32, 36, 39, 40,  
43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57 W pharisei: pharisei 22, 26, 27, 36, 38, 39,  
40, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58 W *epi i*; pharysei 54; pharissei 32 R; farisei 43,  
44 *q* legis periti 56\*; legisperiti 24 resistere 40 opprimere: obpri-  
mere 3, 10, 16, 25, 29, G R T W; oppremere 5\*; opprime 28\*; deprimere 27; sub-  
primere 23; imprimere 53 *corp ox*; imprimere 58.

54. insidiantes ei, et quaerentes aliquid capere de ore eius ut accusarent eum.

insidantes 2; insidiantis 5. ei: eius 32; *om* 3, 4, 10, 16, 18, A D G Θ M V X  
*aur dur Gr N X* 130 *cop.* querentes 18, 22, 24, 27, 28, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 47,  
 48, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57 *R mol* aliquit 35 aliquid capere 16, 23, 53, 58 *D mt*  
*Gr K II*: capere aliquid capere 36, 45\*; >capere aliquid *the rest.* de 47: *ex the*  
*rest* accusarent 5, 21, 32, 44 *R mol r*; acusarent 17\*. eum: illum 21, 32, 49.

The analysis of the above collation seems to show the following results:

2. good Vulgate.
3. very good Vulgate; decided resemblance to O; resembles 4, 18.
4. very good Vulgate; decided resemblance to A; very close resemblance to 5.
5. good Vulgate; decided resemblance to A; very close resemblance to 4.
6. good Vulgate.
7. good Vulgate; decided resemblance to V; resembles 10, 11, 25, 27; Alcuinian.
8. good Vulgate; close resemblance to 36.
9. good Vulgate.
10. good Vulgate; decided resemblance to V; Alcuinian text blended with Irish readings.
11. good Vulgate; resembles 7, 10, 20, 25, 27; Alcuinian.
12. good Vulgate.
14. good Vulgate.
15. contains African Old Latin readings; earlier MSS preserve mainly European Old Latin readings.
16. resembles DR, also *mol* T; resembles 21, 32, 44; most akin to *r* in Old Latin readings.
17. good Vulgate.
18. good Vulgate; contains readings like 3.
20. good Vulgate; like 25; Alcuinian with Irish readings.
21. good Vulgate; very close resemblance to 32; resembles 16, 44.
23. poor Vulgate.
25. like 20; Alcuinian with Irish readings.
26. poor Vulgate.
27. Alcuinian.
28. poor Vulgate; close resemblance to 35.
30. good Vulgate.
31. good Vulgate.
32. good Vulgate; very close resemblance to 21; resembles 16, 44.
35. poor Vulgate; close resemblance to 28.
36. good Vulgate; resembles the older MSS.
41. resembles *aur*; also 53, 58.
42. poor Vulgate.

- 43. resembles 44.
- 44. good Vulgate; resembles 16, 43, 21, 32.
- 45. good Vulgate.
- 47. good Vulgate.
- 48. resembles 52.
- 51. poor Vulgate.
- 52. poor Vulgate; resembles 48.
- 53. very like 58.
- 58. very like 53.
- 59. poor Vulgate.

G. MALLOWS YOUNGMAN

SALISBURY, ENGLAND

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON CHRONICLES

This is the latest volume<sup>1</sup> of the "International Critical Commentary," the most important work on the Bible produced by the American and English scholars of the present day. Of the series in general it may be affirmed that the volumes covering the Old Testament are on the whole more satisfactory than those on the New Testament. That fact is due largely, it may be presumed, to the vastly freer work which for a generation has been done in the former field. While there are many unsolved problems still in the Hebrew biblical literature, there are numerous important points which are settled so far as present knowledge permits.

Professor Curtis' contribution seems to be on a level with the best of the commentaries in this series, and some of his predecessors had already made the standard high. It is especially satisfactory to have a worthy treatment of Chronicles; for there has been nothing in English to which the student could turn, and unfortunately most American theological students are limited to their native tongue.

Chronicles originally covered the two books still known by that name and the books of Ezra-Nehemiah as well. Therefore it is in its early form a history of the Jews from Adam to the Greek period. But since for the early period there is practically nothing but lists of names (I, 1-9), Chronicles as we use the term covers the history from the time of David to the Exile. Now, that period is already included in our books of Samuel and Kings. What then was the purpose of a writer who proposed to rewrite that great period of Hebrew history? To begin with a negative, it is certain that he had no narrow view of the inspiration and infallibility of the earlier histories; for he uses them at times with great freedom; and it is plain that he wrote his book because he was not satisfied with his predecessors' interpretation of the events they recorded.

<sup>1</sup> *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles*. By Edward Lewis Curtis, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Divinity School of Yale University, and Albert Alonzo Madsen, Ph.D. New York: Scribner, 1910. xxii+534 pages. \$3.



To get the author's point of view there are three matters in which he shows a compelling interest, genealogical records, the Davidic dynasty, and the Temple with all other institutions connected with its worship. He was therefore an antiquarian, a somewhat narrow Jewish patriot, and an enthusiastic devotee of the priestly law. His personal traits are not only discoverable in his work, but they also exerted a strong influence upon his composition, to so great a degree indeed that his work is far removed from the plane of scientific history, and degenerates frequently to apologetics, a noble enough science in its place, but out of its element when it colors historical narrative.

Whence did the Chronicler derive the material for his history? We may disregard revelation without prejudice, for in that we follow the author, for he claims only written sources for his work. In the first place he makes liberal use of the narrative portions of Genesis-Kings, as we may see from the table given by Curtis (pp. 17-19), the most complete list of the parallels known to me. Then the Chronicler cites a number of other authorities, partly annals of Kings, partly prophetic writings or biographies. For the full list see Curtis, *Introduction*, pp. 21 ff. Right here we come to the most mooted problem in this field. As a matter of fact, did the Chronicler have any written sources, or did he merely cite authorities, somewhat after the fashion proposed to the perplexed de Cervantes by his friend,<sup>2</sup> merely to embellish his narrative and to give an appearance of authenticity, as alleged by some scholars of the present day?

The Chronicler wrote certainly as late as 300 B.C., and very possibly a century later. The late date is one of the grounds for distrusting his sources. Too much has been built upon the question of date. The best American histories are usually those of most recent date. So far as date goes, a far better history might have been written in the third century than in the fifth. The author of Kings wrote after the destruction of Jerusalem, yet he certainly had written sources, from which he took what served his purpose; but he surely did not use all the material he had before him. If old sources were available for him in the exilic period, there is no reason why original writings may not have survived to the time of the Chronicler.

But it is urged that all of the matter peculiar to the Chronicler shows the same literary style, being full of words, phrases, and constructions used only or chiefly by him. There is much force in this argument, and yet it is not so convincing as often alleged. For the Book of

<sup>2</sup> See author's preface to *Don Quixote*.

Chronicles, in its full form, betrays evidence of much revision or successive editing. A thorough criticism of the text that is common to Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah and I Esdras shows abundant traces of that overhauling. It is certain that our Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah differs materially from the form which first left the hands of its author.

It is charged further that the Chronicler deliberately falsifies the history in places where we have a control, and therefore no confidence can be placed in his unsupported statements. It is true that in these books we have a general increase of numbers over those of the earlier books (see *Introd.*, pp. 8 ff., where there is an excellent statement of changes and exaggerations), and there are many other variations from the sources which cannot be justified. And yet it is by no means sure that modern scholars have not been too sweeping in denying historical worth to Chronicles. To cite one of the large matters, these books attribute to David the institution of much of the Temple cult in its broadest sense; the religious institutions of the third century are traced back to a Davidic origin. Certainly there is exaggeration here. Our author belonged to an age in which it was the fashion to give to every writing the support of a great name, and so all laws were given by Moses, all psalms were sung by David, and all wisdom came from the mouth of Solomon. And yet, for all that we know, David, who in the earlier part of his reign was a real head of state and church, may have set up many of the religious institutions which are usually regarded now as springing from a much later period. David was certainly a poet, and therefore to him were ascribed songs he never composed; and David was a profoundly religious man, and therefore too much may be credited to him; but it is also true that we may take away from him many institutions which he did originate.

In dealing with this and other similar problems Professor Curtis certainly does not take a very conservative position. On the other hand, he is fully as clear of an extreme tendency to discard as worthless any statement which may safely be labeled by that assumed tag of unreliability, "Chr." He takes each section of the peculiar material and considers it on its own merits. For the most part his conclusions come to the radical position, but he does not assume that place at the outset. He does finally accept some of the Chronicler's narrative at least as probable.

Again, Curtis is cautious in pronouncing opinions, and is confessedly content with many "probablys." In dealing with books like these, that course is necessary, although in places his caution is carried to

needless points. For example, he says of I Chron., chap. 9, "The chapter seems related to Neh., chap. 11, through their both having a common source." Curtis admits the possibility that both may be free fancies of the Chronicler,<sup>9</sup> as Meyer and others contend. As a matter of fact, it seems clear that the list is the same in both places, just as the list in Neh., chap. 7, is the same as that in Ezra, chap. 2, and the problem of the repetition, a difficult one by the way in spite of many easy proffered solutions, is similar in the two cases. At all events, it is not stranger that the Chronicler should have repeated a list in Chronicles and in Nehemiah, than that he should do the same thing in Ezra and Nehemiah.

There is an excellent and exhaustive bibliography, there is a good index, and perhaps the best list of words and phrases which are characteristic of the books. In connection with the last, it may be well to quote the author's caution: "Words or expressions marked *rare* or *peculiar* may have been in common usage in the Chronicler's day, this statement being due merely to our meager supply of literature of that period" (p. 28).

He who reads Chronicles with the aid of this commentary will discover how greatly this book contributes to our knowledge of the religious conditions of the third century B.C., and will be able to get about as much light on difficult and obscure subjects as the scholarship of the present day affords. The preparation of such a volume, if done at all creditably, involves an enormous amount of rather dry labor; and it may be said that Professor Curtis appears not to have shrunk from the task when it became most irksome.

L. W. BATTEN

ST. MARK'S CHURCH  
NEW YORK CITY

---

### THE OLD TESTAMENT FOR STUDENTS

The third volume<sup>1</sup> of the series under the general title "The Student's Old Testament" is now published. When the six are complete the Old Testament material will have been covered in a comprehensive as well as in a critical and suggestive manner. These books are suitable for the reader as well as the student, and they should help to lessen the truth of the statement that the Bible, or at least the Old Testament part of it, is one of the books that is most studied and least read. We

<sup>1</sup> *The Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses of Israel's Prophets. From the Beginning of the Assyrian Period to the End of the Maccabean Struggle.* By Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D. With Maps and Chronological Charts. New York: Scribner, 1910. 516 pages. \$2.75.

mean by this that while the introductions and critical notes are carefully done and render service to those who are seeking accurate knowledge, the sermons and songs are presented in a form that is attractive and as far as possible intelligible to the general reader. The volume opens with Amos, chap. 1, and closes with the apocalyptic piece, Isa., chaps. 24-27, and between these two extreme points an attempt is made to arrange all the prophetic documents, including the messianic prophecies Num. 24:5-9, 17-19, and II Sam. 7:10-16, in chronological order, providing introductions to the various divisions and brief critical notes of a textual and exegetical character.

Professor Kent has a strong conviction of the importance of this branch of Hebrew literature. He says of the prophets:

A clear understanding of their aims and methods and messages is the key that unlocks the mysteries of the older Scriptures. They also were the fore-runners who prepared the way for the advent and work of the great Prophet-Teacher of Nazareth. Their spirit and principles are still a perennial source of inspiration and helpfulness to a growing group of men and women who are today grappling with the great political, civic, and social problems whose right solution is essential to the strength and efficiency of our modern civilization.

The following words may also be quoted as showing the spirit in which the task is undertaken.

No department of the Old Testament presents more open and difficult problems, both literary and textual, than Hebrew prophecy. Where uncertainty exists the fact has been frankly stated and the more probable or plausible conclusion has been presented. In a vast number of cases the traditional reading or interpretation has been followed rather than the attractive but far from established conjectures suggested by modern biblical scholarship.

This is as it should be in a volume of this kind where the aim is to present the results of the best work that has been done in this department. The author by no means follows the fashion slavishly; e.g., he does not accept the division of Isa., chaps. 40-66, into two parts—Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah—which was approved by such men as Duhm, Cheyne, A. B. Davidson, Marti, etc. With the unity of the section there comes a later date than that usually ascribed to the first part (40-55): "the most satisfactory setting of these chapters is found in the seventy years following the rebuilding of the temple." The name Cyrus is removed from the text and the servant idea referred to Israel and Israel alone. These points cannot be discussed in a brief notice, but they evidently call for considerable discussion. With regard to Isa. 7:13, Professor Kent rejects the latest attempt, that of Gress-

man, to find in the original form of the Immanuel prophecy the hope of a national deliverer. The interpretation accepted is that before the child of some woman, the prophet's wife or the king's wife, known to be pregnant, has attained to the age of discernment, deliverance for Judah will have arrived.

Such obvious errors as *high-places* for *sin* in Mic. 1:6 are, of course, removed from the text. By the way, it is a source of constant regret that the Revised Version is so extremely conservative in matters of this kind. But the author does not run eagerly after attractive conjectures, e.g., he retains Isa. 25:8: "he hath destroyed death forever," though some keen critics regard it as doubtful. It does not seem to us to be at all a wild conjecture that this particular phrase is a marginal note from the pen of a pious scribe which afterward found its way into the body of the poem. But in an edition of this kind the conservatism indicated in the passage quoted above is probably the wisest course.

Great care is bestowed on the translation and in some cases an attempt is made to reproduce Hebrew assonances, e.g., Isa. 5:7: "For redress, but, behold a cry of distress." So also in the famous passage, Mic. 1:10 ff. This is satisfactory so far, though it is difficult for the English reader to enter into the spirit of these word-plays, and it seems doubtful whether a prophet in a serious mood would carry it to the length of the latter passage. In a volume of this kind there are points almost innumerable that could be selected for discussion, but as that is out of the question it must suffice to say that a work upon which such an immense amount of time and labor has been spent is suitable to render good service to the cause of biblical scholarship, and that if a large number of students, outside as well as inside the circle of professional theologians, can be found for such work as this, the Bible will become a new book to the Christian church and will be read with increasing intelligence and devotion.

W. G. JORDAN

KINGSTON, ONT.

---

### THE NEWLY DISCOVERED ODES OF SOLOMON

This is indeed the very heyday of exploration and discovery in matters pertaining to the life of that great world which we call the ancient. One important find treads upon the heels of the other. One of the ablest, most alert, and most successful of investigators and discoverers in the field of early Christian life and literature has been J. Rendel Harris. A share in the first publication of the Sinaitic palimpsest

containing the *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe* (with which the names of Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson are so prominently connected) and in the unfolding of the Ferrar Group, and the discovery of the lost *Apology of Aristides* attest his skill, and the deserved good fortune attendant upon it. He now presents us with his latest and, as yet, his greatest find, the so-called *Odes of Solomon*.<sup>1</sup> He found them together with the *Psalms of Solomon* (better known to some of us as *Psalms of the Pharisees*) in a Syriac manuscript in his possession, which had been supposed to contain the canonical Psalms. The manuscript is late and of paper, much like our chief witness for the Greek *Shepherd of Hermas*, but in contrast with this, it is well written. It is defective at the beginning, two entire odes and a part of the third being lost. Mr. Harris' ingenuity, however, has succeeded in supplying a portion, at least, of the first ode, from the extensive quotations of these odes in the Coptic *Pistis Sophia*. The matter presented to us in this humble guise bids fair to stand forth as one of the greatest treasures of early Christian literature. As they stand, whatever one may think of the origins that lie behind them, these odes represent one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of Christian hymnals. And what splendid hymns they are! The church has produced nothing better than many of these to this day.

The manner in which Harris has presented this wonderful collection is, of course, admirable. The Syriac text is printed in the well-known, beautiful type of the Cambridge Press. It is accompanied by an introduction covering 88 pages, and by an excellent translation with commentary. In the case of a work destined to be so widely discussed and to play so important a rôle in the history of early Christian literature, one wonders what could have induced the experienced editor to omit all indices.

In the introduction and commentary Harris has brought to bear all of his wide and varied knowledge especially in the early patristic field. He takes up first the attestation in early indices and canon lists. In the matter of the so-called Stichometry of Nicephorus, as well as of the Synopsis ascribed to Athanasius, in which two alone the *Odes* are attested, Harris seems to have overlooked the fact that Zahn (*G.K.* II, 295 ff.) has made it very probable that the two are related to one another and that both are of Palestinian origin. The list of Cod. Alexandrinus and the Catalogue of the 60 Books mention only the *Psalms*, not the *Odes of Solomon*. Zonaras (11/12 century) identifies the ψαλμοὶ ἰδιωτικοί of

<sup>1</sup> *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*. Now first published from the Syriac version by J. Rendel Harris, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1909.

the Council of Laodicea's canon 59, with the *Psalms of Solomon*; whether this includes the odes and on what authority Zonaras' statement rests seems uncertain. Use is made of the *Odes* in Lactantius, the *Pistis Sophia*, and, possibly, Irenaeus, all connected with the Orient. This would seem to make practically all the known attestation (except, possibly, Zonaras') oriental, with its center not far from Palestine. As to the original tongue in which they were written, little can as yet be said with certainty. It is practically assured that the Syriac of the *Odes* together with that of the *Psalms* goes back, as does the Sahidic (why "more exactly Thebaic"?) of the *Pistis Sophia*, to a Greek exemplar. But whether this Greek of the *Odes* is in turn, as is that of the accompanying *Psalms*, a translation from Hebrew (or Aramaic) is not clear. Their connection with the *Psalms* and with the name of Solomon is perhaps suggestive. And the content and the style are such, that it may well be said, that the writer or writers, if they were not Semites writing in a Semitic tongue, must certainly have been steeped in Semitic type of thought and thoroughly at home in the poetic style of the Semites.

The question, author or authors, for the major portion of these works of a rare genius, may well be decided with Harris and Nestle in favor of the singular. But with the question, Jewish or Christian, we broach the crux of the situation. On this point the debate is already waging hotly. Harris has decided for a Gentile in a Palestinian Jewish-Christian community. Harnack makes the *Odes* Jewish, with Christian interpolations. With Harris for Christian authorship stands Hausleiter (*Theol. Litbl.* XXXI, No. 12, col. 265-76); on Harnack's side we find Spitta (*ZTNW*, XI, 3, 193-203). The situation hinges largely upon *Odes* Nos. 4 and 6. Of these a translation, as literal as possible, is here given, not as in any way an alternative for or improvement upon Harris' excellent literary rendering, but in the hope that in connection with Harris' well-nigh faultless work it may bring the original nearer to readers who do not know Syriac. Ode 4 reads:

- (1) No man changeth thy holy place, my God.
- (2) And not shall he change it and establish it in another place, because there is over it no power.
- (3) For thy sanctuary (shrine) thou didst plan before thou madest the places.
- (4) The older shall not be changed by those who are younger than it.
- (5) Thou hast given thy heart, O Lord, to thy faithful; never shalt thou cease, nor be without fruits.

- (6) For one hour of thy faith is more precious than all days and hours (years?).
- (7) For who is there that shall put on thy goodness, and be hurt?
- (8) For thy seal is known and thy creatures are known by it (know it?), and thy hosts are powerful by it (possess it?), and the elect archangels are clothed with it.
- (9) Thou hast given us thy fellowship; not was it, that thou wast in need of us, but we were in need of thee.
- (10) Distil upon us thy dews, and open thy rich fountains, which send forth unto us milk and honey.
- (11) For there is no repentance with thee, that thou shouldest repent of anything which thou hast promised.
- (12) And the end was manifest unto thee; for whatsoever thou gavest, thou hast given gratis.
- (13) So that not, therefore, mayest thou withdraw or take them (back).
- (14) For everything was manifest unto thee as God, and was established from the beginning before thee; and thou, Lord, hast made all. Hallelujah.

Ode 6 reads:

- (1) As the hand moves in the *cithara*, and the strings speak.
- (2) So speaks in my members the spirit of the Lord, and I speak in his love.
- (3) For he destroys anything foreign, and everything is the Lord's (Harris conjectures: everything bitter).
- (4) For thus it was from the beginning and unto the end, that nothing should be (*or* come to be which is) hostile, and nothing should rise up against him.
- (5) The Lord has multiplied his knowledge, and he is zealous that these (things) should be known, which by his goodness have been given unto us. His praise he gave us unto his name (for his name's sake?).
- (6) Our spirits praise his holy Spirit.
- (7) For a rill went forth and became a river (the Syriac has a form usual in the meaning "light") great and broad.
- (8) For it overflowed everything and tore up and led to the temple.
- (9) And not were able to impede it the impediments of the sons of men, nor the arts of those who impede (Harris' "restrain" is, of course, better English) waters.
- (10) For it has come upon the face of all the earth, and filled everything, and there drank of it all the thirsty upon the earth.



- (11) And thirst was relieved and quenched, for from the most high the draught was given.
- (12) Blessed (*μακάριοι*, Copt.), therefore, are the ministers (*διδάκτορες*, Copt.) of that draught, they who are entrusted with its waters.
- (13) They have assuaged the dry lips, and the will, which had been relaxed, they have raised up.
- (14) And souls, which were near to departing, from death have they snatched them.
- (15) And members which had fallen they have straightened and raised up.
- (16) They have given strength for their coming (cf. Harris) and light to their eyes.
- (17) Because every one knew them in the Lord, and they live by living water forever. Hallelujah.

It is the attitude toward the temple, evidently the one at Jerusalem, which causes all the trouble. In Ode 4 Harris (and Harnack with some modification) conceives the reference of the unsuccessful attempt to change the holy place to be to the Onias temple at Leontopolis, destroyed 73 A.D. A slight inexactness may here be set right: the shrine at Assuan was, indeed, wrecked "after the retreat of Cambyses," but not until some time thereafter; not, in fact, until well along in the reign of Darius II (in his 14th year, 410/409 B.C.). Now, in the first place, those first four verses of Ode 4 might almost as well be conceived to be the slanting rejoinder of an extremely literal-minded Jewish-Christian to the ideas for which the names of Stephen and of Paul stand. And in the second place, it has been observed by Harnack and others that these first four verses stand in striking contrast with the rest of the ode. For the explanation of this fact an hypothesis along the line of Hausleiter's thought—which would make this first stanza baser metal, of ultra-Jewish or Jewish-Christian origin, taken up, added to, transmuted, and refined by the finer genius of the *Odes* (much as Luther treated the *Media vita in morte sumus*, etc., and Shakespeare the rough material of some of his plays)—seems to the present writer better than the assumption of Jewish origin with Christian interpolations. That the author of the sixth ode, who was probably identical with the author of the fourth, knew and cared little about the actual temple at Jerusalem is a fact which Spitta has stumbled over. Spitta tells us that the reference to the rill which flows to the temple is to the Gihon Spring, for which a way was made to the temple. This is news, indeed. We have waited long for Spitta and the *Odes of Solomon* to make this clear to us. The fact, of course,

is, that, however one conceives the case to stand between Johannine and other New Testament material and the material of the *Odes*, this picture of the temple and the waters is clearly secondary to that of Ezekiel, chap. 47, and parallels. Ezekiel knew the relation of the Gihon Spring to the temple; our author did not and did not care to. (Or will someone make his "rill," which may, of course, be a "canal" also, refer to the aqueduct from the Pools of Solomon, etc.?). To him the temple is an incident and little more than a shadowy symbol. The thing that chiefly engrosses him is the wonderful spread of the gospel. That this was to go out from Zion was a commonplace of early Christianity (Acts 1:8; Rom. 15:19). These considerations, and the fact that not only many of the odes that stand forth as the product of the same spirit and probably of the same author (Harris, pp. 48-52), e.g., Nos. 7, 8, 16, 17, 28, but also others which are probably the product of another mind or other minds, e.g., 19(?), 20(?), 24, 27, 29, 39, and 42, show very clear and for the most part very fine Christian strains, these facts cause the present writer's mind to lean strongly toward Harris' side in the debate over Christian versus Jewish authorship. Harris' supposition of a Gentile in the midst of the Jewish-Christian community which fled to Pella may be an over-refinement. A Christian of the type of Justin Martyr's *παλαῖος πρεσβύτερος* (Dial. 3) would seem to the writer to fit the situation quite as well. But whatever one may decide in detail, it is the fresh, strong impulse of a new, great movement that characterizes these *Odes*, not the "weariness of a spent one," or the precise, tripping steps of one long bound by many traditions (much of which is found in the *Psalms of the Pharisees*, for example). Therefore the writer prefers to go with Harris "not quite so far, nor quite so fast as" Harnack. The fine reserve, the carefully judicial, conservative spirit so characteristic of the best English scholarship of today, is not the least of the good qualities of this book.

M. SPRENGLING

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The German version and discussion of the newly discovered Odes of Solomon<sup>2</sup> follows with gratifying promptness upon Dr. Harris' first publication of their text. It is helpful to have an independent German

<sup>2</sup>*Ein Jüdisch-Christliches Psalmbuch aus dem Ersten Jahrhundert.* (The Odes . . . of Solomon now first published from the Syriac Version by J. Rendel Harris, 1909.) Aus dem Syrischen uebersetzt von J. Flemming; bearbeiter und herausgegeben von Adolf Harnack. (Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXV, 4.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. vii+134 pages. M. 4.50.

translation of the Syriac text, especially in view of the obscurities which the mystical language of some of the Odes presents. Still more welcome is Professor Harnack's estimate of the Odes. Professor Harnack fully agrees that these are indeed the long-lost Odes of Solomon, quoted by Lactantius and Pistis Sophia, and mentioned by name in the pseudo-Athanasian Synopsis (sixth century) and the Stichometry of Nicephorus (ninth century). He finds both Jewish and Christian elements in them, and explains them as Jewish writings of a mystic-prophet of the first century (*ca.* 50-67), interpolated and rewrought into Christian form about the year 100. Harnack points out the prominence in the Jewish parts of the Odes of ideas and expressions which have hitherto seemed characteristic of John: grace, believing, knowledge, truth, light, living water, love, life. The presence of such ideas and expressions in late Judaism evidenced by these remarkable Odes, points to a line of Jewish influence, hitherto unsuspected, upon the Johannine literature. The Odes constitute in a sense a historical link between the Johannine literature on the one hand, and such Jewish literature as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs on the other. In this unexpected light on the Fourth Gospel, Harnack thinks, lies the chief historical significance of these Odes.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### THE SINAITIC SYRIAC GOSPELS

Mrs. Lewis found the palimpsest *Evangelion da-Mepharreshê*, in St. Catherine's on Mount Sinai in 1892. It was deciphered and published for three eminent Cambridge scholars in 1894. Mrs. Lewis afterward republished the text, with emendations and additions of parts not at first fully deciphered. Professor Burkitt based his *Evangelion da-Mepharreshê* (2 vols.) upon the Lewis and the Cureton manuscripts, and now Mrs. Lewis contributes another stately quarto to the literature of the Old Syriac gospels.<sup>1</sup> She has revisited Sinai and re-examined the palimpsest, while she has taken full advantage of Professor Burkitt's admirable edition. It is in part a feeling that that

<sup>1</sup> *The Old Syriac Gospels of Evangelion da-Mepharreshê*. Being the Text of the Sinai or Syro-Antiochene Palimpsest, Including the Latest Additions and Emendations, with the Variants of the Curetonian Text, Corroborations from Many Other MSS, and a List of Quotations from Ancient Authors. By Agnes Smith Lewis. With four facsimiles. London: Williams & Norgate, 1910. lxxviii+334 pages. 25s. net.

edition rests too largely on the Cureton gospels to the comparative neglect of the Sinaitic that has led to this new and probably final edition of the latter.

Mrs. Lewis presents an extended introduction, with a full bibliography and appendices, and then prints the Sinaitic text, with the variants of the Cureton gospels in the margin below. The text is printed solidly, not, as in the earlier editions, in the lines and columns of the manuscript, and constitutes a model of clearness and convenience. The variants of Professor Burkitt's edition are shown in an appendix.

In her introduction Mrs. Lewis urges the priority of the Old Syriac to the Diatessaron, against the reverse opinion expressed by Professor Burkitt, who would connect the Old Syriac version with Palû, bishop of Edessa, *ca.* 200. The appendices exhibit the points in which Mrs. Lewis connects or supplements the readings of the Sinai palimpsest in Professor Burkitt's edition; a list of Syriac patristic quotations which are nearer to the Old Syriac than to the Peshitto; a list of important omissions in the Sinai palimpsest, etc. Further appendices in a pocket within the back cover give an index of the Arabic Diatessaron, and bring Mrs. Lewis' English translation of the Old Syriac gospels up to date. The student of the rise and relationship of the Syriac versions will find much to assist him in Mrs. Lewis' new and elaborate edition of the famous manuscript which she has made in a double sense her own.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## A HISTORY OF THE JESUITS

In 1895 a resolution of the twenty-fourth General Congregation of the Jesuit Order provided for the writing of a history of the Jesuits in all countries where they had been or were active. Since then, in compliance with this action, the following important volumes have appeared dealing with Spain, Germany, Italy, and North America:

*Historia de la Compañia de Jesus en la Asistencia de España*, por el P. Antonio Astrain, S.J., tomo I, "San Ignacio de Loyola," tomo II, "Lainez, Borja" (Madrid, 1902, 1905); *Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge im XVI. Jahrhundert*, von Bernard Duhr, S.J. (Freiburg, 1907); *The History of the Society of Jesus in North America, Colonial and Federal*, by Thomas Hughes, S.J., Text, Vol. I; Documents, Vol. II (London, 1907); *Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia*, dal P. Pietro Tacchi Venturi, D.M.C., Vol. I, "La vita religiosa in Italia durante la prima età dell' ordine" (Romano-Milano, 1909).

The first French volume<sup>1</sup> is the latest in the series, which is yet far from completion. The writing of it was originally intrusted to R. P. Victor Mercier, who collected a large amount of material. After his death the continuation of the researches and the composition of the history was intrusted to the present author.

The history of the Jesuits in France falls into three periods, characterized by the conflicts of the order with Protestantism, Jansenism, and eighteenth-century philosophy. Roughly speaking, the first period extends from 1550 to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685; the second fills much of the seventeenth century; the third corresponds to the reign of Louis XV. To complete the program so outlined will require many volumes, for the work before us gets no farther than 1574. Moreover the subject is exceedingly complex, for the activity and the versatility of the French Jesuits were remarkable, embracing missions at home and abroad, especially in Canada, Scotland, and the Levant; education; their political relations; their apostolic and social activity; learning and scientific achievement; their efforts in the domain of asceticism, etc.

The source material for the history of the Jesuits is enormous and the bibliographically inclined student of history will rejoice in the admirable survey of the sources given on pp. vii-x; the itemized list, printed and manuscript, that follows (pp. xi-xxv); and the carefully selected bibliography prefixed to each chapter. The author claims to have followed the strict rules of historical interpretation which German scholarship has made classic. Externally this is true, for he seems to be scrupulously exact in citation and orthography, and the Latin, Italian, and Spanish documents used, one doubts not, have been faithfully transcribed. The manner of composition also is strictly modern. The authors of the Latin history of the Company of Jesus, save Jouvancy, followed the chronological order year by year and wrote annals rather than history. But instead of compiling annals like Orlandini, Sacchini, and others, or grouping facts after their kind, like Jouvancy, Father Fouquieray has delimited his subject by periods.

But there is a spirit of historical interpretation that is deeper than form. It has been impossible for the author—it is probably impossible for any Jesuit—to divest himself of the immemorial prejudices of his order, and to write candid, impartial history, at least where the Jesuits are involved. I say this advisedly, for it has been my fortune to study

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France, des origines à la suppression* (1528-1762). Tome I, "Les origines et les premières luttes (1528-1575)." Par le P. Henri Fouquieray, S.J. Paris: Picard et Fils, 1910. xxv+673 pages. Fr. 10.

intensively the period between 1559 and 1576—the epoch treated in the present work—and I cannot read history as it is read here. It is a failing of Catholic historical writers in general, that they interpret the Reformation period exclusively in terms of religion. Modern scientific investigation has disproved this, and social, economic, and other causes must be given due weight. Religion is not the only touchstone to test the era by. Examples of this all-inclusive, or all-exclusive interpretation in the present work are many and various. The Edict of January 17, 1562, was not an act of “blind toleration” (p. 265). The estimate of the character of the chancellor L'Hôpital (pp. 267–68 and *passim*) is an ultra-Catholic one and does not agree with modern historical appreciation. Readers of the account on p. 630 which details the efforts of the Jesuit Possevin “pour sauver, au moins de la mort éternelle,” the 200 Huguenots of Roanne imprisoned after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew may have an ironical view of the clemency here so lauded. For “ces malheureux . . . se montrèrent sourds à sa voix. Peu de temps après ils étaient tous massacrés.” Quite as remarkable an example, however, of this partisan interpretation of history is the character-sketch of the cardinal of Lorraine (pp. 643–44). It is with some astonishment that one reads, even from the pen of a Jesuit, that the cardinal “se montra digne du pouvoir par l'étendue de sa prévoyance, la pureté de ses sentiments et l'énergie de son caractère.” But why continue? The present work may be the authoritative history of the Jesuits in France in that it bears the official *imprimatur* of the order. But tried at the bar of scientific, non-partisan, historical writing, which aims to discover the truth without fear and without reproach, the work cannot be regarded as authoritative. Better far should the truth-seeker read the admirable historical introduction which M. Gabriel Monod has lately written as a foreword to Professor Boehmer's history of the Jesuits (Boehmer, *Les Jésuits*; avec une introduction historique, par Gabriel Monod, pp. lxxxiii+304. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie, 1910).

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## THE ENGLISH CHURCH UNDER JAMES I<sup>1</sup>

The reconstruction of the English church, which was the consummation of a long historical process, took place in the early years of James I. The leading spirit was Bishop, afterward Archbishop, Bancroft.

<sup>1</sup> *The Reconstruction of the English Church*. By Roland G. Usher. Vols. I and II. New York and London: Appleton & Co., 1910. 423 and 426 pages. \$6.

In order that the reconstruction may be adequately understood several matters—psychological and historical—must be firmly grasped and as firmly held from the beginning to the end of the process. The psychological matter is the limitation of the mind which causes it to take an inadequate view of things—a view that may contain much of truth, but which is nevertheless fatally inadequate—and hold it to the bitter end, or until through violent collision it is knocked open and made hospitable to new truth. Historically we see a concrete working-out of this limitation—on the secular side in politics and economics, on the ecclesiastical side in Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Puritanism—and throughout the process the interplay of the secular and the ecclesiastical forces.

It is evident, then, that before the subject can be adequately treated there must be several preliminary essays in which conceptions of church and state, the nature and purpose of Anglicanism, the nature and purpose of Puritanism, the real character of the High Commission, a bishop's functions as an officer of state, constitutional problems, condition of the clergy, the attitude of the people toward the church, and a full statement of the problem shall be fully discussed. These preliminary matters occupy all of Book I, and cover 281 pages.

The English church broke entirely with Romanism under the Tudors, and started on its own definite line of development. Henry VIII repudiated Romanism. Its authority over the English church was a usurpation in the earlier centuries, and it had been exercised with more or less effectiveness until this reign. A very decided advance in polity and doctrine was taken under Edward VI in the Prayer Books and the Forty-two Articles. Under Elizabeth still further steps were taken toward unity—but there was no perfect organization—and in the last analysis everything was vague and indefinite. Indeed Elizabeth in her difficult position

must make the definitions of her new church as vague as possible in order to enrol under its banner every subject who could bring himself to abjure the allegiance to Rome. . . . She wished the details to remain in doubt, not, however, because she had any intention of allowing the divines to decide them, but because she was by no means sure what the great bulk of the nobles, of the gentry, and of the common people would approve. They must not be offended and they must accept the new church [I, 201].

Nevertheless in Elizabeth's reign the episcopal form of church government was firmly established as the polity of the English church and by this polity she prepared to stand. She believed in reformation, but

reformation had now gone quite far enough. To go farther was to squint at anarchy. Therefore in some way or other she prepared to arrest further advance, and to have all her subjects conform.

But Puritanism arose in this same reign and began to assert itself very insistently through letters coming up from many directions, and with complete unanimity complaining of oppression and of serious interference with rights. At first all this was perplexing, and the authorities did not know what to do about it. But at last Puritanism was "unmasked." It was discovered that there was a deliberate and deeply laid plan to abolish episcopacy and set presbytery up in its stead. Thus was revealed a radical issue and around this issue the battle was to rage. Moreover, it gradually developed that not only in polity, but also in doctrine, were the differences between Anglicanism and Puritanism so divergent that there was no possibility that they should ever be compromised.

But at the accession of James I we reach the stage of final, and unequivocal, and discriminating decision. The time has come for reconstruction, and this is the subject of Book II. The succession has been made secure by the union of the crowns of Scotland and England; Protestantism has been safely established; and it remains to adjust the relations of Catholicism and Puritanism to Anglicanism. This problem is to be intrusted to the decision of ecclesiastics—and its solution is the reconstruction of the English church.

In 1604 the welfare of the English Church demanded, both for the present and the future, three things: the codification of the Canons, Articles, and Ordinances then in force; the provision of adequate ecclesiastical incomes; and the enforcing of conformity. The first would answer the swelling murmur among the Puritans that "it is now high time for them to declare to the world by what authoritie they doe these thinges and no longer to hold us in suspense with generall termes of justification." The second would remedy pluralities and non-residence, and make possible a learned clergy so far as so deepseated an evil could be reached by any single reform at one time. The last would once more restore the vigour of the old administrative fabric and render the work of maintaining peace and order less difficult in the future. In this golden year, 1604, the English church, as Englishmen now know it, came into definite being [I, 334].

With this threefold purpose clearly in mind James and Bancroft resolutely set themselves to its attainment. Their work culminated in tracing the growth of the written constitution into the Canons of 1604, and the shaping of the Visitation Articles of 1605. It remained to carry out the provisions.



The Puritans, of whom Dr. Usher thinks the comparative number was really very small, had done everything in their power to prevent the passage of the Code of Canons. Yet they were passed, confirmed by the Crown as the binding law of the church, and proclaimed on July 16.

The issue is now squarely joined. The Puritans must take one of two alternatives. They must conform or be deprived. Bancroft had foreseen the crisis. As far as possible he had sought to relieve it of its harshness. He would have been glad to wink at mild non-conformity, indeed he sometimes did. With a little stretch of the Puritan conscience coupled with a little shrewd diplomacy nearly if not quite all might have escaped deprivation. As was understood among the few rulers ecclesiastical and temporal in the mediaeval system: "A man might *think* all he pleased but let him not *talk* about his thinking." But the Puritans could not stretch their consciences, neither could they be wisely diplomatic. The result was that most of them remained "obstinate," and consequently suffered all the terrible consequences of deprivation.

With much learning and admirable technique Dr. Usher has in the second book set the whole subject before us, closing with two chapters on: "Justice Tempered with Mercy," and "Administrative Reconstruction."

The third book is devoted to a vindication of Reconstruction, and is written on the same high plane of scholarship and skill.

Considered as a whole, the work is one of exceedingly minute, painstaking, patient research. Every student of the period, whatever his political, economic, or ecclesiastical point of view, will at once see the necessity of giving it careful and prolonged attention. In his preface the author says:

I have tried in these pages to tell nothing but the truth, with an impartiality which should scorn to serve the interests of a sect or pander to the maintenance of a cherished tradition. I have, of course, aimed at entire accuracy of reference, citation, and statement.

We believe that he is entirely sincere. In his altogether admirable first chapter on "The Problem of Reconstruction" he takes account of all the elements in the problem. He recognizes fully the conscience controlling all parties and the inevitable "clash of two irreconcilable ideas." But as he warms up to his subject any lingering trace of sympathy for the Puritans vanishes, and James and Bancroft are carefully justified. But this only shows once more how difficult, perhaps we

should say how impossible, it is for any of us entirely to eliminate the personal equation.

At the conclusion of an inadequate review of a valuable work we venture to make three observations: (1) Among Dr. Usher's sources are many new ones and he has used them for the first time. Naturally these sources will be rigidly scrutinized by all who may not at first accept the conclusions drawn from them. But we are sure that Dr. Usher will warmly welcome such scrutiny. (2) We believe that the day of enforced conformity even in the slightest particular has passed forever. Indeed it looks as if disestablishment were written in the stars. Most interesting is Lecture 8 in the last Bampton Lectures by Canon Hobhouse. On pp. 326 ff. he says: "Disestablishment is bound up with disendowment." The time is now at hand when Christians can only claim liberty—liberty to believe, liberty to teach, and liberty to pay the bills. This puts a fearful responsibility upon the Christian family—the Christian church—and all the agencies for Christian promotion. (3) The Puritans with all their shortcomings are the forerunners and the English promoters of the course of events that has at last led to the situation in which we find ourselves today.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

## THE CHURCH IN THEORY AND IN FACT

Canon Hobhouse's lectures<sup>1</sup> present a series of studies showing the relations of the church and the world from New Testament times to the present. The complexity and incongruity of these relations increase until the period of the Reformation. Since the Reformation the perennial problem has been to rectify the mistakes of the earlier times, and to make adjustments suitable to the ever-changing order of the modern world.

Beginning with the gospel records we should first of all learn from them precisely what were the fundamental teachings of the Master.

Two principles [says Canon Hobhouse] may at once be stated as clearly demonstrated if the gospel records are worthy of credit: I. Christ intended to found a visible divine society upon earth to perpetuate his work; and his intention was primary, not subsidiary; II. This divine society he represented as being separate from, and in some sense antagonistic to, the world; and membership in it must involve sacrifice.

<sup>1</sup> *The Church and the World in Idea and in History*. By Walter Hobhouse. New York and London: Macmillan, 1910. xxiv+411 pages. \$3.25.

Back of these principles are also two principles found in Natural Religion and the Old Testament:

I. God always respects human freedom, both in the sphere of moral action and in the sphere of intellectual belief.

II. God uses human instruments for his revelation and for the spiritual guidance of men.

We must not forget, then, that this divine society is separate from, and in some sense antagonistic to, the world; and that membership in it must involve sacrifice; and that God always respects human freedom. But these three things are the very ones that the church did begin very early to forget, and did finally lose. The result has been the terrible and shocking events that scandalize the pages of church history; and the paralyzing apathy that too much marks the church today. In the bright light of the discussion the remedy appears full and distinct—the church must get back to first principles.

The antagonism between the church and the world was sharp by the end of the first century. The church to all outward appearances was small and insignificant. The world was powerful and influential, appealing to the natural disposition of men. The church called for radical changes that reversed the moral and commercial ideas of the world. A violent conflict was therefore inevitable. The church stood for its principles, and the world persecuted the church. But upon the whole the church not only maintained its principles—it made substantial conquests during the ante-Nicene period, and by the end of that period it may be said to have overcome the world through the conversion of Constantine, and the triumph at Nicaea.

But now the real danger for the church sets in. The church relaxes the rigor of its requirements, and admits the world on easy terms, and the line of separation is obliterated in the union of church and state. The church becomes coincident with the state and is thoroughly secularized. Then by wholesale and coercive methods it reaches out and takes in the barbarians. In this process of secularization, and in part because of it, taking the imperial organization as a model, there grew up a powerful hierarchy. Paganized and Judaized as it was, it pursued worldly aims, and used worldly means, losing sight of the great truth that Christ's kingdom is not of this world.

But the resulting situation aroused many of the noblest spirits of the Middle Ages, and protests began to appear in such men as Dante, Marsilius, Wiclif, Hus, and at last the great upheaval came in what we call the Reformation. A radical change was made from popery to

Erastianism. Erastianism was only better than popery. Christianity is essentially a spiritual religion, and any authoritative relation between church and state, whether it be popery or Erastianism, is destructive of what is fundamental in Christianity—spirituality.

The Reformation, then, did not undo the mischief that had already been done, and when we look out upon Christendom we do not see a harmonious, happy world permeated and voluntarily controlled by Christian principles, but we do see what Canon Hobhouse calls "the religious chaos of today." Religion is easy. Few who belong to the churches understand that membership means *sacrifice*. They accordingly do not feel financial responsibility. They are unwilling to give time and careful thought to missionary, educational, evangelizing, and other agencies of the church, as they give time and thought to their secular business. To them church membership is a popular mode of getting born, getting married, getting buried, and getting to heaven at last—and that is about all. There is, then, no sufficient reason why they should belong to the church at all.

But what of the remedy? It is perfectly simple, but unequivocal, and uncompromising. All depends upon whether we are willing to apply it. We must go back to fundamental principles. They are: discipleship; sacrifice; distinctness from the world. These principles are not temporary—they are permanent. The whole history of the church shows that neglect of them is disastrous.

The method of procedure is also very clear. There must be a reunion of the churches. This does not mean absolute uniformity—which is impossible. There must also be membership and discipline. Membership must be understood to mean obligation and sacrifice as well as privilege.

Once more: The whole drift of the argument in the lectures is against "establishment." Establishment is no longer logical, and its area is steadily contracting. With disestablishment is bound up disendowment.

In the opinion of the reviewer the book is strong and true; and there is no reason why the lecturer in his preface should have mentioned what he considered his disqualifications for the task he had undertaken.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Studies in Theology*<sup>2</sup> is the title of the latest publication from the pen of the veteran religious philosopher and theologian, the late principal

<sup>2</sup> *Studies in Religion and Theology. The Church: In Idea and In History.* By A. M. Fairbairn. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 265 pages. \$3.50 net.

of Mansfield College whose recent retirement from the teaching staff of that institution means a loss to British nonconformists. The author says of this volume, "I confess that its basis is formed by a collection of scattered papers, yet it has become a treatise on the church," and this is an accurate description of its character. For it is, in part, a collection of essays which were written at different times and yet there is a coherence and continuity to the book. The subtitle, "The Church: In Idea and History," indicates the general character of the discussion. Principal Fairbairn presents a clear, strong apologetic for the ideals and polity of the Free churches as against that of the Established or Episcopal church. As a historian and theologian he undertakes to show that the essential nature and spirit of our Christian religion needs the Free church for its clearest and most adequate realization and expression. The argument is, in the main, historical, and ecclesiastical history is subjected to a critical and discriminating investigation in order that the church of today may arrive at a clear conception of her message and so a true appreciation of her mission. Portions of the discussion have especial reference to ecclesiastical conditions peculiar to England, and, at times, to incidents contemporary with the delivery of the lecture a quarter of a century ago, but the main contentions of the book have vital reference to the present problems of the Christian church.

The first chapter is a reproduction of an address delivered in 1883 before the Congregational Union of England, upon "The Christian Religion in the First Century," and deals in an interesting and most suggestive manner with the origin and essential elements of primitive Christianity, and its relation to the religious, political, and social conditions and ideas of that age. It covers nearly fifty pages and must have taxed the patience of his listeners. "The Christian Religion in the Nineteenth Century" is a reproduction of another address and the second chapter of the book. The author sees in his age a revolt of the reason and conscience of the people against the sacerdotalism and political ideas of the church, and an alienation of the educated and industrial classes from the church.

The remaining portion of the first part of the book is an exposition and defense of Free-church ideals and a comparison between its ideals and polity and those of the Established church. The issue between the Free and the Established church is not merely one of the relation of church and state but "represents fundamental and material differences in our notion of doctrine and religion." The Anglican church is essentially sacerdotal and sacerdotalism is

the doctrine that the man who ministers in sacred things, the institution through which and the office or order in which he ministers, the acts he performs, the sacraments and rites he celebrates, are so ordained and constituted of God as to be the peculiar channels of his grace, essential to true worship, necessary to the being of religion, and the full realization of the religious life. The sacerdotal system, with all its constituents and accessories, personal, official, and ceremonial, becomes a vast intercessory medium, held to be as a whole, and in all its parts, though organized and administered by man, so the creation and expression of the divine will as to be the supernatural, authorized, and authoritative agency for the reconciliation of God and man. . . . Where the sacerdotalism comes in is where the man and the institution, with the acts and articles needed for its operation, are made so of the essence of religion that where they are not it cannot be in its truth and purity; that to belong to it a man must belong to them, that through them, and them only, can God come, as it were, into full possession of the man, or the man into full and living fellowship with God.

Sacerdotalism builds faith in God upon the church rather than faith in the church upon faith in God. It limits the "universality of the divine grace," making it "narrow and partial" conditioned by "imperfect men." It magnifies the church instead of God, the sublimity of its idea is sensuous while the evangelical is spiritual and ethical, an appeal direct to the conscience and reason of men.

The second portion of the volume is concerned with the foundation of the Christian church. The New Testament conception of the "ecclesia" is worked out with thoroughness and clearness and contributes directly to the main argument, but the exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, and of the other teaching of Jesus, of the significance of his death, of the character of Paul and his message, and his relation to the other apostles, the character of John and the main ideas of the prologue of his gospel have only an indirect relation to the main thesis of the book.

It is difficult to appreciate the volume as a whole. While in a sense a considerable portion of it is apologetic and controversial, an exposition and defense of the Free church, yet the author brings to his task such broad culture and sweetness of spirit, such profound philosophical and religious insight, and such sanity of judgment, that there is lacking the narrowness, intolerance, and dogmatism which, unfortunately, too often characterize religious controversy. His spirit and method are pre-eminently those of the Christian and the scholar. The discussion is more largely historical than philosophical, but the philosophical implications are in harmony with those set forth in his *Philosophy*

*of the Christian Religion.* As a historical student his conclusions are practically those of enlightened and progressive orthodoxy. The major part of the book is concerned with such problems as one meets with in biblical theology or in an introduction to the New Testament and there is no valuable contribution to either subject. The book should prove very helpful and suggestive to the preacher or the editor of a religious journal. The reviewer found himself turning from its pages to jot down some sermon outline which it had suggested. The editor of a religious paper will find an illuminating discussion of many problems that are of vital interest to his readers. There is a fine religious spirit in the book and many portions are excellent devotional reading. Intermingled with the historical and biblical interpretations are illustrations, reminiscences, and pictures of the imagination. The material of the historian and theologian is expressed in the imagery, art, and emotional coloring of the preacher, making its appeal alike to heart and head. And, yet, at times, the discussion is prolonged until it becomes wearisome, lacking in virility and freshness, and is a repetition of common-places familiar to the intelligent reader.

WILFRED CURRIER KEIRSTEAD

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK  
FREDERICTON, N.B.

---

### PERSONAL IDEALISM, PRAGMATISM, AND THE NEW REALISM

Philosophy has become remarkably controversial of late. Several significant and vigorous movements of protest have arisen against absolute idealism, the almost unquestioned orthodoxy of the last generation of philosophers in England and America. Three of these movements constitute more or less class-conscious schools of thought, viz., personal idealism, pragmatism, and the new realism. These movements are represented in the three books under review in this article.

Dr. Hastings Rashdall's little volume of six lectures<sup>1</sup> delivered at Cambridge is published as the first of a series of semi-popular "Studies in Theology," edited by Dr. A. M. Fairbairn of Oxford. Dr. Rashdall is a well-known English representative of personal idealism. He differs in some points from others of the same school—from Dr. McTaggart of Cambridge in being a theist, and from Professor Howison of California in being also a creationist. His lectures are intended to serve as an

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy and Religion.* By Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt., D.C.L. New York: Scribner, 1910. xvi+189 pages. \$0.75.

introduction to the philosophical way of conceiving the essentials of Christian faith.

Dr. Bawden's book<sup>2</sup> undertakes an exposition of the principles of pragmatism, dealing with such topics as experience, consciousness, feeling, thinking, truth, reality, evolution and the Absolute, mind and matter. The author is a former pupil of Professor Dewey, and adheres pretty closely to the Dewey type of pragmatism.

The third volume under review<sup>3</sup> comprises nineteen essays—some of them of much more than ordinary interest and importance—published in honor of Professor William James of Harvard, by the members of the faculties of philosophy and psychology in Columbia University. The first eight of these essays, by Professors Fullerton, Dewey, Bush, Montague, Woodridge, C. A. Strong, Pitkin, and Miller, consider more or less explicitly, and most of them favorably, the present trend toward realism.

We turn first to the volume on *Philosophy and Religion*. Dr. Rashdall finds value in the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God, but, as is usual with idealists, his favorite basis for theism is epistemology. The first step is from common-sense to subjective idealism. There is nothing in matter as we know it, it is argued, which does not obviously imply mind; therefore matter can never have existed without mind. This is a glaring instance of the fallacy of arguing from what has been called "the ego-centric predicament"—everything which we know is, of course, known; therefore there is nothing that is not known! It sounds like a confession, though intended as an apology, when the author says: "It is for the most part only by a considerable course of habituation extending over some years that a man succeeds in thinking himself into the idealistic view of the universe."

The next step is to relieve the subjectivism as far as possible, and to complete the theistic argument by introducing the mind of God as a carry-all in which things can exist as ideas when not so existing in the minds of men. Matter cannot exist apart from mind—so the well-worn argument runs—but matter does not exist merely for our minds, which have had a beginning in an already existent universe; therefore there must be a mind possessing universal knowledge. One may admit

<sup>2</sup> *The Principles of Pragmatism: a Philosophical Interpretation of Experience*. By H. Heath Bawden. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. x+364 pages. \$1.50.

<sup>3</sup> *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*. By his Colleagues at Columbia University. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908. viii+610 pages. \$3.



the force of the critique of atheistic idealism, but here the necessity of divine help, in order to get out of the more obvious difficulties of a subjectivism which there was no need of getting into, is offered as a positive proof of the existence of God!

Our quarrel is not with the religious content of Dr. Rashdall's thought; it is with its proffered philosophical basis. He offers us God, freedom, immortality, revelation, and much of the content of Christian doctrine. But when we are asked to accept all as the gift of epistemological idealism, we hesitate to receive what looks so much like stolen goods! When will philosophers learn to found theism upon religion instead of upon epistemology?

Turning to Dr. Bawden's book, we find pragmatism defined as "a recent movement of thought which is seeking to do justice to the neglected claims of common sense, of religious faith, and of science, in determining a true philosophy of life." One wonders, however, why the author mentions religious faith, for one looks in vain for appeal to any religion and its postulates as a source of metaphysical hypotheses. An extremely attenuated shadow of religion appears where it is asserted: "We do sometimes achieve our ends, get somewhere, accomplish something. To this extent and in this sense it may be said that we are of, with, to, for, in the Absolute." Like Professor Dewey's celebrated "postulate of immediate empiricism," pragmatism, as Dr. Bawden actually employs it, is, in its negative aspect, a device for keeping religious faith from having anything to say, directly or indirectly, in the construction of a philosophy of life. (The strange thing is that when this type of pragmatism is taken over intact by the theologian or philosopher of religion, he so often fails to see that the "God-idea" he talks about is nothing more than the ghost of a dead God!) In strong contrast with idealism, which builds a religious cosmology upon epistemology, Dewey and many of his disciples not only substitute the functional psychology and logic of thinking for the theory of knowledge—which may be well enough—but proceed to discredit in advance all attempts to formulate a systematic cosmology. Such a truncated philosophy as remains is at variance not only with "religious faith" but also with "the claims of common-sense" and "science," for all these forms of thought pass readily and even necessarily over into cosmology. In spite of their protests against the charge of subjectivism, pragmatic empiricists of the type under review—pragmatic *idealist* is what Dr. Bawden rather inaptly styles himself—must be classified as psychological positivists.

In the *Principles of Pragmatism* it is claimed that the distinction between experience and reality is not ontological but methodological only. The content of experience is reality; the process of reality is experience. Hence there is no sense in speaking of reality beyond experience; even to judge of what is supposed to transcend experience is to relate it to experience at the same time that one gives it place in reality! Consciousness is defined as a transformation phase of experience; it is a certain kind of adjustment between two parts of the universe. The distinction between the physical and the psychical is simply functional; thoughts *are* things viewed *in process* of becoming something different from what in relation to the needs of former practice they have been.

Professor Dewey's thought seems to be more consciously anti-idealistic and to accommodate itself more deliberately to realism than that of his former pupil. Perhaps this is partly because since leaving Chicago the professor has fallen among realists, but, be that as it may, in his essay in the Columbia volume he takes his stand between the idealists and the realists. Reality, he claims, has practical character. A thing is what it is experienced as, and within the knowing experience a thing is what it is known as; but a thing as known is not what it was as simply experienced; the knowing has introduced into the reality (or experience) a specific, intended change. Knowing neither creates reality (as an extreme idealism would assert), nor does it simply copy it (as a naïve realist would have to say); knowing modifies an already existent reality. Any other view is to be regarded as intellectualistic and static.

Now there is in this so much vagueness as to just how and how far knowing changes reality that misinterpretation is almost inevitable. Clearness would be gained if the qualities of material things had been classified as *primary*, involved in the transformations of physical energy which take place in space and time independently of human experience; *secondary*, belonging to things as experienced through the senses; and *tertiary*, the cognized meanings belonging to things as known, judged about. Now from the point of view of the next judgment about an object, what functions as its reality has been modified by the preceding judgment, as compared with what it would have been without that judgment; but these tertiary qualities, or cognized meanings, are the only ones directly changed by the knowing process; the others are changeable, but indirectly, by the liberation of physical energy through the nervous system. When so explained, the view that knowing changes reality avoids subjectivism while retaining a dynamic conception of reality.

But not only do the realists maintain that knowing reality does not change it (what we have called tertiary qualities belonging, they claim, not to the thing, but to its external relations), but some of them tend to affirm that reality remains unchanged even in its secondary qualities by being experienced. Professor Fullerton gives a cautious and defensible statement of the principles of the new realism as follows: All sensation gives experience of the world, the only external world worth talking about being the one revealed in experience; phenomena are the qualities of things; different minds with their different experiences perceive the same things; things when not perceived are yet to be given a place in the objective world-order. One is interested to learn from his previously published *System of Metaphysics* that Professor Fullerton is a believer in God and immortality, although he does not think it possible or necessary for these beliefs to be supported by a philosophical demonstration.

In fact, the new realists are ambitious to make philosophy a science, and are decidedly averse to the introduction of religious considerations into its processes. Dr. Bush's paper, for example, is a protest against "spiritualistic idealism" as "a survival of primitive animism," and he complains that modern philosophy has been in the main not free inquiry but Protestant metaphysics. Thus the very element which Eucken regards as of chief value in philosophy—the element of spiritual insight—is what these realists regard as the corrupting factor.

Professor Woodbridge's paper examines the philosophical status of epistemology and incidentally gives expression to a realistic point of view. Epistemology is not needed, he claims, as a warrant for the conclusions of science, and the problems of perception are problems of natural science, not of epistemology. The service rendered by the latter is not logical but moral and spiritual only; it is not knowledge which it modifies, but character—although just how it does this is not indicated.

Dr. Woodbridge says if there is a physical world external to consciousness, there is also a physical world within consciousness, and yet, although a perceived world is not the same as an unperceived world, the physical world is not two, but one. The perceived world is the real world; the "perception" is the thing. This may be good common-sense as far as it goes, but it leaves some questions unanswered. For example, it leaves unsolved what has come to be known as "the Columbia problem," the problem of the nature of consciousness. As Professor Woodbridge states it in a still more recent publication, it is the problem of "so defining consciousness that provision may be made for the fact that things sail into it and out again without any break in the continuity of

their being," while providing "for the occurrence of consciousness itself as a temporal event." This problem the Columbia professors seem to have inherited from the pragmatists, and particularly from Professor James's epoch-making article of a few years ago, entitled, "Does Consciousness Exist?" Time was when philosophers said consciousness was everything; now the tendency is to say that it is nothing existent at all—simply a relation between existent things. Thus the new realism appears as a residue of pragmatism, and an inner reason is found for the dedication of the Columbia volume to Professor James.

But another phase of this unsolved problem is the question as to the nature of the things that "sail into consciousness and out again," especially before they entered and after they have left. Shall one be a naïve realist or a Kantian agnostic? Of the four authors whose essays remain to be noticed, Messrs. Montague and Pitkin seem to tend toward the former alternative, and Dr. Miller examines it sympathetically but critically, while Professor Strong's thought is fundamentally Kantian, however much he may try to avoid the agnostic conclusion. Dr. Miller holds that all there is of naïve realism is acceptable, viz., that the different spatial aspects of objects seen successively are all real, but that when naïve realism is made into a metaphysical theory, requiring one to believe that these aspects seen successively really co-exist in time, the theory is untenable. Such, however, would seem to be the thought of Dr. Pitkin, who claims that experience is a sort of picture of a permanently existing real world which is known only at intervals and in a partial fashion. Professor Montague labors to support his thesis that consciousness is a form of potential physical energy. To state the view in his own words: "What I, from within, would call my sensations are neither more nor less than what you, from without, would describe as the forms of potential energy to which the kinetic energies of neural stimuli would necessarily give rise in passing through my brain." However fantastic and untenable such a theory may seem, it is based upon the experienced fact that consciousness gives rise to physical changes, and is thus a liberator, and therefore, it would seem, in some measure a creator of physical energy. This potentiality of physical energy in consciousness is very suggestive of a sort of evolutionary creationism in cosmology—a view readily connecting itself with the thought of the immanence of God.

Professor Strong's very interesting paper offers "substitutionalism" as a theory of knowledge. This is to the effect that objects are always given or known substitutionally; the perceptive experience is projected

and substituted for the object as it is in itself. It is an attempt to merge two antagonistic views, viz., common-sense realism and Kantian agnosticism, into one; with the result, as in the case of the stereoscope, that the original views do not unite, but alternately dissolve into each other. It is asserted that we know directly the independently real object, but it turns out that what we see, for instance, is, strictly speaking, not the object itself, but a visual phenomenon which we project and substitute for it—a substitution which is practically justified. Thus we have what is not knowledge, but something else “just as good.” This curious position is necessitated by the initial assumption that our perceptive experiences are not *in* the order which they *reveal*, but in a place represented by that of the brain-states with which they are correlated—in other words, that experience is all cortical or “subcutaneous.” If that were the case, of course things external to the body—or brain—could be known only substitutionally, and one would be forced, in spite of himself, “back to Kant.”

The real problem of present-day philosophy is not how a subcutaneous mind can know that it has copied an extra-mental reality; that is a false problem which one should not try to solve, but to get rid of. The real problem before the philosopher is how to retain the ethical and religious values for which theistic personal idealism stands, together with the common-sense of realism and the new insight made possible by the functional psychology which is fundamental to the instrumental logic of the most fruitful sort of pragmatism.

DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

In his recent work<sup>4</sup> Professor Ladd has rendered a twofold service. He has compressed into a single volume the net results of his philosophic thinking during the past generation. Further, he has aimed to state his views in such a form that he may be understood by all who yield careful and thoughtful attention. Important as is the former, the latter service is far greater in its significance. This is a hopeful day for philosophy when it aims to make itself understood. It is fitting that so ardent a lover of wisdom should make it a matter of heart and conscience that his theme be presented not as an esoteric discipline but as a way to salvation for his age from that sensuousness and vul-

<sup>4</sup> *Knowledge, Life, and Reality*. An Essay in Systematic Philosophy. By George Trumbull Ladd, LL.D., New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1909. 549 pages. \$3.50.

garity which he believes neglect of philosophy begets. He is concerned in the practical aspects of the situation because he sees in philosophy "an enormous accession of motive power for either evil or good results."

It is inevitable that the author should refer to and quote from his previous publications. He does not claim to present particularly new results of his thinking. Yet, while he writes as one who aims to enforce the reasonableness of philosophizing, he is not unsensitive to the latest phases of his subject. Even the general reader, however, in these days of the popularity of the pragmatic philosophy will be somewhat disappointed to note the absence of any adequate discussion of the merits or demerits of pragmatism. Enough is said, it is true, to indicate the author's opposition to the movement. He denounces its "foolish fury toward the systems called by their older and more respectable names" and sees in it little semblance of an adequate solution of the problem of knowledge. He looks upon "pragmatism" as a much-abused word and denies that the test of truth is ever pragmatic. But these and other similar references to pragmatism are purely incidental and form no important part of the discussions.

There are other currents in present-day thinking which are stamped with disapproval. No sympathy is shown for a psychology "without the metaphysical implicate of a soul." He believes that self-consciousness points to an agent. But by a soul he means something more than mind or intellect (p. 60) and regards "a stream of consciousness" as a most unfortunate and misleading figure of speech. Yet elsewhere he affirms that which he has denied and identifies soul and mind (pp. 227, 232). He declares that a soul is not a mere abstraction but refuses to see in it an entity analogous to material substance. So far as discoverable its essence lies in will, and is coincident with self. He refuses to entertain the notion of an unconscious or subconscious self because it is a contradiction in terms, every self being self-conscious. He holds that all such theories are either a cover for a mechanistic philosophy or for ignorance of the actual causes.

Adherence to any one system of thought he repudiates. He seems to be especially sensitive to the defects of the Kantian philosophy. He denies the possibility of unmetaphysical science—"it is human to philosophize"—and admits the indebtedness of philosophy to science both in matter and method. He rejects mechanism and emphasizes the dynamic as against the static interpretation of things. The universe undergoes development; God alone is exempt from evolution. This exemption is made because God is held to be an absolute person, and a

perfect ethical spirit. There is a certain immediacy in the test of reality that suggests a sympathy, which is admitted, with the faith-philosophy of Jacobi. But that sympathy is not complete; Professor Ladd, unlike Jacobi, knows but one criterion of truth. Reality, whether of subject or object, and the actual relation of both are regarded as indubitable experiences of sense-perception or of self-consciousness. If you raise, in the case of God, an ontological problem, the same problem attaches to all knowledge. "Being" is an assumption "based upon the faith of human reason in itself." Reject that assumption and nescience follows. As between realism and idealism our author is an idealist, but he would contest the exclusive acceptance of either. Even the great ideals have a realistic aspect and objective validity.

In ethics, hedonism is rejected and utilitarian standards are cast aside. The feeling of obligation is ultimate though moral judgments are modified by environment, education, and reflection. Hence, the place of evolution in ethics is recognized; even the moral ideal undergoes evolution. The claims of the various virtues are to be adjusted by the one moral self, a self that determines rather than is determined by the moral ideal. All ethics, however, is fundamentally metaphysical; "the criteria, sanctions, and ideals of ethics must have their ultimate source and final warrant in the world-ground." In other terms, it is based upon the faith that the universe at heart is moral. Of course, this suggests the problem of evil. But faith, our author claims, is the final solution of this. He urges that the mere statement of the problem presupposes the supremacy of moral conditions. However much it may seem to some that the whole case for ethics has been assumed by this dependence upon faith, at least it is clear that Professor Ladd has no sympathy with those who seek to establish an ethics divorced from religious implications.

Throughout the volume runs a defense of anthropomorphism, wherever found. Quite pertinently we are asked how otherwise, being men, could we know the universe save as the human mind grasps it. Even causality, fundamental in science, is both anthropomorphic and anthropopathic in its nature. Such a condition upon knowing cannot be escaped. Hence the God we know must be anthropomorphic. Monism, rather than dualism, is the outcome of philosophy; the universe is grounded in a personal spirit. Religion is not science though it is reason that constructs the object of religious faith. Such a task is undertaken because reason has faith in its power to reach reality. But the God of philosophy, in whom are realized the ideals of humanity,

seems in conflict with the God of popular thought. Nevertheless God is one, and we must guard ourselves against an attitude of opposition to modern science and philosophy.

Upon the whole the work is stimulating and helpful. Some of the conclusions are not as definite as could be desired and, at times, we feel that the presentation of a controverted point has not been so fair and complete as we would like. Yet we must regard the limits imposed by a single volume upon free discussion and expression. We believe that at least the work will introduce, in an intelligible way, problems that carry their own impulse to more detailed consideration.

WILLIAM THEODORE PAULLIN

DENVER, COLO.

In a recent book<sup>5</sup> Dr. Buckham has entertainingly discussed various implications of the category of personality. His major attention, however, is devoted to a consideration of the problem of the self and the nature of personalism.

At the beginning the author is confronted with the old problem, Is there a workable line of demarkation between animals and men? He decides that "the *kind of capacity*" constitutes a dividing line which "nothing can obliterate" (p. 30). Is the chasm then impassable? The answer is cautiously guarded: on the one hand, we may speak of a "germinal" or "potential" personality in domestic animals; but we may not speak of a "real personality" in this connection. "That this potential personality will ever become actual personality in the individual animal, in some other state of existence, no one can absolutely affirm or deny" (p. 29). And, on the other hand, it is difficult to find, in the lowest types of humanity, "any trace of that regality we call personality; yet who doubts that it is there, if only it can be awakened and developed" (p. 30)?

The author's primary interest, however, is in man. His thesis is that in every human being there is a conflict between the "empirical self" and the "True Self"; and that this conflict indicates an opportunity for the achievement of personality. "Whether the True Self . . . or the empirical self . . . is to win and rule, depends upon the Will" (p. 80). The empirical self belongs to the phenomenal order: it is "the product of an evolutionary series that goes back to the primordial germ" (p. 191); it is "the self of moods, the plaything of circumstances and environment" (p. 72); its conscious activity is on the level of "under-

<sup>5</sup> *Personality and the Christian Ideal*. A Discussion of Personality in the Light of Christianity. By J. W. Buckham. Boston and Chicago: The Pilgrim Press, 1910. xvi+263 pages. \$1.50.



standing, feeling, conation" (p. 71); it is not "an immoral self. It is simply *unmoral*" (p. 76). But when the will yields to the natural desires of the empirical self then "an act is committed which tends to deform the empirical self and constitute an anti-self" (p. 81). This anti-self is "no part of our original self-hood; it is a self that each of us constructs *de novo*" (p. 80). It becomes "an actual, enslaving, pseudo-self"; it "finds other spirits worse than itself and develops in their company" (p. 82); it joins that "kingdom of anti-selves" which is "the curse, and the only curse, of existence" (p. 83). And yet this anti-self, "as compared with the True Self," has no "genuine reality whatever" (p. 82). The "True Self" belongs to the noumenal order: it is not "an evolution from below" but "an impartation from above" (p. 191); it is "the self that transcends experience, that partakes of the *universal*" (p. 62); it is "not moved by physical conditions and states, except with its own consent" (p. 106); it introduces "order, harmony, end-serving" into this "unmoral, unregulated, purposeless world of sense" (p. 77); it is the "indestructible center of human salvability . . . incapable of absolute perversion" (p. 82); it is "the Christ within" (p. 260); it is a co-operating member in "a society of persons, a *Kingdom of God*" (p. 131).

The nature of personalism may be defined by contrasting individuality and personality. The former has to do with "the natural order": it is a "distinctively racial product" (p. 33); it is a "time product" (p. 37); it is associated with the natural, the phenomenal, facts, science (p. 240). The latter has to do with "the eternal order": it is "an intrinsic reality" (p. 33); it is "a supertemporal noumenon" (p. 37); its constituent elements are self-consciousness, unity, freedom, worth; it is in its very nature "universal" (p. 39); it is associated with the spiritual, the noumenal, verities, ontology (p. 249). It is impossible, however, to find "a mere human individual, uncompounded with personality" (p. 34). In fact each human being "belongs to two orders of existence—the eternal order and the time order," i.e., man "belongs to the first and inhabits the second" (p. 188). "The person . . . is in the individual, as the nucleus is within the cell" (p. 38); he can "neither be born nor grow old nor die" (p. 37); he is a unique "end in himself," and may realize himself only in association with his fellows (p. 21); his empirical uniqueness consists in his specific type of individuality, his spiritual uniqueness in his specific type of character (p. 28).

Now, Jesus discerned this personality in every man; he counted everything as means to the achievement of the one end, personality;

he established in his daily life the basic principle of conduct—man is to meet man on the level of ends, as person to person. In his own person there was a remarkable and exceptional union “of vitality and harmony, of enthusiasm and serenity.” He was “afire with zeal, and yet, like the burning bush, he was not consumed . . . . He was the radium of the moral world, constantly irradiating moral and spiritual force, yet with undiminished supply” (p. 195). He left “no ideal unfulfilled” (p. 205); he was “the *perfect human person*” (p. 194); he possessed “incomparable purity of moral insight and motive . . . . integrity of moral fiber . . . . wholeness and harmony of moral quality . . . . greatness and splendor of moral achievement.” Such qualities make him “transcendent, archetypal, ideal” (p. 194). To him, however, we may not ascribe “*absolute* perfection,” but only to “the Eternal Word” (p. 194). “He is the Goal . . . . of human aspiration and achievement” (p. 200); and by following Jesus Christ we may best achieve our moral self-development.

Just a word may be said concerning three points. Has not the author virtually reinstated the Platonic dualism? “Impartation,” just as certainly as “participation,” presupposes two worlds. The dualism which is based upon a world of discourse is not to be confused with that which is based upon a Ptolemaic theory of the universe. In the entire discussion we find no *explanation* of “personality”—it is simply *given*, it is imparted to man by God. In the second place, the author employs the theory of imitation (p. 44) to account for the development of the consciousness of meaning. But imitation *presupposes* social consciousness; and becomes comprehensible only when there is a consciousness of other selves. On this theory of imitation, how explain the fact that the action of one form, in a contest for the protection of life, calls out in another form a diametrically *opposite* reaction? Again, during the first year, are not the parents more imitative than the child? Finally, Dr. Buckham virtually forfeits the primary basis for any real explanation of that which he is most interested in—ideals. I quote: “Ideals, aspirations, convictions, valuations . . . . come not at all within the purview of science (except in psychology, and there only on the physiological side) . . . . ” (p. 250). Just what peculiar advantage has physiological psychology over social psychology in the study of ideals? Are ideals merely imparted to the individual, or does the individual really construct his ideals? In either event it would seem fitting, in the study of the inevitably accompanying psychical processes, to elevate psychology into major significance.

C. A. EXLEY

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Cornely, R. *Commentarius in Librum Sapientiae*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 614 pages.
- Cornely, R. *Historicae et criticae introductionis in libros sacros compendium*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1909. 712 pages.
- Curtis, E. L. and Madsen, A. A. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles*. (The International Critical Commentary.) New York: Scribner, 1910. xxii+532 pages. \$3.
- Kautzsch, E. *Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 193-384 pages. M. 2.40.
- Knabenbauer, I. *Commentarius in Proverbia*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 269 pages.
- Müller, Gottlieb. *Studien zum Text der Psalmen*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 77 pages. M. 1.80.
- Skinner, John. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis*. (The International Critical Commentary.) New York: Scribner, 1910. lxii+551 pages. \$3.
- Strack, Hermann L. *Sanhedrin-Makoth. Die Misnattraktate über Strafrecht und Gerichtsverfahren*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 116 pages. M. 2.40.

### NEW TESTAMENT

- Alexander, Archibald B. D. *The Ethics of St. Paul*. Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan, 1910. xxiv+377 pages. \$2.
- Bishop, Charles McTyeire. *Jesus the Worker. Studies in the Ethical Leadership of the Son of God*. New York: Revell, 1910. 240 pages. \$1.25.
- Durand, A. *The Childhood of Jesus Christ according to the Canonical Gospels. With an Historical Essay on the Brethren of the Lord*. Philadelphia: John Jos. McVey, 1910. 316 pages. \$1.50.

- Durell, J. C. V. *The Self-Revelation of Our Lord*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. xxviii+224 pages. \$2.
- Gregory, Caspar René. *Wellhausen und Johannes*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 68 pages. M. 1.50.
- Lewis, Agnes Smith. *The Old Syriac Gospels or Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe; Being the Text of the Sinai or Syro-Antiochene Palimpsest. Including the Latest Additions and Emendations, with the Variants of the Curetonian Text, Corroborations from Many Other MSS, and a List of Quotations from Ancient Authors. With four facsimiles*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1909. lxxviii+334 pages. 25s.
- Montefiore, C. G. *The Synoptic Gospels. Edited with an Introduction and a Commentary. In three volumes*. London: Macmillan, 1909. Vols. I and II. cviii+1118 pages. \$5 net.
- Strack, Hermann L. *Jesus die Häretiker und die Christen. Nach den ältesten jüdischen Angaben*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 120 pages. M. 3.
- Thompson, J. M. *The Synoptic Gospels Arranged in Parallel Columns*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. xxvii+161 pages. 7s. 6d.
- The Vision of the Young Man Menelaus. Studies of Pentecost and Easter*. London: Trench, Trübner & Co., 1910. 211 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Viaud, Prosper. *Nazareth et ses deux églises de l'Annonciation et de Saint-Joseph*. Paris: Picard et Fils. 1910. 200 pages. Fr. 6.
- Weiss, B. *Der Hebräerbrief in zeitgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung*. Leipzig: Henrichs, 1910. 109 pages. M. 3.50.

### CHURCH HISTORY

- Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*. Fasc. III. 392-600 pages.
- Hobhouse, Walter. *The Church and the World in Idea and History*. Eight

- lectures preached before the University of Oxford, 1909. London: Macmillan, 1910. xxiv+411 pages. \$3.25.
- Katzer, Ernst. Luther und Kant. Ein Beitrag zur innern Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Protestantismus. Giessen: Topelmann, 1910. 128 pages. M. 2.80.
- Odhner, C. T. Michael Servetus, His Life and Teachings. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1910. 96 pages. \$0.50.
- Ormanian, Malachia. L'église arménienne, son histoire, sa doctrine, son régime, sa discipline, sa liturgie, sa littérature, son présent. Paris: Leroux, 1910. 192 pages.
- Rinn, Heinrich. Dogmengeschichtliches Lesebuch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 511 pages. M. 10.
- Sainte-Foy, L. De Saint-Pierre à Pie X. Paris: Nourry, 1910. 114 pages. Fr. 1.25.
- Schlatter, A. Die philosophische Arbeit seit Cartesius nach ihrem ethischen und religiösen Ertrag. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 267 pages. M. 4.50.
- Schlatter, A. Wie sprach Josephus von Gott? Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 82 pages. M. 1.80.
- Stuckert, Carl. Kirchenkunde der reformierten Schweiz. Giessen: Topelmann, 1910. 180 pages. M. 5.
- Ter-Mekerttschian, Karapet. Irenaeus gegen die Häretiker. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 264 pages. M. 10.
- Usher, Roland, G. The Reconstruction of the English Church. 2 vols. New York: Appleton, 1910. 423 and 426 pages. \$6.
- Wappler, Paul. Die Stellung Kursachsens und des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen zur Täuferbewegung. Münster: Aschendorff, 1910. 254 pages. M. 6.80.
- DOCTRINAL**
- Champion, J. B. The living Atonement. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1910. 346 pages. \$1.25.
- Dunkmann, Das religiöse Apriori und die Geschichte. Ein Beitrage zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 125 pages. M. 2.
- Hall, John A. The Nature of God. Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1910. 328 pages. \$1.25.
- Le dogme et l'évangile. Essai comparatif entre les dogmes de l'église catholique

- et les doctrines du Nouveau Testament. Paris: Nourry, 1910. 2 vols. 421 and 284 pages. Fr. 7.
- Mathews, Shailer. The Gospel and the Modern Man. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 331 pages. \$1.50.
- McConnell, Francis J. Religious Certainty. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 222 pages. \$1.
- Sanday, William. Christologies Ancient and Modern. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1910. 244 pages.

### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

- Courcelle-Seneuil, J. L. Les dieux gaulois d'après les monuments figures. Paris: Leroux, 1910. 426 pages. Fr. 5.
- Habert, O. La religion de la Grèce antique. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 582 pages. Fr. 4.
- Jastrow, Morris. Die Religion Babylonien und Assyrien. 15. Lieferung. Giessen: Topelmann, 1910. 80 pages. M. 1.50.
- Zimmern, Heinrich. Zum Streit um die "Christusmythe": das babylonische Material in seinen Hauptpunkten dargestellt. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1910. 66 pages. M. 1.

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Ballard, Addison. From Text to Talk. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1910. 214 pages. \$1.20.
- Barry, J. C. Ideals and Principles of Church Reform. With introductory note by James Denney. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. 205 pages. \$1.25.
- Howard, Henry. The Summits of the Soul. London: Culley, 1910. 248 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Kelley, A. R. Friend and Unfriend: A Discussion of the Missionary Obligation. London: Culley, 1910. 104 pages. 6d.
- Lutkin, Peter Christian. Music in the Church. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Young Churchman Co., 1910. 274 pages. \$1.
- McDowell, William Frazer. In the School of Christ. New York: Revell, 1910. 303 pages. \$1.25.
- Nash, L. L. Early Morning Scenes in the Bible. New York: Revell, 1910. 209 pages. \$1.
- Stimson, Henry A. Behind the World and Beyond. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 291 pages. \$1.25.

## MISCELLANEOUS

- Bertrand, A. N. *Problèmes de la libre-pensée*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1910. 293 pages. Fr. 3.
- Bjorklund, Gustav. *Death and Resurrection. From the point of view of the Cell-Theory*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1910. 205 pages.
- Broadhurst, C. N. *Wireless Messages: Possibilities through Prayer*. New York: Revell, 1910. 234 pages. \$1.
- Godlover, H. B. *The Science of Minds. Fundamentally treated*. Berkeley, Cal: The Author. 1910. 48 pages.
- Ketler, Isaac C. *The Pilgrims. An Epical Interpretation*. New York: Revell, 1910. 205 pages. \$1.50.
- Logos. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*. Band I. Heft 1. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 164 pages. M. 9.
- Milligan, George. *Selections from the Greek Papyri. Edited with Translations and Notes*. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. xxxii + 152 pages. 5s.
- Newman, Arthur. *Writing on the Clouds*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1910. 91 pages. \$0.90.
- Students and the Present Missionary Crisis. *Addresses delivered before the Sixth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Rochester, N.Y., December 12, 1909, to January 2, 1910*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1910. 614 pages. \$1.50.
- Wright, A. L. *Modernism according to the Law of Sensual Impression and Historical Inspiration*. Albany: Joseph McDonough, 1910. 155 pages.

# INDEX

## I. AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS

	PAGE
ALLISON, WILLIAM HENRY, Was Newman a Modernist? . . . . .	552
BACON, BENJAMIN W., Review of Spitta, Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu . . . . .	455
BAILEY, JOHN W., Review of Holtzmann, Handkommentar zum Neuen Testa- ment . . . . .	463
BATTEN, L. W., Review of Curtis, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles . . . . .	627
Torrey, Ezra Studies . . . . .	293
BOWNE, The Late Professor Borden P. . . . .	422
BREASTED, JAMES HENRY, The Earliest Social Prophet . . . . .	114
Review of: Alt, Israel und Aegypten . . . . .	442
Naville, The Old Egyptian Faith . . . . .	441
Otto, Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten . . . . .	119
BROWN, WM. ADAMS, The Task and Method of Systematic Theology . . . . .	192
BURTON, ERNEST D., The Status of Christian Education in India . . . . .	169
CASE, SHIRLEY J., The Religion of Jesus . . . . .	234
Review of: Feine, Theologie des Neuen Testaments . . . . .	448
Goguel, L'évangile de Marc et ses rapports avec ceux de Mathieu et de Luc . . . . .	458
Preuschen, Vollständiges griechisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur . . . . .	296
Spitta, Jesus und die Heidenmission . . . . .	450
Zahn, Introduction to the New Testament . . . . .	459
Christian Education in India . . . . .	427
CHRISTIE, F. A., The Significance of the Nicene Creed . . . . .	266
Christological Peculiarities in the First Epistle of Peter . . . . .	62
CLEMEN, CARL, Review of: Friedländer, Synagoge und Kirche in ihren Anfängen . . . . .	126
Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis . . . . .	126
COE, GEORGE A., Review of Jones, Rufus M., Studies in Mystical Religion . . . . .	131
CROSS, GEORGE, Review of: Mignot, L'église et la critique . . . . .	486
Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre . . . . .	474
Schultze, Christian Doctrine and Systematic Theology . . . . .	473
Walther, Die Christliche Sittlichkeit nach Luther . . . . .	476
Wilson, How God Has Spoken . . . . .	485
DICKINSON, CHARLES H., Some Wholesome Humiliations of the Modern Church . . . . .	82
DULLES, A. C., Review of: Dykes, The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence . . . . .	481
Grützmacher, Studien zur systematischen Theologie . . . . .	478
Hilbert, Christentum und Wissenschaft . . . . .	483
Earliest Social Prophet, The . . . . .	114
EWING, J. C. R., Christian Education in India . . . . .	438
EXLEY, Review of Buckham, Personality and the Christian Ideal . . . . .	659
Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ . . . . .	313
FAULKNER, JOHN ALFRED, The First Great Christian Creed . . . . .	47
First Great Christian Creed, The: A Further Word . . . . .	426
FAUNCE, WILLIAM H. P., The Religious Function of Public Worship . . . . .	I
First Great Christian Creed, The . . . . .	47, 426

GATES, ERRETT, Review of: Richard, <i>The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church</i>	130
GILBERT, GEORGE H., <i>Greek Element in the Epistle to the Hebrews, The Religion and Miracle</i>	521
Review of: Guignebert, <i>La primauté de Pierre et la venue de Pierre à Rome</i>	271
Hoennicke, <i>Das Judenchristenthum im ersten und zweiten Jahrhundert</i>	464
Hughes, <i>The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature</i>	121
Klein, <i>Der älteste Christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literatur</i>	445
Schechter, <i>Some Aspects of Rabbinical Theology</i>	121
Scott, <i>The Pauline Epistles: A Critical Study</i>	125
GILMORE, G. W., Review of Hastings, <i>Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics</i>	299
GOODSPEED, E. J., Review of Flemming, <i>Ein Jüdisch-Christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert</i>	487
Lewis, <i>Old Syriac Gospels of Evangelion da-Mepharreshe</i>	632
GRANBERY, JOHN COWPER, <i>Christological Peculiarities in the First Epistle of Peter</i>	638
Review of Dibelius, <i>Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus</i>	62
<i>Greek Element in the Epistle to the Hebrews, The</i>	457
	521
HODGES, GEORGE, Review of: Briggs, <i>Church Unity</i>	144
Spence, <i>Christian Reunion: A Plan for the Restoration of "the Ecclesia of God"</i>	144
JORDAN, W. G., Review of Kent, <i>The Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses of Israel's Prophets</i>	630
KEIRSTEAD, WILFRED C., Review of Fairbairn, <i>The Church in Idea and in History</i>	645
KERR, E. T., Review of Chapel Sermons and Addresses by Members of the Faculty of Meadville Theological School	319
KING, IRVING, <i>The Religious Significance of the Psycho-therapeutic Movement</i>	533
LLOYD, ALFRED H., <i>The Possible Idealism of a Pluralist</i>	406
LYMAN, EUGENE W., <i>The Ultimate Test of Religious Truth: Is It Historical or Philosophical?</i>	16
MACINTOSH, D. C., <i>Pragmatic Element in the Teaching of Paul, The</i>	361
Review of: Bawden, <i>The Principles of Pragmatism</i>	651
Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James	651
Dunkmann, <i>System theologischer Erkenntnislehre</i>	139
Fonsegrive, <i>Essais sur la connaissance</i>	138
Jones, <i>Idealism as a Practical Creed</i>	320
Rashdall, <i>Philosophy and Religion</i>	650
Saintyves, <i>Le discernement du miracle</i>	136
<i>Manuscripts of the Vulgate in the British Museum</i>	608
MARTIN, JOHN J., <i>The Nature of the Atonement</i>	382
MATHEWS, SHALLER, Review of Clemen, <i>Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments</i>	127
MILLER, WILLIAM, <i>Christian Education in India</i>	427
MOFFATT, JAMES, Review of: Bacon, <i>The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate</i>	451
Burton, Smith, and Smith, <i>Biblical Ideas of Atonement</i>	306
Hyde, <i>Sin and Its Forgiveness</i>	306
Walker, <i>The Gospel of Reconciliation</i>	306
MONCRIEF, J. W., Review of: Hobhouse, <i>The Church and the World in Idea and in History</i>	645
Jordan, and Labanca, <i>The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities</i>	304
Usher, <i>The Reconstruction of the English Church</i>	641

Nature of the Atonement, The . . . . .	382
NESTLE, EBERHARD, Review of: Brooke and McLean, The Old Testament in Greek according to the Text of Codex Vaticanus . . . . .	286
Thackeray, A Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint . . . . .	289
Hart, Ecclesiasticus . . . . .	291
Newman a Modernist, Was . . . . .	552
OOSTERHEERDT, A., The Transcendence of God in Its Relation to Freedom and Immortality . . . . .	253
Origin of the Messianic Hope in Israel, The . . . . .	337
PARKER, A. K., Review of: Allier, Le protestantisme au Japon . . . . .	151
Hall, Christ and the Eastern Soul . . . . .	148
Joly, Le problème des missions . . . . .	150
PAULLIN, W. T., Review of Ladd, Knowledge, Life, and Reality . . . . .	656
Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion, The . . . . .	505
Possible Idealism of a Pluralist, The . . . . .	406
Pragmatic Element in the Teaching of Paul, The . . . . .	361
PRATT, JAMES BISSETT, A Mistake in Strategy . . . . .	572
Review of: Jevons, Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion . . . . .	141
Strong, Anna L., The Psychology of Prayer . . . . .	142
PRICE, IRA M., Review of Box, The Book of Isaiah . . . . .	443
Religion of Jesus, The . . . . .	234
Religious Education, Four Principles Underlying . . . . .	589
Religious Function of Public Worship, The . . . . .	I
Religious Significance of the Psycho-Therapeutic Movement, The . . . . .	533
SCHAEFER, H. C., Review of Münsterberg, Psychotherapy . . . . .	315
SEASHORE, CARL E., The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion . . . . .	505
Significance of the Nicene Creed, The . . . . .	266
SMITH, G. B., The Task and Method of Systematic Theology . . . . .	192
Review of: Hunziger, Probleme und Aufgabe der gegenwärtigen systema- tischen Theologie . . . . .	133
Orr, Revelation and Inspiration . . . . .	484
SMITH, HENRY PRESERVED, The Origin of the Messianic Hope in Israel . . . . .	337
SMITH, J. M. P., Review of: Gesenius, Hebräisches und Aramäisches Hand- wörterbuch über das Alte Testament . . . . .	446
Gressman, Die Schriften des Alten Testaments . . . . .	117
Kautzsch, Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments . . . . .	117
Kent, The Kings and Prophets of Israel and Judah from the Division of the Kingdom to the Babylonian Exile . . . . .	117
Mitchell, Genesis . . . . .	117
SMITH, PRESERVED, Notes on Luther's Letters . . . . .	280
Review of: Boehmer, Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung . . . . .	129
Cust, Gentlemen Errant . . . . .	470
Stokes, Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum . . . . .	471
SNEATH, E. HERSHEY, The Ultimate Test of Religious Truth; Is It Historical or Philosophical? . . . . .	16
SPRENGLING, M., Review of Harris, The Odes and Psalms of Solomon . . . . .	634
Status of Christian Education in India, The . . . . .	169
Strategy, A Mistake in . . . . .	572
Task and Method of Systematic Theology, The . . . . .	192
Theological Reconstruction: A Practical Programme . . . . .	107
THOMPSON, JAMES WESTFALL, Review of: Fouqueray, Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France, des origines à la Suppression . . . . .	640
Jackson, The Source of "Jerusalem the Golden" . . . . .	466



Transcendence of God in Its Relation to Freedom and Immortality, The . . .	253
TUFTS, JAMES HAYDEN, The Ultimate Test of Religious Truth: Is It Historical or Philosophical? . . .	16
Ultimate Test of Religious Truth: Is It Historical or Philosophical, The . . .	16
VERNON, A. W., Review of: Clarke, Sixty Years with the Bible . . .	302
Picton, Man and the Bible . . .	302
VOTAW, C. W. Four Principles Underlying Religious Education . . .	589
WALCOTT, GREGORY D., Theological Reconstruction: A Practical Programme . . .	107
WALKER, CURTIS H., Review of Krehbiel, The Interdict, Its History and Operation . . .	472
WARFIELD, BENJAMIN R., The Task and Method of Systematic Theology . . .	192
Wholesome Humiliations of the Modern Church, Some . . .	82
WILLETT, H. L., Review of Gladden, Recollections . . .	147
WILM, EMIL C., The Late Professor Borden P. Bowne . . .	422
WRIGHT, H. W., Review of: Eucken, The Problem of Human Life . . .	321
Frank, Modern Light on Immortality . . .	311
Lindsay, Studies in European Philosophy . . .	477
YOUNGMAN, G. MALLOWS, Manuscripts of the Vulgate in the British Museum . . .	608

## II. RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

Alexander, The Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians . . .	326
Allier, Le protestantisme au Japon . . .	151
Allier, R., Belot, G., Le Baron Carro do Vaux Challaye, F., Croiset, A., Dorison, L., Ehrhardt, E., de Faye, E., Lods, Ad., Monod, W., Peuch, A., Morales et Religions: Leçons professées à l'école des hautes études sociales . . .	330
All, Israel und Aegypten . . .	442
Analecta Bollandiana. Tomus XXVI, Fasc. I . . .	159
Archambault, Justin: Dialogue avec Tryphon . . .	496
Bacon, Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians . . .	156
The Founding of the Church . . .	157
The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate . . .	451
Ballard, The True God: A Modern Summary of the Relations of Theism to Naturalism, Monism, Pluralism, and Pantheism . . .	330
Social Questions and Socialism . . .	162
The People's Religious Difficulties . . .	163
Bawden, The Principles of Pragmatism: a Philosophical Interpretation of Experience . . .	651
Boehmer, Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung . . .	129
Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis . . .	126
Box, The Book of Isaiah . . .	443
Braasch, Die religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart . . .	329
Brandt, Die jüdischen Baptismen oder das religiöse Waschen und Baden im Judentum mit Einschluss des Judentums . . .	492
Bréhier, Philon: Commentaire allégorique des Saintes Lois après l'œuvre des six jours . . .	158
Briggs, Church Unity . . .	146
Brooke and McLean (editors), The Old Testament in Greek according to the Text of Codex Vaticanus . . .	286
Buckham, Personality and the Christian Ideal . . .	659
Burn, The Nicene Creed . . .	330
Burton, E. D., Smith, J. M. P., and Smith, G. B., Biblical Ideas of Atonement: Their History and Significance . . .	306
Burton, L. M., The Problem of Evil: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View . . .	500
Calloud, Le problème de la résurrection du Christ: Etude des diverses hypothèses . . .	156

<i>Caspari</i> , Aufkommen und Krise des israelitischen Königtums unter David . . .	153
<i>Clark, Francis E., and Harriet A.</i> , The Gospel in Latin Lands. Outline Studies of Protestant Work in the Latin Countries of Europe and America . . .	327
<i>Clarke</i> , Sixty Years with the Bible . . .	302
<i>Clemen</i> , Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments: Die Abhängigkeit des ältesten Christentums von nicht jüdischen Religionen und philosophischen Systemen zusammenfassend untersucht . . .	128
<i>Codex</i> , Alexandrinus in Reduced Photographic Facsimile; New Testament and Clementine Epistles . . .	494
<i>Connolly</i> , The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai . . .	496
<i>Curtis</i> , A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles . . .	627
<i>Cust</i> , Gentlemen Errant: Being the Journeys and Adventures of Four Noblemen in Europe during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries . . .	470
<i>D'Allones</i> , Psychologie d'une religion . . .	500
<i>Deussen</i> , Outlines of Indian Philosophy . . .	330
<i>Devine</i> , Misery and Its Causes . . .	332
<i>Dibelius</i> , Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus . . .	457
Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments . . .	117
Die Schriften des Alten Testaments . . .	117
<i>Doumergue</i> , Iconographie Calvinienne . . .	496
<i>Driver</i> , An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament . . .	491
<i>Dunkmann</i> , System theologischer Erkenntnislehre . . .	139
<i>Dykes</i> , The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence . . .	481
<i>Eiselen</i> , Prophecy and the Prophets . . .	324
<i>Emerson and Forbes</i> (editors), Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, with annotations . . .	333
<i>Enders</i> , Dr. Martin Luthers Briefwechsel . . .	280
<i>Essays</i> Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James by His Colleagues at Columbia University . . .	651
<i>Eucken</i> , The Problem of Human Life . . .	321
<i>Fairbairn</i> , Studies in Religion and Theology . . .	647
<i>Feine</i> , Theologie des Neuen Testaments . . .	448
<i>Fonsegrive</i> , Essais sur la connaissance . . .	138
<i>Forsyth</i> , The Person and Place of Jesus Christ . . .	313
<i>Fouquerey</i> , Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France, des origines à la suppression (1528-1762), Tome I . . .	640
<i>Frank</i> , Modern Light on Immortality . . .	311
<i>Friedländer</i> , Synagoge und Kirche in ihren Anfängen . . .	126
<i>Gardner</i> , Modernity and the Churches . . .	499
<i>Geffcken</i> , Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums: Studien und Charakteristiken . . .	494
<i>Gesenius</i> , Hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament . . .	446
<i>Ginsburg</i> , Isaias: Diligenter revisus juxta Massorah atque editiones principes cum variis lectionibus e MSS atque antiquis versionibus collectis . . .	492
<i>Gladden</i> , Recollections . . .	147
<i>Goguel</i> , L'évangile de Marc et ses rapports avec ceux de Mathieu et de Luc . . .	458
<i>Gordon</i> , Religion and Miracle . . .	271
<i>Grütsmacher</i> , Studien zur systematischen Theologie . . .	478
<i>Guignebert</i> , La Primauté de Pierre et la venue de Pierre à Rome . . .	464
<i>Guyot</i> , L'apologétique de Brunetière . . .	163
<i>Hall</i> , Christ and the Eastern Soul: The Witness of the Oriental Consciousness to Jesus Christ . . .	148
<i>Harnack</i> , Ein Jüdisch-Christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert . . .	632
<i>Harris</i> , The Odes and Psalms of Solomon . . .	633
<i>Hart</i> , Ecclesiasticus . . .	291
<i>Hastings</i> , Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics . . .	487
<i>Hautsch</i> , Der Lukiantext des Octateuch . . .	491
<i>Hawkins</i> , Horae Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem . . .	325

<i>Heaton</i> , The Problems of Poverty in the Light of Christian Principles . . . . .	162
<i>Heitz</i> , Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Béranger de Tours à S. Thomas d'Aquin . . . . .	328
<i>Hemmer</i> , Les pères apostoliques . . . . .	496
<i>Hilbert</i> , Christentum und Wissenschaft . . . . .	483
<i>Hirschy</i> , Artaxerxes III Ochus and His Reign, with Special Consideration of the Old Testament Sources Bearing upon the Period . . . . .	154
<i>Hobhouse</i> , The Church and the World in Idea and in History . . . . .	645
<i>Hoennicke</i> , Das Judenchristentum im ersten und zweiten Jahrhundert . . . . .	121
<i>Holtzmann</i> , Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament . . . . .	463
<i>Huckel</i> , Mental Medicine . . . . .	164
<i>Hughes</i> , The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature . . . . .	445
<i>Hunziger</i> , Probleme und Aufgabe der gegenwärtigen systematischen Theologie . . . . .	133
<i>Hyde</i> , Sin and Its Forgiveness . . . . .	306
<i>Jackson</i> (editor), The Source of "Jerusalem the Golden" . . . . .	466
<i>Jevons</i> , Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion . . . . .	141
<i>Joly</i> , Le problème des missions; tribulations d'un vieux chanoine . . . . .	150
<i>Jones, Henry</i> , Idealism as a Practical Creed . . . . .	320
<i>Jones, Rufus M.</i> , Studies in Mystical Religion . . . . .	131
<i>Jordan and Labanca</i> , The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities . . . . .	304
<i>Kaflan</i> , Dogmatik . . . . .	162
<i>Kent</i> , The Kings and Prophets of Israel and Judah from the Division of the Kingdom to the Babylonian Exile . . . . .	118
The Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses of Israel's Prophets . . . . .	630
<i>Klein</i> , Der älteste christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literature . . . . .	124
<i>Knox</i> , The Gospel of Jesus the Son of God: An Interpretation for the Modern Man . . . . .	163
<i>Kochler</i> (editor), Frei und gewiss im Glauben . . . . .	164
<i>Krehbiel</i> , The Interdict, Its History and Its Operations . . . . .	472
<i>Kropat</i> , Die Syntax des Autors der Chronik verglichen mit der seiner Quellen . . . . .	154
<i>Κρησσοτομικά</i> : Studi e Ricerche intorno a S. Giovanni Crisostomo. A cura del Comitato per il XV° Centenario della sua morte. Fascicolo I . . . . .	327
<i>Kuacala</i> , Thomas Campanella, ein Reformator der ausgehenden Renaissance . . . . .	328
<i>Ladd</i> , Knowledge, Life, and Reality . . . . .	656
<i>Lang</i> , Die Reformation und das Naturrecht . . . . .	498
<i>Leckie</i> , Authority in Religion . . . . .	501
<i>Le Long</i> , Les pères apostoliques . . . . .	497
<i>Leeds</i> , The Christian Philosophy of Life . . . . .	161
<i>Lewis</i> , The Old Syriac Gospels of Evangelion da-Mepharreshe . . . . .	638
<i>Lewis</i> , Codex Climaci Rescriptus . . . . .	325
<i>Lietzmann</i> , Handbuch zum Neuen Testament . . . . .	495
<i>Lindsay</i> , Studies in European Philosophy . . . . .	477
<i>Louis</i> , Doctrines religieuses des philosophes grecs . . . . .	498
<i>Lüttger</i> , Die Irrlehrer der Pastoralbriefe . . . . .	155
<i>Margolis</i> , A Manual of the Aramaic Language of the Babylonian Talmud . . . . .	491
<i>Merx</i> , Der Messias oder Ta'eb der Samaritaner, nach bisher unbekannten Quellen . . . . .	153
<i>Mignot</i> , L'église et la critique . . . . .	488
<i>Miller</i> , The Psychology of Thinking . . . . .	332
<i>Mitchell</i> , Genesis . . . . .	119
<i>McFarland</i> (editor), The Christian Ministry and the Social Order . . . . .	331
<i>McGlothlin</i> , A Guide to the Study of Church History . . . . .	158
<i>Münsterberg</i> , Psychotherapy . . . . .	315
<i>Naville</i> , The Old Egyptian Faith . . . . .	441
<i>Orr</i> , Revelation and Inspiration . . . . .	484
<i>Otto, R.</i> , Goethe und Darwin . . . . .	163
<i>Otto, W.</i> , Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten . . . . .	119

<i>Paton, L. B.</i> (editor), Recent Christian Progress. Studies in Christian Thought and Work during the Last Seventy-five Years, by Professors and Alumni of Hartford Theological Seminary in Celebration of Its Seventy-fifth Anniversary, May 24-26, 1909	327
<i>Peabody</i> , The Approach to the Social Question	331
<i>Peake</i> , A Critical Introduction to the New Testament	494
<i>Perry</i> , The Moral Economy	333
<i>Pfleiderer</i> , Primitive Christianity, Its Writings and Teachings in Their Historical Connections	155
<i>Pick</i> , The Apocryphal Acts of Paul, Peter, John, Andrew, and Thomas	157
<i>Picton</i> , Man and the Bible	302
<i>Preuschen</i> , Vollständiges griechisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur	296
<i>Procksch</i> , Studien zur Geschichte der Septuaginta: Die Propheten	493
<i>Rashdall</i> , Philosophy and Religion	650
<i>Reichardt</i> , Die Briefe des Sextus Julius Africanus an Aristides und Origenes	495
Religion and Life	319
<i>Richard</i> , The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church	130
<i>Robertson</i> , Epochs in the Life of Paul: A Study of Development in Paul's Career	157
<i>Saintyoes</i> , Le discernement du miracle	136
<i>Schaefer</i> , Theozentrische Theologie	329
Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, The New	164
<i>Schechter</i> , Some Aspects of Rabbinical Theology	125
<i>Schenck</i> , The Sociology of the Bible	160
<i>Schermann</i> , Griechische Zauberpapyri und das Gemeinde- und Dankgebet im I Klemensbriefe	155
<i>Schlatter</i> , Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments und die Dogmatik	156
<i>Schneider</i> , Zwei Aufsätze zur Religionsgeschichte Vorderasiens: Die Entwicklung der Jähreligion und der Mosesagen in Israel und Juda; Die Entwicklung des Gilgameschepos	153
<i>Scholz</i> , Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre	474
<i>Schultz</i> , Christian Doctrine and Systematic Theology	473
<i>Schwartz</i> , Eusebius Kirchengeschichte	326
<i>Scott, E. F.</i> , The Historical and Religious Value of the Fourth Gospel	157
<i>Scott, Robert</i> , The Pauline Epistles: A Critical Study	299
<i>Sickenberger</i> , Pseudo-Cyprianus De XII abusivis saeculi	326
<i>Smyth</i> , Modern Belief in Immortality	499
<i>Spence</i> , Christian Reunion: A Plan for the Restoration of "the Ecclesia of God"	145
<i>Spitta</i> , Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu	455
Jesus und die Heidenmission	450
<i>Steinmann</i> , Aretas IV, König der Nabatäer	495
<i>Stokes</i> , Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum: The Latin Text with an English Rendering, Notes and a Historical Introduction	471
<i>Strong</i> , The Psychology of Prayer	142
<i>Sulzberger</i> , The Am Ha-aretz: The Ancient Hebrew Parliament	493
<i>Tippy</i> (editor), The Socialized Church	160
<i>Tixeront</i> , Historie des dogmas	497
<i>Torrey</i> , Ezra Studies	293
<i>Usher</i> , The Reconstruction of the English Church	641
<i>Valois</i> , Le pape et le concile	468
<i>Walker</i> , The Gospel of Reconciliation, or At-one-ment	306
<i>Walther</i> , Die Christliche Sittlichkeit nach Luther; Das Erbe der Reformation im Kampfe der Gegenwart	476
<i>Warren</i> , The Earliest Cosmologies	324
<i>Wieland</i> , Der vorirenäische Opferbegriff	159
<i>Wilson</i> , How God Has Spoken, or Divine Revelation in Nature, in Man, in Hebrew History, and in Jesus Christ	485

<i>Winkworth</i> , The History and Life of the Reverend Doctor John Tauler of Strassbourg . . . . .	161
<i>Winter and Wünsche</i> , Mechiltha: Ein tannaitischer Midrash zu Exodus . . . .	324
<i>Worsley</i> , The Fourth Gospel and the Synoptists: A Contribution to the Study of the Synoptic Problem . . . . .	157
<i>Zahn</i> , Introduction to the New Testament . . . . .	459
<i>Zichendrath</i> , Der Streit zwischen Erasmus und Luther über die Willensfreiheit . . . .	159











JAN 8 - 1911

